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The History of Civilization

Edited by C. K. OGDEN, M.A.

The Roman World

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Edited by C. K. OGDEN, M.A.

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A full list of the SERIES will be found at the end of this volume.

The Roman World

By

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Chargé de Conférences at the École des Hautes Études

WITH MAPS



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PREFACE

THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND THE WORLD

THIS volume concludes the Roman series and is at the same time closely connected with the last volume of the Greek series, "Macedonian Imperialism and the Hellenization of the East."

In the Roman series it provides a sequel to Léon Homo's "Primitive Italy and the Beginnings of Roman Imperialism," and we may here recall what we said in the Preface:—"The subject-matter of the volume which begins this series, and of the volume which ends it, will be our knowledge of primitive Italy, the birth and growth of Rome, the extension of her conquests, the gradual assimilation first of the Italians and afterwards of the other Mediterranean peoples" (p. v.).

Further, "The Roman World" shows us the persistence of that endeavour to unite mankind which formed the principal interest of P. Jouguet's "Macedonian Imperialism."¹ We may even say that, on the whole, our first series contains a "history of empires" culminating in that of the Roman emperors, the Empire par excellence, which V. Chapot describes as the most powerful organization known to antiquity, the supreme product of those practical qualities which have been exhibited in several of our preceding volumes.²

Of peasant origin, devoted to their traditional system but ready to learn from experience, and inclined to respect in other peoples, or even to adopt for their own use, any method of preserving social discipline, the Romans had been led to establish ordered relations among an ever increasing number of human beings. We have seen their Empire extended at first by mere force of circumstance—defensive campaigns, anxiety to hold "covering" positions, economic needs, military enthusiasms—rather than by any imperialistic desires or in accordance with

¹ See the Preface.

² See Homo, *op. cit.*, p. vi, Grenier, "Roman Spirit," Preface, Declareuil, "Rome the Law-Giver," p. ix.

any preconceived plan. We have shown that, even when the best opportunities occurred, the Senate sometimes displayed a cautious hesitation—until the day when private ambitions, the thirst for glory or wealth (which must always have had some influence) came to a head and finally swept away all barriers: “constant extension of the power of Rome was the first condition of any private domination.”¹ Then imperialism became self-conscious—but it was an imperialism compounded of very diverse elements. We can see it in Cæsar, who was not without some resemblance to Alexander and some remembrance of him. Like the Macedonian conqueror, he was influenced at the same time by egoistic desires and generous aspirations—“aspirations towards a universal monarchy which should abolish racial distinctions and break down the barriers between the peoples.”² In his pithy synopsis of the successive additions to the Empire, M. Chapot shows that, from a certain point in her development, Rome did not extend her sway by conquest alone: as she spread peace through the conquered world, the attractions of this peace and the advantages conferred by a powerful organization prompted certain kings to bequeath their kingdoms to her at their death.³

After the preparatory era of the Principate, what L. Homo calls the “Dominate” inaugurated a system of government clearly devised to serve the purposes of imperialism. This Roman unity which was finally extended, if not through the whole known world, at any rate up to limits beyond which further advance was impossible, gave rise to a very keen sense of new requirements. In his “Roman Political Institutions,” where he traces the development of institutions, Homo shows clearly that the emperors substituted the State for the City, or, if the phrase be preferred, the territorial for the urban State—a State in miniature—and perfected the system for which the oriental monarchies had furnished models. Homo investigates the mechanism of the central authority: in this book M. Chapot is concerned to point out how the machinery of government was

¹ Chapot, p. 36.

² Chapot, *ibid.*

³ The “right of peoples to dispose of themselves” is a modern idea, and the ancient peoples—above all the most advanced among them, at a time when imperialism seemed beneficent—generally submitted readily enough, though without any profound devotion (see Chapot, p. 416). In his library catalogue, after mentioning his own *Considerations*, Montesquieu quotes this passage from the satire of Sulpicia:—*Duo sunt quibus extulit ingens—Roma caput, virtus belli et sapientia pacis.*

affected by the peculiarities of provincial conditions, and, further, to determine what part was played by those local institutions which were everywhere accepted or created by the State. For Rome made as few innovations as possible :¹ she "lacked the levelling temperament ; she proceeded with great caution and flexibility, taking account of established facts and customs."² Homo and Chapot agree in recognizing the fact that she left to each people the maximum of freedom and particularism compatible with the security and economic interests of the Empire.

The real subject of this book is not Rome but the *orbis romanus*. Two-thirds of the volume is devoted to a description of it in all its diversity—a vast and difficult task, which no one has attempted since Mommsen handled it some fifty years ago. In writing these pages M. Chapot has had at his disposal an increased, though still meagre, supply of documents, and he has known how to make a skilful use of it. The picture he has drawn is at once more sober, more complete, and in some respects more accurate, than that of the German historian, and the interest of the picture is as great as its importance.

Under his guidance we travel through the provinces of this "immense and composite" Empire approximately in the order in which they were conquered. In each case we are instructed as regards the length of their resistance and the chief incidents thereof (on occasion it was desperate,³ and sometimes Rome had recourse to cruel or treacherous methods in order to overcome it) ; the nature of the country from the ethnical and geographical point of view (as regards the influence of soil and climate and the economic possibilities, Lucien Febvre supplies interesting confirmation) ; the administrative divisions, and the methods of government and exploitation (we have already noted the flexibility and opportunism which makes these extremely various). We are shown the wide development of that network of roads and canals which bound the peoples together and facilitated commerce between them, but was designed above all to

¹ Chapot, p. 220.

² Chapot, p. 399.

³ Viriathus, the Numantians, Vercingetorix, Arminius, Tacfarinas, Decebalus.

*insure the safety of the capital, to make the world the warehouse of Rome and Rome the market of the world.*¹ Rome was an "octopus."² The detailed list of the products of each province enables us to estimate the comfort, abundance and opulence enjoyed at the heart of the Empire—by which the national morality was undermined.³ On the other hand the list of technical improvements, of conveniences of every kind—aqueducts, bridges, baths, reservoirs, cisterns, comfortable residences⁴—for which the provinces were indebted to Rome; the magnificent monuments—theatres, temples, triumphal arches—with which the world was then adorned and of which the imposing ruins still remain, sometimes even in desert regions; the schools which spread some knowledge of Latin literature almost everywhere—though in the towns only⁵ and among the upper classes, for even in Italy Rome paid no great heed to education:⁶ all this summary of the Empire's work shows what share its diverse provinces had in the Roman civilization.⁷

The special merit of this picture is due to the endeavour which our contributor has made to reconstruct, as far as possible, the life of each locality, and thus to distinguish the real differences beneath the comparative uniformity, the persistence or, in spite of contamination, the renascence of the "genius loci" with its special characteristics.⁸

There were races that proved refractory: some that broke away altogether; the Semites, for example—Arabian nomads, invincible and fanatical Jews; others that made only a superficial submission like the Egyptians and Berbers, or the Britons at another extremity of the Empire. As regards Egypt, Chapot says that it was never romanized at all; in fact it had been only

¹ On this point see L. Homo, "L'Empire romain," pp. 304, 306.

² Cf. F. Lot, "La Dislocation," etc., p. 81.

³ See Grenier, "Roman Spirit," and Colin, in "L'Hellénisation du monde antique," p. 370; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

⁴ Chapot, p. 408.

⁵ Carthage, Cirta, Madaura (p. 410), Bordeaux, Autun (pp. 331, 333) rival Antioch, Alexandria and Athens.

⁶ See Chapot, p. 168.

⁷ Here and there we see the birth of cities, some to a transient prosperity, others, on specially favourable sites—Paris and London, for example—to the enjoyment of a splendid future. Cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 132 et seq.

⁸ For the renaissances or even innovations which break the monotony of imported architecture, art and literature, see Chapot, pp. 168, 217, 324, 336, 361; cf. Lot, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

partially and temporarily hellenized: "a thoroughfare between several worlds," a land of tourists,¹ its indigenous population had watched the passage of cosmopolitan crowds without undergoing any radical change; even today "the man we see there at the plough, at the shadoof or on the dahabeeyah, is very like his ancestor of the Pharaohs' frescoes; the passing centuries have made no impression on the unchangeable soul of the fellah."²

In the East, generally speaking, Rome maintained or even received more than she gave. With the power of assimilation which we know that she possessed, she freely took over the heritage of Greece. In Greece itself she saw little more than "a museum of antiquities preserved by degenerate descendants";³ but she did not oppose "this tendency of the Greeks to cling obstinately to their national traditions";⁴ and the great public games and the University of Athens, however "Byzantine" it may have been, retained their prestige and attraction. Everywhere in the East the Greeks were specially privileged. In Asia Minor, Syria and Sicily, as in Egypt, the Romans were merely the preservers⁵ of Hellenism—but very often of a superficial Hellenism. To a large extent the East remained the East; as P. Jouguet has clearly shown, it even invaded the West.⁶

Needless to say, it is in the countries of what are now called "the Romance languages" that Rome has left the deepest impression: i.e. in Italy, Spain, Gaul and Roumania. Italy is the continuation of Rome; and yet "local life followed its natural course, tending towards a particularism which lay in the nature of things, for this long, narrow land, although today it is politically one, has always shown differences between its northern and southern districts which cannot be overlooked by even superficial observers."⁷ In Dacia romanization was effected by the army, and if there is still a *Δ Roumania* in that land, it would seem to be due to the preservation of the Roman element.⁸ In Spain, after desperate struggles, romanization was so complete that the capital received emperors and men of letters from that province, though it is true that most of them came of immigrant

¹ Chapot, p. 254.

² P. 292.

³ P. 191.

⁴ Chapot, p. 184; cf. M. Croiset, "La Civilisation hellénique," vol. II, pp. 92, 93, 97.

⁵ Chapot, p. 191. Cf. M. Croiset, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 88.

⁶ For Hellenistic thought see Jouguet; Robin, "Greek Thought"; M. Croiset, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 104.

⁷ P. 129.

⁸ P. 382.

families. The maintenance of the Roman language and of some of her institutions was due to the barbarian kings and the Church :
 “ Rome had not even achieved the unification of Spain, lacking as she did any common institutions or moral centre ; and how can we wonder at the fact, seeing that in this peninsula, divided between two kingdoms, of which the larger is undermined by regionalism, all the partitions raised by nature continue to this day ? ”¹

On the other hand Rome achieved the unification of Gaul. She had a real and profound influence on the institutions, the culture, the industry, the religion, the education, and the taste of the Gallic peoples ; and further, this influence was based in the South on a foundation of Hellenism. High-spirited, ambitious and quick of speech, esteemed by Cæsar and treated humanely by him, the Gauls made their submission to Rome without much opposition ; but they made it with the intention, which they realized, of taking a prominent place in the Empire. It is a Gaul, a former *magister officiorum* and *præfectus urbi*, Rutilius Namatianus, who in the fifth century brings profane Latin literature to an end with one of the most resounding eulogies that Rome has ever inspired :—

“ Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam ;
 Profuit injustis, te dominante, capi.
 Dumque offers victis proprii consortia juris,
 Urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat . . .
 Omnia perpetuos quæ servant sidera motus
 Nullum viderunt pulchrius imperium.”²

To sum up, we are clearly shown in this book that acceptance is a very different historical phenomenon from assimilation. It is important in these cases of Rome's influence to distinguish between what may be called mere veneering and what amounts to internal transformation. Some institutions and, a fortiori, some fashions of life or modes of enjoyment may pass from one human society to another without profoundly affecting the psychology of the recipients, above all without rapidly affecting it. Unless there are peculiar affinities between the two societies,

¹ P. 170.

² “ Thou hast given a common country to diverse peoples ; under thy dominion the unrighteous have profited by their defeat. Admitting the vanquished to a share in thy Law, thou hast made the world one City. . . . The stars in their eternal revolutions have never beheld a more magnificent Empire ” (“ *Itinerarium*,” 63-66, 81-82).

or the recipients are exceptionally plastic, their original character persists. If neither of these conditions is fulfilled, transformation of character can only be brought about by a large admixture of immigrants or by a lengthy process of education—e.g. by a development of rational thought which will diminish the influence of collective sensibility and imagination.

Within the sphere of Rome's activity it is a problem—clearly stated by M. Chapot—to decide whether her influence has been a happy and fruitful one. Unreserved admiration for the work of Rome, the *pax Romana*, has long been traditional; but a kind of reaction against an admiration deemed to be merely conventional has involved some injustice. Chapot cites "harsh critics" like Littré, who said that "Cæsar founded nothing but a decadence terminated by a catastrophe." Wells, in his interesting but biassed synopsis, brings against Rome a veritable public indictment:—Of all Empires this was the most ignorant, the most wanting in imagination. It could foresee nothing. . . . organization of more than doubtful value . . . an Empire without a soul.²

It cannot be denied that Rome had moral qualities, juridical ability, administrative talent. Her influence made for peace and unity: she brought civilization to the West. Ought she to have conquered the West before she conquered the East—which, as Homo has shown,³ infected the West with its luxury and effeminacy? It was the East, as Chapot points out, that provided her with the indispensable means of extending her conquests. Does the evil outweigh the benefits conferred? The question is an idle one, for the problem is insoluble.

It seems no less idle to ask what the peoples who composed the Roman Empire would have become, if that Empire had not existed. But, in so far as the evolution of character is concerned, did Rome stifle originality, has she "finally destroyed the peoples' souls"?⁴ We have already answered the question in

¹ P. 420, note 2.

² "The Outline of History," pp. 243, 244. Wells exaggerates the ignorance of the Romans; but they were really deficient in speculative power. A Lucretius, a Marcus Aurelius, is an exception.

³ See Homo, "Primitive Italy," Conclusion.

⁴ Chapot, p. 424.

attempting, with Chapot, to define the nature of the unity achieved, the depth to which the Roman influence penetrated.

It profits little, in face of the facts, to debate whether the catastrophe might have been avoided, whether the disruption might have been postponed; but the gradual break up of the Empire, ending in sudden collapse, is an instructive and enthralling subject of study. A volume in "The Evolution of Humanity" will be largely devoted to this important subject,¹ but it is natural that we should find it touched on in this book. All round this Roman territory with its incongruous component parts, all along the limes with its more or less feeble defences,² we see the fierce and threatening hordes of Barbarians lying in wait. They grow bolder, become importunate, make inroads and mix with the population, until the day comes when the ramparts fall and definite invasion begins.

We know that the proper method of history is to make a careful distinction between fact and hypothesis, to allow for ignorance that cannot be enlightened and for that which is provisional only, to make free use of those archæological data which supplement, correct or displace our written documents, and, while drawing on every available source, to indicate those which have not yet been explored. M. Chapot never seeks to hide his ignorance or his doubts. He deliberately emphasizes the inadequacy of his sources.³ He points out how much of the past lies hidden underground and may be brought to light "by the excavator's pick"⁴; "archæological explorations have only just begun, and it is from them that some light may at last reach us."⁵

But if the work of excavation opens unlimited prospects of increasing our knowledge of detail, it does not seem likely that we can expect at this date any "great revelations."⁶ This book with its cautious solutions and clear arrangement provides us

¹ F. Lot, *op. cit.*

² For the limes, the rampart of the Empire, see L. Homo, "L'Empire romain," pp. 180-258.

³ See pp. 129, 130, 214, 247, 259, 261, 383, 389.

⁴ See p. 129; cf. pp. 384, 397.

⁵ P. 384. See p. 167, on the excavations in Spain.

⁶ Chapot, p. 413.

with a general idea of the Roman World that is not likely to undergo much modification.

As regards detail, it is rich in points of psychology, both individual and collective. It gives us soberly drawn portraits of many great men—Cæsar, Pompey, Antony, Augustus, Tiberius. In graphic pages, which supplement parts of Jouguet, it conjures up the appearance and moral conditions of many cities—Athens, Antioch, Alexandria. In the picture of the provinces, whose particular value we have already indicated, special prominence is given to three countries: Egypt, Spain and Gaul. The chapter on Egypt forms an interesting pendant to the studies of Moret and Jouguet. In the chapters on Spain and Gaul—which, in some respects, “is already France”—Chapot’s penetrating analysis enables us to foresee something of the future nations.¹

The book has a twofold value—first on account of its own intrinsic merit, and secondly owing to the skill with which the author has made it accord with the general scheme of “The Evolution of Humanity.”

HENRI BERR.

¹ See especially pp. 151-2 and 320, 323.

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INTRODUCTION

“WE hold a vaster Empire than has been.” Such is the proud motto which was widely displayed by the British Empire, even on its postage-stamps, at a time not so very long ago when imperialism was a policy to glory in, not a source of grievance to other nations. Rome might have chosen a similar device. No Empire before hers had covered so vast an area, not even the Empire of the Persian Achæmenidæ, which had a shorter existence and included half desert regions with a scanty population. Alexander’s cannot be considered, for it fell to pieces almost as soon as it was established, whereas the Empire of Rome preserved its unity and almost its whole extent for some three and a half centuries. The Arab invasions gave a vast dominion to Islam, but it was an ephemeral dominion shared between several caliphs. The Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages was merely a fiction outside the German *bloc*. As for the colonial conquests of more recent times, they have brought great, though scattered, territories under the rule of a single European State: some of them, peopled by emigrants, seem no more than fragments detached from the mother country; while others, that have resisted assimilation, present types of society in which there is a sharp contrast between master and subject. Such a colonizing State may set before itself the ideal of diminishing this contrast, but we have not yet seen Asiatics or Africans playing a leading part in the metropolis itself, whereas, even before Caracalla extended the right of citizenship to the whole Empire, the throne of the Cæsars had been occupied by the Spaniard Trajan and the Numidian Severus, while Syrian and Illyrian Emperors were to follow. As a prelude to complete fusion, Rome had at any rate welcomed the best provincials with open arms from the very beginning.

Moreover, this Roman Empire, like the Empire of the Achæmenidæ and the Russian State today, was geographically

coherent; but it included no waste territory. All its possessions had some economic value and, apart from Britain, which was only apparently isolated, being attached to Gaul by kinship of population, all were borderers on or not far distant from the Mediterranean Sea. This was the centre about which the Empire was formed; all its shores had to be occupied, and as a matter of fact, from the time of Augustus Rome commanded the whole circumference. This attraction of an inland sea is remarkable. It does not mean that the Latin race really heard the call of the sea, for no instinct impelled them to navigate it. The Phœnicians and most of the Greeks felt as much at home on the water as on land; but the Roman was a landsman, and those of his poets who have celebrated Neptune and his train were only following Greek models. When barely full-grown and comparatively feeble, the Republic adapted herself to the peculiar conditions of that stern conflict which she was compelled to wage against Carthage. The naval art was, however, only in its infancy; no secrets of science had rendered it complicated, and Rome very soon provided herself with the indispensable ships of war. Nevertheless the issue of the great struggle was determined on land. So too was that of the wars against Greece; the sea merely providing, at the passage of the Hellespont, a vehicle for the troops which were to be engaged in Asia.

We must not suppose, however, that Rome had failed to recognize the prime importance of supremacy at sea. When, according to Appian,¹ the consul Censorinus appeared before Carthage, he announced the Senate's decision to the Carthaginian embassy in the following terms: the Carthaginians must leave their city, which it is resolved to destroy, and go to live where they will, provided that it is not within eighty stades of the sea (15 kilometres). And Censorinus ironically boasts of the Senate's consideration for its unhappy foe: it is the sea that has caused their misfortunes; a city by the sea is more like a ship than an estate; life on land is more stable; agriculture yields smaller but surer returns than commerce; and, besides, the sight of the treacherous sea would keep their wounds open and foster dangerous hopes.

¹ *Punica*, 86.

Greece proper was degraded and no longer possessed any fleets; the Rhodians, once "the carriers of the sea," were now merely docile subjects; the Seleucids had been conquered by land. The mere fact of the growth of the pirates' power shows to what extent Rome deemed herself secure at all points in the Mediterranean. Forming an exaggerated idea of her tranquillity, seeing no other State whose fleet could be a danger to her, and taking no thought of mere robbers, the Senatorial government had carelessly allowed her fleets to fall into disrepair. Then the brigands of Cilicia and Phoenicia started operations and sacked a number of cities on the coast, taking advantage on each occasion of the favourable opportunity given them by some serious conflict, such as the war with Mithridates. There is no need to recall how Pompey, in virtue of a special mission, annihilated piracy, at any rate as a formidable power. After his time only small gangs survived, which were very difficult to capture.

In all the civil wars at the end of the Republic victory went to the men who could move most rapidly and most easily from one end of the Mediterranean to the other. This was one of Cæsar's great advantages. The possession of important naval forces enabled Sextus Pompeius to wage persistent warfare against the triumvirs, even off the shores of Italy, and it was only the perseverance of Octavius and the genius of Agrippa that prevented his success. Finally, we must remember that the supreme struggle which preceded and established the imperial rule was decided by a sea-fight, that in which the fleets of Octavius and Antony joined battle at Actium.

Augustus was not blind to the lesson of events. As soon as he had leisure from other cares he created permanent fleets, no less to consolidate his own power than to guarantee the convoys of wheat essential to Italy's food-supply. Favoured by the prolonged civil strife, the pirates had renewed their activities in some parts; but many of these brigands, Dalmatians or Sicilians, suffered themselves to be enrolled in the imperial service, and the security of the sea was re-established. For two centuries it was hardly disturbed, except in certain parts of the Euxine, where Rome had few interests. But in the third century the too evident weakness

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of the Roman State favoured a renewal of piracy, which was skilfully timed to coincide with the enterprises of the barbarians. Its history is closely connected with that of the invasions. On both elements, land and water, the imperial government showed alternately the same proofs of vigour or confusion; yet never, by sea, did it encounter difficulties too great for its resources to cope with—precious resources which are too often unrecognized or passed over in silence.

We have good reason, then, to reckon among the possessions of Rome this Mediterranean sea, where she reigned without a rival, save for the occasional necessity of punishing private brigandage. But, if we leave this out of account, the Empire at the time of its greatest expansion still covers an area which may be estimated approximately at four million square kilometres—eight times the size of France. It is much more difficult to form an estimate of its population. Apart from the fact that this would differ considerably at different periods, accurate information on the subject is almost entirely wanting. Some calculations, which arrive at a density of about 15 per square kilometre,¹ seem inadequate, at any rate for the periods of prosperity. The figure of 80 millions² gives us an idea more accordant with the Empire's greatness.

It is a tiresome habit with modern historians to allow an excessive amount of space to Rome herself in any account of the Empire's vicissitudes. The capital is not everything in a State, and this capital lived largely on its provinces. In the present book we propose, on the contrary, to devote most of the chapters, and those in which there is most detail, to provincial life. Of this no concerted picture has been attempted since the authoritative work of Mommsen,³ which is already 40 years old; and at any rate we have the advantage over him of possessing a wonderfully increased supply of documents—still far too little to satisfy our curiosity, but is not this the case also as regards our knowledge of the central power?—which have the indisputable merit of being more objective than those from which history in general is derived. The data of each problem, collected for the most part on the spot, do not leave us dependent on written traditions, which have constantly been falsified by party-spirit.

¹ XLIX, p. 10.

² CXXXIV, p. 156.

³ CLXII, IX-XI.

PART I

THE EXPANSION OF ROME AND ITS VICISSITUDES

CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE CIVIL WARS (146-96 B.C.)

CERTAINLY no Roman of the second century B.C. could have delineated, even with grave errors in shape and proportion, a map like that very suggestive one which, in a previous volume,¹ shows us the Roman State in the year 146. But the ruling classes at any rate had a sufficiently clear conception of the Mediterranean world to make them justifiably proud of the position which this sketch reveals more clearly to modern eyes. The whole circumference of the great inland sea—excluding the Euxine—was immediately subject to Rome or obedient to the commands of her diplomacy; and already, only three generations after the first movement in the direction of imperialism, the essentially Mediterranean character of the coming Empire stood revealed. But at that time most of the vast area in which Rome's irresistible power made itself felt consisted only of protectorates or spheres of influence. Such were the regions of the South and East, whose annexation, nevertheless, was to prove the quickest and easiest.

But Rome was in no hurry: she had the best reasons for exercising patience. While her vassals, *de jure* or *de facto*, gave her as yet no serious trouble, provinces in the full sense of the word would require constant care. We shall see elsewhere what wars she was compelled to undertake in order to restore, in Sicily for example, the order which had been disturbed by the exactions of her own agents. But, further than this, Corsica, Sardinia and Spain were not countries won from their original occupants: they were colonies of

¹ L. Homo, *Primitive Italy and the Beginnings of Roman Imperialism*, p. 345.

Carthage, who had been compelled to renounce them on her defeat. The time Rome had taken to dispossess her rival was comparatively short, but she laboured for two centuries to compel the Celtiberians to accept her yoke. The period which followed the ruin of Corinth and Carthage was precisely that of the empire of Viriathus. Men were needed, numbers of men, to suppress an insurrection of such magnitude, as well as to overcome the opposition further north, which may be summed up in the single word Numantia; and the day had not yet come when soldiers could be recruited almost everywhere: the whole burden of great expeditions had to be borne by the Latin peasant.

But an unprecedented stroke of fortune gave Rome without any bloodshed a piece of territory as large as that of the Italian federation. To the prejudice of the Seleucidæ, a highly prosperous State had been established in the western part of Asia Minor—the Attalid State or the kingdom of Pergamus. We have not forgotten the close subjection in which these kings had latterly been held by Rome. She had required them to serve her as a counterpoise first to Macedonia and afterwards to Syria, and they had played their part with a good grace. We have seen¹ the contemptuous severity with which the Senate had treated one of them, Eumenes, whose zeal on their behalf had seemed to be insufficient. His successor, Attalus II, had obtained the help of the Romans against his treacherous neighbour, Prusias of Bithynia, and had lent them in return a contingent which took part in the siege of Corinth. He was succeeded in 138 by his nephew, Attalus III, a hypochondriac afflicted with a sort of mania for persecution, who was constantly suspicious of his subjects and his court, and sought solace in his studies, in sculpture, botany, medicine, agriculture and gardening. Five years later two items of news were brought to Rome: Attalus III was dead, and he had made the Roman people his heir. Since the many testimonies to this event² are very late,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 307.

² Cf. P. Foucart, *La Formation de la province d'Asie*, **XXV**, **XXXVII** (1903), p. 297, 339; **LXXXII**, p. 10 *et seq.*

some doubts have been raised about the authenticity of the will. The strangeness of the proceeding has long made the critics rather suspicious, notwithstanding the fact that the rulers of Pergamus must have had a no less absolute authority over their subjects than that of the ancient kings of Persia, whose traditions and customs still had great influence in Anatolia, and that this would have given Attalus unrestricted freedom of disposal. It would be idle to rely on the formula reported by Florus:¹ *Populus Romanus bonorum meorum heres esto*, which is a Roman formula, not a Greek one; the compiler would put the matter in his own way: but it is certain that, without any particular plan, Rome laboured to undermine and dislocate these Græco-oriental monarchies, foreseeing clearly enough that their States would some day revert to her; the precise form of the reversion was of little importance.

Now Attalus III, who was in poor health and very likely to die without immediate heirs, might ask himself what would become of his kingdom. According to a very probable conjecture,² a bastard son of Eumenes II called Aristonicus, the only surviving prince of the Attalid blood, was covetous of this patrimony and ready in case of need to hasten its transmission. The cruelties which stained the last years of the dynasty would then be the result of a conspiracy on behalf of the pretender; Attalus would have persecuted his accomplices, real or supposed, and would have taken the surest means of disinheriting this hateful and too importunate relative. We should hesitate to admit that Rome openly seized the inheritance. Her hands would not have been free to overcome opposition, for the siege of Numantia was still in progress.

In reality it was a magnificent windfall. What the Roman people expected above all else from the countries of the East, namely wealth, came to them at the appointed time to pay for so many distant expeditions and for the work which they had been compelled to undertake in the countries previously annexed. The wealth of the Attalids had long been vaunted; their treasure, their vast revenue drawn from the Greek cities in the form of rent, from the royal domains,³ fields, forests and pasture lands, from the

¹ II, 20.

² XXV, *ibid.*, p. 302.

³ Rostowzew, XXXIX, p. 360 *et seq.*

famous workshops where the only overhead charge was the meagre maintenance of slave labour more often stolen than bought.

It is true that the will enfranchised some cities¹ hitherto tributary, and that others were already bound to Rome by treaties of alliance and friendship; but this concession was not eternally valid. As a matter of fact, the new owner must have applied to these cities the rules and regulations of her own Public Law, so that such privileges, in Asia as elsewhere, remained subject to revocation. Everything was determined by force, and indeed, in the controversy between the Senate and the Tribunes of the People concerning the use of the wealth of Attalus, it was the Senate who spoke the last word.² Whether autonomous or not, many important centres of population came more completely within the sphere of Roman influence in Asia, in Thrace and also in the Thracian Chersonese, as we can see by the case of Sestos, who was troubled by the fact that she could no longer count on protection against the neighbouring barbarians from the mercenary troops which had been disbanded since the death of the king.³ Besides the Greek cities, there was an abundant native population which must obviously have submitted to absolute dominion.

How did the will of Attalus affect this multitude? Our texts are silent on the subject; but they inform us that Aristonicus did not abandon his claim: such a donation could only be annulled by war, and for war he prepared. He could not find many partisans in the cities, for their lot had been improved by the will; indeed we are told that very few of them took the rebel's part, and those few were doubtless compelled to do so. There remained the country folk and the slaves, who were hastily enrolled by Aristonicus, and it took three years to put him down. At first the absence of Roman troops favoured him, for Rome was occupied on every side, and delayed in sending forces to this new theatre. She got help from the towns and above all from the neighbouring rulers, for the disappearance of the Attalids must have given the kings of Bithynia and Cappadocia an inkling

¹ Cf. the decree of Pergamus, **XLIV**, IV, 289.

² **XXV**, *ibid.*, p. 312 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 318 *et seq.*

of their own future destiny, and it was by an obliging intervention that they could best postpone the inevitable. The city of Pergamus seems to have remained strictly on the defensive and accumulated preparations against an attack which never came to pass. Meanwhile Aristonicus advanced into Mysia, obtained reinforcements from the Carians and Thracians, and gravely threatened Cyzicus, which implored help from the governor of Macedonia.¹

At first Rome had thought to save the situation by sending a peaceful deputation, whose head, Scipio Nasica, died at Pergamus;² but she was compelled to undertake a war, which ended very badly in 131 with the defeat and death of the incapable Licinius Crassus. M. Perperna, the consul of 130, showed himself to be more energetic, and Aristonicus, defeated and made captive, was sent to Rome and strangled in prison. His surrender did not immediately disarm his partisans. The conduct of Perperna, who poisoned the wells where resistance was prolonged,³ hardly suggested submission to the districts that were protected by their natural situation, and we know now that the strong fortresses in certain savage and mountainous regions like Abaitis had to be taken by storm by the consul M'. Aquillius who finally organized the province of Asia.⁴ Thus he deserved the triumph awarded him after his three years of government; and there was also another side to his important work: he repaired and improved the roads and provided them with milestones.

This work was valuable not only to the superior power, but also to the inhabitants, whose good will it was hoped to win before embarking on further annexations. Rome did not even retain all the legacy of Attalus, for Lycaonia was assigned to the son of the king of Cappadocia, who had been killed in the war; a part of Phrygia was ceded temporarily to Mithridates VI, king of Pontus; and the tribes of Pamphylia and Pisidia were left to themselves. These were rocky frontier regions where order was hard to maintain, and Rome was in no hurry to provide for their administration. The governing classes, with the Scipios at their head, were inclined

¹ XLIV, IV, 134; XXV, *ibid.*, p. 323 *et seq.*

² VII, XXXV (1910), p. 484.

³ Florus II, 20.

⁴ XXV, *ibid.*, p. 327 *et seq.*

to liberalism;¹ but the influence of the Gracchi, after 123, made the policy actually adopted a dangerous one, owing to the financial interests which inspired it. The idlers in Italy were to be provided for, and the countries of the Orient, whose wealth was generally known, must contribute to improve the domestic situation. The institution of tithes, more equitable in principle than a fixed tribute, was to be the beginning of a multitude of extortions; and moreover, in many cases, they were collected in violation of the will of Attalus. Finally, for the privileged cities like Pergamus the war had burdensome consequences which gave rise to complaints.² On the whole, however, immediately after the receipt of this vast inheritance, the government of Rome seemed disposed to adopt a cautious policy of slow digestion.

But one conquest leads to another; not only because the conqueror forms the habit and is exalted by success, but because the neighbouring peoples are rendered timid and servile by the consciousness of their own inferiority. Rome had begun to be aware of this soon after the second Punic war. But although her growing power might impress organized States, it had no such effect on mere confederacies living by brigandage. Thus a Roman prætor proceeding to Spain in 189 had been assailed with his escort on the road thither, and the Ligurians had multiplied their piratical enterprises within sight of the coasts. This state of things was very injurious to the commercial interests of Marseilles, and she appealed to the Roman Senate; but the Senate was busily engaged elsewhere, and intervened without enthusiasm. It confined itself to taking reprisals in 154, when the lands seized from the defeated tribes were ceded to Marseilles, since it was not yet easy to assure their union with Italy.³

Now this was the point of departure for further interventions. Marseilles had lived hitherto on good terms with the Celts, but their relations were bound to be changed after the formation of an Arvernian empire, when the Salyes of Provence, who gained admittance to it, brought it into

¹ CVII, chap. XII.

² XLIV, IV, 292.

³ CXLII, I, p. 518 *et seq.*

contact with the ancient Greek city. Exposed to the ravages of the Salyes, she again appealed to the Romans for help. Just at that moment (about 125) the Italian proletariat, stirred up by the Gracchi, was loudly demanding land, and it was deemed most expedient to acquire some at once outside the peninsula. A small army therefore crossed the Alps and, in the second year especially, inflicted many defeats on the peoples dwelling about the lower Rhone. Marseilles was revenged; but in the place of the punished Salyes the Italians themselves settled and occupied a position on the roads by which they had been accustomed to receive their land-borne trade. The consul C. Sextius Calvinus, established with a garrison at *Aquæ Sextiæ*, was the harbinger of a still greater enterprise which was guessed to be not far distant.

What were the pretexts for it? The Gauls themselves provided them. The Celtic cities were many in number, but very hard to unite without schism, and the majority went to war with the separatists, spreading devastation far and wide. Their ravages afflicted the Ædui, who followed the recent example of Marseilles and sought help from Rome. As the circumstances were more favourable, help was granted without delay, and the consul Gnæus Domitius Ahenobarbus set out with his army, supported by a troop of elephants (122). After the Arvernian king Betuitus had made a vain attempt at negotiation, the Allobroges suffered a heavy defeat on the banks of the Sorgue, but its only effect was to strengthen the spirit of resistance, and considerable bands of Arvernians moved towards the south. Domitius had received reinforcements brought to him by his colleague Q. Fabius Maximus. Betuitus allowed himself to be driven back on the Rhone, and the final overthrow of the Gauls took place in the river itself, which swept away the fugitives and their bridge of boats.

The splendid courage of the Celts in the battle at any rate enabled the Senate to form a just estimate of its opponents' worth and inspired it with the idea of crippling their power as soon as possible.¹ It was not sufficient merely to carve a new province out of the Gauls, the Transalpine province—afterwards Narbonne—which extended from Vienne in the north to Toulouse in the west. Rome did not relish the idea

¹ CXLII, III, p. 7-24.

of a great dominion close at hand: after the partition of Asia Minor, she must at all costs secure that of the Gallic world. Betuitus had little knowledge of Roman diplomacy and its unscrupulous manner of conducting negotiations. When he believed himself to be an ambassador he was treated as a "dediticius" and taken to Italy, not without some purely formal consideration; but, more fortunate than others who had been equally unsuspecting, he and his son suffered nothing worse than captivity.

His absence was the signal for the desired partition, which was remorselessly carried out. The mutual jealousy of the Gallic tribes showed itself afresh, and Rome made it her business to promote in each of them the predominance of a plutocratic caste amenable to her instructions. By means of a graduated scale of favours and the policy of bestowing the title of "friend and ally," which seemed to show that autonomy was respected, the Senate prepared the way for further encroachments and created the false impression that all were being treated with moderation.¹

The Transalpine province had hardly been constituted before it was threatened by a grave danger, on which we have the less cause to dilate, because Rome confined herself to averting it and did not make it the pretext for further annexations. Flying, in consequence of some tidal bore, from the sandy shores of the North Sea and the Baltic, with their wives and children and cattle, and the waggons that carried their household goods, a savage German tribe called the Cimbri, who were followed soon afterwards by the Teutones,² had travelled *en masse* through central Europe, not so much for the sake of war and plunder as to find a new home in happier lands. It was not an overwhelming influx, but a gradual advance made without order or predetermined course. When they reached Noricum, after crossing the Danube, they called upon the inhabitants to grant them a portion of their land; but the approach of a Roman army and the command of its leader that they should respect the allies of Rome induced them to turn back again. The Romans, however, who had become man-hunters, made a sudden and treacherous attack on them, from which they did not derive

¹ CXLII, III, p. 24-38.

² Cf. Mommsen's description, CLXII, V, p. 137.

the advantage they had expected. Nevertheless the victorious Cimbri were repulsed by the barrier of the Alps, whereupon they advanced westward along the Danube, less peaceably than before, since nothing was to be got without fighting for it, and arrived, laden with plunder, on the threshold of "the Province."

There they repeated their request for lands; but such a horde of colonists was not wanted; and as for taking them into her employment, as they suggested, Rome had as yet no need of mercenaries and refused to entertain their offer. One after another, at long intervals, they defeated three Roman generals drawn from that degenerate aristocracy, athirst for gain, among whom military capacity was no longer to be found, unless as a rare exception. However exaggerated the ancient accounts of it may be, there is no doubt that the great battle of *Arausio* (105) was a terrible disaster for Rome. Nevertheless the flood turned back from the Alps and swept over the remaining parts of Gaul. After three years of wandering and pillage, the Teutones returned to their starting-point, where they at last encountered a true general in Marius and were routed at *Aquæ Sextiæ*, leaving countless dead on the field and hosts of prisoners in the victor's hands.¹

A few months later (101) the same general encountered the Cimbri who, by agreement with the Teutones, had gone round the great mountain-range in order to invade Italy by way of the Julian Alps; the same furious slaughter was renewed at *Vercellæ* in Cisalpine Gaul, and the survivors formed another long procession of slaves to fill the markets of the peninsula.

These vast operations added nothing to the dominions of Rome, and the number of slaves thus acquired was very far from compensating her for the damage caused by the barbarian inroad. At least the terrible threat had disappeared; Roman power had shown itself irresistible; and, whereas Narbonne owed its safety to her, Rome carefully noted and held in reserve for a favourable moment two serious grievances. As regards the Arvernian aggressors, her previous forbearance doubled her right to punish a second offence; while the German invader had justified in advance any measure of

¹ **CXLII**, III, p. 71-87; **CXXV**, II, p. 363-376.

defence against him which might some day seem necessary. These were arguments which Julius Cæsar and Augustus did not overlook.

But in the meantime other conquests had to be completed. The end of the second century has been called the period of "senatorial laissez-faire,"¹ or, in plain English, during the sort of prostration or lassitude that followed the death of the last of the Gracchi, the foreign policy of the Senate was remarkably unenterprising. The narrow aristocracy of which it was composed aimed at nothing beyond the monopoly of landed estates in Italy, and would gladly have banished from its thoughts the train of events that began to unfold itself in Africa after the year 118.

We have seen that Rome exercised a sort of protectorate over Numidia. On the death of Micipsa, the kingdom was to be divided between his two sons and his nephew Jugurtha.² Sallust's pamphlet is sufficiently well known, so we need not repeat in detail how, according to that account, Jugurtha got rid of his two cousins, and how one of them, before being assassinated, came to Rome to plead his cause before the body which he regarded as his natural protector. The charges of corruption, though perhaps exaggerated, must have had some foundation in fact; but the most honest of men would be struck by the thought that, after all, the frontier of the province of Africa was not endangered by these intrigues, which only indirectly concerned the capital. Jugurtha would not yield to reason but only to force of arms, so that it would be necessary to go to war in a little-known country which was thought to be a desert and promised little remuneration in comparison with what the East had to offer. At length, however, the people are said to have expressed their displeasure through the mouth of a tribune. Jugurtha was summoned to Rome to justify his conduct; but another tribune, who had also been bribed, interposed his veto and prevented him from speaking, so there was nothing to be done but send back the Numidian to his own country and attack him there.

¹ CVII, chap. XIII.

² Lenschau, XLVII, X, col. 1-6.

A consul was sent over, whose generalship was no better than that of the leaders defeated at about the same time in Gaul; he was surrounded and beaten, and pledged himself by treaty to evacuate Numidia (109). At last there was found among the Metelli, who did so little honour to the consulship, one exception more honest or more capable, who had the wisdom to study his opponent and devise suitable tactics. It appears from the ancient narrative that Jugurtha's army was the exact prototype of that of Abd-el-Kader.¹ It comprised two elements: regular troops ordered and equipped after the manner of the legions, which he had been able to observe in Africa, steadfast and faithful soldiers but few in number; and, beside these, a sort of Algerian militia, representatives of the tribes, who were attracted by the prospect of success and were full of zeal when all went well, but deserted after the slightest mishap. As a matter of fact, these were the more dangerous, owing to their extreme mobility and to their knowledge of the country, which was suitable for ambushes. Metellus accustomed his troops to recover themselves quickly in case of a surprise attack, to form a circle with spears advanced, so as to prevent the envelopment of isolated groups, to mislead the enemy by lying hid all day, traversing great distances at night between two oases, with leather water-bottles on their shoulders, and falling upon some undefended position at dawn, which they evacuated as soon as they had demolished the huts, burnt the crops or stores of corn, and carried off the sheep.

Nevertheless Metellus pursued the method of negotiation still more actively. He gained some real advantages thereby, but they took time, and this was the objection successfully urged by his legate, Marius, when he came to Rome to stand for the consulship and promised to make a speedy end of the war with Jugurtha. The Numidian had made an alliance with his father-in-law Bocchus, king of Mauretania; but the blows of Marius were so quick and so terrifying that the Mauretanian gave up his son-in-law in exchange for a part of his kingdom. The remainder of it was left to an obscure descendant of Massinissa (104).

Thus the Senate declined to make any new annexation which would have increased its dangers and responsibilities.

¹ LXVI, p. 23 *et seq.*

On the continent of Africa it adopted the same waiting policy as in Europe, and contented itself with staking out certain claims. The customs and weaknesses of the African natives were now known at Rome; they themselves had experienced Rome's power, and their kings were more than ever indebted to her for all their authority. This was full of promise for the future.

More than once the Senate was forced to abandon its apathy in the presence of urgent necessities. One such came to light in the south of Asia Minor, a mountainous region which had long been under Rome's protectorate, but really belonged to no one except the brigands who freely plied their trade there, robbing travellers on the roads, plundering the farms, and, since they showed no less prowess by sea than on land, making sallies from the creeks on the coast and attacking merchant vessels. However thankless the task might be, the matter had to be looked into and a police force had to be organized.

Pamphylia, south of Phrygia, was occupied in 103, Lycia not being included, since it was already properly organized by itself in a long established and firmly united *koinon*.¹ To Pamphylia was added in the following year, under the name of the province of Cilicia, the western part of that country, *Cilicia Tracheia* or *Aspera*, a mountain range along the coast, generally of great height with lofty peaks; at the foot of its northern slopes Cappadocia remained subject to her own kings. The occupation was carried out by a single fleet and a single body of troops, but our evidence on the subject is slight and very summary.² Its later history was constantly disturbed. The province was sometimes consular, sometimes prætorian, according to the number of men who had to be sent to remedy the disorders that incessantly recurred. In spite of everything, although the open, professional brigandage was suppressed, commercial robbery and privileged swindling were allowed to take its place, for knights and senators alike had their agents of extortion in Cilicia,

¹ CV.

² Cic., *de Orat.*, I, 18, 82; Liv., *Epit.*, LXVIII.

and this fact was to place Cicero in a very delicate position later on, when he became governor.¹

Was it a result of the impression produced by Rome's new activity in these parts, the conviction gradually gaining ground throughout the Mediterranean world that sooner or later every nation would pass under her yoke, or was it, as in the case of the last king of Pergamus, due to some private reason, some family quarrel passed over in silence by our meagre sources for this occurrence? Whatever the answer may be, a second inheritance was bequeathed to the Romans by will.

In 117 Cyrene, which had been attached to Egypt from a very ancient period, was exalted into a kingdom for the benefit of Apion, a bastard son of one of the Ptolemys. On his death (96) this monarch, of whom very little is known, bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans. The occurrence did not produce the same sensation as that of 133. Circumstances had changed: no one now thought of presenting needy Italians with foreign territory, which they did not desire. Moreover, on this occasion there was no talk of fabulous wealth, and the kingdom was infinitely smaller in extent, unless barren sands were taken into account. Indeed it was no more than a Pentapolis: Cyrene, Apollonia, Ptolemaïs, Arsinoë and Berenice.² No doubt the conditions today are quite different from those of the past, for corn, wine and oil were produced on the ridges of the plateau, and cattle were bred there; but nevertheless it was only possible to make use of a narrow strip of land along the coast.

The Senate showed some embarrassment when further responsibilities were urged upon it: hitherto it had been content with the rule of a client prince. On reflection it accepted the personal property of the deceased king, which was mostly estate in land, left the Greek cities their liberty,³ and, while inflicting no governor on the indigenous tribes, but leaving the cares of administration to their barbarian chiefs, imposed upon them an annual tribute which had to be paid

¹ CXXXVII.

² CVII, p. 273 *et seq.*; CXXXVI, III

³ Liv., *Epit.*, LXX.

in kind. They were allowed to purchase their freedom by the regular delivery of some pounds of that produce which had become the great article of export from their country and its principal source of wealth: the silphium¹ that was renowned in antiquity as perfume, medicine and condiment. But the Romans were ignorant of it and slow to buy it in the markets of the capital, where it found no favour. Had it more vogue in the time of Pliny, who catalogues its virtues² so vaguely that we are still asking what this mysterious plant can have been? In any case it cannot have added much to the Romans' wealth. But the situation in Cyrenaica became a difficult one; the cities quarrelled among themselves; Cyrene itself fell into the hands of tyrants. Lucullus had to take measures against the increasing anarchy,³ and at length a quæstor was sent to the new province (74) which it seemed preferable to create.⁴

Meanwhile the state of affairs in Rome itself had changed; but up to that time it cannot be denied that the Senate, still controller of the city's general policy, had shown no desire to extend its frontiers, but had shrunk from too large and too sudden annexations.⁵ The authors whose works have survived show us the conscript fathers of the period in an unpleasant light: corrupt men, easily bribed and for the most part incapable; but their exaggeration is obvious. The charges of venality and military incapacity seem the best founded; but we cannot admit that all political sense had vanished from the Curia. It should be an axiom that any conquest is rash if previous annexations remain insecure, and the constant difficulties encountered in Spain prescribed circumspection. Nor could the Senate be forbidden to regard as the best form of government, apart from any question of personal interest, that which had stood the test of centuries and seen the power of Rome increased beyond all anticipation. Now this aristocratic *régime*, in which the high assembly had pre-eminence, was a civil government; it had recourse, if necessary, to military force, but only under its own direction and control. This supremacy was easy to maintain so long as the wars were waged in the neighbourhood of Italy, but

¹ Rainaud, XLIII, s.v.

³ Plut., *Luc.*, 2.

⁵ CVII, p. 273 *et seq.*

² *Hist. nat.*, XXII, 23, 48-49.

⁴ App., *Bell. civ.*, I, 111.

those which had to be carried on at a distance inevitably allowed more initiative to the army commanders and were bound to increase their authority to a dangerous extent. No doubt the most far-sighted senators had a presentiment of the fatal ascendancy that would be gained by victorious generals. The bequeathed territories were certainly a tempting prey; but the experience gained on the first occasion, the three years' war which had to be waged in Asia, served as a warning to the assembly and taught a valuable lesson of prudence. Such complications might arise again, and indeed the free gift of Bithynia a little later on was to justify the Senate's instinctive hesitation in a remarkable manner.

CHAPTER II

THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS (96-31 B.C.)

WE shall not study these from the point of view of Rome's internal history; that is a subject which has been treated elsewhere.¹ Our concern is to note how the expansion of Roman rule was affected by the civil wars which were destined to fill the last sixty years of the Republican period.

The first of these dictatorships, that of Marius, was a consequence of the military reform which substituted armies of partisans for the old citizen armies. This man of humble origin, the son of a simple day-labourer, was also the first of a new series of rulers, politicians who won the highest honours from the people by buying their votes. Presumably he had secured the necessary means by shrewd speculations; others were to run themselves into debt for the same object and demand the fruits of victory to restore their credit.

Fortune did not allow him to increase the territory of the Republic, for it confined him to those defensive wars that we have mentioned: the war against the Teutones and Cimbri, and the war against Jugurtha. The result of the latter was only to strengthen the protectorate over Numidia, since the treachery of Bocchus, who had hastened its successful conclusion, had to be paid for, and the Senate had not yet been eclipsed by the omnipotence of the mercenary leaders. Marius did not venture, at Rome, to commit himself thoroughly with the demagogues, and therefore, being disowned by all parties, he left the city precipitately and went to Phrygia, under the pretext of a vow to the "Great Mother" of Pessinus, but really to seek opportunities of conquest; for already everyone foresaw a great war against Mithridates of Pontus, who had been occupied for twenty years in building up, on the threshold of the province of Asia, a vast empire of which Rome had naturally perceived the menace. A breach with him was inevitable, from whichever side the challenge might come.

¹ L. Homo, *Les Institutions politiques romaines: de la Cité à l'État*.

But Marius was little known in those parts and found great difficulty in raising recruits, since the populations inclined more and more to the side of Mithridates; while, to crown all, he had a formidable rival on the spot in the person of Sulla, who, as *proprætor* in Cilicia, was supplied with regular troops and had already won considerable renown. Reduced to offering his services for the suppression of the dangerous Italian revolt of 90 B.C., Marius was no longer in sole command, as he had been when he repulsed the northern barbarians, but was forced to endure the rivalry of this same Sulla, formerly his legate in Africa, a considerably younger and more active man, by whom the really decisive victories of the Social War were won.

Although connected with the great family of the Cornelii, Sulla was born poor; but, compensated by lack of scruple, he had known how to enrich himself by a series of scandalous marriages, by extortion during his tenure of magistracies, and by the plunder—now a thing of custom—of the province intrusted to his care, as well as of the neighbouring country of Cappadocia, from which he had expelled the vassal of the king of Pontus. But money could do nothing now without armed forces, of which Sulla was the first to reveal the sovereign power. With sacrilegious daring he crossed the sacred line of the *pomærium* at their head, and Marius, who had no troops, could only take refuge in flight.

To remain master of Rome it was necessary to have military prestige, and Sulla went to seek it in the East. During his absence, Marius in his turn brought the capital city to his feet by the same methods, and caused himself also to be appointed leader in the war against Mithridates. Thus it would have been far from Italy that the fortune of war would have decided between them, had not Marius, who was already an old man, paid for his intemperate habits with his life in the year 86 B.C.

Sulla had no other rival who could match him in reputation and power. It was not even necessary for him to set aside the consular M'. Aquillius, son of the first organizer of the province of Asia, whom the Senate had sent thither.

This man, who was no less corrupt than inefficient, had originally been charged with the task of restoring the conditions which Sulla had left behind him four years before. Taking advantage of the Social War, the king of Pontus had once more secured the hegemony of Asia Minor, and the complaints of the dispossessed rulers were reaching Rome from every quarter. Aquillius did not confine himself to re-establishing Rome's client kings in Cappadocia and Bithynia, but advanced to the attack of Pontus, and thereupon Mithridates began open warfare against the Romans. The large number of troops which he had recruited swept over the whole country as far as the Archipelago, and Aquillius, who had fallen into his power, suffered a form of torture by which his opponent emphasized the opinion that was being formed of Roman generals: the wretched man was choked with molten gold.

It will suffice for us to give a brief description of the character of this war and of the man who began it. A descendant of the Persian royal family, whose divine attributes were bequeathed to him, Mithridates was a very strange type of hellenized barbarian. At the court of Sinope, where Greek was spoken, the ministers were Greeks and so too were the soldiers of the bodyguard. Mithridates posed as the champion of Hellenism—that of Alexander, whose policy he claimed to have adopted: an Asiatic Hellenism, comprehensive and adulterated, enriched with oriental additions. It was the people of the West that he denounced as the enemies of Greece, traitors and robbers; and he found no difficulty in securing the execution of the order which condemned many thousands of Italians to death at Ephesus. Better still, European Greece hailed him as its champion, and the most prominent cities pronounced in his favour. Thus two great provinces had practically revolted when Sulla disembarked with five legions in Epirus.

Rome was not without resources. She had two armies and a fleet, for Lucullus had succeeded in collecting some ships from the allies in Syria and Cyprus. After terrorizing all the cities of Achaia into obedience and taking Athens by storm at the end of a long siege, Sulla twice defeated the Greek generals of Mithridates; but, deprived of his command, which had expired and had not been renewed, he had permitted

the escape of Valerius Flaccus, the general appointed to succeed him by the faction of Marius and Cinna which was then triumphant at Rome. Sulla followed him into the continent of Asia, hurrying in pursuit of Mithridates.¹

Then began a terrible time of trial for the peoples of Asia, who could not make up their minds which side to support.² Mithridates favoured the humble folk, Rome the upper classes; but the former seemed beaten, or likely to be. Nevertheless the dual command on the other side puzzled everybody—until Flaccus was killed by his soldiers at the instigation of his lieutenant Fimbria. The latter carried on the campaign; he and Sulla made separate overtures of peace to the king of Pontus, and Mithridates accepted the terms of the stronger, the irregular leader, who immediately won over the troops of his rival (84). By the treaty of Dardanus the proud monarch abandoned all his conquests in Asia Minor, deserted his vassals, and agreed to pay a considerable war indemnity.

Thus these three years of warfare merely restored the *status quo*, and it was doubtful whether the Roman dominion in Asia had been strengthened by them. The Greeks in their embarrassment had for the most part yielded to the victor of the moment, or to him who they thought would probably triumph in the end; hence the attitude of the cities was essentially fickle. Sulla introduced a system of reprisals everywhere, without regard to equity, subjecting the province to crushing levies, and even abandoning the cities of the coast to the pirates instead of protecting them. Caring nothing for the extension of Rome's power³ but only to crush an enemy whose defeat would bring profit and glory to no one but himself, he took no thought for the vassal states on the borders of the proconsular province, which had been temporarily subject to Mithridates and then torn from his control. Was he to offer fresh fields of exploitation to those knights, those traders, whom he loathed? Content with having accomplished the most urgent tasks, he returned with all speed to Italy, where, by means of massacres in Rome and outside, he established the terrible dictatorship known to everybody and a constitution destined to last longer than

¹ CXXV, II, p. 468-482.

² LXXXII, p. 24 *et seq.*

³ CVII, p. 305.

himself—exactly ten years. By his own power and that of the aristocratic party he had merely retained two provinces for the State; but it was to prove wasted labour for Rome; Mithridates had been spared and would recover his strength.

During these twenty barren years, disregard for law, uncontrolled passion, hatred of man for man and class for class had multiplied the causes of strife. The wars and insurrections born of these disorders were to raise certain persons to the highest positions—more than one person, since the difficulties were manifold—and involve each of them in lengthy enterprises which would give him the opportunity of outshining his rivals.

One of the first to be thus aggrandized by circumstances was Gnæus Pompey (106-48), the exact opposite of Sulla, who had favoured him at the beginning of his career and proclaimed him *Magnus* (the Great). He won his first victory as champion of the Senate, but, being before all things a soldier, he troubled himself little about constitutional problems. Moreover he came of a plebeian family and belonged only to the equestrian order—a fortunate circumstance for the knights and for all men of business, who found in him, if not an absolute protector of their interests, at least a partisan and helper.¹ It was for their sake that he had abolished the laws of Sulla, being dissatisfied with the prestige he had gained, after many repulses, from the successful termination of the war against Sertorius, for he had a formidable rival in Crassus, the principal conqueror of Spartacus.

Another cause of offence to him about the same time was Licinius Lucullus,² also a man of plebeian origin and formerly quæstor to Sulla, whom the dictator had left in Asia, where he gained a good reputation by collecting the war indemnity with real moderation.³ Chance had just given him the best opportunity of attracting attention, for another will, that of Nicomedes III (74), had made Rome the heir to a third kingdom, Bithynia.⁴

¹ CVII, chap. XVI.; CXXV, III, p. 14 *et seq.*; XCVIII, IV, p. 332 *et seq.* ² XCVIII, IV, p. 133 *et seq.* ³ LXXXII, p. 41.

⁴ Brandis, XLVII, III, p. 524 *et seq.*; CXXV, III, p. 31 *et seq.*; CII, I, chap. VII.

The motives of this bequest are no clearer than those of its predecessors. No doubt the testator, having no children or heirs after his own heart, calculated that his subjects would gain by passing voluntarily under an inevitable yoke, for independence had become an idle dream with Mithridates on one side and the Romans on the other. The territory thus bequeathed extended from the lower course of the Rhyndacus to the mouth of the Sangarius; it included several important cities, and above all, since it lay in the direction of the Euxine, it commanded the roads to the Sarmatian coast. This was the spur that moved Mithridates to take action. He had long been on the watch and now perceived that his enemy was occupied with heavy tasks in the West. His preparations had begun long before; he had taken the Romans as his model, copying their military institutions to the best of his ability, and, like them, he made a diplomatic venture, sending an embassy to Spartacus.

To Bithynia were sent the two new consuls. One of them, Cotta, allowed himself to be shut up in Chalcædon, and the huge army of Mithridates laid siege to Cyzicus, a port commanding the shores of the Propontis, which had remained faithful to Rome. Cotta's colleague Lucullus,¹ a new *Cunctator*, refrained carefully from attacking this host with its superior numbers. He gradually wore down his enemy by destroying the detachments that were isolated by commissariat difficulties, and only later, after an attack had been made by sea against the cities of the Euxine coast, did he inflict a serious defeat on Mithridates, who nevertheless succeeded in escaping and took refuge with his son-in-law Tigranes II, king of Armenia.² Thereupon the operations began to assume quite a different scope.

Not that Tigranes seemed desirous of taking part in the war. This adventurer in the grand style turned his ambitions in another direction. Profiting by the dissensions among the Seleucid princes he had got control of Syria (85), which lost nothing by passing under this new domination,³ and had annexed (76) a part of Asia Minor. Then turning against the Arsacidæ, whose place he could usurp all the more easily because he was of their line, he had robbed them of

¹ Gelzer, **XLVII**, XIII, col. 376-414; here, 385 *et seq.*

² **LIII**, p. 16-51.

³ **CLXXXV**, p. 251 *et seq.*

Mesopotamia and Atropatene, in order to gain the title of King of Kings and transmit it to his successors. He would inevitably have come into conflict with the Romans sooner or later, but the conflict was precipitated by the coming of Mithridates.

An attempt has been made¹ in this connexion to portray Lucullus as the creator of the new Roman imperialism, a sort of Napoleon of antiquity. This is more than exaggeration. He seems on the contrary to have persisted in the Senate's ancient policy, and we have no ground for supposing that he had any design whatever against Parthia. But, on the one hand, it was necessary to support a "friend" of Rome, Antiochus, who had been robbed of his provinces, and, on the other, the essential war against Mithridates was not ended so long as that king remained alive and at liberty. Lucullus therefore sent his brother-in-law Appius Claudius to demand the surrender of the king of Pontus; Tigranes refused and war was the result.²

The war was a very hard one in a little-known country, and it was made still harder by an early and severe winter. Lucullus showed indisputable talent. He beat his enemies, who outnumbered him, in several battles, and, by carrying off the royal treasure from the capital Tigranocerta, he knew how "to make the war pay its own costs."³ But he was a general of the old sort—which was no longer required. The recruits of the time wanted a *condottiere*, who would lead them to the plunder without strict discipline, and show more care for the soldiers' interests than for those of the State. His successes did not suffice to preserve for him the indispensable ascendancy over his soldiers; they mutinied, and, as the coalition had rallied and taken the offensive again, he was compelled to make a retreat which was no less wearisome and no less admirably conducted than the advance had been. This reverse was not a misfortune for everybody. The knights, *publicani* and merchants of various kinds could ill brook the measures taken to prevent the plunder of Asia. The deadlock supplied a good pretext for

¹ CII, I, chap. X-XI.

² LXXXI, p. 17, 157, 216; K. Eckhardt, XXIII, IX (1909), p. 400-412; X (1910), p. 72-151, 192-231.

³ Plut., *Luc.*, 29; Rice Holmes, XXII, VII (1917), p. 120-138; XLVII, XIII, col. 395 *et seq.*

reducing and finally recalling the Lucullan delegation; and, as a settlement could no longer be postponed, Rome sent to the East the confidant and benefactor of the equestrian order, Pompey.

He had just achieved a striking success in an unprecedented mission. Rome was regarded in theory as mistress of the whole Mediterranean. In practice, if a Roman fleet put to sea, its strength made it respected; but the merchant service was terrorized by pirates. A number of brigands of every kind and origin, men broken in the recent wars or pirates by birth, forming a sort of loose confederation, attacked and held to ransom the peaceful ship-owners on every trade route of the sea and, with a boldness worthy of their ancestors in Homeric times, made sudden descents even on the coasts, sacked cities and temples, made captive the inhabitants, and lent their aid to all rebels against the Roman power as well as to its enemies, since their chances of plunder were proportionately increased.¹ Trade experienced such difficulties, the import of corn in particular, so indispensable to Italy, was hindered to such an extent that the classes then in power, who were interested above all others in free traffic by sea, resolved to try heroic measures: the tribune Gabinius proposed to confer on Pompey unlimited power for three years² over the whole extent of sea from Cilicia to the Pillars of Hercules. A real battle was fought over this law, for the old oligarchs no longer cared for anything but their party interests. Finally, when the measure was passed (67), Pompey had at his disposal 500 ships, 120,000 men, all the resources of the national treasury according to his needs, and even the command of all the coasts to a distance of 70 kilometres inland, in order that he might hunt down the pirates in their dens. This excessive power explains the violence of the opposition, for what were previous dictatorships in comparison?

Three years were deemed necessary to fulfil the under-

¹ W. Kroll, **XLVII**, IIa, col. 1039-1042: **CLXIX**, chap. V-VI.

² The campaigns of Servilius Isauricus (76-75) had proved to be inadequate (H. A. Ormerod, **XXII**, XII [1922], p. 35-52).

taking and three months proved sufficient. At the end of that period the magazines, arsenals and ships had been destroyed, and those of the men who had not perished, yielding on the promise of pardon, for the most part gave themselves up and were transformed into agricultural labourers and colonists. The measure was a wise one and well conceived, but nevertheless the future was to show that the worst elements of society always regretted the old days, and piracy was destined to revive later on,¹ although on a diminished scale.

The prestige thus acquired made Pompey seem the man providentially appointed to make an end of Mithridates. The latter was under no delusion on the subject and, after the *Lex Manilia* had with much less opposition established a proconsular authority over the whole of Asia Minor, he tried to come to terms. But it was with someone else that Pompey had planned to negotiate and with more important results in view.²

He had no need to resort to high diplomacy, for the man who might have thwarted his plans unwittingly forwarded them. The campaign of Lucullus had ended badly,³ but the rapid advance with which it had begun had impressed Tigranes, who feared for his domains. The Parthians gave him no less anxiety, and his own son plotted against him in league with Pompey. Thus when the king of Pontus once more sought help from the king of Armenia, the latter forbade him to cross their common frontier and set a price on his father-in-law's head. Mithridates chose to save his head rather than his kingdom and fled to Colchis, leaving Pompey face to face with this ex-ally, who prided himself on his cunning. Tigranes humbled and prostrated himself before the Roman, who did not contend with him for a remote kingdom, naturally defended by its mountains and harsh climate, but posted troops there provisionally under the command of a legate. While proclaiming Tigranes a friend and ally of the Roman people, he at the same time stripped him of his conquests and dictated a condition of peace to the Armenians which gave Rome permanent ground for intervention: their kings must henceforward obtain from her

¹ CLXIX, chap. VII.

² CXXV, III, p. 65 *et seq.*

³ LIII, p. 43 *et seq.*

at least the ratification of their authority. We shall see that this was not an empty formula: Pompey, like a true Roman, was staking out a claim.

Mithridates mistakenly supposed that, after Colchis, he could recover his possessions beyond the Euxine and, by making a diversion on a great scale, take Italy in the rear with a sudden attack through the regions of the Danube. At the very outset his mad dreams were shattered by watchful traitors. His sons conspired against him, his wives surrendered their fortresses, the Scythians refused to follow him. His courage was broken by so many simultaneous blows, and he demanded death by the sword and by poison.¹

All Pompey's enemies had been defeated or befooled. Phraates, king of Parthia, who was also troubled by the ambitions of Tigranes, had at the first request allied himself with the Roman leader against him, but this zeal was left unrewarded. The Parthian was used against the Armenian, so long as the latter remained too powerful; but when the Armenian learnt wisdom, he was supported against the Parthian, who had been too ready to entertain large hopes. Phraates gained nothing—except the certain distrust of Rome, who was to make Tigranes her compliant agent against him.

The conquests of Tigranes were consolidated, but for another's benefit, since Rome took possession of them. Before leaving Asia, where he had spent four years (66-62), Pompey determined the fate of many districts,² as if the Senate had given him unrestricted authority; as a matter of fact we do not know exactly how much latitude was allowed him by the *Lex Manilia*. He did not trouble about consistency, even in appearance, and forgot that Lucullus, to whom Tigranes surrendered Syria, had handed it over to Antiochus. It became a new Roman province, extending much further than the zone recently occupied by the king of Armenia. No less arbitrary was his enlargement on either side of the province of Cilicia, but the eastward extension of Bithynia by the addition of Paphlagonia and western Pontus was no more than a just consequence of the war and of the defeat of Mithridates.

More than anyone else, the client princes felt, for good or evil, the effects of these arbitrary proceedings. Ariobarzanes

¹ CLXXXV, p. 408.

² CXXV, III, p. 66.

of Cappadocia was confirmed on his throne and gained some further territory on his eastern frontier. In Galatia the positions *de facto* and *de jure* were in doubtful agreement: the three tetrarchies were maintained, but Deiotarus, the invaluable ally, became virtually sovereign of the whole country, to which were even added some districts of Pontus, so recently conquered and so remote from the ancient provinces that the task of preserving order in them, which might prove burdensome, required a vassal's hand. On the upper Euphrates the rocky district of Commagene remained under a dynasty, half Greek half Iranian, whose task it was to serve as an advance guard and maintain peace for the time being.

All these arrangements made in Asia Minor kindled hopes for the future without overburdening the present. Pompey evaded the king of Egypt's request that he should come and put down a rebellion on the Nile, regarding as premature any immediate action in that country, where the best agent for Rome's ambitions was precisely this constant and increasing disorder. For the time being Syria satisfied his appetite. It was a long strip of coast that could easily be approached at several points; and no police measures, except in the extreme north, where responsible mandataries were established, would be likely to draw Roman troops very far inland, since the desert was more of an obstacle than the Republic to its great Eastern neighbours. At that time there was no anxiety about the Palmyrian oasis.

Nevertheless some measures had to be taken to secure the acceptance of the new *régime* throughout Syria. In the northern zone all was arranged without difficulty: the Arab kings of Damascus accepted Roman supremacy in accordance with their race's instinctive tendency to yield to force. All the favours went to the autonomous Greek cities; those which had lived under the tyranny of various petty kings were given their freedom, and the little sacerdotal states were treated like the cities. Here it was merely a question of local or, as we might say, communal independence, but in Palestine the conditions were different. There an ethnical and religious association was opposed to the overlordship of foreigners; but rival ambitions in the Maccabæan family assisted Pompey's designs. He encouraged the strife between

two claimants to the High Priesthood at Jerusalem; and against Aristobulus, who was finally dethroned, he supported his brother Hyrcanus, as being apparently in the stronger position and better disposed towards the Romans. Nevertheless the opposite party did not yield without fighting: a siege of the Holy City had to be maintained for three months, and was ended by a general assault on the sabbath day.

The tax which Pompey imposed on these stubborn Israelites was not excessive, and the duty of collecting it was left to the natives; but the other regions were taxed with little mercy. Except for Ariobarzanes, a needy prince, who even received a loan, and was expected to render very different services, the new clients and the new subjects were heavily burdened. An immense tribute first of all enriched the soldiers, who had achieved this success, and then added large sums to the Treasury, which served in a marked degree to enhance the triumph of the victorious general.

Finally, a rich country from Antioch to the threshold of Egypt was thrown open without restriction to Italian speculators. It was their avarice that had directed Pompey's policy, for he was in a sense their delegate and had spontaneously adopted their views.¹ But the subject peoples were not left without some compensation for their financial burdens. Rome developed the economic resources of their country, increased the outlets for them, and spread more widely the various advantages of Hellenism. For Rome herself there was something new in this arbitrary power left to the knights to direct foreign affairs and determine frontier policy. It was seen again on other occasions. The annexation of Cyprus not long afterwards (58) was only the result of a conspiracy among the treasure hunters: that of Crete² in 67, connected with the campaign against the pirates, had already shown the consequences of a purely selfish pursuit of glory.

In spite of his free initiative and the scope of his authority, or at least of his acts, Pompey was in fact no more than a transient figure, connected with the equestrian order by birth

¹ CVII, chap. XVI.

² XCVIII, II, p. 41 *et seq.*

and yet deferent to the Senate, which more than once placed its confidence in him hereafter. His imprudence in disbanding his troops after his return in 62 bore witness to a respect for law and order of which he was the last to set the example.

In Julius Cæsar¹ we have a very different personage, deliberately reserved and enigmatic to such an extent that the motive of his actions, much debated in modern times, is indeed a point of controversy. To tell the truth, it matters little to our subject. It is possible and probable that he desired the greatness of Rome, but we cannot doubt that he put his own greatness first. Was not this favourite maxim ascribed to him, that, in order to win power, it was permissible to break the laws of justice?² His special regard for his own person and his own interests appears in all his actions: in the care which he bestowed on his outward appearance; in an affected pride in his royal and divine ancestors; in his literary works, craftily composed, like his face and whole exterior, to serve as an apology for the facts by giving a bare recital of them, omitting all reference to the intentions and principles of their author. We need not describe his wonderfully crowded career in detail, or follow all his changes of policy towards the men of the highest rank, whom he regarded alternately as promoters or thwarters of his own good fortune. With him at any rate there is no more question of anything but a programme drawn up by a single individual and forming no part of the policy of any regular government.

One of his first ventures, which however miscarried, was an attempt to secure appointment as envoy to Egypt—a country which might already have been reduced to the status of a province in virtue of an alleged bequest by king Ptolemy Alexander II.³ As for his legateship in Further Spain, we are less interested in the military successes by which he consolidated the Roman occupation, than in the liberty which he took in adding to the number of his forces without permission, and the riches which he managed to amass there,

¹ **XCIII**, III, p. 125 *et seq.*; Groebe, **XLVII**, X, col. 186-259; **CVII**, chap. XVII; E. G. Sihler, *C. Julius Cæsar*, Leipzig, 1912.

² Cic., *De off.*, III, 21; Suet., *Cæs.*, 30.

³ A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides*, Paris, II (1907), p. 130 *et seq.*

the sinews of the civil war, indispensable to a man loaded with debt.

Prominent at Rome by reason of his demagogic manœuvres, but still too new a man to establish his sole supremacy, he thought fit to associate two colleagues with himself in an ill-matched triumvirate,¹ one of them, Crassus, a mediocrity, the other, Pompey, much less daring than himself. The first was destined to perish in his mad campaign against the Parthians;² and while the second was involved in the difficulties of the corn-supply, and afterwards in a governorship in Spain, which brought him neither profit nor renown, Cæsar presented the nation with a new piece of territory larger than Italy.

We know that on his arrival in Narbonne (58) he found the state of war which he desired—and would have managed to provoke by some means or other. Hosts of Helvetians were making ready to leave their country (modern Switzerland) and emigrate into western Gaul, a land of softer climate and greater fertility. Their best way was by the left bank of the Rhone, but that belonged to the Romans. Cæsar forbade its use and drove them back into their own country.³ Then they attempted to follow another route through independent Gaul, but the triumvir again expelled them, and the Celts, finding themselves thus protected against invasion by their powerful neighbour, were unwise enough to request him to drive back across the Rhine the Suevi of Ariovistus, who occupied the territory of the Sequani (Burgundy and Franche-Comté). This was the opening which Cæsar anticipated. Feeling the imminence of the danger, the Belgæ had already formed a powerful league to defend their independence; the Remi alone, who were nearer the theatre of war against the German leader and more impressed by the Roman power, made terms with the latter rather than fight. Then, as elsewhere later on, Cæsar was favoured from the beginning by divisions among the tribes, and subsequently by the strife of parties within each tribe. Whichever way they turned, they found themselves caught in a trap—as Cæsar

¹ CLVIII, p. 55 *et seq.*

² CLXXXI, p. 150 *et seq.*; CII, II, chap. VI; CXXXIII, II, p. 312 *et seq.*; Gelzer, XLVII, XIII, col. 295-331; here, 320 *et seq.*

³ E. Taeubler, *Bellum Helveticum, eine Cæsar-Studie*, Zürich, 1924.

had wished. We cannot recount here, even summarily, the stages of a subjugation which has been described by the hand of the commander-in-chief himself and critically studied many times.¹ As a matter of fact, the conquest properly so-called was achieved in two years (57-56); two more were spent in repelling incursions from outside (55-54), and the rest (until 51) in repressing at first partial revolts and finally the general insurrection which was practically ended by the attack on Alesia² and the voluntary surrender of Vercingetorix.

To modern eyes this annexation so quickly completed seems a fine achievement. Nevertheless it is not surprising that feelings in the Senate House were divided on the subject. The great victories won by Pompey and Cæsar over foreign peoples were also victories over the Senate, the personification of Rome's old institutions, whose authority was disappearing bit by bit, until it retained no more than a false semblance, a shadow, for which it was indebted to compromises between rival ambitions. Even this phantom of power disappeared on the day when the governor of the Gauls, being recalled to Rome, crossed the Rubicon in arms. We can no longer speak of a Roman policy; henceforward there are only those of military leaders, each laying claim to the supreme power. All contemporary observers were not aware of this fact. Above the lower classes, who cared very little for law and order but much more for plunder and gain, many aristocrats sincerely believed that the Republic was at stake and that Pompey was its defender. Perhaps, after all, if he had been the winner, he would have had more regard for appearances.

We see clearly enough that Rome "was no longer in Rome"; she was in the armies which opposed each other far from Italy. Cæsar did not linger in the capital, but sought out his opponents where their troops were encamped. Once more the provincials felt the effect of those terrible feuds which had left the East in ruins. They had to choose between the competitors, and they were largely represented in all the armies in the field. Happy those whose choice was luckily

¹ We need only refer to **CXLII, III**; C. Jullian, *Vercingétorix*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1903; T. Rice Holmes, *Cæsar's Conquest of Gaul*, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1911.

² R. Cagnat, *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, 15 Nov. 1921.

inspired! By breaking away from Pompey's lieutenant, Cordova won the favour of his opponent. Neutrality saved no one, and Marseilles, whose true policy has been distorted by Cæsar in his history,¹ was not in a position to remain neutral for long. It was at Pharsalia in Thessaly that Pompey's Greek and Asiatic contingents gave way before Cæsar's new recruits, those Gauls and Germans against whom he had just been fighting—and who now obeyed his orders.

Pompey, who fled to Egypt, was killed by a traitor's blow when he disembarked there. Cæsar had captured Alexandria merely with a view to overtaking him; but he stayed to regulate the affairs of the kingdom, which were in great disorder. It was not only the charms of Cleopatra that persuaded him to postpone an annexation which he certainly contemplated; the resistance of the Alexandrians, who were less tolerant than their kings of foreign overlordship, convinced him that it would require time and forces which at that moment were not at his disposal.² Before acquiring new subjects, he had to secure the obedience of the old. The temerity of Pharnaces, son of Mithridates and king of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, was terribly punished, and all Asia Minor lay at Cæsar's discretion. Thence he carried off more great sums of money.³

The final campaigns, in Africa⁴ and Spain,⁵ definitely established his dictatorship. The unreconciled *optimates* had gained a footing in these two countries, and the native inhabitants had now adopted the rule of showing less loyalty to Rome herself than to individuals. One imprudent king, Juba of Numidia, ventured to listen to the overtures of the republicans who in their infatuation had promised to give him the whole province of Africa; but the allies were heavily defeated (46); Juba committed suicide, and a considerable part of his kingdom, easily detached from it in such circumstances, was made into a new province.

There can be no doubt that Cæsar had not foreseen this

¹ M. Clere, **XXVIII**, XXVII (1923), p. 145-156.

² **CXXXIII**, II, chap. XX, and p. 483 *et seq.*

³ **CXXXIII**, III, p. 205 *et seq.*, 509 *et seq.*

⁴ J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder*, Berlin, III, 2 (1912), p. 717-794.

⁵ **CII**, II, chap. XIII; **CXXXIII**, III, chap. XXII and XXIV, and p. 516 *et seq.*, 541 *et seq.*

last prize. Does that mean that the addition of the three Gauls to the Roman dominions would have satisfied his ambition? The motives of his expedition to Britain¹ are not clearly revealed. It is generally supposed that he entered the island for the same reasons which had led him to cross the Rhine, and that his sole object was to spread the fear of the name of Rome among the inhabitants. He must have planned to make with certain Celtic kings one of those "friendly conventions" that prepared the way elsewhere for a protectorate followed by complete subjection; but the stubborn Britons were by no means so well suited for this policy as the peoples of Asia Minor.

If we may believe the concordant testimony of the ancient historians,² he had conceived a far-reaching plan of campaign. He meditated an expedition against the Parthians, in order to avenge Crassus and, at the same time, redistribute the national forces and impose silence on the refractory members of the old parties by the astonishing triumphs of his dictatorship. He intended to subjugate the Dacians and Getæ on the banks of the Danube, and then, as conqueror of Iran, to return by the shores of the Caspian and Euxine seas, through Germany and Gaul. What territorial gain would have followed from such a circuit? The course of events would have decided. Vast preparations were in progress, sixteen legions had been assembled, arrangements had been made for the government of Rome during his absence, when the dictator's career was cut short by the crime of the Ides of March (43).

His power had been established so rapidly, in the face of so much opposition, that it could not but depend on the constant exercise of military force, which alone made its continuance possible. Thus the constant extension of the power of Rome was the first condition of any private domination, the sole means of retaining men and money. Without glory and gain this extravagant power would fall to pieces.

The conquest of the Gauls opens an entirely new chapter in the annals of Rome. Previous annexations were to some extent the consequence of long contact with neighbouring

¹ T. Rice Holmes, *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Cæsar*, Oxford, 1907.

² **XLVII**, X, col. 253; **CII**, II, chap. XVII.

peoples, whose conduct and quarrels it was difficult to ignore; but on this occasion a single pretext had sufficed for taking immediate action. Still it would be wrong to regard Julius Cæsar as a man who turned his back on the past, despised the East with its mirages, and saw no field for profitable activity save in another direction. Egypt interested him; he turned his eyes towards Mesopotamia, and he was credited with the idea of establishing himself in those regions of the Greek Orient where great sovereigns naturally assumed the character of gods. There were traits in him that recall Alexander: the aspiration towards a universal monarchy which should abolish racial distinctions and break down the barriers between the peoples, whom his numerous colonies tended to bring together.¹ But it is no less true that he included the barbarian West within his field of vision, recognized the part that his country was called upon to play in those lands and, at the same time, the totally different policy that would have to be adopted there—a policy of clemency and generosity no longer tainted with rapine and fiscal interests.

The Empire was in germ in Cæsar's dictatorship, and yet, for want of a man capable of founding it at once, more than twelve years passed before it was finally established. The most prominent man in 43 was Mark Antony,² the old lieutenant of the conqueror of Gaul, a very brave soldier and a tried general, but a man of weak and undecided character, whose courage failed him off the field of battle. Immediately after the murder he disguised himself in slave's attire; but he soon appeared on the scene, like a real actor, relying on the confidence which Cæsar was known to have placed in him, but also humouring the Senate, whose favour might be useful to him so long as no formidable rival presented himself.

One soon came forward—Octavius, or Octavian—a very young man of undistinguished appearance, weak in body and apparently timorous, no formidable competitor, one would have supposed, against Antony's noble bearing and

¹ CLVIII, p. 492 *et seq.*, 488 *et seq.*

² XCVIII, I, p. 46 *et seq.*

assurance. But Cæsar had adopted him by will and made him his heir, and this was an important qualification, at any rate in the eyes of the people and the army. He had no difficulty in gaining a considerable number of partisans, and, as Antony too commanded an imposing number of soldiers, mostly won by bribery, they both formed the idea of making an alliance, as Pompey and Cæsar had done not long ago. This was the second triumvirate, in which Lepidus took the place which another lay figure, Crassus, had occupied in the first.

These three men shared the Roman dominions between them, except the East, which remained undivided, since the last of the republicans, under Brutus and Cassius, had made it their field of operations, and were laying Asia under contribution in order to obtain their own share of men and money. The first need was to make an end of the champions of the old nobility, relatives of the proscribed and victims of the first triumvirs. This kept the allies together for the time being; but after the battle of Philippi their agreement became problematical. Having got rid of Lepidus, the other two made a division of duties: Antony was to restore peace in the Orient and then make war on the Parthians; Octavius was to lead home and disband the veterans, giving them their promised allotments of land, and recover the great islands close to Italy, which were dominated by Sextus Pompeius, a son of Cæsar's old opponent.

Which of them had the better lot? Octavius had to maintain the corn supply of Italy—a service of supreme importance, but one that might quickly be forgotten. Antony had the prospect of a glorious campaign, destined perhaps to extend the frontiers of the Roman world still further.¹ It was a fine programme, worthy of such a warrior; but unfortunately this soldier was also a free liver and voluptuary who squandered his strength and was seen leading through Greece and Asia a retinue of clowns and mountebanks, wasting in luxurious orgies the time that his rival knew how to turn to good account. Moreover he lost the initiative; for, after the disaster of Crassus and the quarrels among the Romans, the Parthians, who also wished to extend their

¹ CII, IV, chap. I. Cf. L. Craven, *Antony's Oriental Policy*, Diss. Univ. of Missouri, 1920.

dominion to the sea, invaded Syria and Palestine and assumed control of the little vassal states there.¹ Antony, as if spell-bound by the queen Cleopatra whom he had followed into Egypt, at first scorned to take in hand the defence of his province, but delegated the task to his lieutenants, Sosius, Canidius, and later Ventidius, who won brilliant victories (37). At last, disturbed at finding himself eclipsed by them, he bethought himself of Cæsar's great project and resolved to advance into the heart of Asia.

At this moment the Parthians were suffering from a domestic crisis caused by rival factions, and Artavasdes, king of Armenia, was quite ready to break the pledge of neutrality which he had made to them, in the hope of acquiring Atropatene in Media.² Antony, who was in a hurry to take action and end the campaign, so that he might return as soon as possible to his idle life as a pseudo-Lagid, started too hastily and outdistanced the convoy of his engines of war which he sadly needed at the siege of Phraata. Abandoning the idea of taking the town by storm, and deprived of the help of the Armenians, who had extricated themselves from a situation of doubtful issue, he decided on a no less precipitate retreat, which overtasked his men and left one-third of his forces killed or broken on the road.³ The king of Media offered him, with his alliance, a prospect of revenge; but he feared the delay of a second campaign, even if it should prove victorious. His sole achievement was the treacherous capture of king Artavasdes, who had been summoned to a parley, and of the kingdom of Armenia. That prince was the great trophy dishonourably and unwisely exhibited in the magnificent triumphal procession which wound its way through the streets of Alexandria in contempt of Rome's most explicit laws.

But Antony was no longer a Roman. He was something without a name, an improvised oriental monarch, and, further, the slave of a queen, or rather of a woman, among whose sons he distributed kingdoms carved out of the provinces intrusted to his protection. Even his generalship

¹ CLXXXI, p. 177 *et seq.*; CC, I, p. 352 *et seq.*

² LIII, p. 58 *et seq.*

³ J. Kromayer, XVI, XXXI (1896), p. 70-104; CXI, I, p. 290; II, p. 149; CLXXXI, p. 199 *et seq.*; CII, IV, chap. VI.

vanished in the presence of this Cleopatra, who wanted a victory for her ships of state. Then, defeated and flying from Actium in her wake, the ex-triumvir, who had lost all his titles, ended by killing himself on his conqueror's approach; and thus a phase without parallel in Roman history found a most remarkable issue. Antony, the proved warrior who had won so many battles, left nothing to his country, not even the Armenia that he had seized by treachery, where a certain Artaxias had recovered the throne of his fathers;¹ while Octavius, a soldier by necessity and without genius, had only to pick up, beside the dead body of Cleopatra, a State which had just lost its last foreign supporter.² No less remarkable for its wealth than for the system of government in store for it, this province of Egypt—the tribute of Octavius to Rome, who accepted him as her master—was the inaugural gift of the new *régime* about to be established, the sanction of the coming Principate.

¹ LIII, p. 66.

² CII, IV, chap. XI.

CHAPTER III

AUGUSTUS (31 B.C.—14 A.D.)

“ PROVIDENCE has marvellously enriched and adorned human life by giving us Augustus, whom it has crowned with virtues to the end that he may be our saviour, the benefactor of mankind, of us and those who shall come after us, making wars to cease and order to reign everywhere.”

These words of homage and others in the same style have been found in Asia Minor engraved on stones which at the same time announce the institution of festivals on the anniversaries of the sovereign's birth. No one has been more pompously belauded than the founder of the Empire, the former Octavius, who had been styled Augustus (*i.e.* sacred) by acclamation and apparently against his own will—an appearance which he had artfully contrived. Though a man of the first importance, if we judge by the magnitude of his work,¹ he is an unattractive figure, eluding portraiture by his determined coldness, his indubitable background of hypocrisy, his calculated moderation, his paraded simplicity, and his constant application, which however was rather guided by the lessons of experience than by any great original design.

None of his reforms, constitutional, administrative, civil, religious or moral, needs to be described here.² It is sufficient to recall what is essential for our subject: the reorganization of the provinces, the creation of imperial governments, the appointment of legates and other officials at fixed salaries. The peace of which the inscriptions boast was due to the stability at last introduced by putting an end to the extortion and civil war that had shaken the whole world; but this does not mean that the reign of Augustus was a period of absolute tranquillity: wars were being waged almost continuously in one part or another, and they were not all defensive wars.

¹ Fitzler and Seeck, **XLVII, X**, col. 295-381.

² See L. Homo, *Les Institutions politiques romaines : de la Cité à l'État*.

As a matter of fact, the great "peace-maker" extended the boundaries of the *orbis Romanus* much further than anyone else before or after him.¹

These wars² did not always end successfully. Some of his enterprises involved useless expense or led to the grave disasters. On the whole, however, they gave the Empire more equilibrium and guaranteed it for a long time against the dangers that threatened it from the North.

At the end of the Republic, the Roman world, except North Africa and Italy, was composed of two great masses (Spain and Gaul in the West, the Hellenic countries in the East) barely connected by a narrow Adriatic zone of uncertain boundaries. The course of events that we have described sufficiently explains the temporal order and extent of these conquests. The most unavoidable and the easiest were first achieved, while some had not been completed when the battle of Actium was fought.

Spain³ was the first that called for active intervention (26-25). Nominally the whole of Iberia belonged to Rome; no nation could dispute her ownership; but the great mountain region of the north-west, the most outlying and difficult of access, had not yet submitted. The Asturians and Cantabrians, intractably independent, set a bad example to their neighbours and had to be subdued. After a first expedition had been sent under the command of a legate, Augustus determined to visit the scene of hostilities in person; but falling ill at Tarragona and being markedly unqualified for military duties, he abandoned the leadership to Agrippa, who was compelled to conduct stubborn sieges, found various colonial outposts, and at last even proceed to methodical extermination. There the best general of the day accomplished a terrible task, in comparison with which it was an easy matter for him to repress various Celtic revolts among the Morini of Artois, the Treviri and the Aquitanians. The greater part of Gaul remained quiet and received from

¹ CLXXXIII, p. 201; LXXXIII, p. 12.

² XCVI, p. 360-452.

³ David Magie, XIV, XV (1920), p. 323-339

Augustus a conspicuous benefit in return—the pacification of her frontier both beside the Alps and along the Rhine.

Cisalpine Gaul had only become an integral part of Italy at a very late date, after the defeat of Hannibal, and the right of Roman citizenship was first conferred on the Transpadane peoples by Cæsar. This explains the long tolerance of the brigand tribes who occupied the Alpine heights from end to end of the crescent formed by the mountain range.¹ Officially they were subject to Rome, but in fact they plundered travellers, tradesmen and farmers, having always a place of refuge on the further side of the mountains. The imperial government therefore decided to cross the range, prolong the roads and establish or fortify permanent camps beside them. Even after the Salassi (in what is now Savoy) had been defeated and for the most part sold into slavery, it was thought good to guard against the coming of any successors to them, and for this purpose the fortress of *Augusta Prætoria*, now Aosta, was built.² But the almost immediate support of king Cottius of *Segusio* (Susa) finally assured peace in these regions.

The task was also an easy one in the western sector, since Rome already commanded the exits from the valleys; but on the side of Helvetia and the German tribes a new conquest had to be undertaken. It began somewhat later. In 15 B.C.³ the two sons-in-law of Augustus, Drusus and Tiberius (the future emperor), attacked the central part of the Alpine girdle. The former encountered the Ræti in the narrow passes of the Tyrol and won a victory over them there; while his brother, then governor of Gaul, attacked the same enemy in the flank through Helvetia. Not only by land were operations necessary: a real naval battle was fought on the lake of Constance against the light ships of the Vindelici, allies of the Ræti, and at one blow Eastern Switzerland and Southern Bavaria were added to the Empire.

In this way the upper Danube was reached, and it had already been reached further East by another lieutenant of Augustus. The province of Macedonia, created long ago, had been completely pacified in its southern districts, where the

¹ CLXII, IX, p. 16 *et seq.*; CLXVIII.

² CLXXI, p. 375-413.

³ CLXII, IX, p. 18 *et seq.*; XLVII, X, col. 2107.

population was Greek; but further inland the governors were involved in perpetual warfare against barbarian tribes, not only because the conditions were unsettled, but because even the boundaries of this district had never been defined. The best way to make them definite and lasting was to advance as far as the river which constituted a natural frontier. Octavius turned his eyes in this direction, thereby showing himself a worthy successor to Cæsar, whose projects had not escaped the notice of the kings who ruled in the Danubian countries. The first consequence was that the Daci, occupying the plains of what is now Hungary, who in the dictator's time had often invaded and ravaged the Illyrian regions, pronounced themselves to be on Antony's side as soon as his rivalry with the pursuer of Cæsar's policy stood revealed. In another quarter the barbarian tribes established on the right bank of the Danube—Bastarnæ, Bessi, Dardani, Odrysæ—took advantage of the universal disorder to extend their ravages and threaten even the Greek cities towards the Euxine, the natural clients of Rome, who was interested in protecting the whole Hellenic world.

Thus there was perpetual action and reaction in these parts, and no one could have said who was the aggressor.

A first series of operations,¹ before the end of the Republic, was merely preparatory and determined nothing; Octavius had not his hands free. He took hostages, seized the principal stronghold of Pannonia, and established there the strong Roman fortress of *Siscia*, a base for future expeditions. Shortly after the battle of Actium, M. Licinius Crassus, grandson of the triumvir, was appointed governor of Macedonia and charged with the task of restoring order in the surrounding country as far east as should be necessary. The programme was brilliantly and rapidly carried out; the Mæsonian tribes were reduced to impotence, and all the adjacent countries further south of the great river were intrusted to client princes, until the time should come for annexation pure and simple.²

Peace being restored in this region, including Rætia, the flanks of the army that was to act in Pannonia were secured

¹ Veith, *Die Feldzüge des C. Julius Cæsar Octavianus in Illyrien* (*Schriften der Balkankommission, antik. Abt., VII*), Wien, 1914.

² CLXII, IX, p. 8-16.

from attack. According to the Latin historians, the invasion was provoked by the rioting and brigandage of the inhabitants. The same authors are much more reticent about the details of the operations conducted by Tiberius (12-10);¹ but at any rate it is clear that they ended in the occupation of all the territories bordered by the Danube.

Disturbed by this increase of Roman power, the Thracians, who already barely tolerated the kings appointed by Rome, renewed their agitations and stubbornly resisted the troops of Lucius Piso. At length, in spite of some reverses, he carried the day, and it seemed essential to establish a military government in Mœsia, in order to terminate the intrigues that were being spun from one shore to the other.

Consequently, from Helvetia to the Black Sea, the frontier of the Empire appeared to be protected by the great water-course whose approaches on this side and on that were guarded by Roman camps.²

Nevertheless a river is not an impassable barrier, as the Romans discovered about this time in Germany.³ It was difficult to secure the complete separation of the countries on each side of the Rhine. The Germans were unwilling to renounce their inveterate custom of making raids on the left bank, and some Latin merchants were established on the other; in order to protect them, Roman generals had more than once crossed the river in arms. This was the most dangerous region of all; bands of Germans ravaged the country opposite to them, and even defeated a legion sent to drive them off.

Then (12 B.C.) the conqueror of the Ræti, Drusus, governor of the Gauls, undertook a great punitive and also preventive expedition.⁴ His ingenious idea was to attack the enemy in the rear by starting from the mouth of the Rhine, following the coast of the North Sea, and surprising, about the estuaries of the Ems and Weser, the Bructeri, Chauci and Cherusci,

¹ **CXI**, I, p. 1048; II, p. 660.

² **XCVI**, p. 387, 395, 401; Oxé, **IX**, CXIV (1906), p. 99 *et seq.*

³ **CH**, VI, chap. III.

⁴ **CXI**, I, p. 1061, 1082; II, p. 671, 690; **XCVI**, p. 418 *et seq.*

who were reckoned among the most formidable of these German tribes. But, although the fleet on its return encountered grave perils, this attack on the coast was nothing in comparison with the venture about to be made.

In the following year Drusus struck into the continent itself, to a very considerable distance, since he penetrated as far as the banks of the Elbe, not without fighting bloody battles both going and returning. The objective seemed to be gained, when he died prematurely in the year 9, and his elder brother Tiberius, who succeeded him, marched with his legions more freely through the whole of this territory, which was regarded as a new province and one of the most extensive.

But Roman settlements in the full sense of the word were not established far beyond the Rhine, except on some of its tributaries, especially the Lippe. Roads were made, as well as strong forts, most of them on the hill tops, and above all the policy of moving families from their homes was adopted; but this last measure proved illusory as a cure for the barbarians' discontent. Their secret exasperation hardly showed itself except in a very few clans of secondary importance; the rest reserved their strength for future warfare, and two large confederations were especially busy preparing for it.

In the quadrilateral of Bohemia, Marbod, king of the Marcomanni, strengthened by the submission of the neighbouring tribes, was preparing in the year 6 of our era to make the Romans pay for his long neutrality; but they got the start of him. One imperial army coming from the Main and another from the Danube were about to effect their junction to his cost, when at that moment, in the rear of these legions isolated in unfamiliar country, a great revolt was begun simultaneously by the Dalmatians and Pannonians at the instigation of old auxiliaries of the Roman army. Tiberius saved the situation thanks to the cowardice of Marbod, who dared not take advantage of it but was content to treat on equal terms. Nevertheless there needed three years of hard and incessant warfare,¹ which severely tested the Roman discipline and resolution (6-9), to bring finally under the yoke all the peoples south of the Danube. One army even crossed

¹ **CXI**, I, p. 1171; II, p. 772; **XCVI**, p. 428; R. Rau, **XXIII**, XIX (1924), p. 313-346.

the river for the second time¹ and captured a great number of Dacian prisoners.

Perhaps the result would have been different if all the Empire's foes had moved simultaneously, and if Marbod had been forced to abandon his trimming policy by an earlier appearance on the scene of that Hermann whom the Latin historians call Arminius.

The latter is a less faded personality. He was not a great sovereign like the king of the Marcomanni, but merely a Cheruscan prince, though one of royal lineage, who knew, in spite of his extreme youth, how to stir up the spirit of rebellion among his neighbours and persuade most of the tribes of the interior to move simultaneously.² The governor Varus, who was leading back his troops to their winter quarters, decided to make a *détour* and attack the centre of the disturbance; but, in the course of a wearisome march through the forest of Teutoburg, his 20,000 men were suddenly surrounded and massacred by the bands of Arminius. The Latin annalists have blackened the reputation of Varus in order to diminish their country's shame, and branded him with incompetence as a governor and as a general. The Germans are inclined to exalt the national "hero" who insured German independence once for all. But Mommsen's rapturous enthusiasm³ conflicts with fairer estimates:⁴ this champion of independence was a Roman citizen, a knight, an ex-officer of the Roman army, who devised no more honourable tactics than perjury and treason.

The disaster was a serious blow for Augustus, but it brought him to reason. He renounced this Germany,⁵ conquered and held by forces that were clearly inadequate,⁶ and only left a few small garrisons on the coast as far as the mouth of the Elbe. The occupation of Gaul, guaranteed by a mere cordon of troops, had awakened too many imprudent ambitions. The Celts had been betrayed by their own discords, but they were more capable of loyalty, and could appreciate the benefits of civilization to which barbarian

¹ The first was in 19 B.C. (A. von Premerstein, **XIX**, VII [1904], p. 215-239).

² **CXI**, I, p. 1194, 1205; II, p. 789-798.

³ **CLXII**, IX, p. 77.

⁴ **CXLVII**, p. 30.

⁵ **XCVI**, p. 451.

⁶ E. Kornemann, **XXIX**, XXV (1922), p. 42-62.

Germany remained impervious. The disaster of Teutoburg marked a turning-point in the foreign policy of Augustus: then, and only then, did it become truly defensive.

It had been so from the beginning in the countries of the Orient; and here we have to get rid of a stubborn delusion. At any rate the policy of gradual absorption had found new applications. Thus, on the death of king Amyntas (25 B.C.), Galatia became a Roman province. In Judæa, when Herod disappeared (4 B.C.), the kingdom was divided according to the terms of the royal will, which we may suppose to have been inspired by Rome. In future there were only tetrarchs and an ethnarch, and the territory of the latter, Antipas, was confiscated—as a result of his subjects' complaints, it is true—and annexed to the province of Syria (6 A.D.).¹ It is possible to regard these changes as inevitable, and in Judæa they might have been more extensive.

On the other hand, in an absolutely new country Augustus caused investigations to be made behind which it is very difficult not to discern the motive of conquest. Without at least a protectorate, he could not secure for Rome the economic control of the commercial wealth of Arabia by which he was tempted.² Except with silk,³ the caravans of the Orient did not pass along the continental road. Spices, perfumes and incense, wood of great value, precious stones, were carried across the Erythræan Sea, and all this traffic belonged to the Arabs. It would be profitable to rob them of it, so Augustus charged the prefect of Egypt, Ælius Gallus, with a mission to that effect (25-24).

The latter had for instructor and guide a minister of the king of the Nabatæans, of whom we only know the Greek name, Sullaos. The misfortunes that followed were laid to his charge and he was accused of treason. Was he in reality "a wise councillor whose advice was not followed"?⁴ Whoever studies the extraordinary career of this cynical

¹ W. Otto, **XLVII**, Suppl. II, col. 166-174; **CII**, V, chap. V and VI.

² **XCVI**, p. 380.

³ Alb. Hermann, in the *Quellen und Forschungen* of Sieglin, **XXI** (1910).

⁴ **CLII**, p. 11 *et seq.*

adventurer, which is now perfectly well known to us,¹ will be more ready to suppose that he treacherously misled the Romans.

The expedition started from Arsinoe (Suez), at the top of the Arabian Gulf, and proceeded by sea to Leuce Come, a town subject to the Nabatæan king. The voyage was a treacherous one along a coast all skirted with reefs and shoals on which a considerable number of boats were lost and even some of their crew. On arrival there, scurvy raged in the expeditionary force to such an extent that the leader judged it wise to winter in the port and wait for the spring of 24. Then, across a desert region where the water supply had to be carried on dromedaries, it took six months to reach Mariaba, the capital of the Sabæans. When the stock of provisions was used up, there was nothing for it but to raise the siege and fall back on the coast, in the neighbourhood of the modern town of Medina, whence Gallus transported the survivors to Myos Hormos; he had taken only 10,000 men with him. We do not know exactly what were the results of this enterprise so dearly won. It seems probable, nevertheless, that part of the traffic was deflected through Egypt, a Roman land, and that relations were kept up henceforward with certain Arab chiefs who had been impressed by this daring campaign and by the war material displayed before their eyes. The king of the Homerites and Sabæans was to become the "friend of the Cæsars," who had recognized commercial privileges at *Adana* (Aden).

The reduction in the number of troops in Egypt caused by the Arabian campaign had emboldened the Ethiopians to make raids on the middle region of the Nile Valley. Their persistent brigandage led to the occupation and annexation of Lower Ethiopia, previously a protectorate without military occupation, and this at any rate was an issue that had not been directly sought.

Although Augustus, who himself visited Asia Minor in the year 21, had left the petty sovereigns, except Amyntas, in possession of their territories, this screen appeared to him a very fragile one: Iamblichus in Arabia, Tarkonditomus in Cilicia, Mithridates in Commagene, Archelaus in Lesser Armenia, were princelings that a great flood would very soon

¹ Clermont-Ganneau, *Recueil d'archéologie orientale*, VII, p. 305-329.

have swept away. He was therefore anxious to make his power felt by the Parthians and in Greater Armenia.¹

In this latter State,² Artaxias represented on the throne the party of national independence. Roman intrigue (and perhaps gold) procured a rival for him in the person of his brother Tigranes, who was held as a hostage in Rome waiting for a favourable moment, and was invited to return by another faction, either through cowardice or venality. Augustus himself cannot have considered this faction a very important one, for it was no small army that he intrusted to Tiberius when he sent him to enthrone Tigranes, if necessary by force. Artaxias, however, confined himself to a policy of extreme caution, avoiding any interference in the disturbed affairs of Parthia; but an assassin put him out of the way and facilitated the task of Tiberius, who had only to instal Rome's protégé, Tigranes III (20).

What course would be taken by the Parthians, who sympathized with the murdered king? Their sovereign, Phraates, was unfirmly seated on the throne, unpopular, and subject in the highest degree to the influence of his wife, Thea Musa, an Italian slave whom he had received from Augustus; he feared, on his own account no doubt more than on that of his subjects, a new Roman attack, and he therefore took the initiative, made terms, and restored the standards won from Crassus and Antony, which were trophies belonging rather to the king than to the nation.³ Tiberius formally received them, and their restoration to Italy was the signal for exuberant official demonstrations.⁴

Among the Parthians, however, the disgrace was so deeply felt that Phraates' own son relieved them of his father by murdering him, and determined to adopt a policy of active intervention in Armenia. One more death—this time a natural one—that of Tigranes III (19), changed the course of events. By a sort of alternation that is curious to observe, his son Tigranes IV (19 B.C.—1 A.D.) was the man of the Iranian party, which recovered its vigour on his accession

¹ LIII, p. 66 *et seq.*; XCVI, p. 360 *et seq.*

² A. Abbruzzese, *Le Relazioni fra l' Armenia e Roma al tempo di Augusto*, Padova, 1903.

³ CLXXXI, p. 210.

⁴ Cf. the reliefs on the famous corselet of Augustus at Prima Porta, LXXVII, I, p. 622, fig. 328.

to power. Rome seemed to be baffled, and yet Augustus was resigned: "I could have made Armenia a province," he said afterwards in his political testament; "I preferred to give it to a friend of the Roman people." But this "friend" had only an insecure throne, and when an effort was made twelve years later to secure the acceptance of another in the person of a certain Artavasdes, the attempt was unsuccessful.

What was the meaning of this mere expectancy? Was Augustus haunted by memories of the disaster of Crassus and the trials of Antony? It seems most probable that the Germano-Danubian programme was in his opinion much more urgent and would require very large numbers of troops. Also he lacked a general, for he scorned to choose one who was not a member of his *gens*, and Tiberius had declined the position in favour of retirement to Rhodes. Finally, in the year 1 B.C., taking advantage of a general lull, he made choice of his grandson Gaius Cæsar, then twenty-one years of age. The large army which followed this young prince was not required to fight many battles. The Parthian kings of this period, continually shaken by the storms of family dissensions, were all in favour of peace. Phraataces renounced the suzerainty of Armenia on condition that his brothers, whom he wished to get rid of, were kept as hostages at Rome; so that, when Tigranes IV died in battle (1 A.D.), Augustus had no difficulty in securing the succession of the king of Media.¹ He boasted that he afterwards made the Parthians accept as king of Armenia his candidate Vonones.

There was no longer any need to make the Empire larger. After having secured an uninterrupted line of natural frontiers constituted by the sea, by great rivers or by the desert, it was good policy to keep within them. This is what may be gathered from the famous testament,² preserved in its Ancyran copy, where, although he recounts the whole series of his successes, Augustus tries to appear in the rôle of a

¹ LIII, p. 75.

² E. Kornemann, XXIII, XV (1917), p. 214 *et seq.* Compare the recovered fragments of the copy from Pisidian Antioch: David M. Robinson, *The Deeds of Augustus* [extr. from the *American Journal of Philology*, XLVII (1926)].

peace-maker rather than a conqueror. Yet no one, we repeat, extended the area of subject territory as much as he did, in spite of his tardy renunciation of all Germany from the Rhine to the Elbe. The Empire meant peace, but only in the long run and, to some extent, through force of circumstances. We might suppose that the founder of the new *régime*, being specially careful of his own fame, desired to bequeath to his successors only the less glorious task of preservation.

He was not Cæsar's heir in every particular. It was his earnest desire to maintain the supremacy of the Italian race and preserve its purity intact; he was therefore not at all lavish in bestowing Roman citizenship on provincials, and he took measures to prevent the abuse of wholesale enfranchisements. He was anxious at any rate to know exactly what were the resources of the Roman world and the number of his subjects; hence the creation of the census, whose regular recurrence was contemplated; but in this he was merely following the example of the Lagids, who had found in it an admirable fiscal instrument.

CHAPTER IV

THE END OF THE CONQUESTS. FROM TIBERIUS TO TRAJAN (14-117)

TIBERIUS,¹ the heir appointed by Augustus, was also an "old Roman," and had shown distinguished ability as a soldier. He was without great personal ambition, much more free than his predecessor from all vanity, cold and distant, simple and desirous of simplicity about him, shocked by the luxury displayed by rich provincials who were beginning to come to Italy and eclipse the Italians impoverished by civil wars and proscriptions; a prince, in fine, who refused to "shear his flock" and exact ruinous tribute. He showed great benevolence towards the Greeks, although he was inclined to react against Hellenic culture. He was a man of strict conscience, devoted to his duties, and his wisdom in practice was sustained by reflection. His dark misanthropy provoked him to acts of cruelty against this Roman society whose corruption sickened him; but to the end his strong intellect guaranteed firm government to the Empire and undeniable prosperity. Historical criticism has ceased to be misled about him by a tradition distorted through party spite,² and his remarkable provincial administration now stands clearly revealed. He dreamed of no new conquest and never allowed himself to be influenced in that direction by his advisers.

The son of Drusus had been sent into Germany to repress a revolt of the legions; he set about justifying by a more memorable exploit the surname of Germanicus which the Senate had conferred upon him also. Taking advantage of his troops' repentance, he led them across the Rhine,³ surprised various tribes by the rapidity of his blows, occupied

¹ Gelzer, **XLVII**, X, col. 478-536.

² Cf. A. Lang, *Beitrage zur Geschichte des Kaisers Tiberius*, Jena, 1911.

³ **XLVII**, X, col. 435 *et seq.*; F. Knoke, *Die Kriegszüge des Germanicus in Deutschland*, 2. Aufl., Berlin, 1922.

the forest of Teutoburg, and, on the ancient battle-field, performed the funeral rites of the fallen soldiers. Like his father, he caused a fleet to proceed along the coast, which through winds and tides came near to foundering altogether; and finally, at Idistavisus on the right bank of the Weser, he won a complete victory over Arminius and his Cherusci, which not only avenged the disaster of Varus, but seemed this time to justify the annexation, at first contemplated by Augustus, as far as the line of the Elbe. Soon afterwards, indeed, the Marcomanni and Cherusci annihilated one another (19).

But Tiberius resisted the temptation,¹ deeming the military and financial burdens too heavy to be borne, and also finding no local prince to establish or maintain in the country as Rome's vassal. The Empire ended, as before, at the barrier of the Rhine.

The emperor was less timid in the East, whither he dispatched this same Germanicus to provide against some imminent dangers. In Cappadocia the attitude of the king, Archelaus, seemed suspicious. After having summoned him to appear in Rome, where he died, Tiberius made his kingdom a Roman province, joining with it Commagene, where the dynasty was extinct. At one blow direct government was established as far as the banks of the Euphrates, and thus it became possible to watch Armenian affairs more easily. Vonones, the nominee of Augustus, had been driven out; Tiberius yielded to the wishes of the people and introduced (18) a young prince of Pontus under the name of Artaxias III.² The king of Parthia renounced all claims to the country.

We need not consider the recent (and doubtful) attempts that have been made to rehabilitate Caligula. Even if we suppose that there was something more behind his triumph over the Britons than the ludicrous episode recorded in history, it remains certain that no permanent conquest followed it, and that the first annexations in Britain were reserved for his successor.

Senatorial tradition is no less embittered in its portrait

¹ CXLVII, p. 38.

² LIII, p. 79 *et seq.*

of Claudius, the brother of Germanicus, making him a dolt and clown, the plaything of his wives and freedmen. It was the army that proclaimed him emperor, and it was through favourites of humble origin that he was to govern. The oligarchy could not acquit him of such faults, or of the effrontery, due to a far-seeing policy, with which he had introduced the leading citizens of long-haired Gaul into the Senate house.¹ There is no doubt whatever that he too took a vigilant interest in the provinces and set before himself the ideal of basing the Empire's rule on a good understanding with its subjects.

In the succession of emperors Claudius is one of those who followed the tradition of Julius Cæsar. In particular, he returned to the latter's designs on Britain, which had been scorned by Augustus, who considered a military occupation extravagant—and also unnecessary, since the Britons did not seem to him to be dangerous. This last opinion had to be modified in view of subsequent events: the Celtic and above all the Druid influence had to be kept under in Gaul, and it was necessary to attack it at its source.²

An expeditionary force, proceeding at first without any enthusiasm, quickly won some easy successes; and yet damaging surprise attacks were made from the ambush of river beds and marshes. Finally Claudius himself, summoned by his legate Aulus Plautius, gained the credit of a decisive victory over one of the most important sovereigns of the country. In consequence of it, several petty kings were made captive and various tribes submitted, though it is very difficult to estimate the proportion of gains to losses from the authors' accounts. When the emperor departed, Plautius remained behind as governor, and it seems probable that he incorporated in the Empire about one half of what the future province was to be at the time of its greatest extent.

On the German frontier Claudius remained faithful to the defensive policy, though he consented to intervene in the internal affairs of the Germans in order to insure their disunion and at the same time the tranquillity of Gaul. Corbulo,³ the best general of the time, becoming governor of Germany, wished to resume the policy of Drusus. He crossed the

¹ CXLII, IV, p. 174.

² CXCIII, p. 33 *et seq.*

³ Stein, XLVII, Suppl. III, col. 394-410.

Lower Rhine and conducted a brilliant campaign against the Chauci and the Frisians, but Claudius stopped him in the midst of his success and recalled him to the left bank.

In Africa the killing of Ptolemy in Caligula's reign had been followed by a revolt of the Moors. It was suppressed and led to the creation of the two provinces of Mauretania (42).

In the Greek countries another protected dynasty ceased to exist: its last sovereign, Rhœmetalcès III, was assassinated (46) and Thrace became a Roman province.

In the extreme eastern parts of the Empire confusion persisted, and it would have been dangerous to abstain from all intervention.¹ Claudius gave his support to Mithridates king of Iberia, whom Tiberius himself had prompted to invade Armenia in his desire to resist the encroachments of the Parthian king, who had married his son there. A Roman garrison remained encamped at *Gorneæ*, close to the modern Erivan; but it did not prevent the adverse faction from massacring the Iberian and his family, or the Arsacids from re-establishing their influence over the country. Nero was to be forced to intervene in his turn.

The latter² was not at the beginning of his reign the blood-thirsty masquerader whose exploits are too well known. He seems to have formed a true oriental policy, and attempts have been made to trace its guiding lines.³ In the first place he proposed to come to an understanding with Parthia, since that State was too large and too powerful to be absorbed or even made a protectorate. Rome must therefore reduce her pretensions to Armenia, a natural fortress against the Arsacids, if a great foreign nation dominated it. The essential interest of the Empire was to protect the trade routes leading into the heart of Asia by means of a constant diplomatic and, if necessary, military activity. Apart from that, it was idle to entertain ambitious designs so far from the base in Italy. On the other hand, why should the northern shores

¹ LIII, p. 81-84.

² Hohl, XLVII, Suppl. III, col. 349-394.

³ CXXVI, p. 153 *et seq.*; W. Schur, XXIII, N.F., Beiheft II, 1923.

of the Euxine be ignored, since its southern coast was already occupied and the line of the Danube gave a convenient means of access to them? Nero would gladly have encircled the whole of the Black Sea with a chain of provinces. As a reply to the advance of the Alani in the West, he planned an expedition to the Caucasus, but he only had time to prepare the way for it by sending the legate of Mœsia across the Borysthenes.¹

The Parthians took the responsibility of commencing hostilities by an invasion of Armenia.² Thereupon a solution of the problem by compromise became popular at Rome and attempts were made to bring it about: Armenia was to remain independent, but its king, chosen from the family of the Arsacids, was to receive his investiture from Cæsar. Corbulo, who was in charge of the operations,³ found Armenia a prey to devastation in which the neighbouring peoples played their part. He entered Artaxata, burnt it, since he could not keep it garrisoned, took Tigranocerta, and then, for reasons that remain obscure, retired into Syria. Meanwhile his successor, Cæsennius Pætus, suffered a heavy defeat at Rhandea, whereupon Corbulo began a new campaign with considerable forces. The king of Parthia had learnt wisdom and consented that his brother Tiridates should go to Rome to receive the crown of Armenia, but only with the greatest honours (66).

We may pass over the ephemeral reigns that followed Nero's violent death; but in this period, before he became emperor (69-79), Vespasian⁴ had to take strenuous action in Judæa. We know in what savage strife the rival factions tore each other to pieces; the envoy of the central authority could not avoid taking most cruel measures of repression. Indeed the medal with the device *Judæa capta* celebrated a great Roman victory, but this bloody episode led to nothing more than an administrative change, the substitution of legates for procurators. It was merely the end of a revolt like the one which Vespasian had to repress in Gaul.

In Germany we have seen that the idea of advancing to the line of the Elbe had been abandoned; but the re-entrant

¹ E. Taeubler, **XXIII**, IX (1909), p. 14-28.

² **LIII**, p. 88 *et seq.*

³ **CLXXXI**, p. 268 *et seq.*

⁴ Weynand, **XLVII**, VI, col. 2623-2695.

angle in the Empire's territory between what are now Switzerland and Alsace presented grave dangers. Already, in the reigns of Caligula and Claudius, bridge-heads had been established with advanced posts in the neighbourhood of Mainz and Frankfort. Vespasian was still more daring: one of his legates penetrated further into the interior and built a direct fortified road from the upper Rhine to the upper Danube. Behind it (south-west of the country of Baden) Gallic colonists were established, and this territory was called the *Agri Decumates*, not from the word for a tithe—whatever may have been said—for no tithe was imposed on them, but from an old technical word used in castrametation.¹

In Britain, where Vespasian had already achieved brilliant exploits and left a great name, able governors of his own appointment—Cerialis, Frontinus, and finally Agricola—advanced towards the west and north, the last of them penetrating as far as the heart of Scotland. Tacitus insinuates in his panegyric that jealousy dissuaded Domitian from prolonging Agricola's command and thus put an end to his successes which might have continued. We shall see² that this version of the events is highly suspicious.

The same historian has tried, in agreement with Pliny the Younger, to ridicule the operations of Domitian in central Europe, as well as the titles of *Germanicus* and *Dacicus* that he conferred upon himself at his triumph. But the unlucky wars on the Danube³ at least inspired him with a wise decision—to establish a *limes* between the Danube and the Black Sea; and the excavations on the *limes* of the Rhine no longer allow us to ridicule his activities.⁴ He had to restore a situation disturbed by the movements of the Chatti, and he took care not to abandon the positions before Mainz; moreover, certain medals recovered from the ruins of the fortifications, which bear the names of legions that were only in Germany during his reign, set to his credit the final shortening of the frontier between the Rhine and the Danube, which was brought about by making provincial territory of the *Agri Decumates*, whose area had been much enlarged

¹ Ellis Hesselmeier, **XXIII**, XIX (1924), p. 253-276.

² Cf. below, **BRITAIN**.

³ E. Koestlin, *Die Donaukriege Domitians*, Tübingen, 1910.

⁴ Fabricius, **XLVII**, XIII, col. 585 *et seq.*

since Vespasian's time. The tyrannical spirit of this emperor (81-96) and the cruelties of his last years have caused him to be judged with a too uniform malevolence.¹

The outrageous language and calumnies of the old nobility justified Vespasian in purifying the Senate by admitting provincials of worth. In this connexion the history of the Empire is made up of contradictory tendencies. The rise to supreme power of a Spaniard, Trajan (98-117)—a highly romanized Spaniard, no doubt, like his immediate ancestors—would, we should have thought, have promoted a liberal policy and a wide extension of the right of citizenship; but in spite of his origins he was niggardly in bestowing the *civitas Romana* and very anxious to preserve the supremacy of Italy.

Trajan appears in history as the last of the conquering Cæsars. Yet he does not seem to have been immediately possessed by genuine ambition, whereas he at once took in hand his work within the Empire. He began by hastening the completion of the defensive works rendered necessary by the absorption of the Agri Decumates, and the result was a long reign of peace in those regions.² But, inclined by his military genius to embrace warlike schemes, he made it his duty to end the humiliation inflicted on the Romans since the year 90 by the payment of an annual tribute to Decebalus, king of the Dacians. Moreover, this nation had racial affinities with the Thracians, which was a ground for anxiety; and its sovereign, provided by Domitian with the engineers and workmen that he demanded,³ was endeavouring to civilize his people and organize his army on Roman lines.⁴

This Dacian people had a stronghold, fortified by nature, in the deep vale of Transylvania which, notwithstanding its comparative remoteness from the Danube, left no peace to the inhabitants of the other bank. The only way to protect them against the bands organized in this retreat was to take possession of it and of the intermediate plains as well. This

¹ CXV, p. 262 *et seq.*; Weynand, XLVII, VI, col. 2541-2596.

² CXLIX, p. 23 *et seq.*

³ CXV, p. 222.

⁴ CXLIX, p. 33 *et seq.*

scheme necessitated two very hard campaigns (101-102 and 105-106), of which we possess no contemporary record; certain data from a subsequent period have to be compared with the great collection of figures which constitutes Trajan's column—a sort of picture narrative, recording some of the episodes only, in the light of which attempts have nevertheless been made to reconstruct Trajan's expeditions.¹

In the first of them he got as far as Sarmizegetusa, the capital of Decebalus, who submitted and agreed to accept very hard conditions; but, after an interval of only a few months, he broke all his pledges, rebuilt his forts, and began to organize a sort of confederation against the Empire. Then Trajan decided on annexation pure and simple, and set out from Moesia along the Oltu, while his lieutenants advanced from Pannonia by the Temes. Hemmed in on every side, the Dacians yielded, their capital was taken once more, and the king committed suicide. We shall see further on² what were the results of this conquest and the fortunes of Roman civilization in these lands.

Pleased by his first successes in Dacia, Trajan formed the design of extending to the various extremities of the Empire, where the frontier districts were in constant danger, the defensive system which has been justly called the system of *glacis*.³ From this point of view security must have seemed to him especially precarious in the East.

First of all, even if the desert might provide a convenient frontier, it was still necessary that the border regions should be pacified; otherwise there would be a place of refuge for rebels where all trace of them would be lost. No final arrangement had been made with regard to the Nabatæan Arabs, who occupied the wildest parts of Syria. After his legate Scaurus had driven king Aretas (or Aretath) from Palestine, Pompey had intended to pursue him as far as Petra, but he had been held back by difficulties in his rear. Scaurus merely made an incursion and ravaged the Nabatæan country, until the Arab agreed to make terms and buy his lands for the sum of 300 talents.⁴ Nevertheless there was a kind of nominal suzerainty, which had proved sufficient,

¹ LXXVII, I, p. 641-648; G. A. T. Davis, XXII, VII (1917), p. 74-97.

² See below, THE DANUBIAN REGIONS.

³ CXXXIV, p. 180 *et seq.*

⁴ LXVIII, p. 448-451.

especially since, from the reign of Augustus, efforts had been made to deflect the caravans to another route. But Nabatæans from Petra or Bostra robbed the merchants who still crossed their territory on the way from the valley of the Nile to that of the Euphrates. Occupied himself with the second Dacian war, Trajan directed his legate to reduce Arabia to the status of a province: the task seems to have been quickly performed (105), and henceforward the prosperity of Petra was only the more firmly established.

When the southern portion of the *limes* of the East had thus been organized, the emperor turned his attention to the northern part. He was not merely influenced by private ambition,¹ for public opinion supported him, and Court poets strove to give expression to it. Chance gave him a pretext: a Parthian king recently crowned (110), Chosroes II, announced the disenthronement of the king of Armenia, and, on his own authority, without consulting Rome, substituted the banished man's brother, Parthamasiris.² The challenge was immediately taken up, and the Parthian king, whose courage failed him, made haste to ask for ratification. Trajan rejected his overtures and invaded the country with an army; and when the interested party in his turn claimed to receive the crown from the emperor's hands, the latter announced that Armenia would become a Roman province, and sent back the intruder under a strong escort as far as the Parthian frontier. On the way an attempt at resistance caused him to be put to death—if he did not fall into an ambushade. The Armenian nation could only submit, and Trajan daringly advanced into Mesopotamia,³ where the principal towns, Edessa and Nisibis, quickly fell into his hands. After wintering at Antioch, he resumed his march, crossed the Tigris, broke the opposition in Adiabene, which he made into the province of Assyria, and created a third province, Mesopotamia, whose southern boundary he fixed at the Persian Gulf. Neither the Greek city Seleucia nor the Iranian city Ctesiphon held out against him.

Triumphal progresses have their intoxication. When he reached the shores of the Indian Ocean, Trajan must have

¹ Cuntz, **XVI**, **LXI** (1926), p. 192-202.

² **LIII**, p. 103 *et seq.*; **CLXXXI**, p. 304 *et seq.*

³ **CXLIX**, p. 149 *et seq.*

said to himself that there too the sea would provide a frontier for the Empire: but what of the country further east? Returning to Babylon to sacrifice to Alexander, he fell to pondering the great exploits of his predecessor, and it is said that he was preparing to advance towards India when he learnt that revolts had broken out in every district behind him, and that the small garrisons left on his route had been expelled or massacred. He dispatched one of his legates, Lucius Quietus, who acted with ability, reconquered Nisibis and other towns, and destroyed Edessa which was more recalcitrant. The revolt seemed to have been crushed; so much so that the emperor ventured to crown a king of Parthia at Ctesiphon; but in the meantime the rightful king, Chosroes, who had passed into Armenia, was endeavouring to cut off his retreat. Nevertheless Trajan succeeded in reaching Syria; but the climate and over-exertion had done their work, and he was dangerously ill. Thinking it wiser to return to Italy, he intrusted the command to his nephew Hadrian; but death overtook him almost immediately on the coast of Cilicia (117).

The great problem raised by his last exploits had not been finally solved, but Trajan could think that he left the Empire larger and perhaps more firmly established in the East—as soon as peace should be restored there. With him the period of conquest and expansion came to an end. After him other views were adopted, and although here and there Rome might still make some small advance, it never aimed at anything more than a comparatively unimportant rectification of frontiers. A new era began in which the need for rest and recuperation was predominant, and the time was at hand when, instead of wars of their own choosing, the emperors would wage none but those imposed on them by others.

CHAPTER V

CONSOLIDATION AND DEFENCE

PROCLAIMED emperor at Antioch, where the echo of recent events could not fail to be louder than in the West, Hadrian, who had himself participated in them, was not found unprepared. Reflection must have convinced him very soon of his predecessor's great rashness. In theory Mesopotamia had been annexed—a fertile country, but one of length without breadth, dominated by mountains close at hand which made the Tigris a most inadequate barrier, and inevitably requiring the establishment of very many military posts. Again, the mountain block of Armenia was so closely connected with the Iranian plateau that only an arbitrary frontier could be drawn between them. The province of Arabia could easily be attached to Syria, and that was the only one which Hadrian retained; as for the other three, *omittere maluit quam exercitu retinere*.¹ The desert of the Nejd was a protection to the countries of Syria and Palestine, and helped to isolate southern Mesopotamia, which was too far distant for safety from Asia Minor and the Mediterranean. This great spear-head of territory among hostile peoples would have been a grave embarrassment to the Empire when it was called upon to suppress the last and most terrible Jewish revolt of 132.

Instead of coveting new dominions, Hadrian made it his principle to consolidate those which seemed to be really secured.² This lover of peace devoted all his care to works of defence, and did not hesitate to build his wall in Britain to the rear of the most advanced Roman positions. Opposed to any adventurous policy himself, he was no less anxious to discourage his neighbours from adopting one. He was a great traveller who journeyed through the whole extent of his Empire;³ and he guaranteed peace not only by his

¹ Fronto, *Princ. Hist.*, frag. 4 (ed. B.G. Niebuhr, 1816).

² CVII, p. 137 *et seq.*

³ CCXVII.

precautions, the training of troops and the fortifications that he caused to be made, but also by his affability of manner, his wide understanding of the various temperaments and aspirations of his numerous subjects, his zeal in restoring ruins, his liberality, and the readiness with which, especially in Gaul, he bestowed the Latin right and the privilege of Roman citizenship. There can be no doubt that, when he died (138), the provinces had made great progress towards assimilation; the sight of the emperor himself visiting their towns was a more intimate bond than the cult of the *divi*.

With regard to the peoples on the frontier, he deliberately followed the example of Augustus, giving presents and subsidies to the barbarian chiefs in the hope of winning their attachment and thus spending less than it would have cost to repel their attacks. On the Danube he made a treaty with the Roxolani which was bought by the Empire's money, and thereby a new policy was inaugurated.

The reign (138-161) of Antoninus Pius¹ was for the most part as peaceful as that of Hadrian. Notwithstanding his keen sense of the responsibilities of power, no one carried the spirit of conciliation so far as he did. But he was oppressed by the excessive size of the Empire. In its barbarous regions the peoples easily perceived that the normal garrisons, very limited in number, would not be strong enough to control them. The Dacians and Mauretanians were restless; the Brigantes in Britain provoked Antoninus to cut them off from Caledonia by means of a second wall built further north. These were still no more than shadows of coming events, but Marcus Aurelius had to wage war unsparingly through the whole of his reign (161-180) merely to preserve the Roman heritage.

In the East, Hadrian's otherwise prudent abnegation, following hard upon Trajan's terrifying invasion, had revived the ambitions of Parthia,² especially in regard to Armenia. Antoninus with difficulty averted or postponed the crisis. In the reign of Marcus Aurelius, Vologeses III dethroned

¹ Cf. G. Lacour-Gayet, *Antonin le Pieux et son temps*, Paris, 1888.

² **LIII**, p. 111 *et seq.*; **CLXXXI**, p. 319 *et seq.*

Rome's vassal king and gave the Armenians a substitute; the governor of Cappadocia experienced a real disaster at Elegeia, and when the Parthians, after a sudden raid into north-western Mesopotamia which overthrew the vassal princes, proceeded to invade Syria, the legate of that province pusillanimously decamped with his troops. Years of hard fighting were necessary¹ to restore the situation as far as the Euphrates, and only at a later date still was it possible to cross the river and drive the enemy from Osrhoene. Marcus Aurelius, for all his moderation, deemed it unavoidable to make a demonstration of power: the hostile capitals, Seleucia and Ctesiphon, once more beheld Roman troops, but the emperor then persuaded himself that a second retirement would not, like the first, be interpreted as a confession of weakness. He returned to the *status quo*, appointed his own vassal king of Armenia, and renewed the protectorate over the Mesopotamian lands that were half enclosed within the loop of the Euphrates.

It was all of no avail. Throughout the Orient there had been a formidable upheaval which revived the instincts of plunder and disorder; piracy was resumed off the shores of the Euxine, and war had to begin again with the pirates² in the region of the Caucasus and on the coasts of the Cimmerian Bosphorus.

At the same time the Germanic peoples found the occasion a favourable one for making a combined offensive: Quadi, Marcomanni, Iazyges, Roxolani swept simultaneously over Pannonia and made their way so far as to be within sight of the Adriatic.³ Marcus Aurelius himself took charge of the operations (167) which were long and thankless,⁴ complicated by a terrible plague and by shortage of money. After many encounters, he succeeded in expelling the barbarians from Pannonia and securing the surrender of a host of soldiers; but the drain upon his forces compelled him to have recourse to that short-sighted policy whereby the

¹ **CLXXXI**, p. 325 *et seq.*: C. Harold Dodd, *Numismatic Chronicle*, XI (1913), p. 162-191, 276-282.

² A. von Premenstein, **XXIII**, XI (1911), p. 357 *et seq.*; XII (1912), p. 139 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, **CLXIII**, IV, p. 487-497.

⁴ A. von Domaszewski, *Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, V (1895), p. 107-130; E. Ritterling, **XXXVI**, LIX (1904), p. 186-189; A. von Premenstein, **XXIII**, XI (1911), p. 355-366; XIII (1913), p. 70-104.

defence of the frontiers was entrusted to the very men best situated to violate them: he enrolled the barbarians, and sold his patrimony in the Forum to procure their pay.

But his hopes were deceived: at the end of four years (178) he was urgently compelled to take the field again. Fortunately Dacia, a sort of enclave among hostile territories, provided him with an excellent base from which to attack the Germanic hordes in the rear. The advantages of this position seem to have suggested to him the plan, if not of returning to the policy of his distant predecessor and advancing the boundary of the Empire as far as the Elbe,¹ at least of incorporating within it the quadrilateral of Bohemia and all the land enclosed by the Carpathians, in which case Roman territory in this quarter would have opposed a mountainous front to the barbarians. But the premature death of Marcus Aurelius changed the course of history; his worthless son Commodus made haste to purchase peace of the Marcomanni, in order to return more quickly to the capital and there enjoy, in vice and debauchery, the intoxication of absolute power.

Except for this last reign, the period of the Antonines, which covers the greater part of the second century, had been generally a happy one for the provinces, on the whole the best they had experienced. Some facts, however, strike our attention as omens of evil.

The defensive wars of Marcus Aurelius had only postponed a deadly peril which, in the third century, would stand revealed in all its besetting continuity. Henceforward the barbarians of central Europe would allow the Empire no respite.²

Moreover, the spirit of the army had gradually changed under conditions which prepared the way for what might be called the tyranny of the common soldier. It had not lost its fighting qualities, or at least the European legions had not, for those of Asia, which were similarly recruited on the

¹ CLXII, IX, p. 292-302.

² Cf. James H. MacBride, *Barbarian Invasions of the Roman Empire*, Boston, 1926.

spot, no longer showed more than moderate ardour; but it was in process of acquiring an improper position in the State. We must not confuse it with the army of the last days of the Republic. Then the troops were the devoted servants of individual leaders who intoxicated them with victory and its rewards—rewards before which even the Senatorial opposition was destined to capitulate. Now the converse phenomenon was at hand: the State was surfeited with conquest, but it no longer produced generals superior to the rest of mankind and above the reach of the law. Military despotism was born again, this time among the rank and file: it was no longer exercised by the generals but by the soldiery, who claimed the right of electing their master and controlling his actions. Roman citizens, yet all of provincial origin, the legionaries felt most in sympathy with leaders who were provincials like themselves, and the professional officers who enjoyed their confidence were themselves citizens of no long standing in the Empire. Thus Africans, Syrians and Illyrians came to be seated on the throne, and with them was introduced a very adulterated form of Roman culture; even without the edict of Caracalla, the army would very soon have developed this kind of hybridism.

Septimius Severus (193-211) was an African emperor and remained an African all his life.¹ He retained the indomitable energy and inflexible sternness of his origin; yet, if he laboured much for himself and his family—and the worst consequence of this was the transmission of the Principate to his sons—Rome benefited by his endeavours. No doubt the real motive of his expedition against the Parthians² was a desire to take vengeance on them for their support of his rival Niger; but by his triumphal progress and the capture of Seleucia, Babylon and Ctesiphon for the third time, he constrained the Arsacids to accept a better solution of the eastern frontier problem than the one which had been adopted hitherto. Annexing Upper Mesopotamia, formerly a mere vassal state, as far as the line of the Aborras, he procured for the Empire in the regions of the Tigris and Euphrates a reasonable frontier by mutual agreement, which, except

¹ M. Platnauer, *The Life and Reign of the Emperor Lucius Septimius Severus*, Oxford, 1918; Fluss, **XLVII**, IIa, col. 1940 *et seq.*

² **CXXII**, p. 110-128.

for a few minor adjustments, remained unchanged for four centuries.¹

We must now distinguish the lasting innovations from the transient phases created by anarchy, invasion and all the other events of the melancholy third century, a period about which our information is extremely defective, and drawn from very few sources, in which criticism is constantly detecting interpolations.² At any rate they give a correct general impression, showing us the provinces left forsaken and obliged to defend themselves against brigandage and the pressure of the barbarians which was everywhere felt, on the Rhine, the Danube and the Euphrates. In such general negligence there was great temptation for a professional soldier who had reached the highest commands to profit by his prestige and usurp the supreme authority. More than one yielded to it; but many others were made Cæsars by force, threatened with death if they refused, and convinced by precedent that the end of their reign would be, after a brief respite, either assassination or an inglorious death in fratricidal conflict. Among them were semi-barbarians, uncultured men with equivocal pasts but full of mettle, who, although as little Latins as could be, were nevertheless impressed by the majesty of Rome and zealous to fight for her.³

The texts and other documents bear witness to innumerable attacks repelled, or ended, after futile slaughter, by the exhaustion of both sides. Vast territories changed hands again and again. We should marvel that complete disruption and general collapse were not the results, if we did not remember that, after all, it was the Roman contingents among the combatants that showed the least indiscipline and the most military skill. Besides, there was even more anarchy among the enemies of the Empire.

And yet there was one exception. If in central Europe, in Caledonia, or south of the Atlas range there was no great

¹ LXXXI, p. 8-10, 382.

² Cf. Ch. Lécivain, *Études sur l'Histoire Auguste*, Paris, 1908; L. Homo, XXXV, CLI (1926), p. 161-198.

³ CXXXIV, p. 89 *et seq.* On the "thirty tyrants," H. Peter, *Abhandlungen der Leipziger Akademie*, XXVII (1909), p. 179-222.

disciplined State capable of organizing its attacks, in the East, at the end of the reign of Alexander Severus,¹ something of capital importance occurred: the advent (between 227 and 228) of the Sassanid dynasty. This immediately gave more consistency and vigour to the always incoherent action of the Parthians. The help of the king of Armenia, an old partisan of the dethroned Arsacid ruler, enabled Alexander to resist the first assault and conclude an agreement of which little is known, though it could only be provisional. Others were less fortunate: Philip signed a disgraceful treaty and, later, Valerian was taken captive, the victim of a treacherous ambushade.

At this point of time (260), the Roman State really lost its unity. There was a *Roman Empire of the Gauls*,² comprising also Britain and Spain, and its Cæsar, Postumus, was a remarkable ruler, able to maintain the barrier of the Rhine against the Germans and the Franks, whose name now appears in history; but his task was relatively easy and his frontier narrow compared with that which had to be maintained by the other emperor, who was master of all the rest of Europe and of Africa.

The latter, Gallienus, who is calumniated by the *Historia Augusta*,³ could not hold every point simultaneously. Before him, Decius had stemmed the first inundation of the Goths,⁴ but he had died in harness, and the flood subsequently assumed vaster proportions. Gallienus tried to negotiate with some barbarian kings, among others with the king of the Marcomanni, but he did not succeed in saving Dacia. This advanced position had been very valuable so long as there was a prospect of forestalling invasion, but it was sacrificed on the day when the humbler policy of entrenchment behind a barrier was adopted, for then nothing equalled the barrier of the Danube.

In the East Gallienus felt himself reduced to complete impotence;⁵ the Persian king Sapor had crossed the Euphrates

¹ **LIII**, p. 120 *et seq.*; E. Callegari, *Impresse militari e morte di Alessandro Severo*, Padova, 1897; A. Jardé, *Études critiques sur la vie et le règne de Sévère-Alexandre*, Paris, 1925, p. 76-85.

² See below, **THE GAULS**.

³ L. Homo, **XXXV**, CXIII (1913), p. 1-12.

⁴ Schoenfeld, **XLVII**, Suppl. III, col. 797-845.

⁵ **XXXV**, CXIII (1913), p. 235 *et seq.*

and invaded Cappadocia and Cilicia. Chance fortunately supplied a useful auxiliary in the person of Odenathus, ethnarch of Palmyra; and, far from discouraging his ambitions, Gallienus appointed him *dux* or commander-in-chief for Asia, a delegate of the Empire. In principle he merely reconstituted one of those great *imperia* that had been created two or three centuries before.¹ No doubt the Arab simply regarded it as an opening in the game and intended to serve his own ends, but an official appointment could not fail to assist his plans. Defeated and leaving immense booty behind him, Sapor precipitately re-crossed the Euphrates, while Odenathus, following him hard, advanced as far as Ctesiphon.

There the king of Palmyra died by an assassin's hand, leaving very disturbed conditions behind him. His son Vaballathus and his widow Zenobia demanded the renewal of the previous agreements. Gallienus refused and was about to hurl against them the forces that he pretended to lead against Persia, when he was recalled by the invasions of Europe. Soon afterwards a conspiracy of his lieutenants, more than one of whom was destined to succeed him, put an end to his skilful diplomacy by murder (268).

The Illyrian emperors, who then followed in succession (268-285), bear names which history has relegated to a sort of twilight of renown. They were very much better than the reputation they have borne until quite recently, for attention has too long been concentrated on their obvious faults. With the exception of Probus, they were coarse and uncultured men, who coolly participated in conspiracy and murder; they were barbarians too in more than one sense of the word; but what exalted them was their indomitable energy, their military genius, their unresting activity, their stubborn and almost fanatical consciousness of the grandeur of Rome and the dignity of the Empire. In their very short reigns of from two to six years they performed astonishing feats, and the work of the great emperors who had colonized and equipped the Danubian regions was brilliantly justified by the appearance at the appointed time of these puissant personalities.

Claudius II (268-270) drove back the Alamanni from

¹ A. R. Boak, *American Historical Review*, XXIV (1918-1919), p. 1 *et seq.*

northern Italy and earned his title of "Gothic"¹ by his brilliant victory at *Naissus* (Nisch). Aurelian (270-275) carried on his work in the same quarter. In order to gain time, he granted to the successors of Odenathus what Gallienus had refused them; but, as soon as his hands were free, he remorselessly treated as enemies those he had formally appointed his delegates, who, on the strength of their title, occupied simultaneously Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt. In a short space of time he overcame them, abolished this ephemeral empire of the Orient,² and finally suppressed the last of the Gallic Cæsars.

Probus (276-282) above all accomplished prodigies. He appeared on every frontier, from Gaul to Egypt, from Rætia to Armenia. A word from him was sufficient to terrify the Sassanid king. More remarkable still, considering the period in which he lived, he did not confine himself to repelling attacks, but assumed the offensive, meditated an extension of the Empire in Germany, built a last advanced wall in this region, wrung recruits from the defeated tribes and distributed them among his armies, transported barbarians to other lands in order to tame them and break up their solidarity, compelled his soldiers—and this was what ruined him—to resume as in former days their peaceful avocations in the interval between two campaigns, to plant vines, drain marshes and clear waste lands.

Carus (282-283) also had plans of conquest and invaded the whole of Mesopotamia, but he disappeared mysteriously. Our meagre sources are not in agreement as regards the precise nature of the relations with Persia during this period.

Never, in short, did the Roman armies display greater activity; but political and social demoralization complicated their task and prevented their success. On the whole, they were responsible for this negation or doubtful tenure of authority. Rome's destiny moved in a vicious circle: the military element, retaining its vigour, claimed to dominate the civil power and assign it to persons of its own choice; but, for want of agreement, the Empire being too huge, many different choices were made, and the legions were exhausted simultaneously in domestic broils and foreign warfare.

¹ L. Homo, *De Claudio Gothico*, Lut. Par., 1903.

² CXXXV, p. 84-115.

These disastrous conditions were to persist for a century, and in the long run the plan of dividing the Empire, conceived by Diocletian, was only to increase the anarchy. At first sight it seemed a reasonable conception; but, from the moment that a fundamental rule of succession, recognized by public opinion, ceased to exist, the tumultuary election of a ruler in any part of the Empire lost its revolutionary and separatist appearance and became simply a new application of an established system. The subdivision of the provinces¹ was only a partial protection against this danger; in any case war favoured the great military commands.

We must not forget, however, that among the chosen rulers more than one opposed partition. From Diocletian to Theodosius there was to be almost continuous strife between the two tendencies of unification and division; and, according to circumstances, we shall see one, two, three or four rulers invested at a given moment with the imperial dignity. The man who has restored unity in his own interest by force of arms will divide the Empire among his sons, the most daring of whom will think of nothing but a return to the unity of his father's time. This intermixture of Augusti and Cæsars, of rulers appointed at Rome or tumultuarily elected in some distant province, renders the history of the fourth century extremely complicated, and has provided so much material for historians² that among other subjects our own have been comparatively overshadowed—namely, the protection of the frontiers, the repulse of the barbarians, and the difficulties with Persia.

In the East the question of the Persian frontier was always the rock of offence.³ During the reign of Diocletian,⁴ the Armenian throne was occupied by Tiridates, who had spent his youth on Roman soil. The new Sassanid, Narses (*circ.* 293), did not hesitate to drive him out and invade his kingdom; whereupon Diocletian entrusted the task of avenging this insult to the Cæsar Galerius, who was at first defeated, but subsequently won the great victory of Nisibis. This gave the Romans acknowledged possession of Northern Mesopotamia and of the five *regiones Transstigritanæ*,⁵ to which

¹ CLXIII, V, p. 561-588.

² CXXXIV, p. 107-130.

³ C. Huart, *Ancient Persia and Iranian Civilization*, etc., p. 152 *et seq.*

⁴ LIII, p. 135 *et seq.*

⁵ LXXXI, p. 10.

a special status was given: they became as it were Roman "satrapies," keeping their own dynasties and remaining attached to Armenia, but as vassals of Rome; while, as regards the rest of the kingdom, the Empire only retained its general right of investiture.

In vain did the kings of Iran endeavour to withdraw this concession and recover Osrhoene; the state of affairs remained unchanged for more than sixty years. Finally, towards the end of the reign of Constantius, Sapor II reopened hostilities, and the task of barring his way fell to Julian.¹ With a picked force he once more traversed the whole of Syria as far as Ctesiphon: a military pleasure-trip, as it might be called, which determined nothing. He crossed the Tigris only to find the country ravaged by Sapor's orders, whereupon, misled by treason, he was beginning a wearisome retreat when, in a skirmish, he received a javelin wound which proved fatal.

The army at once proclaimed Jovian²—a deplorable choice. This wretched leader shamefully accepted Sapor's conditions, surrendered most of the *gentes* beyond the Tigris, and even on this side of it a whole district which included Nisibis, the scene of his predecessors' exploits and a great Roman arsenal for two centuries. Thus the two adversaries practically returned to the boundaries drawn by Septimius Severus, since, in this elusive land of Mesopotamia, they could do nothing but slaughter each other without securing definite results. Finally, Jovian renounced a phantasmal suzerainty over the Armenian kings.

Valens made futile plots to recover it.³ Theodosius alone arrived at an understanding with Persia about the division of the country. In the Roman part of it, which was of little importance, not extending beyond the sources of the Euphrates and the estuary of the *Acampsis* (Choruk), satraps of doubtful authority held sway under a *comes Armenia*, while in Persian Armenia half a century was spent in getting rid of a few shadowy kings. The solution was an inglorious one for Rome, but it saved what was essential. The danger was greater elsewhere.

¹ CLXXXII, p. 191 *et seq.*; LII, III; CCI, IV, chap. IX.

² CCI, IV, chap. X; XLVII, IX, col. 2006-2011.

³ LIII, p. 159 *et seq.*

We should be wrong in supposing that there was already disaffection among the inhabitants of the provinces. The peasant insurrection in Gaul which goes by the name of the revolt of the Bagaudæ was only one of the manifestations of that brigandage which, in the fourth century, remained one of the Empire's plagues. But on the frontiers the barbarians, emboldened by their previous transitory successes, incessantly renewed their attempts,¹ the attacking forces were more numerous, and their pressure was felt at many more points simultaneously. In vain had Gallienus reserved all the higher ranks for professional soldiers, for by so doing he had made more dangerous any adventurer who knew how to win the favour of his troops. In vain had Diocletian increased the strength of the units and given them greater mobility; the quality of the recruits deteriorated every day, and the army was becoming denationalized by the increasing enlistment of barbarian mercenaries.² We shall not record the interminable series of violations of the *limes*,³ especially after Carinus had entirely abandoned the positions on the right bank of the Rhine.

Not that all the Cæsars had given up the policy of vigorous defence or of reprisals on enemy territory. Maximian, Valentinian I, Valens and Julian conducted campaigns of devastation in Germany; but these did not terrorize the barbarian, and caused little damage to his lands, which were slightly or poorly cultivated. Very different were the sufferings of the provincials when he came to ravage the more civilized countries of the Empire, where the towns alone remained generally safe behind the shelter of their strong walls. Attempts were made to re-establish some advanced positions, but great difficulty was experienced in defending them. Reconstruction of the fortresses to the left of the Rhine and on the right bank of the Danube, and the building of complementary strongholds to support them, sufficed to maintain the barrier at intervals; but invariably an advance *en masse* broke through it, and sometimes the horde penetrated more than a hundred miles beyond it before turning back after great slaughter.

There came a day when, at least on the Danube, it seemed

¹ CXXXIV, p. 221.

² CCI, I, chap. VI.

³ CXXXIV, p. 235 *et seq.*

more expedient to make the Goths a free gift of the territory they had long been seeking. Their establishment in Mœsia was the first trial of a method which was to be employed again elsewhere, especially in Gaul. We know what the consequences were. The Roman Empire of the West still survived—in name—while its provinces were gradually replaced by barbarian kingdoms, to which another volume in this series will be devoted.

PART II

THE MACHINERY OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER I

MEANS OF DEFENCE

I

THE ARMY

By the date at which we begin our history of the Roman World the organization of the army¹ had already undergone important modifications, and others were introduced on several occasions before the fall of the Empire. Not to go outside our chronological limits, we shall content ourselves with recalling in a few words the chief characteristics of the primitive army.

That which, according to tradition, king Servius Tullius created was nothing else than civil society placed in time of need on a war footing. As a general principle, all citizens from seventeen to sixty years of age were enrolled in it; but in virtue of a distinction between *juniores* and *seniores*, the older men formed only a sort of reserve which was usually exempted from service in the field. The system of centuries,² which was essentially military, reveals the idea of graduating obligations according to wealth, that is to say practically according to birth. The richest citizens composed the picked troop of cavalry which was revised every five years by the censors; indeed, equestrian service involved very heavy expenses, which were only diminished by the grant of a first indemnity on the purchase of the horse and a second, paid annually, to reduce the cost of its maintenance. This organization was not unlike that of the Macedonian army, whose order of battle, in phalanx formation, was also that of the first Republican army, though less homogeneous and compact.

¹ Liebenam, **XLVII**, VI, col. 1589 *et seq.*

² Cf. L. Homo, *Les Institutions politiques romaines*, etc.

This archaic army owed its first successes, which however were not unmingled with reverses, to its civic spirit and the national sentiment with which it was inspired. But it proved inadequate against very numerous forces, such as the Gallic bands, or troops possessed of an approved technical equipment, like those of Pyrrhus.

Originally there was a single *legio*¹ (a word meaning "levy"), but when the number of soldiers was increased, several were constituted; moreover, important changes had already been introduced, of which Camillus was the author or at least the initiator. In the middle of the second century B.C., the starting-point of this book, it was still the army of Camillus that operated wherever Rome was engaged in offensive or defensive warfare. It was no longer a solid block as in earlier days, but had been rendered much more mobile. Its smallest subdivision was the *manipulus*, and the *manipuli* were arranged in the form of a quincunx on the field of battle, with intervals between them which facilitated their manœuvres. Moreover, the place of each soldier in the fight was no longer determined by his wealth but by his age: the youngest were in the first line and the eldest in the third. One consequence of this was the introduction of pay, which was also given to the cavalry.

The many wars of the time required many men: every year four legions were raised, each containing as many as 6,000 men, and those of the previous years could rarely be disbanded. Moreover, the contingents were increased in number by those which the allies furnished, and they included a considerable proportion of cavalry, generally massed on the wings.

Notwithstanding the reforms of the third century and the lowering of the minimum census for admission to the army, it was for a long time the middle class that provided the State with the majority of its legionaries. The day came when it was so much reduced in number by the losses it had suffered, and so impoverished by leaving its land uncultivated, that all distinction of census had to be abandoned: Marius enrolled the poor, the "proletariat" who could only claim to have given sons to their country. Henceforth there

¹ Kubitschek, *Legio* (under the Republic), **XLVII**, XII, col. 1186-1210.

was no more distinction between the three lines of battle; all were armed alike, and the *manipulus* was replaced by the cohort, a tenth part of the legion.

The last century of the Republic prepared the way for the innovations of Augustus.¹ Already for many years each citizen had been required by law to serve a fixed number of campaigns, but in fact the number had not been completed, least of all consecutively. From the time of Marius, the poor men admitted to the army asked for nothing better than to stay there, in order to benefit by the pay; and there they stayed generally for sixteen consecutive years, or even longer in the case of the veterans. The annual levy practically ceased, and the legions began to be numbered consecutively. Finally, the category of allies disappeared and was replaced by that of auxiliaries, furnished as a sort of tribute by vassal sovereigns or subject peoples.

The evolution was completed during the reign of Augustus. Henceforward there was really a standing army—the men expected no discharge; and this army was also a professional one. It was recruited by voluntary enlistment for a period of at least twenty years in the legion, twenty-five in the auxiliary corps; and recruits were attracted above all by the pay, which had already been introduced by Camillus but was raised more than once under the Empire, when free rations also were added. To this essential benefit was annexed a share in the spoils, and later the *donativum*, a largess which recalls the *dons de joyeux avènement* of the French kings. Of course the soldier was no longer required to clothe or arm himself. At the termination of his service he received a bonus either in money or in kind, by the grant of an allotment of land in one of the colonies. Finally—and this was no small advantage—the foreigner became a Roman citizen, from the day on which he joined the legion, or from his discharge, if he had served as an auxiliary.

The prohibition of marriage would perhaps have hindered recruiting if the military authorities had not tolerated, apart from chance *liaisons*, a form of legal union inferior to those of Roman law, and this tolerance even assumed an official character from the time of Septimius Severus, at any rate

¹ Ritterling, *Legio* (under the Empire), **XLVII**, XII, col. 1211-1361.

in respect of the legionaries. As for the auxiliaries, the same certificate of discharge which conferred Roman citizenship upon them conferred it also upon their consorts.

Discipline, which had long been strict, grew slacker after the Antonines, when expeditions became incessant and yielded neither glory nor spoil. Previously the life of the soldier had been on the whole a hard one. In the intervals of peace, not only did the troops observe the methods of training that have been practised at all times, gymnastic exercises, marching and running, handling of arms¹—and frequent inspections, such as were held by the emperors themselves, discouraged slackness—but they were compelled to do work that is rarely required of them today, or is reserved for the so-called engineering section. All the soldiers took part in the construction of the camps, the frontier fortifications, and the roads; and, besides this, military labour supplied the place of civilians in various enterprises that did not concern the army at all: it was used very often to erect public buildings, even temples, to build bridges and aqueducts, to dig canals, to work mines and quarries. Thus the Roman army consisted of men who were at once enduring, versatile and possessed of a remarkable variety of qualifications; and for centuries this sufficed to compensate for the inadequacy of their number.

We shall not speak of the Prætorians, the emperor's bodyguard, some in Rome and some in the rest of Italy, or of the city cohorts, which were merely charged with the task of policing the capital. There remain the legions and the auxiliaries.

The legion, whose number under Augustus was theoretically 5,620 men, including 120 horsemen, though in times of great peril it was often much smaller, was pre-eminently an infantry body unembarrassed by any cumbersome train, since the baggage-waggons formed a distinct division of the army. Each legion had a number, and the same number might be borne by more than one legion, in which case a qualifying epithet distinguished them from one another; thus there were three legions called *tertia* (*Augusta*, *Cyrenaica*, *Gallica*). This epithet recalled the place where they had

¹ For the armour of the legionary at the different periods see Paul Couissin, *Les Armes romaines*, Paris, 1926.

been originally recruited or the province in which they had first seen active service.¹

The Principate owed its establishment to vast assemblages of troops, the soldiers of the civil war. When peace was restored and he had only to take account of operations outside the Empire, Augustus limited himself for the sake of economy to 20 legions (a little more than 100,000 men), a number which was gradually increased by subsequent changes to a maximum of 33 under Septimius Severus. They were distributed among the imperial provinces, but were moved when a serious danger called for reinforcement at any particular point.

It is much more difficult to arrive at an idea of the total strength of the auxiliary corps,² which were separated into two classes: infantry cohorts of 500 or 1,000 men, according to circumstances, with *alæ* of cavalry analogous in number, and mixed corps, *cohortes equitatae*, in which about a quarter of the men were mounted. Each of these units also bore a number, the name of a people, and generally a distinguishing epithet. Various indications suggest that their total number of recruits was not very different from that of the legionary contingent.

As regards the staff, it was a long time before the imperial government put an end to the duality of origin which dated from a very remote period. The principle had early been established that the civil power should take precedence of the military; therefore the superior officers of the legion, the six tribunes who took command of it in turn, were not professional soldiers but quite young men of good family belonging to the senatorial or equestrian order, who thus began their political career; the tribunes and prefects of the auxiliary corps were supplied in the same way. Each legion preserved its autonomy, but a certain number of *auxilia* were attached to it, and this whole body, which was something like a division in our modern armies, had at its head a *legatus legionis* who was always drawn from the senatorial order. On the other hand the subaltern officers, the centurion in the infantry and

¹ A catalogue of the references to each legion separately that have been discovered up to the year 1925 is given by Ritterling, **XLVII**, **XII**, col. 1361-1829.

² Cf. G. L. Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Army*, Oxford, 1914.

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the decurion in the cavalry, the former commanding a century or even the whole cohort, if he was in command of the first century, were professional soldiers, former *principales* or sergeants.

Promotion was governed by very strict and complicated regulations which need not be described in detail here. There were sixty stages in the hierarchy, but men of mark went up several steps at a time. Regard was not had merely to merit, but since it was desired, at any rate in the early days of the Empire, to preserve the Roman character of the army, care was taken to promote only citizens by birth, or at the worst Italians, natives of the very old *municipia* of the West. In the course of time this condition became more easy to fulfil; but, on the other hand, the military qualities of the higher officers were found to be more and more inadequate, especially among those of the senatorial class, so that there was a tendency to prefer the equestrian order—Septimius Severus created *præfecturæ legionis* in its favour—and even to promote centurions to the positions previously occupied by knights. Invasion of the higher ranks by provincials was naturally the result.

Inasmuch as it partly explains the revolutionary movements of certain governors, by which the Empire was temporarily divided, we have already had occasion to remark the change in the system of recruitment which began to show itself under the last Cæsars of the Julian *gens*: the legions tended more and more to fill their gaps by taking conscripts on the spot. Since the provinces had accepted Roman rule, it seemed not unreasonable to unite the sons of the same country, instead of forcing them to live on garrison duty in very different lands from that of their birth, where the climate was either too hot or too cold, and even to entrust them with the defence of their native soil, in which they seemed particularly interested. To Italy, where the military spirit had entirely disappeared, this system was inapplicable; but from the time of Hadrian the various frontier armies presented a "local" appearance, and this epithet acquired a more and more restricted meaning, since a large number of the latest recruits were sons of the soldiers themselves, born in the neighbourhood of the camp where their fathers had long served, and adopting in their turn the same mode of life.

This would have been all to the good if it had not gradually given rise to a form of local patriotism, and, above all, if the quality of the soldiers had been approximately the same in the various provinces; but the case was far otherwise; the oriental recruits gave nothing but dissatisfaction when hard fighting became necessary from time to time on the eastern frontier. It is true that this grave defect was palliated by the general distribution of the troops, but not to a sufficient extent, for those stationed in Italy and Spain, especially from the second century onwards, merely constituted a reserve army of much reduced strength, and then it frequently became necessary to transfer, not entire units, but *vevillationes* or detachments from another front that was less endangered. This was a cause of delay in replying to the enemy's offensive and sometimes of discord between regiments that were unaccustomed to serve side by side; moreover, the watchful enemy gained courage when he saw the line before him partially undefended.

We lack space to describe the various units which made up as many independent armies as there were frontiers to protect. Their strength often varied, and more than one legion changed its station. In the first century of the Empire the army of the Rhine¹ was the most important, comprising as many as 100,000 men, who were reduced by one half as soon as the works of fortification had been completed. Experience had shown that the Germanic peoples were among the most dangerous neighbours; but, besides the Rhine, they threatened the Danube, and on a much more extended front. Thus the army of the Danube² became under the Antonines the most powerful in number, though unfortunately it suffered more than some others from local recruitment, since its eastern divisions, in Mœsia, contained Greeks and Asiatics of poor fighting quality. The army of Asia (Syria and Cappadocia),³ which was similarly reinforced on account of the constant friction due to the problem of Armenia, the insurrections in Palestine, and finally the coming of the aggressive Sassanids, was the cause of incessant mortifications. It had the incorrigible defects of oriental troops, indiscipline, disorder, lack of cohesion; and the emperors were never

¹ CXXXIV, p. 192.

² *Ibid.*, p. 194.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 197; LXXXI, p. 70 *et seq.*

successful in this region without the help of soldiers drawn from elsewhere. Those of the army of Britain¹ were surprisingly numerous in view of the narrowness of the frontier, so that the romanization of the country must have been very slow and the Britons must have been kept under constant supervision. Apart from the legion of the proconsular district—an exception in a senatorial province—Africa, in spite of its large extent, could be satisfied with a very few *auxilia*, which, from the second century, were composed exclusively of men of African birth. From the same period Egypt had the smallest army of the Empire: a mobile force of purely local recruitment which experienced very few serious alarms.

It was not only the valour of the troops, which, as we have just said, was very unequal, that prolonged the Empire's existence; much was due to the care devoted to fortification; and in this connexion we must emphasize the inferiority of the Greeks and the other nations of antiquity and the originality of the Roman science of castrametation.²

The republican period saw the creation of the temporary camp by the army in the field, that marvel which so much impressed Polybius that he devoted fifteen chapters to its description.³ We need not describe it again after him; a note on the character and effect of its organization will be sufficient. With its rampart and ditch, an inviolable refuge inaugurated by religious rites—we can almost say that no Roman camp was ever taken—its four gates where the two main cross-roads ended, its night-watchmen organized like those of the city, its *forum*, its *quæstorium*, its tents strictly arranged in unvarying order, this veritable town was a sort of miniature Rome that moved with the army. Its strength was doubled by the salutary moral impression that it made, and, thanks to the camp, the soldier never felt himself completely exiled from his country.

But it was a hard task to construct one of these camps; it devolved upon the soldiers themselves who at last grew weary of raising defences, with ditches and palisades, from which only a momentary advantage would be derived, since they were better destroyed than left to the enemy when the

¹ CXXXIV, p. 199.

² LXXVII, I, p. 250-267.

³ VI, 27 *et seq.*

legion moved away from them. Under the Empire the soldiers took less and less interest in the temporary camp, preferring in their idleness to run the risk of surprise.

On the other hand, the permanent structures—still camps but this time made of brick, and more like barracks or frontier fortresses—were brought to perfection and increased in number both on the boundaries and far in the interior. Modern place-names containing the words *castel*, *cateau*, *château* or *châtre* in France, and ending in *cester* or *chester* in England, are generally reminiscent of a Roman fortress. Their types were innumerable,¹ depending on the general nature of the country and the particular topography of the fortified points. Besides the big camps, attaining the dimensions of a town and holding a strong garrison, *castella* of inferior size sheltered a little corps, often of cavalry; while the still smaller *burgi*, whose name rather than their true nature is perpetuated in the German *Burg* and the African *bordj*, served as look-out stations. Isolated towers flanked the camps or were set at intervals between the big stations.

We can only summarize here the general plan of the *limes*,² without studying its details on the various frontiers.³ It did not exist before the Empire and it served a twofold purpose: to check attempts at contraband trading, and to provide a zone of observation where the preliminary resistance of the advance guard would allow time for the troops from the interior, who were immediately notified of the danger, to reach the scene of action. We must not picture to ourselves a continuous barrier like the wall of China; in some provinces at any rate the *limes* seems to have been a purely ideal line, or else represented by a road, a long circuit linking the fortresses together. Such was the case in Syria and Arabia, and in the various African provinces,⁴ including Egypt. A continuous line with intrenchments, ditch, wall or palissade, was found in three places only: on the frontier of Britain, on the curved sector between the Rhine and the Danube,

¹ **XLIII**, art. *Castra*. See the restoration of the camp at Saalburg: Jacobi, *Das Römerkastell Saalburg*, Homburg, 1897.

² **CLXIII**, V, p. 456-464; R. Cagnat, **XLIII**, art. *Limes*; **CXXXIV**, p. 203 *et seq.*; Fabricius, **XLVII**, XIII, col. 572-582.

³ See further below: **BRITAIN**, **THE GAULS**, **THE DANUBIAN PROVINCES**.

⁴ In Africa, however, at least a *fossatum* appeared in the fifth century. (See below, Part III, chap. XII.)

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and in Dacia. Sometimes the line was boldly drawn through uninhabited deserts, as for instance when the *legio III Augusta* came at the beginning of the second century of our era to establish itself at Lambesa, where its camp, clearly recognizable today, still kept to the model of the old republican camps, save that solid walls took the place of earthworks or heaps of rubble.

The zone of the *limes* was a military area in the full sense of the word; all the resources of the country within it were at the disposal of the army. But, further, every legionary camp might become the centre of a district officially classed as its dependency, where the command found firewood and timber, as well as pasturage for the horses and beasts of burden. There the legate might assign some square feet to the traders who are always attracted by a garrison. At first they lived in canvas tents or wooden huts (*canabæ, tabernæ*), but finally they built small stone cottages which formed the nucleus of a new town. Then followed the grant of allotments to veterans in the arable parts, so that the army was an extremely effective source of urban development and a means of extending Roman civilization.

These were undoubted advantages, but they were balanced by very serious drawbacks which came to light in the course of the second century. The army was easily recruited because it rarely took the men away from their native land and because an area of peace, with a sprinkling of civilians in it, was established round about the provincial garrisons. The advantages of Roman rule were gradually more appreciated, while the soldiers' duty of defence was forgotten, and the mere thought of a distant campaign became irksome. Reforms were obviously necessary.

Gallienus was the first to take them in hand.¹ He did not hesitate to detach a number of contingents from the frontier camps and withdraw them into the interior, where, with the addition of some of the troops stationed in Italy, they formed a reserve army for use in emergencies, which could be moved without risk of mutiny or ill-humour. For nucleus it had a considerably larger body of cavalry than before. With these new resources and the superior officers no longer drawn from the old senatorial aristocracy, which

¹ Homo, **XXXV**, CXIII (1913), p. 248-263.

had grown effeminate and lacked all martial spirit, the emperor might consider himself ready to take immediate action whenever the first line was broken through; but the desired result was not completely attained, since it became necessary to abandon Dacia and the Agri Decumates, and keep strictly to the Rhine and Danube.

Diocletian took energetic measures,¹ which however were no more than an extension in the same spirit of those of Gallienus. He raised the strength of the contingents to a much higher level; and yet we must not judge by the number of legions,² which was now considerable, seeing that we can count as many as 175. They no longer resembled the legions of the Principate, but were of two kinds: those on the frontier, the least reduced in size, but broken up into various scattered detachments; and those in the interior, whose strength no longer exceeded that of the big cohorts of former days, one thousand men. After a time these two categories were assimilated, and besides them there were still *auxilia*: infantry cohorts of about 500 men, and detachments of cavalry that bore the old name (*alæ*) or new ones (*cunei*, *equites*, *vexillationes*). For all these formations a single title (*numerus*) came more and more into use, and before long this became the uniform tactical unit for all arms, reduced in number to about 250 men, and corresponding to our French companies on the war establishment.

The language itself most clearly reflects the innovations already introduced by Gallienus. The army of the interior comprised the *comitatenses*, those who "accompanied" the commander-in-chief, among whom were distinguished the *palatini*, stationed in Italy, nearest to the imperial palace at Rome, the rest being stationed near great provincial residences and the most important provincial towns. Constantine added the *pseudocomitatenses*, analogous to the others, a sort of reserve force, but composed entirely of foot soldiers. For the Prætorians of other days were substituted, as the emperor's bodyguard, two distinct units: a corps of cavalry called *domestici* and the *protectores*, who were composed partly of cavalry and partly of infantry. To these we must add the

¹ CLXIII, VI, p. 206-283; CCI, I, chap. II.

² Kubitschek, *Legio* (under the Lower Empire), XLVII, XII, col. 1829-1837.

scholæ, militarized officials, and some troops of barbarians, entitled *fœderati* or *gentiles*, under the command of their fellow-countrymen. Thus the barbarian gained a place even in the special reserve. He encroached still more upon the territorial formations. The frontier militia, of which two types were distinguished—*limitanei* when they lived beside a land frontier, *riparienses* or *ripenses* when they occupied the banks of a great frontier river—were charged with the duty of watching their inconvenient neighbours and breaking their first attacks; but as a matter of fact they tended rather to come to an understanding with them.

The comparative strength of the two fundamental categories—the army on the frontier and the army in reserve—is not easy to determine, in spite of the *Notitia Dignitatum* (of the beginning of the fifth century), because its nomenclature is partly fictitious and places garrisons in territory no longer subject to the Empire. If the army of Diocletian reached a total twice as large as that of Augustus, many of its soldiers must have existed only “on paper.” The principles of recruitment had hardly changed, except for the obligation to furnish men locally: so many per cadastral unit (*capitulum*). In point of fact this obligation was generally discharged by the payment of money and, beside the hereditary service of the *limitanei*, another system became general: the hire of conscripts.

We know that Diocletian separated civil appointments in the provinces from military commands, the latter being exercised by the *duces*, whose districts did not always coincide with those of the civil *præsides*. The contingents, reduced in number as we have pointed out, were commanded by tribunes, successors to the centurions, who had been abolished, and the whole force was subject to the *magistri militiæ*. All these officers were professionals of provincial and, more and more often, barbarian origin. The quality of the reserve army was certainly improved by the reforms of the third to fifth centuries; but in its frontier army the Empire had more and more execrable ingredients, imposing on the other units a task that became constantly heavier and finally hopeless.



I Claudius I



IV Trajan



II Nero



V Hadrian



III Vespasian



VI Marcus Aurelius

ROMAN EMPERORS

(as represented on coins)

II

THE NAVY¹

We have already said that, under the Republic,² a navy was only used by the Romans as an occasional instrument: ships were quickly built, even in very large numbers, for a given operation. After the destruction of Carthage, since the royal fleets of the Greek world were no longer any danger, Rome could regard herself as undisputed mistress of the whole extent of the inland sea, and it was only the great mobile republic of the pirates that restored activity to her dockyards. Yet Pompey, Cæsar, Antony and Octavius still possessed fleets, though they were usually mere instruments for civil war and hardly survived the victory of their organizer. As a general rule the allied cities were required to furnish the necessary ships, and their crews were augmented in case of need by Roman citizens of the lowest class, who were exempt from legionary service, or even by freedmen. In a word, the Romans had no taste for sea-faring, and their policy down the centuries aimed at destroying the fleets of other peoples in order to render one of their own superfluous.

Augustus was the first to break with this imprudent tradition of inertia; his caution delighted in permanent institutions, and at sea as well as on land he desired to have an armed force always in readiness. He possessed the elements of one on the morrow of Actium; his own ships, and those of the enemy which he had neither sunk nor allowed to escape, enabled him to create a fleet with its base at *Forum Julii* (Fréjus), on the coast of Gaul, and two others whose principal ports of call were Misenum and Ravenna. The fleet of Fréjus was abolished after the first century, but the other two had a long history: they were called "prætorian," no doubt to emphasize their strict attachment to the emperor's person, since the ships would escort him on his journeys by water. Their task was essentially one of keeping order. The fleet of Misenum had for its sphere the whole western Mediterranean, where the coasts of Sardinia in particular required attentive watching, but it sent detachments as far as Egypt and North Syria; that of Ravenna operated in the

¹ Fiebiger, **XLVII**, III, col. 2630-2649.

² J. Kromayer, **XXX**, LVI (1897), p. 426-491.

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Adriatic and in Greek waters. Epigraphy suggests that they had some ports of call in common.

The very extensive responsibilities of these two fleets did not prevent the formation of others, of a local character, at dates that are not always certain: a fleet of Britain operating in the Channel and commanding its two coasts; fleets of Alexandria, Pontus, Syria and Africa. These last had only a limited range of action and left long voyages to the "prætorians." Finally, on the great river frontiers of the Rhine and Danube (we have no information as regards the Euphrates) there were flotillas composed no doubt of small flat-bottomed boats which, without constituting true weapons of war, impressed the neighbouring barbarians with a sense of Rome's ever watchful power, and must also on occasion have proved useful to the State as transports.

Under the Empire the crews were a little less mixed than before. The *classiarii* or *classici* were genuine soldiers, no more prisoners of war or condemned criminals were to be found among them. After a short period, during which the emperor's slaves were enrolled, they consisted of foreigners who received the right of Roman citizenship on their discharge and, from Hadrian's time, the Latin right on joining the service. They were essentially volunteers, but there must have been some sort of conscription to insure filling the gaps at all costs. Judging from the inscriptions, this did not operate everywhere, but the crews were principally recruited from the Greek regions (Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, Thrace), except for a strong contingent of Corsicans, Sardinians and Dalmatians. Normally their term of service was much longer than that of the soldiers on land; twenty-six to twenty-eight years, if not more; but many of them died young, for life on board was hard and discipline was undoubtedly severe.

The emperor was commander-in-chief of his navies as he was of his legions. His delegates the admirals belonged to the equestrian order, while the subordinate officers were professionals as in the army. The *classici*, like the legionaries, were involved in plots against their sovereigns, took part in the civil wars, and helped to make or unmake emperors. Having a strength of at least twenty thousand men and, above all, controlling the food-supply of Italy through their power of intercepting the corn ships, they could hardly have

resisted the temptation. And yet the imperial navy passes through history almost unnoticed, discharging its duties to the best of its ability. Like the army, it became decadent in the end. It is true that Diocletian doubled its strength and created new fleets, on rivers and even on lakes; the *Notitia* of the fifth century mentions a considerable number of them, especially in the West; but it is difficult to avoid the impression that all this was only a mirage or a piece of administrative hypocrisy.

III

THE ROADS

The famous roads¹ that traversed the Empire in all directions and exacted the most diligent care for their maintenance constitute one of the Roman government's titles to glory. We are too ready to assume, because we lack evidence on the subject, that all or almost all of them had to be created *ab initio*. It is true that Greece seems to have paid very little attention to land communications; she was too divided to realize their vital importance, and also too much addicted to commerce by sea. But the oriental monarchies did not show the same negligence: Hittites and Persians had made roads in Asia Minor which were improved and extended by the successors of Alexander. Similarly there were good roads in Etruscan territory and in Gaul before Cæsar's conquest. But there was certainly no system comparable with the one which began to be established under the Republic, in Italy and Asia first of all, and was completed during the first two centuries of the Principate.

It was an exceedingly close network; none of the *Itineraria* that has been preserved gives us a complete idea of it, and we are constantly discovering portions of roads that are not mentioned in them.² Moreover the roads were most conscientiously metalled,³ having foundations which, at any rate in damp countries, would compare with those of dwelling

¹ Besnier and Chapot, **XLIII**, art. *Via*; **CLX**; **CXLII**, V, p. 188 *et seq.*; **CXXXIV**, p. 297 *et seq.* See the map at the end of this book.

² M. Besnier, **XXXII**, XXVI (1924), p. 22.

³ **LXXVII**, I, p. 41-47.

houses. Never since has a commission of public ways taken such a number of precautions; yet the thickness and solidity of the underlying stone-work did not prevent the surface from wearing rapidly away through use,¹ and this explains the frequent reconstructions to which the mile-stones bear witness, often giving their dates. But at any rate the repairs needed on each occasion were not extensive, and the Romans felt themselves guaranteed against subsidence or other serious accidents. They did not hesitate to take the shortest line, in spite of steep gradients, and their roads were remarkably straight: a fact which has been accounted for² by the mediocrity and very limited capacity of their horses. The indication of distances, in one or several directions, engraved on the mile-stones was an invaluable aid to travellers in thinly populated countries. Interest in the roads was not confined to the central authority; the governors who were responsible for them knew how to interest the local populations in the matter and make them understand, since the cost fell on their shoulders, that roads served an economic as well as a military purpose.

We have not yet made out all the details of this Roman system, and we shall never be able to do so; but the general direction of its main arteries is little disputed, since it is revealed to us in our literary and epigraphical documents. The provisional maps that we have been able to draw³ enable us to make two immediate assertions: in many countries the system is curiously coincident with that of our railways today, and, in the second place, it is particularly elaborate on the frontiers of the Empire and in the regions of great commercial activity. In certain countries, notably Asia Minor, it emphasizes the ridiculous inadequacy of the modern system, and in North Africa, not long ago, a similar comparison would have been decidedly to the advantage of Roman antiquity: we note with astonishment that the forlorn oasis of *Cydamus* (Ghadames) was linked with two ports on the Libyan coast. For lack of space we can only say that this whole organization was the product of great guiding ideas, and that the main roads were truly conceived and constructed as international highways.

¹ Lefebure des Noettes, **XII**, 1924, p. 253-261.

² *Id.*, *ibid.*, p. 85-90.

³ **XLIII**, fig. 7434 and 7439.



VII Septimius Severus



X Aurelian



VIII Gallienus



XI Probus



IX Claudius II



XII Diocletian

ROMAN EMPERORS

(as represented on coins)

CHAPTER II

THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

WE need not return to a subject that has been dealt with elsewhere:¹ the great financial offices, the *ærarium* and *fiscus*, and the gradual absorption of the former by the latter. All that concerns our subject is the taxes imposed on the inhabitants and their mode of collection.

In this matter the views of the ancients were diametrically opposed to those which are becoming more and more prominent in modern nations. They held that direct taxation was an insult to a free man and should only be resorted to in cases of absolute necessity. Thus, under the Republic, only extraordinary expenses, the soldiers' pay, the various costs of war, were defrayed by a special tax on property, called *tributum*, and this was paid back when the spoils and the enemy's reparations furnished the means of doing so. After the conquest of Macedonia, Roman citizens were finally exempt; so that for them at the time when our study begins, and for all Italians after the Social War (for the Transpadanes after Cæsar), there was no question, except for the momentary extortions of the triumvirs, of any but indirect taxes, *vectigalia* in the widest sense of the word. It was from these that the Treasury had long been obtaining its regular income.

First there was the *portorium*,² a term which covers transit dues, tolls and customs, both on land and sea. Several customs districts were already in existence under the Republic, corresponding to the various provinces, Sicily, Asia, Spain and Gaul. Under the Empire their definition becomes much more accurate, thanks to the epigraphical data, which show that some of them included several provinces and help us to trace a certain number of collecting stations. The rate of taxation was not the same everywhere; most often it was $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., whence the name *quadragesima*. Customs dues

¹ L. Homo, *Les Institutions politiques romaines*, etc.

² Cagnat, **XLIII**, art. *Portorium*.

were levied on all articles intended for commerce, except where exemption was granted for reasons of State. The collection of them was at first farmed out to independent financiers, then to persons who were also imperial officials, and progress was gradually made towards immediate collection by the procurators and their subordinates.

Transit dues were paid on entering certain towns. They were a privilege granted to them by the State, whether it tolerated the continuance of a system that had been in operation before the conquest, or conferred them as a reward for some service rendered.

To the customs revenue was added the income derived from national estate, which increased in amount as conquest enlarged the *ager publicus*. Some of it was let to individuals for cultivation; the rest—hills, wooded plains and waste land—was devoted to pasturage. When the flocks left the valleys and went to spend the summer on the hills, the tax-collector's agents kept a record of them, and the word for this record, *scriptura*,¹ became the title of the tax on pasturage or transit that was collected on this occasion. There were considerable areas of *ager scriptuarius*, not only in southern Italy, but in various provinces of Africa and of Asia.

Public estate included also some monopolies: the coal and salt mines belonged to the State. All these dues together sufficed to maintain the public services except in times of crisis, foreign or civil war.

When Octavian, after having squeezed the landed proprietors of Italy, became Augustus, he did not insist on his preference for direct contributions; but since expenses were much increased by the creation of a standing army and the payment of fixed salaries, it was necessary to draw upon new sources of revenue. He therefore instituted legacy duties (6 A.D.) and ignored the violent protests which had been aroused by a similar project of Cæsar and the triumvirs. Fear of seeing the old direct tax re-established led to the acceptance of the *vicesima hereditarium*,² which was incident on all legacies except those of very near relatives and of the poor. After Nerva and Trajan had given a wide interpretation to these exemptions, Caracalla suppressed them altogether and, by extending the right of citizenship, rendered

¹ CXC, p. 355.

² Cagnat, XLIII, art. *Vicesima hereditarium*.

this tax of 5 per cent. a very fruitful one. But originally it was only levied in Italy. Augustus added to it the *centesima rerum venalium*, a tax on sales (only sales by auction, it is thought) of which the rate varied several times until Caracalla abolished it so far as the inhabitants of Italy were concerned. Finally there was also created (in 7 A.D.) a tax of 4 per cent. on the sales of slaves, paid by the purchasers originally, by the vendors after Nero.

All this was a mere trifle compared with the taxation imposed on the provinces.

In the first place they were not exempt from the indirect burdens that we have just enumerated, and the custom-houses in the interior gravely handicapped merchandise on transit by their taxes *ad valorem*. But, further, the provinces paid tribute,¹ a mark of subjection since the year 167 B.C. Some vassal kings and territories had paid it earlier. Often, after the conquest, it amounted to no more than the tax paid to the former masters of the country, as in the case of the tithe in Sicily, Sardinia and Asia. At first it was paid in kind, but afterwards, at dates which varied in different countries, it was converted into a money debt, as Cæsar converted it in Asia. By an intolerable abuse the inhabitants found themselves compelled to pay the accumulated dues of several years in advance: in the same district Cassius exacted the tithes for ten years at once and Antony those for nine. In Judæa the Seleucids had exacted one third of the corn crop; this was at first left unchanged, and then reduced to one quarter by Julius Cæsar. In some provinces the exact nature and amount of the tax under the Republic is not clear.

Under the Empire precision was introduced and procedure brought to perfection. The periodical census furnished lists of the living inhabitants with an estimate of their wealth, so that they could be arranged in classes and their tax could be assessed. At first the census was quinquennial but finally, after Hadrian, it was only repeated every fifteen years. The imperial survey was a very great undertaking. Begun by Cæsar, it required twenty-five years of continuous labour, after which the land-register could be drawn up. A formidable number of specialists devoted themselves to these

¹ Lécivain, **XLIII**, art. *Tributum*.

two great works and to the corrections that were constantly needed in the second. Each proprietor had to declare his property and estimate the value of it himself, subject to the supervision of the State's agents. Various categories of land were distinguished: fields under cultivation, plantations of vines or of olives, woods and pastures. Moreover, houses and other buildings were also included in the list, together with movables, furniture, slaves, and even cash savings, all this being regarded as an extension of the landed property, since the incidence of the tax was upon the land itself, not upon its possessor. Even Roman citizens in the provinces were not exempt, unless their land had the *jus italicum*, which assimilated it to the exempted land of Italy.

The land tax properly so-called is only known by a few scattered references, except in the case of Egypt, where the papyri abound in allusions to it. In its most ancient form it was a quota, generally a tithe. There were countries, Asia for example, where Cæsar replaced it by an assessment, called *stipendium* as well as *tributum*; but elsewhere the quota seems to have been maintained, certainly in Britain and the Agri Decumates of Germany.

Beside the *tributum soli* Augustus, thinking of those who were not landed proprietors, placed the *tributum capitis*,¹ of which the organization under the Principate is full of obscurities. Another tax was levied on the plebeian class in the towns, artisans, small tradesmen, members of corporations; under Alexander Severus it bears the name of *aurum negotiatorium*, but it certainly dates from a much earlier period.

The system of farming had been generally confirmed in respect of the indirect taxes, notably that of Augustus on legacies, but it no longer enriched great speculators of the equestrian order, who contracted for numbers of taxes put up to auction simultaneously in the capital. Under the Empire, only small undertakings were farmed out *en bloc*, and this was done on the spot, in the province itself; the tendering parties were then for the most part persons of less standing and less cupidity. Further, the new type of *publicanus* is only found in some senatorial provinces, and the land tax is generally outside his purview.

Cæsar had left the task of collection in Asia to the muni-

¹ Seeck, *Capitatio*, XLVII, III, col. 1513-1521.

cipalities, and this system was extended to many other parts of the Empire. Every year the towns had to make the levy, each in its own district, under the supervision of Roman magistrates, the procurators,¹ specially trained agents of the equestrian order who were placed at the head of the financial districts. In each district one of them controlled a whole staff of clerks, slaves or freedmen. Within the cities the Greek system of the "liturgy" was at first generally adopted; but as it became more and more difficult to find individuals to undertake this kind of *munus*, it was assigned *en bloc* to the decurions. In the East commissions of ten or twenty members, *decaproti*, *icosaproti*, were charged with the duty of collecting the tax. Neither process gave much satisfaction, and the procurators were often obliged to take action themselves through the agency of their subordinates. Direct collection became more and more general throughout the Empire and was finally applied to all varieties of tax.

The reforms of Diocletian and his successors made hardly any alteration in the indirect taxes, except that certain rates were increased and enfranchisements and legacies were no longer burdened. But the land-tax was modified in several respects. The Lower Empire had a taste for clearly defined categories of smaller dimensions. It was thought to simplify matters by dividing the taxable material into fiscal units, each subject to an identical tax and called a *jugum* or *caput*. Its size was irrelevant; only its value was considered, and that depended on the quality of the land and the use that was being made of it. Transfers of property were noted, recorded and inscribed in the land-register, which was guaranteed accurate by periodical revision. Frequent revisions were necessary because account was kept also of movables, flocks or herds, labourers or slaves, which were added to the value of the land properly so-called, and their number might often change. In fact, however, the constant value of the *caput* was a myth, for a sort of budget period of fifteen years had been instituted; but every year each prætorian prefect determined the *indictio*² or sum total that his territory had to pay. Divided between the provinces, and between the cities in each province, the tax was finally portioned out, city by

¹ Cagnat, XLIII, art. *Procurator*.

² Seeck, XLVII, IX, col. 1327-1332.

city, among the tax-payers by certain *principales*, and the *curiales* were jointly responsible for its punctual payment. It had several names, among which it is not easy to discriminate exactly; but it seems that *tributum* was the part paid in cash, and *annona* the part paid in kind.

The abolition of the tithe is easily explained. As the population of the Empire decreased from year to year, the revenues of the State would constantly grow less, while its needs on the contrary increased; a tax by assessment was therefore preferable in theory. On the other hand, to fix the amount in cash would have been to swindle the government, since the currency was becoming ever more debased. Consequently, from the end of the third century, the greater part of the land-tax was paid in the form of *annona*, its object being to maintain the food supply of the capitals, the court, the high officials and, last but not least, the army. The tax-payers had themselves to transport the commodities thus requisitioned, which were chiefly articles of food; but under the title of accessories the State also exacted military uniforms, horses and the raw material for manufacture. It rested with the Treasury to decide whether payment should be in cash or in kind, and to accept or refuse in lieu of merchandise the equivalent in money, *adæratio*.

The land-tax would not have affected a sufficient number of tax-payers if to the *capitatio terrena*, incident only on estates of some importance, there had not been added the *capitatio plebeia* or *humana*, levied on small-holders and on persons who were not landowners at all, as well as the *chrysargyron*, a transformation of the old tax on commerce and industry.

To sum up, this fiscal administration conveys the impression of a very cleverly constructed machine; its technical skill is extraordinary. But of far greater value would have been a political, social and economic system at once more stable, less costly, and seeking rather to increase the taxpayer's wealth than to extract the maximum tax from him, even at the cost of his ruin.

CHAPTER III

THE MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION

THE Roman Empire sprang from a city and had that city for its centre: a strange state of affairs to us moderns, and one which the monarchies of antiquity would not have understood, since their centre of union was always the sovereign; moreover, only incomplete precedents can be found for it in the history of Greece, the Athenian empire being in theory no more than a confederation of allies. Yet it is in Greece that we see the most striking analogies. Greeks and Romans had the same conception of the city, *polis* or *civitas*, and scarcely recognized a political organism that differed from it; any other system impressed them as being a merely transitory form of government.¹

We must not picture the Greek or Roman city as a mere centre of population like the great French townships; it had also its "territory," more or less extensive, often exceedingly large. We find something similar to this remarkable position during the Middle Ages, in the Hanseatic cities, in Geneva, and in certain small Italian republics, especially Venice, though these were rare exceptions.² Yet we may discern a reminiscence of this remote past in the fact that the average area covered by the Italian townships of today is very much larger than that of our own.

Still it would be wrong to suppose that any profound thinking gave rise to the municipal system of the Roman Empire. From the earliest days of conquest examples lay ready to hand: the petty kingdoms of Sicily had included several cities; the great Hellenistic States had likewise maintained—or suppressed, as the case might be—genuine instances of urban autonomy; the various privileges, to which the inscriptions of that time bear witness, are precisely those which the Romans granted or refused in Asia, according to

¹ LXIV, p. 224 *et seq.*; CXXXIV, p. 264 *et seq.*

² CLXXXIII, p. 4, 12.

the relation of the cities to their environment. The municipal system was an undeniable aid to Roman expansion: it furnished a useful pretext for intervention to "liberate" oppressed towns; and moreover, since the towns retained their spirit of particularism and did not all combine against the foreigner, they offered less resistance to a truly centralized state; even the barbarian clans, notwithstanding the instability of their alliances, proved much harder to subdue.¹

After the conquest, the pre-existent urban organizations had this immense advantage for Rome, that they spared her the countless troubles to which the details of administration would have given rise. When five hundred square miles passed at one blow under her authority she would have needed, to supervise everything, a veritable army of officials, which she did not possess. Her liberalism was founded on necessity. The difficulty of administering everything herself had already been experienced when the city of Rome became dominant in Italy, and it was not otherwise when Italy became the head of a Mediterranean empire.

The task was harder in the West than in Greek territory, where it sufficed to maintain the *status quo*, while insuring the predominance of one class; in Spain and Gaul there was need of genuine creation. Even so the conquerors proceeded most cautiously, making as much use as possible of pre-existent institutions, without keeping to a uniform plan. They relied on emulation and on the system of rewards which had produced good results in Italy. There a sort of hierarchy distinguished the cities possessing the Roman right, with or without *suffragium*, from those possessing the Latin right;² and it was possible by discreet behaviour or a show of devotion to the metropolis to gain promotion from one grade to another. This grading system might be an advantage in the provinces too.

They had also a second resource: the establishment, especially in countries just annexed, of colonies which served as centres of influence and masked garrisons, some being composed of veteran legionaries, Roman citizens, others of recruits from the auxiliary corps who were merely Latins. Into both alike the native population gradually penetrated

¹ CLXXXIII, p. 23, 38; CLIII, p. 432-476.

² L. Homo, *L'Italie primitive*, etc., p. 262, 269.

by a process of selection. Their constitution was modelled on that of Rome.¹

Except for this group, all the various centres of population formed the mass of "peregrine" or "alien" cities.² At the bottom of the scale were the tributary or "subject" cities, distinguished by the tribute they had to pay; what remained to them of independence *de facto* was a gracious concession, though Rome benefited by making it. Above these ranked the free cities, which differed from them less than one would have supposed, because their exemption from paying tribute was never complete, and even their freedom might be revoked; nothing could be more uncertain than the idea of autonomy, to which the Greeks were passionately devoted. Still higher, in theory, were the allied cities, whose independence was no greater but was deemed to have a better guarantee because it originated in a treaty; but this was in truth only a verbal distinction, for on the slightest provocation Rome would undertake to prove that such and such a city had broken the contract.

The old title of *municipium*, a creation of the fourth century B.C., finally acquired a wider meaning and was given to all towns which adopted an organization modelled on that of Rome. In current speech it was even applied to all the cities of the Empire, whence our French "municipalities." There were also some cities which continued to bear the title of "colony," their elaborate name being encumbered with the *nomen gentilicium* of the emperor, wherein they saw a kind of reassuring patronage; but this did not always imply the benefit of Roman law: in the oriental provinces especially, and above all in Asia, the populations remained exceedingly faithful to their old national customs.³

To the Romans all these distinctions meant very little, and they often laughed among themselves at the importance attached to them by the provincials.⁴ Had each city its particular charter? If so, the dispositions contained in it must have been to a large extent in conformity with a uni-

¹ Homo, *op. cit.*, p. 268; Arnim von Gerkan, *Griechische Städteanlagen*, Berlin-Leipzig, 1924, *in fine*.

² Homo, *op. cit.*, p. 272 *et seq.*

³ L. Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreichs*, Leipzig, 1891.

⁴ LXXXII, p. 126.

versal model.¹ The differences were due to ancient usage and sometimes were only visible in official titles: in Africa, until Hadrian, some towns still had *suffetes* for their chief magistrates,² as in the time of the Carthaginians; and there were still *vergobrets* in Gaul, only in this case the magistrate was single, a fact which conflicted with the system of the *municipia* and their *duumvirs*. In Greek territory no Roman title for a magistrate found favour in the towns, which kept their archons without great powers and their *strategi* without an army.

Popular assemblies were found everywhere except in Gaul, where the lower classes had always occupied a subordinate position. In the West they took the Roman name of *comitia*, and through them the people kept in theory their electoral rights, though even at Rome they had not in fact possessed these since the time of Tiberius. But the *comitia* lost their *raison d'être* when public duties became so burdensome that they ceased to be an object of desire and were imposed officially by another power on persons who would never have undertaken them of their own free will.

The magistrates had military, civil and judicial competence. There is little to be said about the first: not all cities had a militia of their own, and the growing insecurity is sufficient evidence of deplorable negligence. Brigandage was rampant under the Lower Empire; but in those days the only thought was of invasion, and every effort was concentrated on building bulwarks against it. As regards the urban jurisdictions we have very little information. During the first centuries, in the free cities, they decided in principle all civil disputes, and even took cognizance of crimes and delicts; but some evidence preserved by chance shows that the emperor and his agents intervened in many suits. In the third century the jurists only recognized in the local authorities the right of punishing simple infractions of the law and holding enquiries on more serious matters; any case in which the interest at stake exceeded a modest sum was outside their competence.

Municipal finance was undoubtedly the chief sphere of the magistrate's activity: the towns' revenues³ might amount

¹ **CLIII**, p. 174-430.

² **XLI**, viii, 7, 765, 10525, etc.

³ **CLXXXIII**, p. 450; **CLIII**, p. 2-68.

to a very considerable sum when they possessed an extensive territory. This was either worked directly, or allotted in portions to individuals who paid rent for it. The Roman State was not slow to monopolize valuable property, such as woods, fisheries, mines and quarries; tolls were maintained in a number of cities, especially allied cities, though they did not prevent the coexistence of imperial customs. The right to coin money conferred some benefits on the coiners; this privilege was much more widely extended in the East than elsewhere, out of regard for traditions with which Rome did not desire to make an open breach; yet in the third century the State mintage practically eliminated the rest.

In Greek countries, above all, bad habits were perpetuated. A regular budget was disdained;¹ it seemed so much simpler to fall back in case of embarrassment on the voluntary or prompted generosity of some citizen. There were endowments, but they were generally quite inadequate to meet the follies of ostentatious expenditure: the erection of public buildings of exaggerated size and magnificence, the shows and festivals, and that plague of embassies which the central authority had to check by commanding the governors themselves to transmit the prayers and respects of the inhabitants to Rome. Each municipality was also required to pay its doctors, who attended the sick without fee.² Professors were remunerated, but by preference indirectly, certain exemptions being granted to them. Public works, road maintenance, water supply, lighting—almost everywhere inadequate—were often suspended altogether, although their cost was covered by the taxes imposed on shop-keepers.

The bad state of the municipal finances led to the creation of city curators³ (*logistæ* in Greek lands), who at first were few in number and appointed occasionally, with the supervision of several cities at once, but presently became very numerous, and finally, in the third century, were made regular magistrates in every town. From Trajan's time, *correctores* had to be associated with them in the Eastern provinces.⁴

Rome also emphasized her protectorship by strengthening

¹ **CLIII**, p. 68-173. ² S. Reinach, **XLIII**, art. *Medicus*, p. 1692

³ Kornemann, *Curator reipublicæ*, **XLVII**, IV, col. 1806-1811.

⁴ A. von Premerstein, **XLVII**, IV, col. 1646-1656.

the authority of the second chamber, the senate ("council" in Greek towns), which was invested with control in all matters. In Latin countries at any rate, the duumvirs, thence called *quinquennales*, revised the list of senators every five years,¹ including in it the magistrates who had left office and as many tax-payers as were required to complete the total, generally a hundred in the West but elsewhere very variable. This very soon developed into a caste, envied at first, then exploited and ruined by its responsibilities, especially in regard to the tax. This same social class provided the magistrates who, in the West, displayed all the external paraphernalia of consuls: *toga prætexta*, curule chair and train of lictors. But this pomp was a poor compensation for such burdensome realities as the *summa honoraria*, a largess distributed on accession to office, proportionate to the wealth of the individual, not to speak of many others to which circumstances gave rise during tenure.

This senate gradually became the only authority in the towns; even at Rome the comitia fell into decay, and they experienced the same fate in the provinces. This led to the ruin of local life, of that pride which, though ludicrous when exaggerated, was nevertheless a spur to action. When the alien cities were cast in a uniform mould, decadence ensued and Rome was the first to suffer from it. In vain had she multiplied the number of cities; in vain had she followed the example of the Seleucids in Asia and patiently transformed the life of the clan into an urban life, creating new centres through the politic revival of old civil or sacerdotal principalities; by an inverse process vast territories were being covered with imperial domains² whereon wretched serfs lived a degraded life without moral fibre and without hope.

The Romans had been right in their original opinion that the municipal spirit ought to be encouraged, even in its excesses. It involved a sentiment which our times would find hard to understand. The honorary title of citizen of another city than one's own is a favour that is now very rarely granted and hardly taken seriously, but the ancients held quite a different view of the matter. Athletes, professors, artists gloried in thus belonging to several cities,

¹ Kuebler, *Decurio*, XLVII, IV, col. 2319-2352.

² Kornemann, *Domänen*, XLVII, Suppl. IV, col. 238-261.

which was the equivalent of a decoration, for the citizen of a town was not a mere unit lost among several millions; he had a direct share in the government.

But Rome did not accept all the consequences that followed from this conception. No doubt local liberties were destroyed only after a long period;¹ there were towns in which the popular assembly was not really annihilated until the third century; nevertheless the same decadence affected them all. The preponderance (determined at headquarters) of a single class, the wealthy class, from which in return exactions were made that reduced it to ruin, put an end to disputes in the city, but only because it made them inconceivable. One side was expressly forbidden to hold office, the other was oppressed by it; constant encroachments of the central authority took away all that might compensate for the discharge of public duties, leaving only the thankless toil and the responsibility. Therefore, when the economic crisis developed, the magistrates abandoned office, and, in order that their services might be more easily secured, they were given Roman citizenship, *i.e.* the *Latium minus*. This measure proved insufficient, whereupon the whole curia was required to bear the public burdens, and all its members received the same honour (*Latium majus*).² But what was the value of this inducement when everyone became a Roman citizen? The curia was deserted, and all sorts of persons were compelled to enter it: aliens, freedmen, bastards, women and children; it was only necessary that they should be *possessores*. And as their possessions constantly decreased, the burdens were distributed among an increasing number of individuals or, to speak more accurately, patrimonies. The magistracies were dismembered, divided, diluted into a plurality of curatorships distributed among the decurions, constantly increasing in number and diminishing in scope.

Nevertheless these duties continued to be repulsive; everybody wished to escape from them, and there was only one means of escape: admission to the class of Senators of the Empire, *clarissimi*, who were exempted from the crushing *munera* of the curia. This was secured as a favour by individuals, and was bought if necessary, one great momentary sacrifice being easier to bear than an

¹ CLIII, p. 476-538.

² CLXIII, III, p. 33-40.

indefinite series of losses. But very few were in a position to attain this highest rank; the rest had no other resource than to exploit to the full those for whom they were answerable. In view of the complaints caused by the extortions of the *exactores*, the emperors devised another expedient and created counteractive agents, the *defensores*.¹ But the expedient was a poor one; the latter soon proved to be mere additional persecutors, or else, being appointed by all and obliged to act for all, they became simply *curiales*, more burdened than the rest because their responsibilities were more extensive.

To shun the public service became the universal ambition. Men who had no taste for soldiering enlisted in the army, or found the life of a farm-labourer, for all its wretchedness, more stable and more sheltered from unforeseen misfortunes, or took refuge among the clergy and became monks; and at a time when the barbarians were striving to make their way into the Empire, it was observed that, by a curious *chassé-croisé*, some citizens were crossing the frontier to live among the barbarians.

The central authority found only one remedy for this desertion, namely, to pen each man in his class and social category together with his descendants: the senator's son was a senator, the son of a *curialis* was a *curialis*. And this measure did not apply to officials only. The *curiales* had been forbidden to engage in trade or business that might enrich them, but might equally well ruin them and thus annihilate the patrimony that served as security for the State; for trade and commerce no longer yielded the anticipated profit. Rome, who had need of them, made them subject to contingent requisition, so that in this sphere also it was necessary, whether one wished it or not, to become a member of a corporate body,² to remain in it from generation to generation, and to accept a position that was determined immutably without regard to one's own choice or bent.

Under a government that at last became more tyrannical and meddlesome than it was strong, the Empire was at once too large and too poor; its increasing needs had to be met

¹ Seeck, **XLVII**, IV, col. 2865 *et seq.*

² **CCI**, II, chap. VII; **CCXIV**, II, p. 208.

by an ever decreasing population. No artifice could save it, and the measures that were taken served only to aggravate the evil; a kind of paralysis was creeping over everything.

In all the cities of antiquity religion held an important place; the institutions in which it was embodied would provide material for a long disquisition,¹ but we only wish to define its character.

Certain distinctions have to be drawn, above all between East and West. The Mediterranean peoples had made for themselves entirely practical faiths that troubled no man's conscience and were less concerned to preach duties than to procure useful oracles and provide good pretexts for holding magnificent festivals. In this respect Greece had surpassed Italy to such an extent that the latter was content to borrow divine types from the Hellenic world and identify her own with them. These became largely hellenized, at any rate in their plastic features. But Rome gave very little in return: the old abstract divinities of Latium could be of little interest in the provinces, except to the few Italians who were taken far from home by their duties. The Greek countries kept their pantheon, not without adding to it the gods with which the peoples of Africa or Asia had made them familiar, but the formulæ, the rites and the religious organization of the Romans hardly made any impression on the eastern half of the Empire. From that part of it Rome was accustomed only to receive: the pomp and the "comfortable" practices, as we may call them, of the Græco-Roman religion flattered the dilettantism of the higher classes of imperial society.

In the provinces of the West and those bordering on northern Italy the case was different: the priests of the national cults bore Latin names and insignia; there were sacerdotal colleges like those in Italy; the provincial towns had their augurs and their pontiffs; and above all others ranked the minister in charge of the imperial cult, the only one which had really penetrated into the Greek cities, where its minister was called priest *par excellence* (*archiereus*).

Yet it is quite obvious that, for the lower classes, these

¹ See A. Grenier, *The Roman Spirit in Religion, Thought, and Art*, etc., *passim*.

pseudo-Latin rites were merely attractive because they were compulsory; only the ministers in each town, who were Roman citizens or about to become so, had a kind of belief in them, which in any case was entirely secular in its origin. Moreover, certain works of art found, for example, in Africa¹ or in Gaul,² whose size or quality sometimes forbids us to assume that they were idols for the lower classes, represent divinities which are only to a very small extent, or not at all, Greek or Roman. At any rate the simple folk, peasants and workmen, remained very faithful to the old fetishes of the soil, which, even when decked out in Latin trappings preserved their indigenous character; epigraphy has expressed better than art the deepest feeling of the masses.³

Nevertheless the latter showed at an early date a spontaneous devotion to the divinity of Augustus, which was emphasized by the institution, at first quite private in character, of the *augustalitas*.⁴ This was a free association of workers in shop and factory, occasionally due to some imperial movement in favour of this humble class, but more often to an instinct of loyalty, or to the desire not to be outdone by neighbouring cities. Sometimes too a brotherhood already constituted for a different object placed itself under the patronage of the master of the Empire.

The municipal authorities were not slow to transform these independent associations into official colleges, which did not always observe precisely similar rules in every town. As a general rule, the six officials connected with the altar of Augustus (*seviri*) were henceforward appointed by the council of decurions, who conferred privileges upon them: seats of honour at the civic festivals, a crown and *toga prætecta*, lictors carrying fasces and walking before them as they did before magistrates. All this was to compensate them for the duties which they undertook: the offering of sacrifices, followed by a banquet, the conduct of games, the execution of public works, and other voluntary expenditure. When their year of office was over, these dignitaries entered the order of the *augustalitas*, which was chiefly recruited

¹ LXXVII, I, p. 437 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 454 *et seq.*

³ Cf. J. Toutain, *Les Cultes païens dans l'empire romain*, Paris, 1908 *et seq.*

⁴ CLXIV.

in this way, but also by the favour of *adlectio*, with exemption from the priesthood.

The order of *Augustales* certainly included some freeborn men, but it was chiefly composed of freedmen, artisans or tradesmen, who had attained to a position of comfort or even wealth through the exercise of a profession from which the municipal nobility was excluded. They thus acquired very enviable distinctions which placed them immediately below the decurions; they were "the *bourgeois* of the Roman Empire, *bourgeois* who aspired to become gentlemen."¹

The *augustalitas* is found almost exclusively in cities with a Roman constitution, *municipia* or colonies. It flourished in Italy; but, except for a certain number of instances furnished by Narbonne and Bætica, and a few beside the Rhine, the Danube and the Dalmatian coast, it was practically non-existent in the rest of the Empire, and it was for the most part concentrated in the regions where Roman civilization had been longest established.

The date of its disappearance is uncertain, and was in any case the end of a long period of gradual decay; the sexvirate was abolished earlier in some towns than in others. To some extent the *augustalitas* was connected with the curia; the same reasons which caused the office of decurion to be shunned must have diminished the number of candidates for the priesthood of Augustus, and in this case no indispensable institution was at stake which the Roman government must preserve at all costs—the government had never been concerned with it at all. Economic disorder was the cause of its decease; it succumbed because its supporters, the *bourgeois*, themselves disappeared, and there was certainly no need for Christianity to administer the *coup de grâce*.

¹ CLXIV, p. 123.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION

IF Rome made a point of preserving as far as possible certain autonomies which seemed to her to be a stimulus of local activity—whence the development of urban life—she was further willing, when organizing the provinces, to give the inhabitants of the Empire a share in the administration by granting them certain franchises.

This participation of the subjects in public life is most strikingly shown in the domain of law. They do not seem to have been allowed any competence in criminal suits—no doubt they would have erred on the side of indulgence—but in civil cases it seemed right that they should lend the aid of an experience that was not to be despised to the governor who had come from a distance and was at first ignorant of the spirit of his province. Moreover, the parties might feel themselves better protected against indifference or an arbitrary decision when they pleaded before men of their own society and race. So, from the days of the Republic, the governors held periodical assizes in the principal towns of their jurisdiction: the principles of law were defined beforehand in their edict, the questions of fact were determined with the co-operation of the leading townsmen, assessors taken, in the ordinary way, from among those natives who were not Roman citizens, whenever the parties to the suit were both aliens. These courts, held in public, were called *conventus*, a name which was also given to the district constituting a sphere of jurisdiction; we hear of *conventus juridici* in Spain, Dalmatia and Asia.¹

Yet it was never more than a handful of subjects that could thus participate in public affairs. The provincial assemblies had to allow their majority to speak for the whole population and interpret its wishes. Under the Republic especially, these institutions would have rendered very precious

¹ Kornemann, **XLVII**, IV, col. 1173-1179.

services, for that was a time of terrible abuses, and many a governor could have been charged at Rome with cruelty and breach of trust. As a matter of fact, complaints were frequently made even then, and were not always made in vain; they provided good opportunities for the gratification of private hatred. We do not know how such proceedings were organized, in what *commune* the grievances of the various cities were grouped together, or who appointed the embassy charged with making a formal complaint. It was a long time before a regular *concilium* was established.

Its institution is usually associated with that of the provincial cult.¹ There is no doubt that these assemblies owed their origin to religion, but this had prepared the way for them long before Augustus. An important gathering of delegates found its prototype in the *koina* of the East;² indeed a considerable number of these *koina* existed in Greek lands and administered common cults; but the religious bond was often superimposed upon an ethnic bond, or at any rate a regional one, which had acquired all its strength in the Hellenistic period. Consequently their offspring, the *koina* of the Roman period, were not always exactly coincident with the provinces; it never happened that one *koinon* embraced several provinces, but one province might include several *koina*. The nomenclature of these provincial assemblies in Greek lands attests this fact,³ and we hear of a general *commune Asiæ* in proconsular Asia over and above the various secondary assemblies.

In the West, on the other hand, these little provincial parliaments were entirely the creation of the imperial rule,⁴ and—a clear proof that the cult of Rome and Augustus was their determining factor, rendering them inoffensive, even advantageous to the State—it was in the most recently conquered provinces that the imperial cult was first introduced.⁵ In these countries an entirely new form of existence had just begun; it was easier for them than for the others to accept this mark of subordination to Rome, who had just imposed her law upon them, and to the emperor, Rome's first

¹ LXIV, p. 216; CXXXIV, p. 266.

² Kornemann, XLVII, Suppl. IV, col. 929.

³ *Ibid.*, col. 930-934.

⁴ *Id.*, XLVII, IV, col. 803-830; XCVI, p. 351 *et seq.*

⁵ LXIV, p. 217.

servant and instrument. We need not discuss the nature of this cult,¹ but will only remark that the Augustus in question was first of all the former Octavian, and afterwards the reigning Cæsar, without regard to his personal name.

Local usage determined the organization of the cult, which was by no means uniform. Among certain peoples, who had long been accustomed to religious ceremonies in the open country, there was simply a gathering about an altar, though this might assume monumental proportions, as for instance the altar of the confluence at Lyons. Elsewhere an actual temple was built called the *Augusteum* (*Sebasteion*² in Greek lands), a term which was applied indifferently to a municipal or a provincial temple. The most famous of these provincial temples in the East is the *Sebasteion* of Ancyra, where the memory of the first Augustus is perpetuated—even to our own time—by the text of his political testament inscribed on the walls.

Again, the high-priest who presided over the ceremonies was not always given the same title: in Spain, in Narbonne, the old Latin title of *flamen* was preserved, but generally he was the *sacerdos provincæ*,³ a very prominent dignitary who had usually filled many offices and was therefore an aristocrat, most often a Roman citizen. The delegates of the towns chose him among them and generally appointed him for one year; competition must have been keener between the cities than between individuals. In proconsular Asia it was increased by an exceptional circumstance, the existence of more than one provincial temple; there were thus several meeting-places of the assembly,⁴ and sometimes the sessions of the *koinon* were simply held near a municipal temple of the emperors. These rivalries betray at once a marked taste for idle distinctions and an anxiety to make money: the great concourse of people caused by the session of the *koinon* brought material profits to the place where it was held. The question is constantly raised⁵ whether the *archiereus* of Asia is identical with the asiarch, the *archiereus* of Bithynia with the bithyniarch, etc., since, in the Greek Orient, this

¹ Cf. A. Grenier, *The Roman Spirit in Religion*, etc., p. 452 *et seq.* Also G. Herzog-Hauser, **XLVII**, Suppl. IV, col. 814-853.

² V. Chapot, **XLIII**, art. *Sebasteion*.

³ Id., *ibid.*, art. *Sacerdos provincæ*.

⁴ **LXXXII**, p. 465.

⁵ Kornemann, **XLVII**, Suppl. IV, col. 936.

series of parallel titles is found. If so, the fact would explain the incomparable value attached to this title of high-priest, since it made the holder for some days a sort of supreme magistrate of the province. He was unique and had no colleagues. He walked at the head of the procession on its way to the temple or altar and made the sacrifice there; he presided at the banquet that followed and at the games, with which the meeting of delegates began to assume a more secular character. Then in the place best suited for it, according to the resources of the town, the assembly proper was held.

There the affairs of the province were discussed, the favours to be requested, the claims to be advanced; and the most important session was certainly that which followed the departure of a governor. Generally a sort of unconscious and timorous complacency moved the deputies to proclaim the magistrate's high merits. In Greek countries above all, there was no lack of hyperbolically flattering decrees, and, where so many statues were erected in honour of athletes, they might well raise one to a representative of Rome; it served as a hint to his successor to show himself benevolent. But on more than one occasion, even under the Empire, the governors were incapable or unscrupulous; their extended powers multiplied the grounds for complaint against them.

We know of several actions¹ brought by provincials against their governors. The most delicate case was that in which the grievances concerned only a few cities and not all of them. Are we to suppose that the city deputies, elected in their senates, received an imperative mandate from them or only general instructions? On the first hypothesis it is clear that, if the governor had seriously offended only the minority of the inhabitants, a vote of censure or complaint would be hard to obtain; if, on the other hand, the delegates were free to express their own opinions in session, a few facts of very grave importance would be likely to influence the whole assembly in the course of the debate. In any case we have evidence in the famous inscription of Thorigny² that real deliberation took place, so that some latitude of opinion must have been left to each deputy.

When an action against the former governor was voted,

¹ CXVII, p. 173 *et seq.* ² XLI, XIII, 3162; LXXIX, p. 129 *et seq.*

a special deputation went to Rome to demand a prosecution from the competent authorities and establish the grounds for one. The higher orders, senatorial and equestrian, naturally looked askance at such suits; but the emperors constantly maintained the legitimacy of the principle. The admissibility of the fact was another matter, and of this the emperor was sole judge; if he deigned to grant the request, his council, or the Senate, thoroughly sifted the matter after the usual pleadings; the deputies were present as assessors at the audience, where they generally had the support of the patron of the province, some great personage at Rome who had grounds for taking an interest in it. Certain governors who were found guilty were excluded from the Senate, or forbidden to hold any provincial governorship in future, or even condemned to undergo severe punishment such as exile.

In either case, whether the governor was approved and honoured or criticized and prosecuted, expenses were incurred over and above those arising out of the ordinary routine of the assembly—the maintenance of a special staff and the upkeep of premises. Legally the *concilia* came within the category of authorized *collegia* and could therefore draw upon a contingent fund (contributions from the towns and also, no doubt, subscriptions from individuals); the administration of this property seems in most cases to have devolved upon the high-priest himself. The *koina* of the East even had the right to coin bronze money.¹

It is easy to explain the attitude of patronage which the emperors adopted towards the provincial assemblies, combined as it was with a real investigation of the complaints made. They liked to convey the impression to their high officials, many of them inclined towards autocracy and more than one of them a danger to the reigning prince, that the supreme ruler and his subjects were linked together by bonds of good will. Moreover, the cult of Rome and Augustus could not fail to be more enthusiastically practised in consequence. The emperors clearly perceived that these petty congresses, gathered for a few hours about an altar or a temple, were no menace to the security of the State; the best policy was to use them as checks upon the arbitrary power of legates and proconsuls. Only well-founded complaints supported

¹ XLVII, Suppl. IV, col. 938 *et seq.*

by serious allegations could get as far as Rome, for proceedings on insufficient grounds were more dangerous than silence: no doubt the accused governor's successor gave his advice before judgment was passed, and the failure of their request would put him on his guard against the persons under his jurisdiction.

We have no instance of a provincial assembly in which any attempt was made to encourage or excite the least disloyalty. Well satisfied if they received at long intervals a letter from the sovereign congratulating them on their commendable spirit and announcing some piece of good news, they were for the most part centres of loyalty, and it has been truly remarked¹ that in the great crises which shook the Roman world—competitions for the throne, revolts of armies or of governors—these *concilia* seem never to have taken any part, or even to have been asked to take one.

There is little or no reference in the Roman historians to the provincial assemblies after Diocletian's reform. We should naturally assume² that the conversion of the emperors to Christianity, rendering their worship impossible, would deprive this institution of its principal *raison d'être*; but it has long been established that the Church practised a wise opportunism, finding compromises and formulas which allowed the sacred character of the monarch to persist without offence to anyone's belief;³ and this cult, which retained all its civil importance, cannot have disappeared before Theodosius I.

According to the evidence of inscriptions, the *concilia* were affected by the multiplication of the provinces and the assimilation of Italy to the rest of the Empire.⁴ One novelty of this time was the rule that henceforward an assembly *must* be held in each province.⁵ Under the Principate the municipal spirit remained predominant and the provincial bond was weakened by it; but when this spirit declined, the

¹ CXXXIV, p. 267.

² Cf. E. Lohmeyer, *Christuskult und Kaiserkult*, Tübingen, 1919.

³ LX, p. 287 *et seq.*, 329 *et seq.*

⁴ XLVII, IV, col. 821 *et seq.*

⁵ *Cod. Theod.*, XII, 12, 11-13.

emperors strove to substitute a provincial spirit after their own heart, in order to consolidate the system of groupings and administrative divisions that served as fulcrum for the new *régime*. There were ordinary sessions and others called extraordinary, and, in addition to their other duties, the *possessores* had to attend them under penalty of a fine. They were the *honorati*, the nobility of the Empire, the *primates* among the *curiales*; the *decreta*, *desideria*, *postulata*, *querelæ* resulting from their deliberations were submitted to the governor, and he had to register them and forward them to the emperor, whose approval was always necessary. The Christian emperors no longer accepted the sacrifices and marks of devotion of former times, but the high-priest retained the administration of the surviving temples and the organization of the games, which were modified in such a way that anyone could take part in them without scruple. The secularized *concilia* saw their political functions augmented.

There were also "diocesan" assemblies,¹ probably in every "diocese," though our texts refer to very few; the imperial mechanism had lost its earlier suppleness, and rigid uniformity reigned everywhere. The regular recurrence of these assemblies is attested at any rate for the fifth century. They must have contained fewer representatives of the curias, and another point in which they differed from the more local *concilia* was that the governors of all the provinces in the "diocese" attended them, as well as the prætorian prefect; unjustified absence was penalized by a fine, which was particularly heavy in the case of these latter personages. The State officials were forbidden to obstruct the debates in any way, or to check complaints about their own administration; for the *concilia* possessed a recognized right of supervision over them as well as power to discuss a number of administrative questions indicated in the various constitutions of the Theodosian Code.²

But this collection is full of most righteous provisions that were left unapplied. The corrupt officials of the declining Empire continued to be the stronger party, and, in spite of "patronage" obtained with great difficulty, the provincials strove in vain against bureaucratic opposition on the spot

¹ XLVII, IV, col. 823, 826.

² CXVII, p. 259 *et seq.*

and at Rome itself. Nevertheless these *concilia* lasted at least until the end of the fifth century, and traces have been found of a prosecution brought against a prætorian prefect in 468 at the instigation of the Gauls.¹ This means that justice could still sometimes make itself heard, though no doubt it needed the support of exceptional circumstances.

History must not forget that these assemblies, provincial or "diocesan," served as models for the provincial or primatial councils of the Christian Church where, from the second century, the bishops came to discuss questions of doctrine and discipline. Although they were held at irregular intervals and less frequently, and although their canons often had to be repeated for lack of observance, they left more lasting traces because, unlike the synods of paganism, they had the power of final decision. Yet perhaps we should see in the provincial assemblies the origin of our modern parliaments.²

¹ LXXIX, p. 334.

² Tenney Frank, *Classical Journal*, XIV (1918-1919), p. 533-549.

PART III

LIFE IN THE PROVINCES¹

CHAPTER I

ITALY

ALTHOUGH conquered with difficulty, after numerous and generally stubborn wars, Italy was none the less Rome's most easily assimilated possession, for ethnic reasons which created a sort of family tie between it and the capital. The Latin element was very strong there and had some kinship with the Etruscans, who long left their trace upon it.² We should expect then that long contact and, in the main, common interests would quickly establish a closer connexion between Rome and her former enemies, making the latter seem much less like subjects than fellow countrymen. We should assume that a common culture, the ease and rapidity of communications throughout the land, the progressive extension of the right of Roman citizenship would promote a vigorous local life in every part of Italy, and that full evidence of it would be preserved for us in the far-sounding echoes of literature, the abundance of ruins and the multitude of epigraphical records.

Such an assumption needs to be considerably modified. In the first place, apart from some exceptional sites like Pompeii, which is constantly being excavated, and a few others in the neighbourhood of Rome or Naples, we can form but a dim idea of even the most important ancient communities. Very few of them have been the subject of detailed, methodical monographs, and an examination of Nissen's

¹ After some hesitation in view of precedent, we have decided in this regional study of Rome's many possessions to follow the approximate order of annexation, though this is a rule which may be modified in detail.

² R. A. L. Fall, *Etruria and Rome*, Cambridge, 1924; cf. p. 145, *et seq.*

collection,¹ the most recent on this vast subject, will suffice to show how poor our historical and archæological documentation still was at the beginning of the present century.

As regards the organization of Italy by the Romans after its annexation, the main outlines have already been described in another volume.²

We have seen how circumstances gave rise to a complicated assortment of colonies with a twofold population, in which the indigenous element eludes our observation—Roman colonies and Latin colonies, prefectures, municipalities with or without voting rights, which in any case remained unexercised owing to distance from the capital. There is practically nothing to add to this picture during the half-century after 146. It would be wrong to extol the spirit of caution with which the government proceeded during the period of transition, taking care not to open its arms too quickly to the recently subjected populations which still required watching. By the date mentioned, those stubborn adversaries the Samnites had long renounced all independence. The invasion of Hannibal had at first provoked no secession; the Italians only complained of being inadequately defended by the temporizing tactics of Fabius. To explain the subsequent defections we must take account of the terror produced by the presence of the Carthaginian general and his victory at Cannæ; only the South betrayed the Roman cause. The imperfect resistance of the lower classes revealed the mistake that had been made by the capital in confining its interest at first to the rich. In the north of Italy no enclave of territory remained unsubjected; the Gauls in the neighbourhood of the Po had long been crushed; the Ligurian mountaineers had been exterminated or deported; the country, about the year 176, was at peace within frontiers that extended as far as the Alps and were also protected in the less known eastern regions by defensive works which have been more closely studied as a result of the recent hostilities in the same theatre.³

Nevertheless, when the Social war broke out in the year 90, nothing had been done to attach her allies to Rome.

¹ CLXVII.

² L. Homo, *Primitive Italy*, etc., chap. v.

³ K. Pick and W. Schmid, XIX, XXI-XXII (1922), *Beiblatt*, p. 277-308.

The attitude of the capital toward them was not one of reserve but of contempt; the insecurity of property, the extortions, the arbitrary brutality of the Roman magistrates on circuit kept alive a smouldering irritation, and at last the Italians lost patience. But what was their demand? Not by any means secession. Their aspirations resembled those of the plebeians long before, and they claimed the right of citizenship. But the Roman plebeians, once satisfied, were not at all disposed to share with so many newcomers their privileges of voting and receiving distributions of corn. Only the democrats, from C. Gracchus to Livius Drusus, supported the Italians; and at last, failing to obtain anything by legal methods, they resolved on war.¹

The movement originated among the peasants and the middle class; the insurgents chose leaders from elsewhere rather than obey their nobles; and the revolt was in fact limited to the southern half of the peninsula, which had been less liberally treated than the North. Marsians, Samnites, Lucanians² pledged themselves by an interchange of vows and hostages, and formed a confederation with its capital, which they named *Italica*, in the Abruzzi. Was this a separatist movement? Apparently it was. The Samnites struck coins bearing Oscan legends, and one of them represented the Samnite bull ripping up the Roman wolf. There was an underlying jealousy of the kindred peoples who had obtained the coveted status from Rome individually; the new republic was modelled on its opponent. *Italica* was the capital of a State, only it was a State in which all had the right of citizenship, and that fact alone showed the rebels' true aspirations.

The Roman government understood the situation exactly. At the beginning of the year 90, the *Lex Julia* granted the full right of citizenship to all Italians who remained loyal; thus any pretext for new revolts was removed, and a movement was initiated in the direction of supplementary concessions, which were not long delayed. In fact, at the beginning of the year 89, the tribunes Plautius and Papirius granted the same favour to any Italian, whether a rebel or not, who

¹ CLXII, V. chap. VII.

² Cf. Giac. Racioppi, *Storia dei popoli della Lucania e della Basilicata*, Rome, 2nd ed., 1902, II, *in fine*.

went to Rome to claim it within a period of two months. Defections from the hostile league were bound to follow. Yet the fears of Rome must have been very acute, seeing that a third law, that of the consul Pompeius Strabo, conferred the right of citizenship on the Gauls dwelling south of the Po, and the Latin right on those of the other bank. These latter were then distributed among a certain number of urban districts in which the Celts of the Alpine tribes were incorporated as aliens.

Gradually the opposition gave way. Only a comprehensible feeling of honour and the vain hope of support from Mithridates prolonged hostilities, the Samnites in particular, who were the most warlike and the most recently brought under the yoke, continuing the strife with blind fury. In spite of their final defeat, the Senate had the wisdom not to go back on the concessions made in the hour of danger; it even thought fit to add another to them. More than one Italian who would gladly have profited by the terms of the *Lex Plautia Papiria* had in fact found it impossible to do so. A *senatus consultum* of 87 gave them all a further period of grace in which to make their claim.

Yet these last hour citizens were crowded together in newly created tribes, to the number of ten only, which had to vote last;¹ but the peoples far from the capital set much less store by political privileges than by the possession of full civil rights. Otherwise Rome showed herself generous and friendly; it was her interest to do so. The union was sealed in blood, for furious battles had destroyed Rome's best soldiers, and the free population of Italy was also much diminished; the Republic needed new recruits, and both sides were found to have interests in common.

Order would have been completely restored except for the rivalry of Marius and Sulla: against the latter the opposite faction appealed to the Tuscans, Samnites and Cisalpine Gauls. The dictator's triumph was followed by terrible reprisals: many saw their property sold by auction at a paltry price, or allotted to the veterans of his army. But such cruelties did not exceed the prescriptions, deportations, spoliations perpetrated in the capital. Henceforward Rome and the rest of Italy experienced the same insecurity in the

¹ V. Chapot, **XLIII**, art. *Tribus*, p. 426.

midst of civil strife; for both alike it was a matter of supreme importance to make no mistake in choosing sides.

Thereafter for some time Italy was in a curious position: her inhabitants had the full right of citizenship,—those at least who had claimed it, and they were very numerous,—so that the title of City-State had become altogether paradoxical for the town of Rome, which could now only be described, one would suppose, as the capital of a State in the modern sense of the word, to wit the Italian peninsula. But things did not proceed so simply. At first there were still alien enclaves, and then the colonies and municipalities continued to exist under their different titles. Both alike passed under the authority of the “urban” prætor, so that they were subject to the “city,” which seemed to have attached them to herself on a levelling principle, and in theory they were only administered by this prætor’s delegates, prefects (duovirs or quattuorvirs) *jure dicundo*. On the spot no citizen could engage in any but the affairs of his own particular city; to participate in those of the whole State, which was already very extensive, he had to go to Rome on certain specified dates. As a matter of fact very few chose to do so, and thus the “Roman” who did not live at Rome was usually a sort of second grade citizen; on Cicero’s lips *Italicus* was still a contemptuous epithet.

Further, this *Italia* was reduced in size by Sulla (in 81), if not earlier. All the northern districts had at first been administered directly by the magistrates of the city of Rome, but now we find *prætores* or *proprætores* of Cisalpine Gaul, which had come to rank as a province, separated from the rest of the country by the Arno on the side of the Tyrrhenian sea and by the little stream of the Rubicon which flows into the Adriatic between Ravenna and Rimini.

As regards the cities further south, although they were looked upon as an extension of Rome, they were governed by *leges datæ*, each having its own which differed in some details from those of its neighbours; and the famous *lex Julia municipalis* is less and less regarded as the prototype of these municipal laws.¹ None of them, however, was subjected to a governor or compelled to pay tribute or land-tax, and that was the essential point. Thus, being satisfied

¹ The controversy is summarized in CXXXIII, III, p. 553-564.

with its condition, Italy made common cause with the Senate against the triumvirs.

This was an unfortunate choice, for the other side was the stronger and made full use of its power.¹ Exactions of various kinds, confiscations and the quartering of troops then fell to the lot of the peninsula, and when Octavius received it as part of his share he began by giving lands to his veterans, assigning them the territory of twenty-six towns without indemnifying the dispossessed owners. Legates proceeded to make the allotments, and they were extended to Cisalpine Gaul which no longer ranked as a separate province (43-42).

Italy revolted in disgust; the so-called Perusian war lasted for many months, and more than one city was pillaged, burnt, or emptied of its inhabitants. Octavius showed himself implacable towards those who had stirred up the insurrection, but afterwards, when intimidation had done its work, he thought it prudent to show some clemency, to reduce the taxes, and to restore some of their property to the former proscripts. As his prestige grew and his rivals were eclipsed, he relaxed his sternness a little further and this time bought lands from the municipalities for the foundation of new colonies. There were even cases where the military element coalesced with the original inhabitants of the town, which took the title of colony instead of municipality; and this was an advantage, because colonies were regarded as part of the capital, and Augustus granted their decurions the right of sending their votes to Rome instead of troubling to attend the comitia in person. Thus the political conditions of Italy remained finally privileged in comparison with those of the provinces; but she was none the less drained of her resources by the long years of civil war.²

Fortunately these wars were, practically speaking, the last she experienced until the time of the invasions, and Italy never revolted again. Thenceforward Rome subjected her to a system of government which is obscure in many of its details;³ we do not know what the actual regulations were, and if any of them were permanently fixed, various contradictory cases suggest that the State interpreted them

¹ Appian, *Bell. Civ.*, and Dio Cass., XLVII.

² CXLIII, p. 28-37.

³ CLXVII, I, p. 81-87.

very freely. Certainly they did not mean that Roman law was applied in its entirety to every city, and that all the old local usages were thrown on the scrap-heap.¹

No less obscure was the administration of justice: the Senate, the consuls and prætors, the emperor himself all had a share in it, with distinctions that we cannot perceive. In practice it seems likely that the emperor's jurisdiction always prevailed in matters of importance, where it was exercised by his subordinates, the prefect of the city and the prætorian prefect. Nevertheless this placed the Italians in an uncertain position.

Similarly, no legal measure exempted them from military service, and yet in fact they were almost always exempt henceforward; the provinces sufficed to provide recruits, who were attracted by the grant, immediate or postponed, of Roman citizenship. There remained however the prætorian and urban cohorts, charged with the protection of the emperor and the city of Rome, and these were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment in Italy. The country could not be left entirely ungarrisoned unless there was a reasonable prospect of unbroken tranquillity; but, failing quarrels between colonies or municipalities, or between groups of inhabitants of different towns,² there were often slave riots to be repressed.

We find the same uncertainty in regard to taxation. Italy's exemption from tribute was not due to any decision of principle, and the census, the condition precedent to its levy, was held there as elsewhere. Nevertheless exactions of this kind remained exceptional,³ and were due to some great catastrophe or to a sudden need of money on the part of some pretender to the imperial throne. So too the land-tax did not touch the inhabitants of the peninsula, whose exemption was based upon a theory about the *jus Italicum*, which never had occasion to be seriously disputed by the supreme power. Another proof that the emperors had no thought of exploiting Italy unduly may be found in the fact that they undertook for her benefit and at their own expense a considerable number of public works: city ramparts, canals,

¹ J. Toutain, **XLIII**, art. *Municipium*, p. 2027.

² See for an amusing instance **LXXVII**, II, p. 106.

³ Ch. Lécivain, **XLIII**, art. *Tributum*, p. 431.

ports and quays, aqueducts, drainage, and above all road maintenance.

Pliny¹ has given us a list of the eleven regions into which Augustus divided Italy,² enumerating in alphabetical order the colonies and municipalities of each region. The author's interest in this division was purely geographical,³ and indeed, being based on the traditional names of the peoples, it recalled very clearly the ancient races of the peninsula; but, so far as we know at present, it seems to have had no utility except in regard to the census.⁴ Perhaps it also served as a framework for the different administrations that were then introduced, each district, judicial or financial, embracing several regions in their entirety. Thus the painfully acquired unity of this country was destroyed and regionalism was once more introduced. Its inhabitants could no longer contrast themselves proudly with the *provinciales*, and the law forbidding the Senators or members of the imperial council to cross the frontier of Italy without the emperor's permission was presently abrogated in respect of Sicily and Narbonne. The organization of Italy bore a constantly increasing resemblance to that of the provinces.

Nevertheless the emperors did not cease to show their benevolence towards her: the institution of aliment for poor children, distributed among four prefectures,⁵ was a great benefit to the towns, which were also authorized by the Antonines to receive bounties bestowed by individual citizens on their native place. But then it seemed necessary to supervise the municipal finances, whose sources of revenue had been increased by the good will of the emperor himself; and this task was assigned to certain *curatores rei publicæ*, State officials who, without destroying the autonomy of the towns, made it subject nevertheless to an authority analogous to that of a provincial governor.

In matters of justice the Roman tribunals retained their competence in any suit within a municipality which required

¹ *Hist. nat.*, III, 46 *et seq.*

² According to an estimate which is of necessity a little vague, she would then have had a population of about 14 millions, 10 millions of whom would be free men. [Tenney Frank, XIV, XIX (1924), p. 329-341.]

³ CLXIII, V, p. 268-285; Lackeit, XLVII, Suppl. III, col. 1248-1262.

⁴ Thedénat, XLIII, art. *Regio*, p. 820 *et seq.*

⁵ CXXIX, p. 212-224; cf. p. 221.

the power of *imperium*. In order to relieve them of this heavy additional burden, Hadrian appointed four *consulares* and placed each in charge of a district. Antoninus suppressed this office, though he himself had held it; but Marcus Aurelius re-established it and reserved it for ex-prætors, who took the title of *juridici*.¹ Their jurisdiction did not cover the whole of Italy; there remained an *urbica diæcesis* amenable to the tribunals of the capital; but elsewhere the *juridicus* possessed a high civil and administrative, and probably also criminal, competence. In virtue of a general right of supervision, he served as intermediary between the central authority and the towns, and his powers were continually increased by successive encroachments on those of the local officials. The number and extent of the judicial districts, also called *regiones*, are uncertain; we catch glimpses of certain temporary modifications. Normally they were four: the Transpadane region, the districts south of Campania, the environs of Rome, the country bordering on the Adriatic and the Tyrrhenian Sea.² Thus they coincided neither with the divisions of Augustus nor with the procurators' districts created for the administration of the imperial domains.³ In criminal law there were fresh distinctions: the prefect of the city was competent within a radius of a hundred miles from Rome, and all the rest of the country was under the jurisdiction of the prætorian prefect. Notwithstanding so many entangled divisions, Italy was still exempt from a really provincial system of government; but they prepared the way for it, and it was introduced during the third century.⁴

Then a superior official called *corrector* was appointed in place of the others; the first, under Caracalla, being *electus ad corrigendum statum Italiæ*, while another, under Gallienus, was also perhaps *corrector totius Italiæ*. They seem to have been temporary magistrates who were made permanent by Aurelian;⁵ but he confined them to certain districts, no doubt to repress sedition and the brigandage that was rampant there as on the confines of the Empire. Some remnant of scruple may still be divined in their official designation: just

¹ Berger, XLVII, X, col. 1147-1151.

² CXLIII, p. 130 *et seq.*

³ CXXXIX, p. 127 *et seq.*

⁴ Homo, XXXV, CXXXVII (1921), p. 161 *et seq.*

⁵ CXXXV, p. 144 *et seq.*

as the title *juridicus per Italiam, regionis Transpadanæ*¹ seems to affirm the unity of Italy, so we find a *corrector Italiæ, regionis Transpadanæ*;² but the same official is afterwards called *corrector Campaniæ*. In any case, after Aurelian, these correctors' districts, apart from their names, were analogous to provinces.³ The earlier *juridici* were Italian senators, often great landlords in their own district; the *correctores* were usually strangers to Italy, above all to their district.

At the beginning of the fourth century every kind of fiction disappeared. Italy was now divided into eight "provinces": the Transpadane region, Istria and Venetia, Æmilia and Liguria, Flaminia and Picenum, Etruria and Umbria, Campania and Samnium, Lucania and Bruttium, Apulia and Calabria. Between this list and that of the divisions of Augustus there are fewer divergences; in order to suppress three units, Tuscany had been combined with Umbria and Campania with Samnium, and the division of the territory round about Rome had been modified. Once more the old ethnic or political groups were established; so the ties of vicinity, the economic or religious bonds had retained their latent force under the deceptive mask of unity. The emperors of that day saw no danger in this resurrection; the subdivision of the country was in their eyes sufficient guarantee, and it was destined to be carried still further.⁴

But there remained an Italy in the form of a "diocese,"⁵ completed by the three great islands of Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia, together with the Cottian Alps and Rætia, bulwarks against the barbarians of the North. Only this *diæcesis Italiciana*, which exceeded its natural boundaries, was very soon divided in two, at any rate by about 320; there was a *vicarius* "of the suburbicarian regions" in residence at Rome, and another in charge of *Italia annonaria*, the old Cisalpine Gaul, now taxed to maintain the imperial Court, who resided at Milan, as did the emperor himself.

The old privileges of Italy had been, more *de facto* than *de jure*, admitted by jurisprudence rather than created by law; so that, as regards military service no less than taxation,

¹ *XLI*, V., 1874.

² *Ibid.*, VI, 1418.

³ *CXLIII*, p. 172.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 207 *et seq.*

⁵ L. Cantarelli, *Studi e documenti di storia e diritto*, XXII-XXIV (1901-1903).

they were never strictly adhered to in times of urgent need. Now, in the long run, the exception became the rule¹—not in virtue of any new laws, not by express abolition of privileges which had never been more than tolerated, but through mere force of circumstance, through the great need of men and money in the third century. Caracalla's edict played its part in this process of evolution, for Roman citizens abounded thenceforward in every part of the Empire, so that Italy no longer retained any superiority in this respect; and finally, when certain emperors had transferred their Court to distant cities, the old Latin land ceased to be the indisputable centre of the whole Roman world.

Nevertheless those emperors refrained from treating the Italians officially as provincials, which they had now become, and respected the liberties and traditions of the towns.² Local life followed its natural course, tending towards a particularism which lay in the nature of things, for this long, narrow land, although today it is politically one, has always shown differences between its northern and southern districts which cannot be overlooked by even superficial observers. During the imperial epoch these distinctions are less easy to grasp; ancient historians generally confine themselves to the record of wars, in which very few of the municipalities took any notable part. The latter were increased in number at the cost of their importance: Strabo says there were 474 of them under Augustus, but, according to Ælian, there were nearly 1,200 in the third century. Their annals have perished, and the only memorials of them that remain are the few monuments still standing and the fragments brought to light by the excavator's pick.³

¹ LXIV, p. 211-216.

² CXLIII, Conclusion.

³ See the articles in XLI, vols. V and IX to XI; A. L. Frothingham, *Roman Cities in Northern Italy*, London, 1910; and for particular instances: Santo Monti, *Como romana*, 2nd ed., Como, 1908; Paschetto, *Ostia, colonia romana*, Roma, 1912; Ch.-Ant. Dubois, *Pouzzoles antique*, Paris, 1907. For the social classes and the development of *latifundia* in Italy, where the course of evolution was the same in this respect as in the provinces, CXC bis, p. 182-193.

CHAPTER II

SICILY

It is rather remarkable that the Sicily of the Roman period is so little known.¹ Without the depredations of Verres and the revolts of the slaves its history would be almost entirely a blank. Even its topography lacks precision, being necessarily dependent on a river system that is quite unstable; variations in the small water courses, assisted perhaps by the deforestation due to the Saracens, have caused the ancient names to be lost, and these have almost all been replaced by Arabian names of the Middle Ages, or by quite modern words from the current speech; thus the site of places of secondary importance becomes very doubtful. Even the geographers of the imperial era showed themselves prodigiously ignorant in regard to this island; Strabo relied on obsolete documents.

When the Romans took possession of Sicily they had to deal with populations that had no Italian blood in them, except for the most ancient inhabitants, the Siculi and Sicani, of whom a few tribes still remained on the plateaux of the interior, where they retained, together with a certain independence even in the time of Rome's fullest power, their ancestral customs, their types of dwelling (caves, and huts made of clay and reeds) and their graves, a succession of cells opening on the side of a hill. But, practically speaking, only Greeks, who predominated in the east, and Phœnicians in the west had to be taken into account.

We need not recall here the circumstances of the conquest,² the opportunity which Rome seized to set foot on the island when she came to suppress the Campanian robbers whose brigandage Hiero, king of Syracuse, could not tolerate. The question has been asked³ whether she was actuated by strategic or economic motives. As a matter of fact her

¹ Ziegler, **XLVII, IIa**, col. 2501-2511.

² Homo, *Primitive Italy*, etc., p. 321-332.

³ **CXXXIX**, p. 27.

primary object was to drive back the Carthaginians into Africa; with the Greeks an agreement was conceivable, and indeed Hiero, maintained in his petty kingdom, as a friend of the Romans after 263, remained loyal to them, even though they had monopolized all the rest (241). Stupidity on the part of his successor, a dupe of the agents of Carthage, was the cause of a further Roman intervention: after the attack on Syracuse (212) and Agrigentum (210), Sicily finally ceased to have more than one master.

A first "province" had been established there since the year 227, but the remembrance of it was blotted out by the reorganization that followed these last events; then a subsequent remoulding in accordance with the terms of the *lex Rupilia* brought the island to the condition in which we find it towards the end of the Republic. The lot of the various cities differed according to circumstances; those which had been best disposed towards the Roman cause before the fall of Syracuse were treated with benevolence. On the whole the dominion of Rome was at first indulgent: some Sicilians had fled at the time of the war; they were persuaded to return to their country, where their property was restored to them.

The island was governed by a prætor, generally appointed annually, who was supported by two quæstors. Now no other province ever had more than one. Mommsen's explanation, based upon the former division of the country between Carthage and Syracuse, is probable though not proven. As a matter of fact one resided at Lilybæum, where he succeeded the former quæstor of the fleet, the other at Syracuse. There was need for financial agents, because an important tribute was anticipated; after all, the Sicilians were used to paying it. The first prætors left a good reputation behind them. After the ruin of Carthage, Scipio Æmilianus had the grace to restore to Sicily out of the enormous plunder all that the Carthaginians had formerly carried off, statues and other works of art, and the municipal magistrates crossed over to Africa to be present at the distribution.

From the very first the island provided Rome with a useful base, sometimes with troops or their pay, with sailors, and above all with corn. The Romans sought to revive agriculture which had suffered heavily from the prolonged

warfare. Following the Carthaginian example, they caused the land to be worked by colonies of slaves, especially by their prisoners from Africa. Of these there was an enormous number belonging either to the Romans or to wealthy natives. Badly treated, without clothes and almost without food, they procured the bare necessities of life by robbery, stripping and, if need be, killing travellers or peasants. Nevertheless the small landlords had their sympathy by contrast with the proprietors of *latifundia*. Nearly 200,000 of these unfortunates revolted, laid waste the great domains, and



MAP I.—ROMAN SICILY.

even got possession of fortified towns, several prætors being massacred. It became essential to send large forces under able consuls to drive the slaves from their strongholds at Tauromenium and Henna; finally Rupilius¹ came to complete the task (131), and, seeking to remove the causes of the outbreak, he tried to favour the small landlords, this being in Rome's interest too, because on the great estates breeding sooner or later replaced agriculture. But the large landlords knew how to defend themselves and the contemplated reform had to be postponed for some time.

¹ Muenzer, **XLVII**, Ia, col. 1250.

A further revolt broke out in 104, instigated, like the first, by some fanatical soothsayer. From the west it spread over the whole island, and it had its "king" against whom two prætors fought with so little success that they fell under suspicion at Rome and were banished to make room for the consul M'. Aquillius, who required two years to bring the war to an end (101). This was not accomplished without much slaughter which left Sicily short of labour and partly untilled; but on the other hand, for lack of slave labour, the great estates tended to be broken up, and the free peasants benefited to some extent.

Fortunately the Social war did not break out until later, and Pompey, who had expelled a prætor of Marius, treated the Sicilians kindly. If they had been more lasting, the reforms of Sulla would have been valuable in reducing the power of the knights. Already on a previous occasion the plan had been formed of establishing Roman colonies in order to save the best arable land from this corrupt and avaricious order; but it only became more greedy, having found a complacent prætor, the famous Verres (73-71), of whose misdeeds we can only give a summary.¹

He came to terms with the pirates instead of pursuing them: one fine day a band of sea-robbers invaded the harbour of Syracuse. As judge of the provincials he sold his decisions. As supreme controller of the municipal administrations he allowed no appointment to be made until his approval had been obtained, and paid for. Everywhere he himself chose the censors, who estimated the value of men's property according to the size of their bribes. He shared scandalous profits with the farmers of the tithe, robbed private individuals, even Roman knights, laid hands on the works of art in his hosts' houses, ordered a high official of *Catina* (Catania) to send him all the silver vessels in the town, and had a temple robbed for his benefit in *Melite* (Malta), which was included in his province.

The latter grew weary of absolute submission. There had been governors of Sicily condemned for breach of trust, but their accusers had been Romans, who had brought about their prosecution to gratify private hatred. This time the cities themselves took action; they bethought them of the

¹ CXXXII, p. 184 *et seq.*; LXXVIII, p. 255-277.

young quæstor, Cicero, who had lately won their esteem, and he undertook their defence, glad to make a name for himself by attacking a member of the old aristocracy. His enquiries on the spot were warmly welcomed everywhere, and the true story was revealed to his eyes, a very different one from that which had been forged by a governor who extorted commendatory decrees from the municipal assemblies.

And yet, had it not been for the exactions of individuals, above all of this Verres, Sicily would have held a position of privilege among the provinces already constituted by this date.¹ As regards the tax on harvests, Rome had retained the Syracusan legislation which was liberal and protected by guarantees. The tithes were farmed in kind, by small instalments and every year, in Sicily, not at Rome; all could compete for the contract, even the cities; indeed, the Roman companies were excluded. But the operation took place under the presidency of the prætor, and the artifices of procedure put terrible power into his hands. By forced purchases of corn, under conditions which he arbitrarily determined, he made enormous profits. As lawful judge in any dispute, he could assist or paralyze the farmers in the maintenance of their rights. Thus he was able to make himself the real tithe-owner of Sicily, the owner of a monopoly, but a secret one, since he was hidden behind the small men, his creatures, who alone appeared officially; and in suits relating to the tithe no respite was allowed by the judges, his servants: distraint was made on the property of the unfortunate debtor. These iniquities ended by depopulating the fields; the owners fled rather than toil for the sole profit of a pitiless master, and a large number of estates were left fallow.

It must not be supposed, however, that this meant the total and immediate ruin of the country. In the civil wars it was always a centre of food supply, and when Sextus Pompeius turned pirate and got possession of it, there was fear of famine at the gates of Rome for lack of corn from Sicily as well as from Sardinia. Octavian and Antony had to compromise with Sextus, until Agrippa succeeded in expelling him.

In spite of the wars of the third century, Rome had

¹ LXXVIII, p. 1 *et seq.*

received Sicily in a prosperous condition; the very large army of revolted slaves argues an exceptionally thick population. Now certain indications point to an opposite conclusion as regards the state of affairs at the end of the Republic. The domination of Sextus, the reconquest by Octavian had delivered up the country to bands of slaves, half soldiers and half brigands. The least wretched among the Sicilians were the shepherds and goatherds; their flocks alone provided them with food and clothing, and this peripatetic wealth was the least exposed to danger, since they travelled in armed groups and were able to defend it. This kind of industry continued unembarrassed, and for a long time Sicily remained pre-eminently the country of sheep, wool and hides. The great estates were reconstituted as a result of Cæsar's confiscations from the knights, and the vast concessions made to Agrippa and other persons of the first importance. The modern names in *ano* have preserved the memory of these *latifundia*, on which groups of colonists were established. The number and importance of the cities decreased; Strabo asserts this clearly, above all in respect of the south coast; yet he mentions as vanished some towns which, as inscriptions and coins bear witness, were still existent in his time.

In any case the number of the Sicilian cities in the various periods is a disputed question. The *Verrines* refer to 65, and this list ought to be one of the most reliable;¹ but the majority cannot be identified; only 22—one third—are recognizable under their modern names. More than half paid the tithe; of the rest three were privileged, the "allies" who had favoured Rome from the first: *Messana* (Messina), *Tauromenium* (Taormina) and *Neetum* (Noto). The list of the elder Pliny still includes 68 cities, and this document, based partly on official statistics of the time of Augustus, has found resolute supporters,² notwithstanding the fact that it abounds in serious mistakes, as for instance when it places certain ports in the interior of the island. One significant fact has been remarked:³ in the dawn of Christianity episcopal

¹ LXXVIII, p. 207-225.

² Cf. Ettore Pais, *Osservazioni sull' amministrazione della Sicilia, durante il dominio romano* [*Archivio storico siciliano*, N.S., XIII (1888), p. 118-252].

³ Enrico Loncaio, *La Sicilia romana* (extr. from the *Rivista italiana di Sociologia*), Palermo, 1905.

sees were formed in all the populous centres; they abounded in southern Italy and in Africa; Sicily only numbered ten, of which nine were on the coast. That is where the Romans preferred to live, deserting the mountainous regions of the interior.

We do not know precisely what fiscal status was conferred by law upon the Sicilians even at a period for which the texts are more abundant. From a letter of Cicero¹ it appears that Julius Cæsar conferred the Latin right on them all, and that was usually a temporary state of affairs. Does it follow that they were, as Mommsen thinks, already Roman citizens in the time of Augustus? At any rate it is hard to suppose that the *civitas Romana* did not reach them long before Caracalla, since their country was practically a continuation of Italy, and Roman senators were free to go there.² Besides, Sicily had already enjoyed Roman citizenship for a few years (until 36 B.C.): Mark Antony had granted it to her in fulfilment, as he said, of a last wish of Cæsar, and during this period the tithes were no doubt abolished, as they were in Asia. But, for having submitted to the yoke of Sextus Pompeius, she was at first treated with severity, compelled to pay the *stipendium* of conquered territories and to lose the *civitas Romana*, which she subsequently recovered at an unknown date.

The history of Sicily under the Empire is a blank page; we shall have to say the same of more than one province, and this suggests an optimistic view, for ancient historians chiefly recorded unpleasant events. Thus a source dating from the Lower Empire only mentions another Servile war under Gallienus;³ it may have had the same cause and the same character as its predecessors, but in the third century the trouble was general.

Augustus, who made the island a senatorial prætorian province, immediately showed his good will towards the cities and took steps to retrieve the recent disasters. He sent military colonies—there was never any want of veterans for him to reward—to Syracuse, Catina, Thermæ Himeræ, Tyndaris, Tauromenium and Panormus (Palermo), to which others were sent by Vespasian and Hadrian. He twice

¹ *Ad. Attic.*, XIV, 12, 1.

² See above, p. 126.

³ *Treb. Poll.*, (*Scr. hist. Aug.*), XXIII, 4, 9.

visited Sicily, whither Caligula and Hadrian also went, and Septimius Severus was one of her proconsuls.

Between the natives and their Roman masters a link might be found in religious sentiment, and as a matter of fact there existed at the western extremity of the island, on Mount Eryx (Monte San Giuliano), a temple of Venus which, according to the legend, Æneas himself had dedicated to his divine mother and his hero father.¹ When many other shrines in the country were, according to Diodorus, practically abandoned and fallen into ruin, this one saw its prestige increase. Consuls and prætors sacrificed there and brought their offerings; the *publicani* devoted to it a part of their profits. The quæstor of Lilybæum had supreme control over the treasure stored there, and, with the consent of the Roman authorities, fourteen of the principal towns combined to maintain the temple, providing as a guard for Venus Erycina a troop of 200 men under the command of a tribune.² This devotion has left a more lasting memory than the Sicilian manifestations in honour of the deified Cæsars. The provincial assembly, the usual centre of the loyalist cult, seems to have played in Sicily a most insignificant part. The Empire established peace between cities which had recently seen too many conflicts, but does not appear to have troubled otherwise to unite them or group them together. In the municipal organizations we can only remark the usual preponderance of the plutocratic element.

If the populous cities declined from the splendour to which they had been exalted in the fifth and fourth centuries, we nevertheless find in them the remains of buildings dating from the Roman period, chiefly from the time of the Empire, and Soluntum was entirely rebuilt. No temples were built, except at Agrigentum (Girgenti); the ædiles concentrated their efforts especially on pleasure buildings, baths and gymnasia. Amphitheatres were made at Catina, Syracuse and Thermæ Himæræ; the more ancient theatres of Tauro-menium, Catina, Syracuse, Acræ and Tyndaris were restored and transformed after the new models; aqueducts conveyed, to Thermæ and Panormus in particular, the pure water with which even today Sicily is not everywhere generously provided.

¹ CXXXIX, p. 90 *et seq.*

² XLIV, I, 501.

And yet the effect produced in this country by the centuries of Roman peace was one of decadence, and the economic system¹ had much to do with this. The exportations of corn continued under the Empire, but they were very much reduced in quantity; other lands, Egypt and the Chersonese, compensated the capital for the deficit. The island still yielded fruits, honey and wine; the cinders produced by the fire of Etna served as a natural manure of the finest quality for the vineyards; moreover, the great volcano was a curiosity of repute with tourists, among whom we must reckon Hadrian, who climbed the mountain. Breeding was some slight compensation for the decline of agriculture; the herds of cattle and horses produced animals of admirable quality; and fishery was a thriving industry. But, generally speaking, only the cities on the coast showed a certain degree of prosperity. The road system bears witness to this; failing mile-stones—none has been discovered—the ancient itineraries inform us that a road ran all round the island. The name of *via Valeria* given to a part of the road on the north coast suggests that its construction was due to a governor of the earliest days of the Roman occupation; the *via Pompeia* mentioned by Cicero, which passed through Messina, no doubt served the east coast. Secondary roads also linked Agrigentum with Panormus and Catina, Catina with Thermæ Himeræ, and Gela with Syracuse, but, notwithstanding a few late and isolated documents, the system appears to have suffered from long neglect.

The most searching investigations² have led to a very strange conclusion: in spite of the proximity of Italy and her long domination, Sicily was never completely romanized. The distinction between the various ethnic elements persisted; the language of the Siculi had not disappeared, and Apuleius³ in the second century still spoke of the "trilingual" island. The creation of the province was the beginning of a very great minting activity in many cities, notably in more than one that had hitherto lacked the right of coinage; but Greek legends predominate on the coins until the time of Augustus. Under the Republic, the Latin inscriptions,

¹ *CXC bis*, p. 194-197.

² *CXXXIX*, p. 106 *et seq.*; *XLVII*, IIa, col. 2518.

³ *Metam.*, XI, 5.

dedications to gods or to Roman patrons, are due to foreigners, not to natives. When colonies were established the use of Latin was imposed upon them, but in the municipalities the official documents continued to be drawn up in Greek,¹ or else in both languages;² indeed, the Greek idiom was destined to last well into the Middle Ages. Among the original writers of Sicily, the first of the imperial epoch retained the language of their ancestors; then we find some using one language, some the other; and it is not until the fourth century that Latin seems to have definitely won pre-eminence.

Even Christianity, once it was established in the island, showed no Roman characteristics; it is proved to have been a movement from the East by the nature of the monuments, the numerous catacombs (Agrigentum, Mazzara, Lilybæum, Panormus and Syracuse) and their ornamentation. The local spirit also showed itself among this population of farmers and shepherds, full of religious enthusiasm but especially in regard to the forces of nature, by an abundant growth of doubtful legends, stories of miracles and extravagant martyrdoms.

General prosperity was restored towards the end of the Saracen occupation, and that of the Normans proved for Sicily a brilliant period of artistic renaissance. Today the country is obviously Italian, but as a result of very recent assimilation, and the population still shows physical and moral characteristics of such a kind that the student of ethnology is naturally directed towards mediæval influences.

¹ XLIV, I, 509.

² *Ibid.*, 499.

CHAPTER III

CORSICA AND SARDINIA

THAT these two islands¹ could not fail to belong to Rome from an early period would be readily admitted, especially in Italy, since, like Sicily, they are the natural complement of that country. Yet the three islands have not shared a common destiny in modern times: Sardinia and Sicily were not reunited until 1860, after centuries of separation, and Corsica alone has felt the attraction of the North, for the first time under the French Carolingians.

In the third century before our era they were alike bones of contention between Rome and Carthage, being of the first importance for complete mastery of the western Mediterranean; and it was at this period that they were transferred almost simultaneously from one of these powers to the other. Had the Romans designs upon one of them still earlier? On the solitary authority of Theophrastus,² who died at the beginning of the third century, they sent twenty-five ships to Corsica to found a city there, but were repelled by the dense forests, by the branches of trees which tore their sails even in the creeks, and the squadron confined itself to loading an immense raft with timber which was lost in the sea. This piece of information may have a historical foundation, but legend seems to have taken possession of it.

The Roman annals record only one previous operation—that of the consul L. Cornelius Scipio in 259,³ and here too the details are wanting. The islanders had revolted against the Carthaginians, who occupied at least all the coast land; but it was not with the purpose of submitting to the Romans, for when the latter were rid, or almost rid, of their African rivals, who continued to intrigue in the islands, they had to

¹ X. Poli, *Le Corse dans l'antiquité*, Paris, 1907; Et. Michon, **XXIV**, VIII (1888), p. 411-425; Huelsen, **XLVII**, IV, col. 1657-1660 (*Corsica*); Philipp, *ibid.*, Ia, col. 2490-2495 (*Sardinia*).

² *Hist. plant.*, V, 9, 2.

³ O. Leuze, **XXIII**, II (1902), p. 406 *et seq.*



MAP II.—CORSICA AND SARDINIA.

proceed to overcome the natives. An expedition of 238 put an end at least to the open hostility of Carthage, but it did not prevent help being privately given to the Libyan and Punic colonists, especially after the battle of Cannæ. The revolt headed in 215 by a certain Ampsicoras—a Punic name—is a proof of this insidious policy. The texts relating to all these events are ambiguous, and seem to confuse names and dates;¹ the triumphal *Fasti* bear the mark of undoubted exaggeration on the part of the victorious generals. The fact remains that the resistance of the Corsicans and Sardinians in the interior lasted for very many years; indeed everything conspired to stimulate it. It was the time when Rome needed vast supplies of corn for her armies in Greek lands; her requisitions exceeded all bounds: instead of a tithe per annum, she demanded two or even more. Such cargoes were brought to the Tiber that the granaries could not contain them and new ones had to be built. Sardinia was also required to provide clothes, togas and tunics. Corsica had to give hostages and thousands of pounds of wax, since she had nothing else to give. As usual, a swarm of usurers descended upon these islands, and the prætor M. Porcius Cato was the only man to denounce them. Year after year insurrections broke out anew, giving ambitious generals an opportunity for new triumphs, and one of these must have been decisive in character, since a votive tablet relating to it speaks of 80,000 enemy killed or taken captive by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus—but by whom was this total verified?

Only the coasts and the plains near the shore were quickly pacified, for Roman squadrons were constantly cruising in the neighbourhood to prevent any Carthaginian surprise; and then soldiers from Italy must have received allotments of land, this being a favourite method of advancing the Roman cause. The natives of the mountain region, the *pelliti* (wearers of skins), who were poorly armed, had at first made the mistake of accepting a pitched battle and had thus brought upon themselves a ruinous defeat; but subsequently they changed their tactics: keeping quiet in the presence of the government troops, they took advantage of their temporary absence to swoop down upon the cultivated plains and carry off a rich supply of plunder. It seems that Rome

¹ CLXXIII, chap. I-IV.

abandoned the idea of pursuing them into their strongholds. When we see the Senate granting the general instead of a full triumph the more modest triumph *in monte Albano*, we can hardly assume that jealousy alone was the cause; in point of fact the successes gained were trifling in comparison with the victories in the East, the spoil was mediocre—wax in Corsica!—the enemy were contemptible, *latrunculi mastrucati* as Cicero calls them, mere brigands clothed in sheepskins, and those that were taken prisoner did not deserve even their usual title, *Sardi venales*, since their native stubbornness made them unteachable and stern measures were of no avail. Similarly it was said of the Corsicans “whoever has bought one regrets the waste of his money.” Rome declined to send troops weakened by malaria into the mountain region; it was more profitable to surprise the robber bands at their revels, when they met together to hold festival after a successful foray.

In the civil strife which rent the Republic during its last century the islands of the Tyrrhenian Sea played a leading part. In Corsica at least—there is no evidence for Sardinia—Marius and Sulla established a large number of their veterans at Mariana and Aleria. The success or failure of party leaders depended largely on their command of corn supplies: M. Æmilius Lepidus, the opponent of Sulla, strove to intercept the convoys of grain on their way to the capital. When the strength of the pirates compelled Pompey to devise a plan of operations on a great scale, his efforts were largely concentrated on these regions; during the five years (57-51) of his *cura annonaria*, the governors of Sardinia were all men of his appointment. Then Cæsar caused the island to be occupied by his delegates, for it was Sardinia, together with Sicily, that kept the dictator’s armies supplied with food; the rivalry between Carales and Sulci, which took the Pompeian side, was overcome by extreme measures, especially by confiscations. With the second triumvirate the same story began again: Octavian had received Sardinia as part of his share for five years, and it was required to supply corn for the armies destined to oppose Brutus and Cassius in the East; but a new pirate, Sextus Pompeius, hurried in pursuit of the cargoes. In the island itself a freedman of Pompey carried on a partisan war, supporting now one side, now the

other, and betraying both, until the day when the competition was finally determined at Actium.

This involuntary participation of the two islands in Roman quarrels is the most salient feature of their history to the end of the Republic. But a distinction must be drawn between the central forests and the coast regions, which alone were exploited and which, in Sardinia especially, were alone of appreciable value to the Romans. The interior was practically a different country: there was no easy way through the inextricable forests; a consul ordered to conduct operations there sent to Italy for packs of police dogs, which pursued the Sardinians even to their caves. In the second century before our era, armies of 20,000 men, in those days an imposing number, fought in vain to overcome these new subjects: the heroism and stubbornness of the natives, the great influence of their chiefs outbalanced the handicap of inferior weapons, and by their account of a few episodes the Roman annalists enable us to perceive all the difficulties of pacification.

In the times of Sulla, Pompey and Octavian the attempt had been postponed; the harvests of the plains and piracy had alone engaged their attention. Thus the Empire in its early days might well be deluded and make of Corsica and Sardinia combined a single senatorial province. But there only needed some police activity, some imprudent bickering, to stir up the mountaineers again (6 A.D.). Then the islands became part of the emperor's share, and he maintained an armed force in them; not the legions that had been there before, but only auxiliaries suited to the climate. Sardinians and Corsicans were recruited from the pacified regions, Ligurians, a kindred people, were sent there, and finally Moors were imported from Africa. Their orders were not very ambitious: to prevent any raid upon the cultivated fields.

As a matter of fact the raids began again in times of disturbance, for example in the year 69, after Nero's death. A Sardinian inscription¹ gives us the text of an order, repeated by Vespasian, forbidding the *Galillenses* of the hills to invade the lands of the *Patulcenses* of the plain (*campani*). In Corsica about this time an imperial procurator wished to

¹ XLI, X, 7852.

employ the natives in the interest of Vitellius: he made them take an oath of fidelity, after having cut the throats of Otho's supporters. But the Corsicans were little interested in all these rivalries; they put the partisan to death and sent his head to Vitellius. This minute detail is a sufficient indication of what could be expected from these unassimilable islanders. We have described elsewhere¹ the resources which, in Sardinia at least, they had at their disposal: the *noraghes*, of which thousands remain today, more or less ruined, were fortified places of refuge at the time when they were made, and might still serve the same purpose in the hands of determined rebels; the Roman government may itself have used some of them as *castella* to guard the passes.

But it could afford to neglect the interior, where the poor soil was only fit for pasturage or forestry. And yet Sardinia was crossed by a road, which followed the most accessible valleys and linked up only a few unimportant centres of population: such as *Uselis* and *Forum Trajani*. Moreover, fortified posts had to be placed at intervals along it—a symptomatic detail, for these forts were not raised against an external enemy, who would have been stopped at the landing-place. On the whole the system of Roman roads in Sardinia coincides very nearly with that of the railways today; nature had marked out certain thoroughfares by which the government could without too much difficulty assure a feeble circulation; they formed neutral zones in the bush, which was intentionally isolated under the official name of *Barbaria*, land of barbarians. Some kind of administrative separation is proved by the existence of an *evocatus Augusti, præfectus I cohortis Corsorum et civitatum Barbariæ in Sardinia*.² As for Corsica, the governors lived in terror of its alpine regions; only one road is shown in the Itineraries, along the east coast, the flattest and most unhealthy, between Mariana and *Palla*; the reasons for restoring another to the map between Aleria and *Aiacium* (Ajaccio) are purely hypothetical.

Under the Republic, the command in these two islands had attracted some men who sought adventure and desired a triumph that was deemed easy of attainment; but when the province was regarded as pacified, no one was in any hurry

¹ XII, 1923, p. 86-90.

² XLI, XIV, 2945.

to go there: more than one governor only arrived after a very noticeable delay, while some refrained from going at all. It had a poor reputation in Italy: a land unblest by nature, unhealthy, disagreeable in appearance, backward, devoid of polite society. Many authors vie with one another in applying the epithet *pestilens* to Sardinia, and indeed malaria was rife in the coast regions, the only ones for the Roman to live in, where Carthage, whose sole interest was in the corn, had cleared away the forests and forbidden replanting. Seneca, during eight years of exile, inveighed emphatically against the *cœli gravitas* of Corsica in summer.¹

The two islands were recognized places of banishment. C. Cassius Longinus, the lawyer accused of conspiracy by Nero, was deported to Sardinia, as also were Crispinus, the prætorian prefect, and Anicetus, the murderer of the first Agrippina. Apart from these well-known personages, hosts of exiles came there who were suspected by the State on account of their beliefs: Tiberius transported 4,000 freedmen accused of Jewish superstition;² many Christians, after the persecutions, were sent to work in the mines, and thus was formed the small nucleus of a Greek-speaking population.

It is hard to understand and follow the constant changes in the administrative system. Normally, during the first centuries of occupation, one prætor governed both islands together; if there was a prospect of strife, Rome preferred to give each island its own prætor, or even sent a consul or proconsul with an army. Then, under Augustus, mere procurators of the equestrian order begin to appear; who are found again under Claudius, Nero, Hadrian, Commodus, and constantly in the third century. In 67 Nero gave up Sardinia to the Senate in compensation for the loss it had sustained when "freedom" was granted to Achaia, but this favour was of very short duration. Subsequently we see a curious alternation of procurators and proconsuls. The two islands are, or appear to be, generally united, but we suspect a real distinction between two such titles as *præfectus Corsicæ*³ and *proconsul provinciæ Sardinia*⁴; under the Syrian emperors the complete titles of the governors are no more than *procura-*

¹ Senec., *Epigr.*, I; *Dial.*, XII, 6, 5; 7, 8; 9, 1.

² Tac., *Ann.*, II, 85.

³ XLI, XII, 2455.

⁴ *Ibid.*, VI, 1501, 1503.

tores Augusti et præsides provinciæ Sardiniaë.¹ In all this there is much that remains obscure. In the fourth century Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily were together placed under a *rationalis trium provinciarum*, several times mentioned in the Theodosian Code; but in the *Notitia dignitatum* the two first are distinct provinces. It must often have been necessary to adopt emergency measures in regard to them.

How did the majority of governors conduct themselves? Except for the periods of war, in which unbiassed judgments were out of the question, we only have evidence of the unselfishness of the elder Cato, who did not deign to avail himself, for his own maintenance and that of his escort, of the rights associated with his magistracy; of the abnegation of the quæstor C. Gracchus, who spent his own money rather than put his subjects to expense; of the illegal requisitions of a certain Scaurus, whose complete acquittal even the eloquence of Cicero failed to secure; of a governor of Nero's time, who was condemned for exactions. The provincial list supplies a certain number of names which however are no more than names to us. Under the Empire at any rate, as in other countries, the honest officials must have been the great majority. We are tempted to repeat that the lack of information is a good symptom.

If Corsica and Sardinia submitted for about eighty years to the domination of the Vandals, there is nothing to suggest that they accepted it gladly or invited it. Besides, before making a complete conquest of the islands, these barbarians sailed along the coasts each spring in search of plunder. Genseric, their king, desired above all to starve Rome; he adopted once more, after four centuries, the tactics of Sextus Pompeius, and improved upon them by attacking the towns and burning the government's granaries. Action had to be taken several times against the invader, and at last, after the collapse of their African kingdom, Belisarius easily drove the Vandals out of the two islands, which were attached for a time to the Byzantine Empire. It was then that they experienced a really oppressive government—but that is outside the chronological limits of this work.

The Principate, to which we must confine ourselves, seems in short to have taken very little interest in Sardinia and

¹ **XLI, X**, 7683 *et seq.*

Corsica; no Cæsar, as far as we know, ever visited them. Their economic value had much decreased in the course of time; when once Carthage was destroyed, no naval power threatened Rome in this quarter; and the corn supplies, the *opimæ Sardiniaë segetes feraces* of which Horace still sang in obedience to tradition, were not as valuable as those of provinces more recently acquired; moreover, the quality of the Sardinian grain began to be looked down on.

Except for this product, Italy received little from the two islands. A great number of wild boars seems to have been sent to Rome; an export of no more serious value than that of the rabbits which swarmed in Corsica. The small breed of horses which is still reared there, though it has almost disappeared from Sardinia, hardly satisfied the demand of the capital. Honey was abundant, but lacked the esteem of connoisseurs. The products of this province and those of Italy were not complementary. Moreover, the native flocks, wild sheep in Sardinia, goats in Corsica, sufficed only for the needs of their own country; they were half wild animals, without stables, that strayed at liberty but did not shun the society of man; then as now, they flocked together when the musical call of the herdsman summoned them.

Of wine Italy had no lack at home. A special permit was required by provincials who wished to cultivate the vine; the Sardinians must have obtained it, and they derived from it a source of wealth that was overlooked before the Empire; the legionaries of the Republic carried their wine with them when they set sail for Sardinia, but the funeral monuments of Cagliari in the form of a cask¹ compel us to assume that vineyards were planted in the following period. The woods of the islands, pines, firs and oaks, must have been laid under contribution for the naval dockyards. On the other hand, the thick hides of the animals, veritable cuirasses, of which the Sardinians made themselves garments (as they still do), were more serviceable in their own harsh climate than in Italy. Finally the two islands had their quarries of granite, but the neighbouring peninsula was not poor in building materials. The mines at any rate were exploited by the capital: argentiferous lead and afterwards iron, especially in the fourth century, were certainly the objects of a traffic of

¹ E.g. **XLI, X, 7703.**

which our wretched sources give us no hint; lumps of lead that have been discovered stamped with the names of Augustus or Hadrian show that the workings were imperial property.

All the guesses that have been made at the total population of these countries are without foundation, and it is equally difficult to trace the stages of their romanization. We do not know how the *ager publicus* was originally distributed: allotments of land must have been made to veterans, and to the Sardinians who remained loyal during the rebellions of the first centuries; but the grant of Roman citizenship, even of the Latin right, to individuals seems to have been late, hesitating and parsimonious. In Sardinia Rome did not favour the creation of cities properly so-called—there were only eighteen altogether—but the growth of simple rural communities, *vici* or *villæ*, which were more suitable for agriculture. The *latifundia* were multiplied there to a deplorable extent; the serfs of the glebe could hardly escape from a country walled about, as it were, by its insularity; their only resource was to fly to the bush, where pursuit was difficult and the “noraghes” provided them at any rate with a shelter for the night.

Few towns deserve mention; we know practically nothing of *Turris Libissonis* (Porto Torres), the only colony of Roman citizens, which dated from the time of Cæsar or Augustus; or of Uselis, called *colonia Julia* under the Antonines. The coast towns, originally more prosperous than those of the twentieth century, were ruined by the Saracens, notably *Sulci*, a small market-town that was benefited by the lead trade. Chief among them were *Nora*—perhaps at first the capital, in view of its obvious position as *caput viarum*—where there are still traces of a fine theatre and an aqueduct, and, most important of all, *Carales*, in whose neighbourhood two-thirds of the inscriptions of Sardinia have been discovered; the ruins show that it was an active and populous centre. There the provincial assembly, of which we have no record, must have held its sessions; certainly justice was administered there, but, in view of the difficulty of communications, it has been supposed¹ that there were four *conventus* (Carales, Othoca, Turris, Olbia), a supposition which would date back

¹ CLXXIII, p. 389 *et seq.*

to the Roman period the origin of the four "jurisdictions" of the Middle Ages. Corsica had only two notable centres of population: Aleria—now a name and nothing more—and Mariana, of which Bastia is really the heir. The peninsula of Cape Corso was occupied by the *Vanacini*, a more civilized people, who remained faithful to the memory of their benefactor Augustus.

The interior of the two countries was not developed beyond the clan system, the source of family rivalries and of the *vendetta* which has not yet been stamped out. The old rites were retained; the names of people and places rarely betrayed Roman influence; even in the cities—at Carales itself!—the magistrates kept for some time the Carthaginian name of *suffetes*. The language of Carthage was regularly spoken in the time of Sulla, and the Phœnician cults lingered on, no less tenaciously than the worship of that enigmatic local divinity Sardopater.

Christianity¹ served better than anything else as a vehicle for the Roman spirit, just as it gave Sardinia some eminent personalities—Lucifer of Cagliari, for example, in whom the indomitable energy of the race was manifested. When the orthodox bishops of Africa were persecuted by the Arian Vandals, the latter remembered that the island had long been a place of banishment: 150 prelates at least were exiled there or to Corsica. The first exiles were employed in cutting down trees for ship-building, but the rest were better treated and suffered to live as monks; they represented and preserved the culture of the preceding age. The bishop of Rome also, who had been presented with land in Sardinia by Constantine, maintained relations with that province, after it had become part of the Byzantine empire, and thus preserved the same culture there for a longer period. Then came other suzerainties and other influences. Those from the North were finally triumphant in Corsica, and if the loyalty of its neighbour to the great fatherland is indisputable, a certain grave dignity in contrast with Italian mobility, and some dialectical forms reminiscent of Spanish, are to be explained by the long domination of Aragon; that and the insular atavism, which is recognizable in some old usages and in the fashion of their dress, still exercise a visible influence on the Sardinians of today.

¹ D. Filia, *La Sardegna cristiana*, Sassari, I (1909).

CHAPTER IV

SPAIN

I

THE COUNTRY AND ITS INHABITANTS

THE great Iberian peninsula was one of the first countries into which Rome was impelled to send an army, not by any premeditated design, but by sheer force of circumstances. War to the death was being waged against Carthage who, after being expelled from Sicily, maintained herself in Spain. It seemed easier to pursue the hereditary foe there than in Africa itself, the centre of her power. Yet the Senate would perhaps have hesitated, if it had known the magnitude of the country, its geographical peculiarities, and the character of its inhabitants. But it had only very vague information on the subject, and knew of nothing beyond the coastal regions covered with Greek and Phœnician colonies. A more detailed knowledge of Spain was not acquired until later, after the long campaigns that its conquest demanded and its final consolidation. Polybius was there for too short a time, and Strabo is the first to give a description that is at once just and less summary.

The peoples of Spain were not all derived from one common stock.¹ Upon her first inhabitants, the Ligurians, were superimposed the Iberians, who undoubtedly came from Africa, and, as in all Mediterranean countries, there was an addition of Greeks, of Phœnicians from Syria or Carthage, and finally of immigrants from the North, especially Celts, whence the general name of Celtiberians.² This name is in accordance with the facts; indeed, except perhaps in the ports, the native differences were effaced, and the country made upon all alike that strong impression which it still makes today.³

¹ Schulten, **XLVII**, VIII, col. 2013 *et seq.*

² **CXCVIII**.

³ Cf. H. Fertig, *Spanien, Land und Leute in dem letzten Jahrhundert vor Christus*, Bamberg, 1902.


Notwithstanding its regular shape, tending towards a square, Spain is a land without unity, divided by the mountains into a host of narrow compartments between which communications are still difficult. Its partition explains the extreme slowness of all progress, the clannish spirit, the taste for independence.¹ As in our own time, the influence of climate made a separate group of the people of the South and South-East, less wild, more highly civilized, and that from an earlier period, thanks to the sailors who visited them. Nevertheless all Spaniards were found to possess warlike instincts, great natural pride, singular powers of endurance, and, in spite of a certain frivolity which was already revealed in their passion for dancing, a spontaneous stoicism and a proud obstinacy which had to be reckoned with by all invaders. The Celtic element in the land underwent a rapid transformation: the racial type, fair, tall and strong, was no longer apparent in the Iberians, who were hardly of medium height, inclined to be thin and dark like the Africans, not by any means hearty eaters and drinkers like our fathers, but on the contrary sober and extremely frugal. Less lively than the Celts, more reserved and melancholy, they showed more self-control; their contempt for death sometimes went so far as self-slaughter in order to shake off the burden of old age; a voluntary end by poison had no terrors for them, so that we need not be surprised if the Christian communities of Spain could reckon many martyrs.

The national character had its good sides: there is very ancient evidence of the spirit of chivalry among the Iberians: they were hospitable, true to their word, obedient to their chosen leader, moved by courteous treatment, and, though ready to risk their own lives, sparing of the lives of others; there are not many traces of cruelty in their history. Extreme individualists, they respected the liberty of others; there have never been many slaves in Spain. Their intellect had more agility than penetration; their imagination was lively, but marred by a propensity to emphasis and precious language. On the whole they showed a tendency to withdraw into themselves and reject foreign influence. The word "patriotism" was understood by the Iberians in a very narrow sense; they confined their affection to a very small "fatherland,"²

¹ XLVII, VIII, col. 2026 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, col. 2021 *et seq.*

the clan to which they belonged; and, destined in consequence to form only small armed bands, they were less skilful in pitched battles than in sudden raids, in the war of surprises to which we now give a name from their own language, *guerilla*—a war in which even the women were able to take part.¹



MAP III.—ROMAN SPAIN.

It took Rome two hundred years (218-19) to secure the peaceful possession of this country, whereas for Gaul seven years were to prove sufficient. Does this mean that the Iberians showed finer qualities than the Gauls? The generals who commanded in Spain were not all incompetent, the name

¹ LXX. p. 61-74; CXCVIII, p. 179-252.

of Scipio lost none of its lustre there, and six leaders in the space of only fifteen years won triumphs over the Iberians, although triumphs were not awarded too lavishly. But in Gaul there were large confederacies; in dealing with them a single battle or a single negotiation had important results. In Spain, with its swarm of clans inhabiting a country everywhere broken up by mountains, where was a beginning to be made or a decision obtained? Besides, the troops engaged were not so many as those which Cæsar had at his disposal in Gaul.

II

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE¹

The conquest properly so-called, which resulted in the creation of the double province of Spain, was won rather over the Carthaginians than over the natives, many of whom welcomed the Romans gladly in the belief that they would thus more easily escape from all domination. Nevertheless the tribute weighed heavily upon them, and these rude mountaineers did not become inured to it with the fatalistic resignation of the Orientals. Moreover, among these peoples with their constant rivalry the submission of one to Rome was the reason for another to keep its independence. The heroic obstinacy of the enemy suggested to some Roman leaders deceitful practices that did more harm to their diplomacy than the worst harshness. Cato bought assistance for which he afterwards disdained to pay; then he ruined the mines with taxation, and caused four hundred villages to be dismantled. Only Sempronius Gracchus showed good faith and moderation, and his name was held in veneration. The others vainly attempted terrorism; Cato sold a considerable number of prisoners, but they took poison, which they carried about them, or killed their masters and sunk the ship that was taking them from their home. Despoiled by avaricious prætors, the Celtiberians formed bands and intercepted the enemy's communications, risking a surprise attack on the tent of the general himself. On the faith of a treaty, the inhabitants of Cauca surrendered to Lucullus, who broke his

¹ M. Marchetti, **XCIV**, III, p. 765-775; Schulten, **XLVII**, VIII, col. 2084 *et seq.*

word and had 20,000 of them slaughtered. After being defeated by the Lusitanians, Galba made an agreement with them and gave them allotments of land; but as soon as they were disarmed and dispersed, 7,000 of them were massacred.¹

One of those who escaped was worthy to stand at the head of all the rebels (Vercingetorix, Arminius, Tacfarinas, Decebalus) who strove to unite scattered kindred forces against Rome. He was not an aristocrat or tribal chief, but a man of humble origin, a hunter, shepherd and brigand, Viriathus.² He knew all the mountain paths and so proved uncapturable; he could even bring about the escape of 10,000 Lusitanians who were almost surrounded in a position deemed to have no exit. At first his only supporters were a handful of those light horsemen who are so numerous in Spain; but soon he was at the head of an army, over which he exercised a real fascination. While the Romans held the strong places, Viriathus cut their lines of communication and succeeded in shutting up the consul in a pass, near Italica, where he forced him to capitulate. Such was the ending of a struggle of eight years' duration (149-141). There was to be peace and friendship between the adversaries, and each was to retain what he possessed.

But if the tactics of Viriathus, *latrocinii more*,³ were formidable, still more so were his plans for the future, his design of uniting the two principal peoples of central Spain, his own and the Celtiberians. Some traitors won over by an emissary of the Senate, which was always trying to divide the enemy, assassinated him in the year following the armistice. His supporters did not know how to conduct the *guerilla* as he had done; they finally submitted and were transported *en masse* to the far off Mediterranean coast. The town of *Valentia*, which was the result of this exodus, by its name at any rate does homage to their valour. The Roman annalists have themselves contributed to the glory of Viriathus, who has remained a national hero in Portugal. In view of their methods of warfare, the Carlists of last century were said to have been inspired by his example.

¹ For this first period see Goetzfried, *Annalen der römischen Provinzen beider Spanien* (218-154), Diss. Erlangen, 1907.

² Schulten, **XXIX**, I (1917), p. 209-237. See Homo, *Primitive Italy* etc., p. 378.

³ Liv., **XXI**, 35, 2.

All was not ended by his disappearance: the Celtiberians showed no less tenacity than the Lusitanians.¹ They had already inflicted two serious defeats on the consul Nobilior in the valley of the Douro (153). On the banks of this river, among the Arevaci, Rome encountered her most formidable antagonists, only this time it was not a man who was most prominent, but a city, Numantia. The war close to its walls² was at first suspended by a nine years' truce (152-143), since the consul Marcellus decided to negotiate.³ Whether this peace should continue depended on Rome alone; but when the Numantines received their allies and kinsmen, the people of Segeda, and vainly requested the enemy to have pity on them, they were called on to deliver up their arms, refused to do so, and proved victorious.

And yet they were only 8,000 men, reinforced perhaps by a few contingents that came in by stealth from the surrounding country; but the city was protected by steep hills and dense forests, and surprise attacks were incessant. Pompeius and Popilius Lenas miscarried one after the other; the consul Mancinus allowed himself to be trapped in a blind alley with 24,000 men by 4,000 Numantines. With any other opponents than the Romans, the generous terms of the natives might have proved an astute stroke of policy: so far from massacring these men who were at their mercy, they required them only to lay down their arms and make peace; they administered an oath to the consul, his principal officers, and the quæstor Tiberius Gracchus, whose honesty recalled the virtues of his father—that Sempronius to whom Spain had been indebted for twenty-five years of tranquillity. But the Senate repudiated the compact, and the only compensation they paid to the Numantines was the consul, half naked and bound, who was left for a whole day at the gates of the city. In order to attempt a diversion, Æmilius Lepidus attacked without excuse the great city of the Vaccaei, Palantia; but the *guerilleros* cut off his convoys and dearth made havoc of the besiegers; so many men perished that the consul resigned himself to the dishonour of raising the siege and abandoning the sick and the wounded.

Numantia had become the "second terror" of Rome.

¹ CXCVIII, p. 332 *et seq.*

² On this fortress see CXCVII, p. 16-54.

³ Homo, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

At last she appealed to the man who had delivered her from the first, to the vanquisher of Carthage, Scipio Æmilianus. His cold resolution, implacable if need be, was destined to prove successful. His methods of terrorism were applied first of all to his own soldiers, whose discipline had been impaired by disheartenment: moreover, the number of his troops was doubled and raised to 60,000 men. Nevertheless, he preferred to bide his time and reduce the city by starvation. He surrounded it with a circumvallation 9 kilometres in length, guarded by seven camps,¹ with fortified towers at intervals. To prevent boats or divers from entering the city by the Douro, he closed the river between two strong castles by means of cables and beams armed with iron spikes. This was the first time that a town willing to fight had been blockaded; Alesia was merely a repetition of Numantia with the means of blockade perfected. In spite of a strict watch, some Numantines managed to get through the lines of investment and implored help through all the territory of the Arevaci; only one village dared to promise reinforcements; Scipio was informed of the fact and caused them to be delivered up to him, whereupon four hundred young men suffered a punishment worse than death, the amputation of their hands.

Abandoning hope, the Numantines prepared themselves by a funeral meal of half raw flesh to seek death in a last fight, which the Roman leader declined, refusing to accept anything but surrender pure and simple. But famine did its work: presently the grass was exhausted and even the leather, the hides of beasts, to which the besieged had finally been reduced. They devoured human corpses, they killed each other, the sick and weak were cut down and eaten by the stronger; misery had made the survivors mad or unconscious. Some committed suicide by fire, steel or poison. When the remnant perceived their small number—about one hundred—they staggered out, three parts naked, covered with filth, their eyes haggard, their hair unkempt, their nails so long that they seemed like the claws of savage beasts. Too broken to serve as slaves, a few only adorned the triumph of the victor, and that was all the booty won.

The town was set on fire, but only the masonry of the

¹ CXCIII, map IV; CXCVII, map I; circumvallation, p. 62-76.

walls was burnt; all the rest had already been destroyed or consumed. The territory was divided among the neighbouring towns that had capitulated. Only at a later date, under Augustus, did a second Numantia rise from those ashes, a humble village for which no other destiny seemed to be reserved than to perpetuate the memory of a cruel and heroic episode.

Appian has described it¹ with a wealth of detail which he must have owed to Polybius, an eye-witness whose deference to Rome could stand the test of so many horrors. The excavations conducted by Schulten² have confirmed and illustrated this gloomy story. Scipio's camps have been discovered, stone structures no less solid than the permanent camps of the imperial epoch. Except for one that blocked the plain, these purely defensive fortresses were raised on partly escarped hills; one of them that has been preserved intact corresponds exactly with the description given by Polybius of the Roman camps of his time. Others of smaller dimensions were placed at a further distance from the besieged town. The interest of these discoveries is all the more marked because topographical traces of early wars are extremely rare in Spain: most of the forts built by the Romans have been transformed from top to bottom by the Arab invaders. There is hardly anything to be seen except the remains at Leon of the camp of the legion *X Gemina*, the analogous ruins of Viseu in Portugal, and, more important and more recently explored than these, a Roman camp of the time of Sertorius, 2 kilometres north of Cáceres.³

Sertorius is still a name to conjure with among the Spaniards, and yet he was not a Spaniard himself. Until we come to him there is no notable insurrection to record; the terrible example made of Numantia secured for the Roman governors a comparative lull for fifty years, by which Metellus profited to win the Balearic islands⁴ from the pirates who occupied them (123). It was only disturbed by a rising of the Arevaci in the year 90, which was ended by the destruc-

¹ *De reb. Hisp.*, 76-98; cf. 97.

² *CXCVIII*, p. 332-375; cf. *XIII*, XV (1913), p. 365-383.

³ Schulten, *XVIII*, XXXIII (1918), p. 75-106. The town of Norba, a colony of veterans under Augustus, succeeded to the camp of Metellus, the opponent of Sertorius.

⁴ *XLVII*, II, col. 2823-2827.

tion of the town of Termantia. But all hope of freedom had not been abandoned. This was seen clearly enough when a former lieutenant of Marius, flying from Italy before Sulla, came to take refuge in Spain. This Sertorius, already in league with the Celtiberians, who defied the prætor Valerius, knew how to rally the Lusitanians to his standard. As quick as or even quicker than themselves, he soon gained a knowledge of the country. A man of striking character with the temperament of a native, skilful in stirring their hearts by miraculous stories, supported by a numerous retinue of emigrants who hastened to attach themselves to him, he might well be regarded by the Spaniards from the very first as a real champion of their independence. He therefore attracted a resolute following and, eluding the attacks of Sulla's lieutenant, Metellus, held the field for several years. But when other Italian troops joined him under Perperna, revealing to the Iberians the increasingly Roman character of this revolt, in which they were only allowed to render humble services, being excluded from all command, their illusions gave way; conspiracies were made, with the encouragement of Perperna, and in one of them the leader was assassinated. Thus ended a second conflict of eight years' duration (80-72).¹ After this catastrophe, Pompey, who had set out to make war against Sertorius, had only to accept the submission of the whole country.

Nevertheless Cæsar, appointed governor in the year 60, still found an opportunity there for some military successes north of the Tagus; perhaps his subjects were glad for him to win them rather than enrich himself too much at their expense. They were destined to see him again ten years later, preoccupied as usual with his own interests and trying to demoralize the Pompeian troops, of whom the best were in Spain under poor generals. A stern campaign followed, but he had the advantage of knowing the country well and the kind of battle that could be fought there. In this quarrel, which little concerned them, he was not obstructed in any way by the Iberians.

Still there were the Asturians and Cantabrians to be subjugated, intractable mountaineers intrenched among their

¹ XLVII, IIa, col. 1746-1753; Guill. Stahl, *De bello Sertoriano*, Diss. Erlangen, 1907.

heights in the north-west corner of the peninsula. That task fell to the Principate in almost its earliest years (29-19). Agrippa succeeded in destroying their eyries, and guaranteed peace for the future by transporting the inhabitants *en masse* to the plains. He put an end to all resistance, except for a few scattered disturbances hardly worthy of mention.¹ Henceforward Spain was a *provincia pacata*. Must we suppose that after so many failures she perceived the futility of any attempt to win freedom? Another explanation occurs to us: history does not record all the abuses of power from which the peoples suffered under the Republic; the more equitable system inaugurated by the Empire would incline them to resignation. But this summary of events will help us presently to understand what the "romanization" of Spain really was.

III

THE GOVERNMENT²

No State existed in this country before the coming of the Romans; the tribes sometimes formed ephemeral coalitions, but that was all. Therefore the question immediately arose whether there should be one province of Spain or several, and how their boundaries should be determined. A provincial era³ can be traced from 206, after the departure of the elder Scipio, but it probably referred to a single province only, which was officially succeeded in 197 by two provinces entitled simply *Hispaniæ Citerior* and *Uterior* ("further" from the point of view of access by land). Near the coast their boundaries were immediately fixed without difficulty; starting from some small river near Carthagena, the line of division between them was carried as far as the *saltus Castulonensis*; beyond that, in view of the existing state of war, the commander of each army included within his own sphere those tribes which he succeeded in subduing.⁴ But after the fall of Numantia a commission of ten senators carried the precise line of demarcation still further, making it the same no doubt

¹ CXCVIII, p. 379 *et seq.*

² Mispoulet, XXXI, XXXIV (1910), p. 301-328; XLVII, VIII, col. 2036 *et seq.*; XCIV, III, p. 775 *et seq.*

³ C. F. Fita, VIII, LXI (1912), p. 475-497.

⁴ LI, p. 16.

as it remained until the coming of Augustus: passing through the *juga Oretana*, crossing the Tagus below Toledo and leaving Avila on the east, it turned towards the north-west to reach the Douro above its confluence with the Tormes.

Previously the country had been divided into *civitates*, which paid a fixed tribute by coining a part of their metallic wealth; but after 123 the right of minting Spanish metals was reserved to the Roman workshops. From the administrative point of view, the State ignored the native clans; their arbitrary association by the treasury, without regard for their reciprocal sentiments, was to be the cause of frequent troubles and of revolt against authority.

At the division of the provinces in the year 27, Hither Spain was assigned to the emperor and Further Spain, now called Bætica, to the Senate; but from the latter was detached another imperial government, Lusitania, separated from Bætica for the most part by the course of the *Anas* (Guadiana), and to it were transferred all the troops of Further Spain, since Lusitania was less docile, and action was already regarded as inevitable against the peoples of the north-west who were associated with her. Dio Cassius assigns this tripartite division also to the year 27, a date disputed by some,¹ though without much reason, accepted by others,² and probably correct. The respective capitals do not seem to have been finally determined at once. Tarragona gradually gained pre-eminence over Carthagena for Hither Spain, Cordova over *Hispalis* (Seville) in Bætica, while Lusitania's capital was *Emerita* (Merida), founded in the year 25. The governors of Lusitania had subjugated the Asturians, and those of Hither Spain the Cantabrians; yet, about 2 B.C., Augustus preferred to include both peoples in the latter province, which was extended to the south-east by addition of the very insecure zone of the Sierra Morena.³ Henceforward it was called in preference Tarraconensis—a vast, heterogeneous district exclusive of Bætica,⁴ which was more civilized and peacefully devoted to agriculture, being only disturbed in the second century by pirates from the Moroccan

¹ Mommsen, *Res gestæ*², *Additamenta*, p. 222; Garofalo, VIII, XXXVI (1900), p. 177 *et seq.*; CCXIII, p. 179 *et seq.*

² LXXII; LI, p. 25 *et seq.*

³ For the details see LI, p. 37-40.

⁴ XCIV, III, p. 881 *et seq.*

Rif, and of Lusitania,¹ which naturally looked westward, like modern Portugal.

The Cantabrian wars seem to have brought about in the 1st century the division of *Tarraconensis* into three districts termed dioceses, each subject to a legate of the governor: *Callæcia* (Galicia), Asturia-Cantabria, and the remainder of the province. This was an emergency system, purely military in character, which disappeared under Claudius when peace was restored.² Only the *conventus juridici* were maintained,³ and all the Iberians included in the same *conventus* finally acquired, thanks to the periodical assizes and business meetings, a kind of moral solidarity which the government shrewdly promoted by using the same framework for the organization of the imperial cult.⁴ Pliny enumerates the seven *conventus* of Hither Spain: Tarragona, *Asturica* (Astorg), *Bracara* (Braga), Carthagera, Clunia, *Lucus* (Lugo) and *Cæsaraugusta* (Saragossa). In Bætica there were four: Astigi, Cordova, *Gades* (Cadiz) and Seville. As Pliny is silent on the subject, it is very difficult to reconstitute the three *conventus* of Lusitania: Merida, *Pax Julia* (Beja) and *Scallabis* (Santarem). Perhaps these *conventus* alone exercised some influence on later groupings, in particular on the formation of the old provinces of the present kingdom. The arrangement of the time of Augustus was based upon the data of experience and the observation of facts; it was retained through the following centuries; from Pliny to Ptolemy there were only a few very slight rectifications.⁵ Under Caracalla, an *Hispania Nova Citerior Antoniniana* isolated Asturia and Galicia, though only for a very few years,⁶ and Diocletian⁷ only made an arbitrary division of the ancient Hither Spain into three parts: *Gallæcia*, *Carthaginiensis* and *Tarraconensis*. The Balearic islands became a distinct province between 369 and 385.

In other provinces the Romans were concerned to break up and disunite confederations; in Spain this trouble was spared them. They desired rather to drag the native out of his narrow and miserable way of life, to overcome his tendency to withdraw into himself and ignore his neighbour.

¹ **XCIV**, III, p. 906 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 83 *et seq.*

⁵ **LI**, p. 114.

⁷ **XCIV**, III, p. 928 *et seq.*

² **LI**, p. 44 *et seq.*

⁴ **XCIV**, III, p. 829 *et seq.*, 895 *et seq.*

⁶ **XLI**, II, 2661, 5680.

The political unit before the conquest was not the large tribe, as among the Celts or the Germans, but the strictly local Iberian clan, attached to a group of villages, a town, a fortress or a mere watch tower. An ancient geographer¹ called Spain a country of a thousand cities; Pompey, when he set up his trophy, boasted of having subdued 876 between the Alps and the Pillars of Hercules.² Pliny counted only 513 (293 in Tarraconensis alone), but the conqueror was making towns of fortresses and watch towers. In this dispersion some villages consisted of no more than a single family. The Romans found the restricted *gens* already in existence. The *gentes* were numerous, but not on friendly terms with one another, and they rarely united against the foreigner, merely withdrawing into some stronghold like Cauca, Pallantia, Termantia and Numantia. The unit preferred by the Iberians was that of *gentilitas*, intermediate between the family properly so-called and the *gens*; it still occurs in the epigraphy of the Empire, either without qualification: *gentilitas Desoncorum ex gente Zælarum*,³ or indicated by a genitive: *Flavinus Comenesciquum Flavi f. Caucensis*.⁴ It is therefore of little use to count the *civitates* of Spain at various periods. Fifty of them, under Augustus, had the full right of citizenship, and an equal number had the Latin right, which Vespasian extended to all the non-Roman communities.⁵ The *civitas Romana* was hardly distributed at all before Caracalla.

The military occupation,⁶ after peace had been established, was limited to a very small force. Under Tiberius, the legion *IV Macedonica* was in Cantabria, *VI Victrix* and *X Gemina* in Asturia-Gallicia; only three legions all told; and fifty years later there was only one, the legion *VII Gemina*, which, from Vespasian's time, was stationed in the mountainous country of Asturia, where it bequeathed its name to the town of Leon. In addition there were some auxiliary forces; and these troops were generally recruited abroad. Being a frontier of the Empire in virtue of her sea coasts alone, Spain would perhaps have found a fleet more useful than an army.⁷

¹ *Geogr. Græc. minor.*, II, 266.

² Plin., *Hist. nat.*, III, 18.

³ *XLI*, II, 2633.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2729.

⁵ MacElderry, *XXII*, VIII (1918), p. 55, 61 *et seq.*

⁶ *XCIV*, III, p. 819-829; A. Solari, *Rivista indo-greco-italica*, V (1921), p. 111 *et seq.*

⁷ MacElderry, *XXII*, IX (1919), p. 89-92.

The qualities of the race allowed a considerable recruitment of Iberian troops for the service of Rome; Cæsar derived his body-guard from this country, and she contributed cavalry cohorts to the *auxilia*, picked troops both as regards men and horses, the latter being small quick-footed animals, as agile in the mountain regions as on the level plain. All the cavalry of Spain had a high reputation.

The road system¹ was energetically developed from the first; Mommsen² has justly remarked that Spain is the only province of the West where milestones have been discovered dating back to the end of the Republic. A road begun as early as 120 skirted the eastern coast from the frontier of the Gauls, passing through Valentia to Carthagera and afterwards further;³ from Barcelona a branch road led towards Ilerda. From Carthagera Augustus made a road to Cadiz through Cordova and Seville. In these two last cities, as well as in Saragossa and Merida, certainly more than four ways met; as many as eight great roads started from the principal town of Lusitania. This province also had its coast road, only interrupted on the Cantabrian shore, where communications by water sufficed. The interior plateaux had not been forgotten: the recent discovery of epigraphical itineraries⁴ has revealed the roads that passed through Leon and the system that radiated from Astorg. Here was certainly an attempt to link up the various towns, but its results were limited. These documents reveal the use of a local unit of measure, the *milia*, different from the Roman mile and varying in value even within a small area. There were many roads in Bætica, a wealthy province on account of its mines and agriculture. In barren Castille cross roads linked up the great rivers; others followed the river valleys, although there were more facilities for navigation in those days, with flat-bottomed boats, than there are now. Some authors refer to canals dug in Bætica to connect the lengthy estuaries. Spain also benefited from that hydraulic science of which we have so many fine examples in Africa.

¹ XCIV, III, p. 855, 902, 924.

² CLXII, IX, p. 92.

³ G. Bonsor, *Les Villes antiques du détroit de Gibraltar*, XIII, XX (1918), p. 77-127.

⁴ M. Besnier, XIII, XXVI (1924), p. 5-26.

IV

THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The writers of antiquity were always ready to describe Spain as a paradise, in accordance with a conventional opinion about it; Polybius himself¹ has not escaped the temptation when he boasts of the wealth of Lusitania. As regards climate at least this reputation has considerably changed. It is true that the Greeks and Romans extended to the whole peninsula the praise they were entitled to give to the coastal or southern regions, those which they knew best; moreover, the deforestation, much less due, we may suppose, to the working of the mines than to the prolonged occupation of the Arabs, may have changed the conditions of temperature and the quantity of rainfall.

The economic resources² of the country were considerable, although, according to the texts, they do not seem to have maintained a very dense population. Breeding produced excellent kinds of horses, cattle, pigs, goats and above all sheep; the hare was hunted and also the rabbit, the scourge of the cultivated regions—this animal is the symbol of Spain on Hadrian's coins. The neighbouring seas were rich in fish and yielded a very important article of export; excavations have revealed at *Belo* (Bologna) in the south of Bætica remains of Roman establishments where the fish was cleaned, dried and salted in large vats.³ Well supplied today with grapes, oranges and lemons, the Spain of antiquity was at least rich in olives, as is proved by the number of Iberian potsherds collected under the Empire on Monte Testaccio at Rome, as well as in dyes, corn and flax, which hardly count now.

Among the products from underground,⁴ which then defied all competition, the precious metals, gold and silver, first attracted the avaricious foreigners; some mines passed to the State, others to private individuals: the *Mons Marianus* (Sierra Morena) recalled by its title a very fruitful monopoly of Marius. Iron, copper and lead gave employment to a

¹ XXXIV, 8.

² CLXII, IX, p. 92; LXX, chap. VI; XCIV, III, p. 779-784; XLVII, VIII., p. 2040 *et seq.*; LXXXIII, p. 150-167.

³ M. de Figueiredo, XIII, VIII (1906), p. 109-121.

⁴ Orth, *Bergbau*, XLVII, Suppl. IV, col. 120 *et seq.*, 147.

number of miners; Cato had merely exacted tribute from the native workings; under the Empire, confiscation played its usual part. The table of Aljustrel¹ provides evidence of State exploitation: over the *metallum Vipascense* was set a *procurator Cæsaris* who farmed out the mining and all subsequent operations. In order to guarantee the means of subsistence in a barren country and meet the first needs of the mining city, the imperial administration acquired a monopoly of all services and supplies necessary to the population which the mines called into being. The raw mineral was freely exported without prejudice to certain metallurgical industries: the steel blades of Toledo have been famous for two thousand years.

The wealth of the country did not attract Romans only; merchants from the East established themselves everywhere; we find their traces in the commercial towns, and the cults which they introduced (Mithras, the Mother of the Gods) penetrated up the valleys into the heart of the country. There also came a number of Africans, and it was with Africa that Spain had the closest relations.²

V

THE TOWNS³

Nevertheless the Italian element invaded Spain more than any other. Also, according to the inscriptions, many natives bore the gentile name of a former governor or military leader: Sempronius, Cornelius, Pompeius; and this fact is significant. The Iberian character was thoroughly appreciated, and places of trust were given without fear to people who were "all of a piece," somewhat rough externally, but morally far superior to Asiatics.

Colonization⁴ had facilitated contact. Already by the middle of the second century Italica, near Seville, had been founded by the elder Scipio and Cordova by Marcellus; Cæsar and Augustus created more colonies in Spain than in any other province. This development of urban life is being

¹ Dessau, *Inscr. lat. sel.*, II, 1, p. 682.

² Albertini, XLVI, p. 297-318.

³ LXX, chap. IX; CCXIII, p. 33 *et seq.*

⁴ XCIV, III, p. 797, 877.

brought to light through the archæological researches that have recently been set in motion by the "High Commission for Excavations and Antiquities." They have yielded good results at Merida:¹ the plan of the ancient colony and capital of Lusitania, a purely Roman creation in a country of brigands, an Alpine Mainz, can still be recognized under that of the modern town. The veterans admitted an Iberian element into their society and the city covered a very wide area. In spite of its essentially military origin, it became a centre for the dissemination of higher culture, and its ruins are among the most magnificent; their large scale, obviously designed for the purpose, gives the impression of power:² vast walls of granite, imposing vaulted aqueducts, with artificial fountains and reservoirs,³ subterranean drains, an arch of triumph, a bridge over the river, a huge circle which formed the theatre,⁴ profusely decorated with statues and other sculptures—all this is being gradually brought to light. At Bolonia excavation due to French initiative has revealed stuccoed houses, hastily painted and covered with inscriptions, a theatre, a forum, and a monumental fountain.⁵ The Commission has also directed its attention to the amphitheatre at Italica, to the ruins of Cordova and, further north, to those of Saguntum, Segovia and Bilbilis. At Clunia the ancient town is being resuscitated: we can see its forum, its theatre, its temple of Jupiter, its basilica flanked with stalls.⁶ Astorg has preserved its Roman gates and walls, with their towers. In the extreme north the Catalans are exploring Ampurias,⁷ whose name also is a survival; *Emporiæ*, "the markets," was a mixed town with an Iberian quarter and a quarter of Greeks from *Massilia*. At Tarragona remains of houses and tombs and fragments of Græco-Roman works of art are found from time to time: the town was highly favoured by Augustus, who spent two years there, and it grew at the expense of Carthagera, whose decadence was complete by the beginning of our era.

¹ Max Macias Liáñez, *Mérida monumental y artística*, Barcelona, 1913; Schulten, *Merida, das spanische Rom*, Barcelona, 1922.

² P. Paris, **XIII**, XVI (1914), p. 269-316.

³ R. Lantier, **XIII**, XVII (1915), p. 69-83.

⁴ **XIII**, XX (1918), p. 93; **XXII** (1920), p. 204 *et seq.*; Pierre Paris, etc., *Fouilles de Belo*, I, Paris, 1923. ⁵ *Id.*, **XV** (1915), p. 164-174.

⁶ *Museum of Barcelona*, I-II (1911-1912).

⁷ P. Paris, **XIII**, XV (1913), p. 129 *et seq.*; **XVI**, LX (1925), p. 66-73.

VI

THE ROMANIZATION OF SPAIN

This was therefore rapid and successful—and very early, Mommsen adds¹—having been begun under the Republic even before the country was fully pacified; all these ruined towns, where the style of the Empire is predominant, seem to confirm this impression. Has not Spain given emperors to Rome? Trajan came from Italica; Hadrian's mother was a woman of Cadiz, and it is not without reason that the coins term him *Restitutor Hispaniæ*; Marcus Aurelius came of a family from Bætica, and Theodosius too had kinsmen there. But provincials of this sort, who may be remarked elsewhere in the annals of the Empire, and facts like these merely prove, like the Roman style of the big towns, that many Italians went to reside in Spain without any idea of returning, that they founded families there, and that their descendants were acclimatized there for many generations.

There grew up quite a distinct Latin literature of Spain² with the two Senecas, Lucan (of Cordova), Columella the agriculturist, the grammarian Hyginus, librarian to Augustus, Pomponius Mela the geographer, and above all Quintilian (of Calagurris) and Martial (of Bilbilis). The mental attitude of these authors corresponds on the whole to what we know of the race, but that is because they felt the influence of their environment. Apart from the half-breeds, we should like to be able to distinguish the Roman immigrant or his sons from the romanized natives,³ for there is no doubt that the latter existed, although the government paid little heed to education in the provinces or even in Italy itself. The towns collected a cosmopolitan population whose common tongue was necessarily Latin, a tongue which many learned like a foreign language; and it was correctly spoken, for the Latin of the inscriptions is purer in Spain than in most of the provinces. It was only after a long time that vulgar idioms began to intrude into it, and it preserved traces of archaism owing to the high antiquity of the many Roman settlements dating from the Republic.

¹ CLXII, IX, p. 86 *et seq.*; cf. XCIV, III, p. 777 *et seq.*

² CLXII, IX, p. 95; LXX, chap. X.

³ A distinction neglected in CXC *bis*, p. 198-202.

In this we have an artificial creation; the men of letters belonged almost exclusively to the Roman colonies. It is quite true that the dealings of the other cities with the central authority were only expressed in the language of the Empire; but an edict of Vespasian expressly authorized the use of local dialects in private dealings. If epigraphy yields us very few texts composed in these Iberian idioms, it is because the uneducated population did not use writing. The survival until our own day of the dialects of Biscay and Navarre, protected by the nature of those countries which are so impervious to external influence, suggests that others have not been very long extinct. History does not speak of these natives, who were regarded as negligible; in the time of Isidore of Seville¹ (sixth century), they still lived in wretched dwellings built of stones without mortar, rough-cast with unworked clay, and sometimes of clay alone. The Romans easily succeeded in introducing their composite fashions into the towns, but these were merely a veneer, of which the countryfolk had scarcely a notion. Besides, all foreign influences were freely admitted; the Asiatic or African Orient has left its mark enduringly on the country's workmanship: affectation and exaggeration were highly appreciated there. The Roman cults, private or imperial, never really gained a footing save in these same centres, colonial or military, and above all in Bætica. Elsewhere we more often find striking analogies to the Celtic rites.

The modern tongues of Spain are derived from Latin, but that is not merely due to the Roman occupation. When the barbarians poured in in the fifth century, leaving Rome a nominal suzerainty, a false semblance that finally disappeared altogether, their sovereigns retained the use of Latin in their chancellery, and the Christian Church especially helped to extend it by its preaching and its schools. Spanish literature flowered a second time in Prudentius, Orosius, Juvenius, and others who were this time true Spaniards and, as has been said,² did not rise above mediocrity. Since Christianity was cast in a Roman mould, there remained something of the structure previously erected; the municipal development, certain points of law which betray their origin,

¹ *Etym.*, XV, 9.

² H. Leclercq, *L'Espagne chrétienne*, Paris, 1906, p. xxxiv *et seq.*

the persistent conception of a purely ritualistic State religion, without metaphysic or ethic, are survivals of the Roman spirit.

But everywhere, even in Bætica which now became "Vandalusia," the Iberians, once so devoted to the emperors, immediately accepted the domination of the barbarians, who were less interested in administration and fiscal matters. Rome had not even achieved the unification of Spain, lacking as she did any common institutions or moral centre;¹ and how can we wonder at the fact, seeing that in this peninsula divided between two kingdoms, of which the larger is undermined by regionalism, all the partitions raised by nature continue to this day ?

¹ LI, p. 128.

CHAPTER V

GREECE IN EUROPE

I

THE GENERAL POSITION

ALTHOUGH declared free, Macedonia and Greece proper had in fact been under Roman supervision for many years when the revolts that broke out here and there in the middle of the second century B.C. induced the conqueror to establish a more rigorous system of control. The provincial era¹ of Macedonia (148) dates quite clearly from the year when the former kingdom of Perseus received a governor, who was a proconsular prætor. The four districts carved out of this territory were abolished; the fiscal burdens were perhaps not increased; but the foreign domination was immediately made manifest by the creation of the Egnatian way, a military road connecting Thessalonica with Illyria. Indeed, Rome at the same time incorporated this latter country in the new province and similarly annexed to it the coasts of Thrace. Only a few towns retained their independence: Apollonia, Epidaurus, Amphipolis, Thessalonica, Ænos, Abdera, and also the islands of Samothrace and Thasos.

The position is less clear as regards Greece proper.² We will pass over the destruction of Corinth, wrought in hatred of democracy and above all to end a commercial rivalry that annoyed the Roman financiers. As a matter of fact Rome decreed no *ager publicus* except Eubœa, Bœotia and a few districts near the isthmus; the rest of the country does not seem to have been subject to tribute; the leagues, at first declared to be dissolved, were suffered to come to life again. One of the first to do so was the Amphictyony of Delphi, after-

¹ *Journ. of Hell. Studies*, VIII (1887), p. 360; M. N. Tod, III, XXIII (1918-1919), p. 206-217.

² LXXXV, p. 640 *et seq.*; G. Niccolini, *La Grecia provincia* (*Studi storici per l'antichità classica*, 1910, 3, p. 423-444).

wards reorganized by Augustus himself; then followed those of the Achæans,¹ Ætolians,² Boeotians, Eubœans, Locrians, Phocidians and Dorians,³ who kept at least the appearance of the old union, with their own magistrates and their federal coinage. But everywhere Rome imposed oligarchic rule, restoring the Areopagus at Athens to its ancient functions and substituting election for the drawing of lots.

These novelties justified the adoption of a new era (146) which, according to the inscriptions, was used by many cities. But Greece was not then made a province: when the central government was moved to intervene, it delegated the task to the proconsul of Macedonia, who was normally charged with supervision from a distance, especially of the *ager publicus*. Polybius⁴ could pride himself on having obtained favourable conditions for his great country, which was not organized as a province until the dawn of the Principate.

The boundaries of the province of Macedonia can be traced:⁵ on the east the river *Nestos* (the Mesta); on the Adriatic a point not certainly determined, south of the estuary of the *Drilon* (the Drin); while the northern frontier excluded the lofty plateau of Dardania. The capital was Thessalonica, chosen, in default of a distinguished past, for its admirable situation. The first governors had no sinecure: the population remained quiet, but constant warfare had to be waged against the barbarians, chiefly Thracians and the Celtic Scordisci, who threatened all the terrestrial boundaries of the province. We have no details of this story until the wars of Mithridates, of which it will be sufficient, in this chapter, to emphasize the consequences for Greece proper.

They intensified the troubles from which the country had long been suffering, troubles for which her own sons were originally responsible, though it was no longer within their power to check them.⁶ The impoverishment of Greece, in men and money, was terrible, and the material ruin contributed still further towards depopulation. The wars of the Roman Republic had increased the number of slaves, many of whom were of Hellenic origin. Among the men who remained free, some, the least degenerate physically, had been

¹ *Inschriften von Olympia*, 328.

² Dittenberger, *Sylloge*³, 744.

³ *Inscript. Græcæ*, III, 568.

⁴ XL, 13.

⁵ CXLVI, map 33 (1911).

⁶ CXXVIII, I, p. 359 *et seq.*; CLXII, X, p. 22 *et seq.*

enrolled, whether they wished it or not, in the Roman armies; of these many were killed and many others who had served under Sulla—Peloponnesians, Macedonians, Thessalians—were content to follow their general when he returned to Italy to fight the supporters of Marius. There they found or preceded a number of civilian emigrants driven into exile by the ravages in Greece, the requisitions made and the debts incurred, as well as by the hope of repairing their fortunes in the now wealthy countries of the West by practising some art or providing Italy with the skilled labour which she lacked. Those who remained in their own country were chiefly the *possessores*, because for them were reserved as a favour—before they were inflicted as a burden—the public offices and influence: they were mostly landed proprietors, tied to their native soil by the nature of their property, which they cultivated, if they had enough slaves, or abandoned to grazing. All alike made it a rule to limit the size of their families. Thus, through constant emigration and depopulation, ancient cities of the interior degenerated into mere villages.

Still worse was the position of the coastal towns, once the most prosperous. Mithridates had found valuable allies in the pirates; when these had taken their fill of plunder from a town on the coast, the inhabitants, robbed and left without resources, finally adopted themselves a profession of whose large profits they had witnessed the proof, and Greeks soon became citizens of this floating republic, which for a long time was chiefly recruited from the mountains of Anatolia. Rome only dealt the more harshly with those regions which supplied the pirates with reinforcements or hiding-places; with Crete, for example, which had been devastated and almost stripped of its population by the time it was made a province. When Pompey had cleared the seas and consequently taken captive very many Greeks who had sunk to this abject condition, he formed the idea of settling them in the exceptionally depopulated regions—a restoration that brought Greece neither glory nor profit.

From this distressing fact many Romans must have drawn exaggerated conclusions. A twofold attitude towards the Greeks, respect for their talent and contempt for their

character, caused some wavering in the Senate's policy. Consideration of the circumstances allows us to form a juster estimate than theirs. The Greek of those days, at the end of the Republic, was a disillusioned man who desired nothing but peace; it was no fault of his that Mithridates had stirred up so much strife. But the Romans themselves involved their subjects in the gravest perplexities. For more than fifty years Greece took part in the intestine broils of Italy without being able to confine herself to the ideal rôle of spectator. The great party leaders—Sulla, Marius, Pompey, Cæsar, Brutus and Cassius, Antony, Octavius—even the supernumeraries, would not leave the Greek out of their factions. Everywhere there was constant impressment, for men were needed both for civil war and for foreign conquest, to enhance the commander's prestige. Now the recruit was not always free to choose his side and there were compulsory enlistments. As for the towns, from which the rival leaders expected material assistance, supplies and information, they desired nothing so much as neutrality; but those which remained neutral, supposing themselves to be models of loyalty, were adopting the most dangerous attitude of all, for each side might suspect them of dissembled hostility. Often the first competitor who appeared on the scene assured himself of their assistance by force. Even if they had time to choose a side, on what grounds should they base their choice? Such and such a city, being at enmity with its neighbour, whose choice was already made, went over instinctively to the opposite faction. Failing such inducement, it hesitated and, if the matter was urgent, took its stand on some rumour, whether true or false, or allowed itself to be influenced by some leading citizen, whether he was sincere or bribed. Then the Roman leader took up his abode in the "allied" town, laid the "good will" (of which it was almost unconscious) under contribution, made demands and exactions, and took what he wanted with the promise of paying large compensation after his victory. If he won, he forgot some of his obligations; if he lost, he disappeared, and his opponent came to show his anger, plundering the town in his turn by way of reprisals, generally avoiding further cruelties which he knew to be useless, and boasting of his forbearance, his homage, as he called it, to the glorious

ancestors of a degenerate population.¹ Such was the tragedy more than once enacted.

Strabo, a contemporary of Augustus,² also gives us a heartrending account of the position in Greece: there was nothing but ruin from one end of the country to the other, in Macedonia, Thessaly, Epirus, Bœotia, Ætolia, Arcadia, and in a large part of Attica, whose great port, the Piræus, had been destroyed under Sulla. Districts formerly preserved by their remoteness, such as Acarnania, had shared the same fate. The islands of the archipelago had suffered no less severely, and Delos, once crowded with inhabitants, was now merely an abandoned rock. But this geographer is habitually behind the times, and other sources reveal attempts at reconstruction from the very beginning of the Empire.

Julius Cæsar had already restored Corinth³ in the year 44. He established freedmen there, Italians of the lowest class, and made it a Roman colony with the resounding name *Colonia Laus Julia Corinthus*. But the new city no longer possessed the renown and activity of former days; through the influx of this new and impure blood it became a centre of fraud and debauchery, deriving a sort of scandalous attraction from its luxuries and wealth.

Augustus continued this work of reconstruction. But first of all the position of Greece was changed by the general measures taken in the year 27. The frontiers of Macedonia were now more secure and it was extended eastwards by the annexation of a series of towns on the eastern coast of Thrace. Augustus detached Achaia from it as a distinct province, with its frontier somewhere to the south of Thessaly;⁴ but this latter country remained under a special *régime*, with a federal assembly of its own. It seems that the towns hitherto free were not deprived of that privilege. Those regarded as free were Athens,⁵ whose past glory was to preserve her privileges to the last, Elatea, Thespiæ, Tanagra, Pharsalia—where Cæsar had conquered!—Ægina, the Ionian islands (at any rate Cephallenia and Zacynthus), and Sparta,⁶ who

¹ Dio Cass., XLII, 14; Appian, *Bell. civ.*, II, 88.

² *Geogr.*, VIII, *passim*.

³ XLVII, Suppl. IV, col. 1033-1036.

⁴ The boundary line is imperfectly known; cf. J. Netusil, analysis of the Russian book of S. Zebelev, "Αχαϊκά (*Berlin. philol. Wochenschrift*, 1905, col. 895-902).

⁵ CLXII, X, p. 8 *et seq.*

⁶ CLXXXIII, p. 483.

atoned for the double error of an alliance first with Mithridates and afterwards with Pompey by her good behaviour on two subsequent occasions: 2,000 Lacedæmonians fought at Philippi against Brutus and Cassius, and others fought for Octavius at Actium. For this the presidency of the *Actiaci ludī*, which was assigned to the city, was indeed a fine reward, and shortly afterwards Augustus also increased the Spartan territory at the expense of Messene, which had remained loyal to Antony. At Delphi the ancient league of amphictyons¹ was reorganized, and seventeen peoples were appointed to administer the sanctuary.

The old cities, the most glorious in former centuries, were treated with respect, but their prosperity declined in contrast with that of recent towns or towns which had been specially recalled to life. Corinth, favoured with still more privileges, took rank as capital;² she had a central position and was now a Roman, or at least an imperial, town, very little Greek but cosmopolitan, abounding in oriental elements, Jews, Syrians and Egyptians. The case of Patras³ is analogous. Reduced to extreme poverty since the second century, it was in a sense recreated by Augustus, who established veterans there and transported thither the inhabitants of other decayed cities, notably of Dyme, where the pirates captured in Pompey's time had been settled. The territory of this colony, which was considerably increased, extended as far as the north shore of the gulf of Corinth by a process of synœcism like that from which Thessalonica had arisen. A similar process gave birth to Nicopolis⁴ in the neighbourhood of Actium, and the memory of the great victory was thus perpetuated on the spot: all the poor villages scattered about this part of Epirus were combined to form a single city, whither the population was transported, and this became one of the most important towns of Achaia.

II

THE ATTITUDE OF THE EMPERORS

The history of the province from the beginning of the Empire is made up of minor episodes; no war came, before

¹ CLXII, X, p. 3-5.

³ CLXXXIII, p. 430.

² See above, p. 175, note 3.

⁴ CLXII, p. 58 *et seq.*

the middle of the third century, to disturb its peaceful, grey, monotonous existence, which resembles a kind of lethargy. The evolution of the Greek world, so rapid at certain times, seems during this long period to have been almost completely arrested.¹

The attentions of Augustus and his various schemes, even the most benevolent of them, had no doubt their unpleasant counterpart, for, immediately after his death, in the year 15, an Achæo-Macedonian embassy came to Rome to pray for a reduction of the burdens that weighed upon the provincials. The Senate then resigned both provinces to the emperor, since government by legates was less costly, and Tiberius extended the powers of those governors whose administration had been markedly successful; at the same time the crushing incidental expenses disappeared. His nephew Germanicus, in the course of a voyage, undertook a valuable tour of inspection in Greece, and Tiberius made his severity felt by the agents of the central authority, when circumstances called for it.

Nevertheless, Claudius restored senatorial governors both to Achaia and to Macedonia. He too favoured his Greek subjects, made amends for the exactions and follies of Caligula, restored to the towns the works of art which the latter had torn from them, and set free the young men whom that mad emperor had forcibly taken to Rome to celebrate his own cult. Claudius was thoroughly steeped in Greek literature, science and art, and showed a special sympathy for the Hellenes; a letter from him to the Senate² expresses these feelings in strong terms; it seems that he even desired to transport the Eleusinian Mysteries to Rome. He also took note of the embarrassed financial situation, and, thanks to him, Byzantium obtained exemption from taxes for five years. It has been remarked that all the emperors of the *gens Claudia* showed favour to the Greek-speaking populations;³ moreover, the *Claudii* were numerous in the East.


On the other hand the reign of Nero⁴ brought with it something very different from a consistent and moderate

¹ Cf. Corrado Barbagallo, *Il tramonto di una civiltà*, Firenze, 1924, II, p. 183 *et seq.*

² Suet., *Claud.*, 42.

³ Eug. Albertini, **XXIV**, XXIV (1904), p. 247-276.

⁴ **CXXXVIII**, II, p. 97 *et seq.*; **CXXVI**, p. 382-392.



MAP IV.—MACEDONIA, ACHAIA, CRETE.

policy. It was on Greek soil especially that this "blend of lunatic, simpleton and actor" felt his imagination effervesce and sought a stage for his æsthetic exhibitions. Nothing concerned him beyond the care of his reputation as an artist; he was hardly interested in the choice of governors: one of them, in the year 61, did not even know the language of the country—such an exceptional ignoramus must have been quite hard to find—and the malpractices of the proconsuls could not attract the attention of a sovereign who did not hesitate to set them the example. After the fire of Rome he desired to replace the works of art destroyed by the disaster and only saw one means of doing so, a renewal of the exploits of Mummius and others through confiscation. The exportations began again; and in this hurried pillage works of art were taken *en masse*, without plan or method. Ruffianly commissioners plundered Athens, Delphi, Olympia, the great sanctuaries and even small towns; and, since more than enough was exported, the balance went to the personal profit of the emperor; statues of bronze cast into the crucible enriched his privy purse. He also knew how to find pretexts for putting wealthy men to death and confiscating their property.

Then he went himself to Greece; he did not think Italy capable of appreciating his merits; such a poet and musician needed another public. He took part in the competitions and was applauded to order—a formidable rival mysteriously disappeared. Thus he experienced a series of brilliant successes that were to dazzle him and inspire a great display of generosity eclipsing that of the most illustrious philhellenes of former times. An inscription¹ has preserved for us his bombastic speech at Corinth: "All you Hellenes inhabiting Achaia or the land hitherto called Peloponnesus be exempt from tribute and receive therewith your freedom. . . ." The land *hitherto* called Peloponnesus? No doubt he intended to give it another name after the completion of a great work, the cutting of the isthmus of Corinth, which he undertook with much pomp, but did not finish, since it was thwarted by difficulties which seem to have been due to technical errors. The canal has been completed in our day, but it has only been of moderate value; in those far-off times it would have been more useful.

¹ M. Holleaux, *X*, XII (1888), p. 510-528.

Finally, perhaps to minimize the impression made by his thefts, Nero granted 100,000 denarii to the Delphic oracle and 250,000 to the Hellanodiciæ of Olympia. But Galba required the repayment of these sums without any compensation.

The emperors of strictly Roman character adopted towards the Greeks an attitude of mere justice and moderation. Vespasian decreed that these people "were no longer capable of making a reasonable use of their freedom," and he deprived them of it; that is to say, he cancelled the general freedom of the whole country, though he does not appear to have encroached upon the special autonomy of individual towns. Indeed, it was to investigate the finances of these free towns of Achaia that Trajan despatched a special envoy. The question of money was always the plague of the cities, as it was of individual citizens.

The true philhellene was Hadrian,¹ more a Hellene than a Roman in taste and culture, who extended his sympathy to the contemporary Greeks, whereas the Italian nobles affected to limit theirs to the great figures of past centuries. He often paid long visits to Athens, which he made his centre; and there he showed himself in public surrounded by the intellectual *élite*, and took part in the religious festivals, of which he accepted the presidency. His favours have left their trace south of the Acropolis:² to the urban territory, too restricted for its population, he annexed a pleasant suburb which formed practically a second city; two famous inscriptions on the arch bearing the emperor's name still distinguish the city of Theseus from that of Hadrian. His work was not all vanity; he did not think it beneath him merely to complete the vast temple left unfinished two centuries earlier by a Syrian king, because he wished to make it the sanctuary set apart for the panhellenic festivals,³ the general *rendezvous* of the Greeks (even of those living outside Achaia) who were too scattered and disunited for his taste. The *pax Romana* was to bring them together again, and the emperor's statue close by that of the god showed that the sovereign, the first devotee of the Greek Olympus, was sponsor for the union of Greece and Rome.

¹ CXXVII, p. 105-121.

² G. Fougères, *Athènes*, Paris, 1912, p. 146 *et seq.*

³ CCXXVII, p. 195 *et seq.*, 271 *et seq.*

Other towns also received his attention: Patras, whose coins termed him *Restitutor Achaiae*, and Corinth, which was liberally supplied with water by an aqueduct of his building; while, to encourage relations between the cities in yet another way, it was thanks to him that a road—a great novelty in this country—skirting the Saronic gulf connected central Greece with the Peloponnesus.

The Antonines, under whom the whole Empire was paternally governed, were also benefactors of Greece. Antoninus Pius had already been a governor of Achaia; he knew its hardships and its needs; when terrible earthquakes spread desolation there, he loaded with bounties the towns, like Sicyon, which had suffered under the scourge. Marcus Aurelius, who thought in Greek, showed the same benevolent inclinations, but the crisis which developed during his reign extended to Achaia: the barbarian wave that broke upon the Danube frontier overflowed for a time as far as central Greece, stopping under the walls of Elatea in Phocis. Moreover, the legions returning from the war against Parthia brought the plague with them, and the whole province, especially Athens, suffered terribly from it.

Nevertheless the second century, like the first, had at any rate maintained internal peace; when, at the end of it, competitions for the throne began afresh, it might be thought that the worst days of the Republic were about to return. The Greeks were unfortunately inspired to take the side of Pescennius Niger when Severus was destined to win the day. There were reprisals of which history says little, except as regards the pitiless chastisement of Byzantium after a three years' siege (196): soldiers and magistrates were executed, the citizens' property was seized, municipal autonomy was cancelled, and the famous walls were razed, not without danger to the surrounding country. And yet so great was the influence of Hellenism on the roughest and least polished Romans that Severus soon relented, stayed in the town and undertook great buildings there, while his son, Caracalla, restored all its rights to the city.¹

But the middle of the third century saw the beginning of a whole series of trials: Macedonia was ravaged by the Goths; from the Black Sea Goths and Germans extended their

¹ Kubitschek, **XLVII**, III, col. 1140.

piratical raids as far as the Ægean, their many swift-sailing vessels being manned by Greek sailors who were terrorized and compelled to serve in them. Then other barbarians invaded all the Balkan countries, laid waste Macedonia and seized all the principal towns even in the Peloponnese. Yet no catastrophe was so terrible for Greece as the campaign of Alaric (395-396)—long months of massacre, pillage and fire. Against this flood of fanatics the inhabitants seem hardly to have tried to defend themselves; the remarkable resignation of the Greeks of the Empire had degenerated into apathy. Hardly any cities rose from their ruins except those on the coast, for which the sea was still a stimulus, a call to life. Finally, under the influence of a princess, Eudocia, who had been brought up on Greek literature, Theodosius II took a series of measures which relieved the lot of Achaia; but they marked the end of constitutional life in Greece, and from that time forward the country lost for ever its old aspect derived from the "city-state."

III

LOCAL LIFE

For centuries this fixed type had been preserved in the land, and it was only at a very late date that Rome attempted to modify it. The old magistracies had kept their names, and in principle their attributes, though these had been limited in practice, since the cities ceased to be States and remained no more than towns in the modern sense of the word. Yet there were still some exceptions, and frontier disputes occurred of more importance than those concerning a township's jurisdiction. Between Messene and Sparta a dispute concerning several districts was settled by Augustus in favour of the latter, by Tiberius in the opposite sense. Athens continued to hold possessions outside Attica; only, instead of being the component parts of an empire, they were estates, a source of revenue—which nevertheless left her poor. Hadrian also assigned to her the revenues of the island of Cephallenia, and paid many bounties to the indigent population. Athens repaid these benefits as well as she could by creating a thirteenth tribe, the Hadrianid, and by

zealously participating in the heroification of the favourite Antinous. An account of the municipal life should include many details which were practically the same in Europe as in Asia; epigraphy has preserved many more references to them in Asia Minor, and it will suffice for us to study them in our chapter on that country. In both continents we find those "correctors" who begin to multiply after Trajan's time.¹

Owing to the customary use of obsolete forms, the great national festivals were still celebrated according to the ancient rites: every year at Platæa the Panhellenes sacrificed to Zeus "the deliverer" in memory of the soldiers who fell in the war against Persia. Since the relegation of local powers to wealthy citizens was called aristocracy, the cult of old families which had been powerful in ancient times was vaingloriously maintained; the Spartiatæ still boasted their descent from divine ancestors. At Athens Herodes Atticus demonstrated his descent from the Kerykes; but nobility carried obligations with it, as regards sumptuary matters, so he became one of the great benefactors of his time. Others came from abroad, for Athens more and more, and other cities in a less degree became a fashionable *rendezvous* for tourists; rich foreigners had their country seat in Achaia, a villa acquired from some native debtor.

The cause of their visits was not, as in Egypt, the lure of exoticism, of an unknown civilization. Nothing was more familiar to everybody than Hellenism, at least the Hellenism of those days, and their pleasure was simply to attend those festivals and public games which were the great vanity, the principal occasion of heavy expense for the cities, where the old performances were exhibited practically unchanged, though the Greek element was no longer isolated, but opened its doors to "the barbarian," and the performers were no longer the youth of the nation burning with religious and patriotic ardour, but cosmopolitan professionals continually on circuit, loaded with honours and rewarded with special privileges. The spirit of the performances had changed; yet the Greek mind remained attached to exhibitions in which the palm was awarded to elegance, dexterity and nimble strength, and the butchery of gladiators never obtained more than polite applause.

¹ See above, p. 103.

Later on, Athens provided another attraction of the first order in her "University,"¹ which was all the more famous because for a long time it had no serious rival anywhere, not even at Rome or Constantinople; but it was "Byzantine" in spirit, in the sense that we now give to that word, closely attached to traditional subjects of study, philosophy and sophistic, in which it made hardly any innovations. From our sources we know many of its professors by their inglorious names—wretched men sometimes, badly paid, though at least compensated by certain fiscal privileges and allowances in kind. Nevertheless, in the fourth and fifth centuries especially, they were great personages in the city, distinguished by their dress and their retinue of pupils. They were elected in the theatre by the Council of Directors after competitive oratorical displays. Their rivalries degenerated into open strife in which their students took part, very young men—finally young women too—who formed societies and tried to deprive other teachers of their audience. Neoplatonism hardly gave new life to the obsolete science that was taught in their lecture rooms. But the historical importance of the University of Athens is nevertheless considerable: associated as it was with the conceptions of Greek paganism, it helped by the very large number of its students and the range of its influence to retard the progress of Christianity, especially in Achaia and among men of culture. The masses offered less resistance to the new religion, but even they did not get as far as renouncing the empty forms of mythology; the latter merely assumed a Christian exterior, and thus can be explained the worship of saints, local saints if possible, the passion for relics, the mania for winning celestial favour by vows, the custom of sick persons to go and sleep in the churches, as they had formerly done in the temple of Asclepius.

This tendency of the Greeks to cling obstinately to their national traditions merely gives a peculiar aspect to certain institutions. In the other provinces the provincial assembly's first duty was to render homage to the supreme authority, to maintain the imperial cult. Without neglecting this duty, the *koinon* of the Achæans, meeting at Argos, preferred to evoke the past, to which the people limited their range of

¹ CXXVIII, vol. III.

vision, and clung to the language of their ancestors, although this was at length deformed and corrupted by the multitude of foreigners, like all idioms now in use in the East. The edict of Caracalla which made the Greeks Roman citizens, privileged on account of their culture and their natural gifts, no more induced them to learn Latin than the marked deference paid them by their masters, though its use was essential to the discharge of high imperial functions. The municipal dignities satisfied most men; far from seeking to better themselves by way of the *cursus honorum*, they thought it more glorious to attract foreigners to their country by conferring on them with pomp and circumstance a right of citizenship which presently became a source of revenue. The Roman spirit was passively resisted;¹ least impervious to it were those who had last been hellenized, the inhabitants of the countries where Greek civilization had made the slowest progress.

The reorganization of Diocletian, who multiplied the territorial districts, did little more than confirm and sanction divisions which already existed either *de jure* or *de facto*. Achaia, as far as the Spercheius, preserved its unity, which there was no ground for disturbing. Whether or not Thessaly² had been detached from it under the Principate—a supposition that is disputed and insufficiently proved by the existence of a *koinon* of Thessalians at Larissa to which Hadrian and Antoninus sent rescripts³—this separation now became complete and final. Epirus, which had long been detached—at least since Trajan's time, perhaps since Nero's—was divided in two; the old division to the south being truly Greek, the new (Albanian) division more barbarous and, moreover, partially included in Macedonia. This latter province was hardly changed in future, being only reduced a little in size towards the north; its *koinon* of Bercea, probably founded by Augustus, of which a closer study than usual has been rendered possible by its wealth of coins,⁴ stood for

¹ CLXII, X, p. 27-31.

² Cf. Friedrich Staehlin, *Das hellenische Thessalien*, Stuttgart, 1924.

³ *Dig.*, V, 1, 7; XLVIII, 6, 5, 1.

⁴ H. Gaebler, *Zur Münzkunde Makedoniens* (*Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, XXIV [1904], p. 245-338; XXV [1905], p. 1-38).

nothing but empty show. The country had lost its strategic importance, but the municipal system was hardly at all developed in consequence; except for the ancient maritime towns and some Roman colonies, such as Philippi, provided with special magistrates called *politarchs*, whose name would suggest that their freedom was only relative, we find nothing in Macedonia but villages in isolated districts. Rome generally took no interest in her, but sometimes demanded troops or prætorian guards, remembering nothing of her past, except the military qualities to which her history bore witness.

IV

THE OUTLYING REGIONS

Thrace, the next door neighbour of Macedonia, had adapted herself to the dominion of Rome,¹ and even acquired a slight veneer of Hellenism. The common people continued to speak a language of which no written monument remains, though the forms of the names of persons and places betray the persistence of this idiom. Greek appears in the inscriptions, but incorrect and deformed. So too the Hellenic mythology had taken root in the country, but not very deeply: the usual idol was a hero warrior, so widely distributed that the habit has arisen of calling it "the Thracian knight." We can see from these rude monuments² that Thrace was no more truly hellenized than the heart of Asia Minor, which had racial connexions with her and is believed to have supplied her with colonists even under the Empire. The inhabitants were barbarians and it was long before they were subjugated.

At first they were grouped in districts or *strategiæ* coincident with the tribes or clans. The centres of population in the interior were not organized as towns until Domitian's reign; several villages were then united under the title of a single city, but the conditions cannot have been much changed fundamentally. The agricultural resources of the country (corn, vineyards, fields of roses) were more favourable

¹ **CLXII**, X, p. 67-74; cf. Arthur Stein, *Römische Reichsbeamten der Provinz Thracia*, Sarajevo, 1920.

² Cf. the publications of G. Seure in the *Revue archéologique* and all the recent volumes of **XXXII**.

to a life on the land; yet Philippopolis, the meeting place of the provincial assembly, attained to a certain degree of importance.

Ruled at first by a procurator, who was responsible not to the governor of Macedonia, but to the legate of Mœsia, Thrace had its own legate from the time of Trajan. Diocletian retained the name of the original province for the most backward part of it, the centre of Roumelia, but separated some other small provinces from it: Rhodope, the territory of the coast towns on the north of the Ægean, which had been hellenized at a very early date, but were fallen into decay: Mons Hæmus, which embraced the Hellenic cities on the west coast of the Black Sea, with their territory; and finally Byzantium with its environments on the coast of the Propontis, to which the name Europa was given.

Formerly Byzantium had not been connected with Thrace; it had remained attached to Bithynia at least until Trajan's time. The capital Constantinople was more than ever isolated from its *hinterland*, especially by the building of a very long wall; and yet, though it kept its Latin character for a long time, thanks to the official language and the *personnel* of the court, the attraction which it had for the Greek world, the constant influx of men of that race, the artistic treasures torn from Hellas to adorn the imperial city, all helped to transform it into a Greek town.¹

Just as the series of towns in Rhodope and Mons Hæmus were linked together by the sea and had little dealing with the interior, so further north, on the borders of Lower Mœsia,² Odessus, Dionysopolis, Callatis,³ Tomi and Istrus, a "pentapolis" which the subsequent addition of Marcianopolis made into a "hexapolis," constituted a distinct confederation, with its *koinon* and its sacerdotal ruler, the pontarch.⁴ Even if we suppose it to be marred by exaggeration, the description of Ovid, the exile of Tomi, helps us to understand why these cities deemed it best to form a confederacy, in order to possess in the sea a defence against the Getæ and Sarmatians of the Dobrudja (Diocletian's Scythia). They were rough neighbours, whose dress the Greeks themselves had prudently

¹ CXXVIII, III, p. 238 *et seq.*

² CLXII, X, p. 74-78.

³ O. Tafrali, *Revue archéologique*, 1925, I, p. 238-292.

⁴ J. Toutain, XXVII, LXII (1901-1903), p. 123-144.

adopted—that elaborate dress revealed to us in Trajan's column—even speaking a little of their language. Thanks to this compromise, the natives tolerated the presence of those skilled middlemen (which the Greeks have always been) in order to secure the export of their country's products and to obtain certain articles in return.

Although the Empire did not extend officially beyond the mouths of the Danube, it gave its support to some other Greek cities which had sprung up further on¹ in the estuaries of the great rivers, such as Tyras, near the modern Odessa, and Olbia, as well as to the kingdom of the Bosphorus. For the Greeks the north shore of the Euxine had been their first Eldorado; the wealth of the great Scythian plain was justly vaunted, and those regions had trafficked for centuries with the western world, which derived from them slaves, hides and furs, timber, and tunny caught along the shore.² The Tauric Chersonese,³ or Crimea of today, included two important towns: Chersonesus (near Sebastopol) and Panticapæum (Kertch) to the east, as well as Phanagoria and Theodosia. The difficulty of arriving at an understanding with the people of the interior made them feel the need of a protector. The great Mithridates, king of Pontus, had first assumed this rôle, in which, after his great defeat, he was naturally succeeded by the Romans. Monuments of all kinds, ruins of walls, traces of a camp, epigraphical texts, bear witness to us of their activity on this coast. An inscription from Chersonesus records the mission performed for Julius Cæsar, from whom he received the right of Roman citizenship, by a notable of that town,⁴ one of those ship-owners, of whom there were also some at Olbia, with ships armed in defence against the pirates, which they used for piracy themselves on occasion. Cæsar may have derived flotillas from them for his expeditions, and he guaranteed freedom to Chersonesus; Augustus did the same, as also did Antoninus later on.

As for the kingdom of the Bosphorus as a whole, its

¹ Ernst von Stern, **XXIII**, IX (1909), p. 139-152; Ellis Minns, *Scythians and Greeks*, Cambridge, 1913, *passim*; M. Rostowzew, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia*, Oxford, 1922, p. 147-180.

² L. Preller, *Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, Berlin, 1864, p. 441-467.

³ **CLXII**, X, p. 79-89; Brandis, **XLVII**, III, col. 2254-2269.

⁴ M. Rostowzew, **XXII**, VII (1917), p. 27-44.

dynasty gladly accepted the protectorate of Rome, an arrangement that was no less advantageous to the emperors and less burdensome than the provincial *régime*; Augustus and Agrippa contented themselves with it, after dreaming of something different; communications were easily maintained through the officials of Bithynia.¹ This protectorate, guaranteed by the presence—even under the Severi²—of a small Roman corps to supplement the local militia, and by imperial subsidies with which peace was bought, induced the barbarians of the steppes to suffer the proximity of the Greeks, and to refrain from troubling them as they had done hitherto. Thus, during the first three centuries of our era, Panticapæum enjoyed a new period of extreme prosperity, to which its splendid *tumuli* bear witness with their sepulchral chambers of freestone and rich furniture.³

Yet in the long run these sovereigns of the Bosphorus lost much of their Hellenic character; as early as the time of the Antonines the ruling classes were more influenced by Asiatic culture. The local gold coins continued to bear the effigy of a Cæsar, but his demeanour and dress became purely Iranian.⁴ No doubt matters would have followed a different course if a real imperial dominion had been enforced there. At any rate Rome was not absent from these regions, and we must recognize that, except for the inhospitable shore between Phanagoria and Dioscurias, she kept in touch with the whole coast-line of the Euxine Sea.

With Greece proper we may associate Crete,⁵ which is geographically an appendage to it. Its history during the republican period is obscure, but it is certain that, under Augustus, it was united with Cyrenaica to form a senatorial province. This union seems strange, but perhaps it dated from before the Principate and was due to the fact that the island had been given, at the same time as Cyrene, by Antony

¹ Id., III, XXII (1916-1918), p. 1-22.

² Fr. Cumont, *Bull. de l'Assoc. Guillaume Budé*, Oct. 1924, p. 53.

³ Rostowzew, XX, 1920, p. 49-61.

⁴ Id., XXXIII, XXXII (1919), p. 479.

⁵ R. Paribeni, XCIV, II, p. 1257-1275; G. Karo, XLVII, XI, col. 1800.

to Cleopatra. From a very early period the destiny of Crete seems to have been unhappy; the centre of the fascinating Minoan civilization had become, since the Dorian invasion, nothing more than a reservoir of mercenary archers,¹ a nest of pirates, which long held out against the Roman invasion, but was subjugated in 67 B.C. by Q. Cæcilius Metellus, afterwards called Creticus.² Efforts at unification or syncretism during the time of its independence had all come to nothing. Under the Romans the towns seem to have been less loosely connected, with their *koinon* which minted money from the reign of Tiberius to that of Marcus Aurelius, and supervised the quinquennial games. Only two towns of this period are known: Gortyna, the capital of the double province, in whose territory Augustus appropriated a rich estate which was owned for centuries by Capua, and Cnossus, which had become a Roman colony. Italian excavations have revealed the importance of Gortyna³ and the buildings that were erected there under the Empire; they have enabled us to recognize part of the *agora*, a Roman theatre, an imposing *prætorium*, the governor's palace, a *nymphæum*, an aqueduct and an *odeum*. The city was allowed to retain its particular legislation, seeing that the text of the famous law was engraved and exposed to view until the end of the third century. Gortyna was troubled by earthquakes, so several buildings have been reconstructed in the style of the decadence; traces of Byzantine repairs can be found almost everywhere, for Crete, which had already been separated from Cyrenaica by Diocletian, was attached to the Eastern Empire in 395. A temple erected in honour of certain Egyptian deities seems to be the only reminiscence of the island's union with African territory.

¹ G. Cardinali, *Creta nel tramonto dell' ellenismo* [*Rivista di filologia* XXXV (1907), p. 1-32].

² P. Foucart, **XX**, 1906, p. 569 *et seq.*

³ L. Pernier, **II**, I (1914), p. 373 *et seq.*; **Id.**, **VI**, XVIII (1915), p. 49-68.

CHAPTER VI

ASIA MINOR

STUDY of European Greece during the Roman period leaves for the most part a gloomy impression. The masters of the country scarcely regarded it as anything but a museum of antiquities preserved by degenerate descendants. In the northern parts, Macedonia and Thrace, where there was still a work to be accomplished, we have shown that the rulers acted with reserve and confined their tardy innovations to matters of small importance.

The picture which Asia Minor reveals to us in the same period is not altogether similar, for Rome seriously undertook the important task of spreading Hellenism there. She did not attempt any original methods; the more we study the colonial policy of the Seleucids and the Attalids in the interior, the more clearly do we recognize that the way was already marked out; the Romans merely followed in their footsteps. Like the hellenistic sovereigns, they founded new cities by bringing together isolated groups and associating them under common institutions; they worked for the development of the municipal system by limiting the size and independence of the petty sacerdotal States, so numerous in Anatolia, which consisted of agricultural domains and even workshops grouped about a feudal sanctuary.

Perhaps no other country has presented such a mosaic of peoples as Asia Minor. Even before Alexander, it had been the meeting place of a host of idioms which linguists consider to be in no way related to one another¹—a fact presupposing great racial confusion. Its condition had not been changed in the following centuries: in the time of Augustus, Strabo² asserts that at Cibyra alone Pisidian, Solymean, Greek and Lydian were spoken. Moreover, they were nearly all the languages of barbarous peoples, and it was in the interest of general civilization to unify these as far

¹ H. Sayce, **XXXIX**, p. 259.

² **XIII**, 1, 17.

as possible under the influence of Hellenism. They were so primitive that most of them have left no trace except their names; the Lydians, Carians and Phrygians are almost the only ones among them who have any monuments of their very early history; the Celts of the central plateau are better known to us through their European kinsmen.

All these nations were easy to hold under a firm and tolerant dominion; their revolts against Rome were few and unimportant, for, like the Greeks, they had no desire to emancipate themselves. Moreover, the Roman government, while gradually dividing up this great peninsula, did not seek to establish an organization that would break the ancient moulds; the provincial frontiers were practically identical with those of the States which preceded them, except for some temporary concessions of territory which were made to pay for help rendered at a critical moment or to intrust some dynasty with a preparatory mission which should lead to annexation. The peoples of Anatolia offered so little resistance to foreign suzerainty that nearly all of them very quickly accepted the rule of that hellenized Iranian Mithridates the Great. The bitter wars that had to be waged against him made it essential for Rome to master all the regions where Hellenism had until recently been preserved.¹

I

PROCONSULAR ASIA

The province of Proconsular Asia was called the jewel of Asia Minor. Its boundaries² which remained almost unchanged—they were only modified in one part of Phrygia—included almost all the districts which have their natural outlet towards the west, and added practically nothing to them. Essentially it consisted of Phrygia, Caria, Lydia, Mysia, and that Ionia which had known such a brilliant past. Its towns were reckoned by the hundred; Sulla seems to have made a division of territories among them of which we know no details. It had always been spoken of as the land of many cities (πολύπολιν αἶαν). But these centres of population were not all cities; the more modest villages

¹ CLXXXV, p. VII *et seq.*

² LXXXII, p. 85 *et seq.*

(κῶμαι) possessed in practice institutions of their own, but were legally connected with a πόλις, just as the suburbs of a modern city form an integral part of the township. In Phrygia alone, when the land was first made a province, many of the natives still lived κατὰ κώμας, in the villages of the interior, without municipal law; yet, in the north, the wildest parts of the Mysian plateau, at first left to a few chiefs of doubtful reputation, were very soon civilized by the foundation of cities.

Natural wealth was abundant throughout almost the whole extent of the proconsular province, but it was in the north-western region that it had lately been most thoroughly exploited, for the kings of Pergamus, whose kingdom comprised these districts, knew better than the Seleucids how to adopt a true system of political economy.¹ They had derived much profit from their mines of copper and silver, as well as from the timber of their forests, and they had developed agriculture. Cornfields, vineyards, olive-yards, and fruit trees prospered; sheep and goats supplied fleeces for a very flourishing industry of wool and cloth manufacture, horse-breeding in the neighbourhood of Mount Ida guaranteed a constant supply of remounts for a widely renowned cavalry. Thus these kings could maintain an army that made them very useful allies for the Romans. To the south, the valley of the Meander was then, as it is today, one of the richest in Asia Minor. The commercial activity of the whole country was clearly illustrated by the multitude of trade guilds; the inscriptions acquaint us with a great many colleges of artisans,² wherein the representatives of the luxury trades seem to preponderate. These associations are found here and there throughout the western districts of the province, but the more backward Phrygia shows fewer traces of them. It was there especially that attempts at colonization were made, and they seem to have been entirely successful, above all from the time of Augustus.

There were countless cities that could pride themselves on a famous history; more than one of them had ranked as a capital. Rome did not affect to ignore their ancient position, but neither did she take pains to remind them of past

¹ M. Rostowzew, **XXXIX**, p. 359-390.

² **LXXXII**, p. 167 *et seq.*; **CCXIV**, III, *init.*

greatness. As a general rule she refused them freedom, the autonomy which she more willingly conceded to towns of secondary importance. On the other hand she was lavish of titular distinctions,¹ the empty names of "metropolis" or "first city of Asia." On old cities of the first rank—Ephesus the capital,² Smyrna, Cyzicus,³ Miletus, Pergamus, Sardis, etc.—she conferred the title of *neocorus* or the right to possess a temple of the Cæsars;⁴ one or more than one, for the right was cumulative: Ephesus had four; Pergamus and Smyrna, three. The title of *neocorus* was stamped on their medals,⁵ on the exergue of the emblems which allowed the plurality of sanctuaries to be seen. The rivalry between the towns is thus betrayed by their coins as well as by epigraphy; it is characteristic of Asia in the time of the Romans. The latter seem to have designedly multiplied the number of cities of medium importance, and promoted this levelling policy by their redistribution of territories.

II

BITHYNIA AND PONTUS

ALTHOUGH Bithynia⁶ was much less extensive and sharply distinguished from Asia by its population, of which the principal nucleus was of Thracian origin and provided valiant soldiers, it was nevertheless a fertile and populous country with few but generally prosperous cities.⁷ It was happily placed, having easy means of communication with the continent of Europe through the Bosphorus and Byzantium—a Bithynian town, although founded on the opposite shore; and it also maintained constant relations with the Tauric Chersonese. The kings, of whose coins we possess fine series, knew how to administer their finances prudently; they did not pay the same assiduous attentions to Rome as the Attalids, except the last of them, who bequeathed his kingdom to her.

¹ **LXXXII**, p. 136.

² G. Lafaye, *Conférences du Musée Guimet*, **XXXII** (1909), p. 1 *et seq.*; *Forschungen in Ephesos*, I-III, Wien, 1906-1923.

³ F. W. Hasluck, *Cyzicus*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 178-191.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 450.

⁵ B. Picq, **XIX**, VII (1904), p. 1-41.

⁶ Brandis, **XLVII**, III, col. 523 *et seq.*; **CLXXVI**, p. 1-68.

⁷ **CLXXX**, p. 179-197.

The immediate intervention of Mithridates overawed the inhabitants, and it was only after a real conquest that the will could be executed.¹

Bithynia was at first a senatorial province, but more than once during the first century of our era it was placed under imperial procurators,² and, before really becoming an imperial province, probably under Marcus Aurelius, it was governed by a legate sent out on an extraordinary mission, the younger Pliny.³ The letters of this scrupulous governor, always anxious about trifles, who never ceased to worry his sovereign with questions of detail, occasionally give us some information about the appearance of the country in Trajan's time, as well as about the *lex Pompeia*, his charter, whose very special provisions had no application to the neighbouring provinces. The author of this law was anxious to annex to the Empire the Pontic region, the domain of its great adversary Mithridates, excepting the territory of Amisus, which was left autonomous, and the eastern extremity, which was granted to the Galatian king Deiotarus. Thus there was a double province, *Pontus et Bithynia*, and this state of affairs continued until the day when Diocletian separated Bithynia from the former Pontus, now termed *Honorias*, east of the river Sangarius.

The coast had long been colonized. Pompey took pains to organize the municipal *régime* of the countries of the interior. He divided all the territory subject to the ancient kings between eleven cities, which were created by the transformation of a few large villages and situated for the most part beside a frequented highway separated by a mountain chain from the sea. How many of them were included in the province of Pontus and Bithynia we do not know. On the coast, Heraclea Pontica, which had been destroyed in the war against Mithridates and restored again after some time, received a colony of Roman citizens. The creation of Sebastopolis, Comana Pontica, Juliopolis, Germanice-Flaviopolis and the group of *Agrippenses* shows the progress of Hellenic colonization. Nevertheless these new centres were

¹ See above, p. 25.

² CLXXIX, p. 373 *et seq.*

³ U. Wilcken, *Plinius Reisen in Bithynia und Pontus* [XVI, XLIX (1914), p. 120-136].

always eclipsed by the old royal towns¹; the chief place was always occupied by Nicomedia, despite the fierce rivalry of Nicæa, which is revealed to us in the discourses of Dion of Prusa, whose native city was far surpassed by the other two.

The Roman administration had its headquarters at Nicomedia; there were held the most brilliant festivals and games; Pliny had dreamt of building water-works for it, but the dream did not become a reality. On several occasions it was troubled by earthquakes,² but they did not hinder its activity. Like its rival Nicæa, it suffered more severely from the invasion of the Goths (258). Diocletian made Nicomedia his place of abode, and, by way of compensation, a great council met at Nicæa. Autonomy belonged, at least transiently, to Prusa, Chalcedon and Byzantium; Apamea and Sinope,³ after Cæsar's time, had the status of Italian colonies. At first the province had to pay the tithe like Asia, and it seems probable that the centre and social headquarters of the powerful international society of the *publicani* was in Bithynia.⁴

The civil wars preceding the foundation of the Empire had their repercussion there: Bithynians fought at Pharsalia in Pompey's army; the country, after Cæsar's death, had to furnish money and men requisitioned by Brutus and Cassius, and Antony took the same measures. Then peace descended on the province, and it was only troubled from time to time by the quarrels of its towns disputing, sometimes with armed force, a claim to precedence. The rivalry between Severus and Niger had a more disastrous echo in these regions, although it was almost negligible in comparison with the fires and ravages of the barbarians in the third century.

The dual form of the province was shown, apart from its name, by the existence of two *koina*: the first, restricted to the cities of Bithynia, met at Nicomedia; the second may not have received representatives from all the towns of Pontus—the spirit of separatism easily gains strength in mountainous regions—for an inscription not earlier than the

¹ Joh. Soelch, **XXIII**, XIX (1924), p. 165-188.

² On this scourge of Asia Minor see Capelle, **XLVII**, Suppl. IV, col. 352 *et seq.*

³ D. M. Robinson, *Ancient Sinope*, Chicago, 1906, p. 252 *et seq.*

⁴ R. Laurent-Vibert, **XXIV**, XXVIII (1908), p. 175.

second half of the second century¹ mentions the *koinon* "of the ten towns of Pontus," and at that date the demi-province of Pontus must have contained more than ten; it has even been held for a long time, as we shall see, that a larger number had made a separate confederation. This provincial assembly may have varied its places of meeting; according to the text just quoted it chose Heraclea, but a second,² which refers to a pontarch at Amisus, suggests another *rendezvous*.

III

GALATIA

On the borders of Bithynia and proconsular Asia, but more to the east, lay Galatia.³ Its name alone reveals its origin. In a poor, arid and flat region with a hard climate, excessively hot in summer and cold in winter, without vegetation in many districts owing to the saltiness of the water, and furrowed with ditches to serve as subterranean stoves in which the dried dung of animals was used as fuel, the kings of Bithynia had settled the Gallic bands which, after the plunder of Delphi, had at first been scattered about the whole of western Asia Minor. These Celts, who were born soldiers, had furnished mercenaries to all the kings of the East and attempted to cross the boundaries of this wretched country; but the Romans and the king of Pergamus defeated them and confined them by force to their steppes; finally Hellenism won them over little by little and softened their brutal manners. They were persuaded to become the allies of Rome and felt themselves bound to her by the high-priesthood of Pessinus, whence the famous black stone had long ago been transferred to Italy to restore peace in the capital.

They were divided into three great federations which were never really fused together under the Empire: *Tolistoboii*, *Tectosages* and *Trocmi*. Each of these was subdivided into four classes or tetrarchies;⁴ but Mithridates put most of the tetrarchs to death, together with their wives and children. About the year 63 Pompey substituted the principality of

¹ XLIV, III, 79.

² *Ibid.*, 97.

³ CLXXVI, p. 173 *et seq.*; V. Chapot, XLII, art. *Galatie*.

⁴ V. Chapot, XLIII, art. *Tetrarchia*.

the race for that of the clan; there were no longer more than three tetrarchs, and at one time, as has been noted, one of the three dominated and at last even abolished the others. Deiotarus was succeeded by Amyntas, who gained some territory towards the south, and after his death in 25 B.C. his kingdom was transformed into the province of Galatia. But the new province was confined to very narrow limits; these turbulent populations were cut off from the sea no less on the north than on the south. Amyntas had betrayed Brutus and afterwards Antony; it was deemed wise to concentrate these Galatians and keep watch over them. Paphlagonia, which was added to the province in 6 B.C., formed a purely continental annex, separated by a high mountain barrier from the zone of Bithynia-Pontus zone. Other additions—Pontus Galaticus (in the year 2), Pontus Polemoniacus (in 68), Armenia Minor (probably in 74)—were only temporary, for these countries, being natural dependencies of Cappadocia, only remained attached to Galatia so long as its legate was governor of Cappadocia as well. This connexion, due to Vespasian (74), ceased for a time under Domitian and permanently in 114, when Trajan made Armenia Major a part of the Empire for a few years. About 138, southern Isauria and the southern and eastern parts of Lycaonia passed to the province of Cilicia. Then at last Galatia took its permanent shape, which was a sufficiently strange one, since it consisted of a long and narrow strip of territory with a twofold indentation in the middle and curious tentacles jutting out in various directions. Except perhaps for a gradual extension, in the third century, towards the north,¹ it remained unchanged until the general reorganization of Diocletian. Then Lycaonia was detached from it on the south, and Paphlagonia on the north was extended as far as the sea. *Galatia prima* comprised the two former tetrarchies of the east, with Ancyra and Tavium, while *Galatia Salutaris*, the former tetrarchy of the west, with Pessinus, encroached upon Phrygia; it was less low-lying than the other province and more healthy, whence its name, which may also perhaps be explained by its abundance of hot springs.

These Gauls of Asia² had become half-castes through intermarriage with the Phrygians, and their cults, which had

¹ V. Chapot, **XXXIX**, p. 104.

² **CCII**, *in fine*.

quite lost their Celtic character, resembled the native cults of Asia Minor. The loyalty of the Galatians remained beyond reproach; Augustus ran no risk when he enrolled *en bloc*, under the name of *legio Deiotariana*, the army which the recognized leader of all the tetrarchies had formed and trained in the Roman fashion. The Galatians transcribed the emperor's will—a glorification of the new *régime*—in its entirety on the walls of their temple, the *Augusteum*. But in some respects this people progressed extremely slowly; the Celtic language survived until the fourth century at least; urban life developed late.¹ The clan persisted, without offence to Rome since it had an aristocratic basis; the notables boasted their descent from the ancient tetrarchs. The gifts bestowed on their clan by rich men rarely took the form of a festival of scenic games after the Greek manner; more often they provided gladiatorial shows, fights between wild animals, bull-fights, which revealed the bloodthirsty propensities of their ancestral instinct and could not displease the Romans, who were themselves devoted to the shows of the amphitheatre and *venationes*. Further, the strength of the family tie, the unshaken authority of *patria potestas* among the Galatians, was a ground for mutual understanding between themselves and their masters.

IV

CAPPADOCIA

Besides Galatia, the uncultivated and monotonous central plateau included also Cappadocia,² which, like its neighbour Armenia, had received an Iranian stamp from the domination of the Persians. Agelong contact with peoples of oriental traditions had helped to perpetuate customs and usages totally opposed to those of Hellenism. The sovereigns of this country, the Ariarathes, who were true satraps and, like the local nobility, of Persian blood, had not abolished the ecclesiastical principalities which had for their centre a sanctuary of Mâ or of some other analogous divinity, recalling the privileged temples of Babylon and Judæa. These petty

¹ CLXXX, p. 221-267.

² *Ibid.*, p. 267-314; Ruge, XLVII, X, col. 1910-1917.

sacerdotal states, with their domains and their thousand temple-slaves and serfs bound to the soil, continued to exist until well into the Roman period; but the imperial government looked askance at their autonomous powers, and gradually these strange organizations, which however had made a large contribution to the agricultural development of the country where it offered anything better than poor pasture land, saw their property diminished, either in the interest of a city that had sprung up under their shadow and to their detriment, or through the progressive extension of some imperial domain.¹

The Ariarathes were at first encircled by Gallic mercenaries, but after the Galatians had been vanquished by their neighbours and compelled to adopt a life of peace, the kings of Cappadocia looked to Rome to maintain their dynasty in power; they became her clients and the allies of Pergamus. Thus this monarchy was able to endure for more than three hundred years.² When at length Tiberius created the province, in the year 18, he first of all retained the ten *strategiæ* or prefectures instituted by the royal government, administrative districts which kept their practical utility in a country of only two cities—Mazaca (afterwards Cæsarea) and Tyana (which became a Roman colony)—lost among the poor villages and the strong fortresses with which the country bristled.³

The Roman procurator appointed guardian of the last king remained in office; in case of need the governor of Syria had to lend him military aid; the petty native princes were tolerated for some years on condition that they remained quiet. But in the year 70 Vespasian placed Cappadocia under a consular legate with imposing forces, since events in Armenia during Nero's reign had shown the necessity of reinforcing the garrisons of the Taurus passes. After its temporary junction with Galatia,⁴ this province, extended as far as the Euxine, annexed the various "Pontuses" (*Galaticus*, *Polemoniacus* and *Cappadocicus*) which were not joined to Bithynia. It had very little unity: the southern part, Cappadocia proper, whose nature we have described above, was one of the last to admit the municipal system and Hellenic

¹ CXc, p. 294.

³ CLXXXIII, p. 353 *et seq.*

² LXVIII, p. 645.

⁴ See above, p. 198.

civilization, under the influence of the Romans who established several cities there; for a long time Greek was spoken imperfectly and ridiculed by the peoples of the west. It was Christianity that in the long run, with this language as its vehicle, propagated a transformed Hellenism in Cappadocia: doctors like St. Basil were an ornament to Cæsarea, which became a populous capital with a very wide circulation for its coinage.

Further north the country was quite different, consisting of three zones—forests, orchards and vineyards, pasture and corn land—not to speak of its mineral wealth. The description of Strabo,¹ a native of Amaseia, reveals a prosperity, no longer existent today, which astonished the Romans when they came thither from Galatia in the year 72; the Moslem mania for deforestation has dried up the springs or made marshes there. In a very extensive first district, a *Κοινὸν Πόντου*, whose precise nature long remained doubtful,² since it was only in Latin that it was given a more exact title (*Pontus Mediterraneus*, or Pontus of the Interior), included six towns which are shown side by side in line on their federal medals; these were certainly Neocæsarea, Sebastopolis, Comana Pontica, probably Amaseia and Zela, perhaps Sebasteia.³ This *koinon* must have originated under the last descendants of Mithridates, for the country had been the centre of their power. It also contained a large sprinkling of villages (*Chiliocomon*).⁴ Rome defined the territories of the cities there and, through a special procurator, watched the interests of the treasury in this Pontus of the Interior, whose populations still maintained the old solidarity.

Except for Amisus, a very prosperous free city of the province of Pontus and Bithynia, the coast of the Euxine only provided seamen with a few small ports of call. One of them, destined to enjoy a happier future, ceased to lie idle on the day when Vespasian joined Armenia Minor to Cappadocia, for then Trebizond became of the first importance both commercially and strategically; but the study of this town cannot be isolated from that of the Romano-Parthian frontier, which also involves eastern Cappadocia and its great camp, Melitene, intrenched beside the Euphrates.

¹ XII, 39; CLXXXVI, p. 365 *et seq.*

² V. Chapot, XXXIX, p. 98 *et seq.*

³ XLVIII, II, *passim*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 144 *et seq.*

V

THE SOUTHERN ZONE

To the lofty mountain chain on the coast of Pontus there corresponded another in the south of Asia Minor,¹ less regular in outline, more wild, and rising to greater heights. The nature of this littoral zone explains the savage character of its inhabitants and the reasons which prompted Rome to intervene there at an early date. Brigands and pirates swarmed from one end of it to the other. Except in the plain (*Cilicia Pedias*) looking towards Cyprus and Syria and suitable for cultivation, the principal resources of the inhabitants were limited to timber and herds of goats whose hair was used to weave sail-cloth. Thus they had material for making ships and, as the country yielded few products for exportation, these ships travelled long distances to prey upon the commerce in the neighbourhood of busy ports, plundered, levied contributions, and returned to their dens when the hold was full. After the first campaign of Marcus Antonius against the pirates in 103, the Romans got a footing in this country, and a province of Cilicia-Pamphylia is mentioned at that period. The war against Mithridates and the cession of territories to Amyntas unsettled everything, and the word province, as applied to this long strip of land, was understood rather in its original sense of a personal command intrusted to an officer in a given region. The region in question was very large but varied according to circumstances, and consequently, in the apportionment of this zone between several provinces, there were incessant changes, of which it would be impracticable to give the details here, since a number of points still remain undetermined.

The terrestrial brigandage caused perpetual warfare, of which certain episodes only have come down to us. Chance determined that Cilicia should be governed in 52-50 by the great orator Cicero,² whose letters abound in information, and he distinguished himself by an expedition against the peoples of Mount Amanus on the Syrian frontier. We also have some particulars of the mission intrusted by Augustus to the

¹ CLXXX, p. 361-387; Ruge, *Kilikien*, XLVII, X, col. 385-389.

² CXXXVII.

Galatian Amyntas to repress revolts in Pisidia and Isauria; but this officer was killed during his operations against the *Homonadenses*,¹ who could not be subdued without calling in the help of the governor of Syria.

One district, Lycia, an Asiatic Tyrol, as it has been called,² being isolated from its neighbours by the fact that it forms a promontory jutting out into the sea, appears to have led a more peaceful life. Not only was a local dialect developed there, which lasted well into the Roman period and has left many epigraphical remains that have never been fully explained,³ but there was a league, a *koinon*⁴ of twenty-three towns, in which annexation made no change, since it had repulsed the overtures of Mithridates. The inhabitants, obviously highly cultured, had given proof of an original civilization since before the Persian conquest: their carved rock tombs reveal the influence of a very ingenious art of working in wood. Moreover, it was set to the credit of the Lycians that they had never been addicted to piracy.⁵ Subjects of Rhodes for some time and initiated into Hellenism by her, they finally became entirely Greek.

Further east, in Pamphylia and Cilicia, hellenization had begun at various places on the coast owing to the protectorate of the Ptolemies. The influence of the Seleucids and afterwards of the Attalids (who founded Attaleia) was less marked and was interrupted by the pirates. It was Rome who completed this work: she established colonies of veterans at Antioch and Seleucia (in Pisidia), and founded Cremna, Parlais and Olbasa. The most ancient towns of Pamphylia and Pisidia still possess remarkable ruins, generally of the Roman period, which give us a high opinion of their prosperity. It has been observed⁶ that the majority of their monuments on which a dedication can be read were set up by individual citizens, and this suggests economic conditions favourable to the acquisition of wealth; the numerous and sometimes very long inscriptions which have been discovered bear witness to an exceedingly busy municipal life. Moreover, the buildings are of a sumptuous kind and, except the water-works,

¹ W. M. Ramsay, **XXII**, VII (1917), p. 229-275.

² **CLXXXIII**, p. 363 *et seq.*

³ Cf. *Tituli Asiae Minoris*, I.

⁵ Strabo, XIV, 664.

⁴ **CV**.

⁶ **CL**, I, p. 14.

nymphæa and aqueducts, have an imposing appearance due to the generosity of subscribers. The towers of Attaleia¹ and its "Gate of Hadrian" are good examples of the decorative art of the Empire. Temples, basilicas, markets, porticoes and assembly halls astonish the visitor who compares them with the wretched appearance of the country's dwelling-houses today; this contrast is most strikingly emphasized by the series of theatres which, at Aspendus, Perge, Sagalassus, Selge, Side, Termessus, must have enabled even the natives to hear the classical masterpieces of ancient Greece.

A stable system of government was at last established for all this southern zone of Anatolia by Vespasian. In Cilicia, an aggregation of territories, where many diverse eras and capitals existed side by side and the petty vassal kings appointed by Antony and maintained by Augustus continued to rule for a century, an imperial province was created,² and to its north-western extremity were attached, doubtless on the accession of Antoninus,³ the poor districts of Isauria and Lycaonia taken from Galatia. This attachment was at first regarded as temporary, for one of the governors is officially styled⁴ *legate of the provinces* of Cilicia, Isauria and Lycaonia. Further, Vespasian returned to the original idea of Claudius and associated Lycia and Pamphylia under a common legate, without forbidding them to retain separate *koina*; Hadrian handed over this double province to the Senate in exchange for Bithynia.

Such were the complications and successive changes in the provincial organization of the Greek Orient. The Lower Empire returned more or less quickly to the subdivision of southern Anatolia, following the guidance of ethnography, and all these names were assigned to different parts of it: Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia, Lycaonia, Isauria. These were so many distinct provinces in the fourth century, and Cilicia, which was increased in size, added two more. Proconsular Asia and Bithynia were the only provinces of Asia Minor which remained, until Diocletian's reign, exempt from such vicissitudes.

¹ II, III (1916/1920), p. 5 *et seq.*

² XI, 1905, p. 225 *et seq.*

³ Ramsay, XIX, VII (1904), *Beiblatt*, col. 57-132.

⁴ XLIV, III, 290.

VI

THE MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS

It is in these latter provinces that the wealth of inscriptions best illustrates municipal life,¹ with its naive formulas, and the redundant grandiloquence of its decrees, almost always made to glorify the Roman magistrates or some national benefactor.

Each town in fact had its *ekklesia*,² composed in principle of all the citizens. We must picture an assembly, often noisy and disorderly, to which even children and perhaps women were admitted, comprising not only the Roman citizens of the place, but even some persons—athletes or singers—who possessed the right of citizenship in several towns, for they generally made a free gift of this, though they seem to have sold it sometimes over the counter. In these sessions there was no discussion, and no amendments were made to the proposals submitted by the municipal magistrates, who called the crowd together and presided over it; everything was carried by acclamation. The assembly appointed the principal officials, but they were always the candidates of the *boule*, and the latter, respecting the formal procedure in regard to the old magistracies, only supplied candidates for those of recent creation, which were in reality the most important.

This *boule*³ or “council” usurped more and more of the popular assembly’s functions, and the Roman government helped the process—in so far as Bithynia is concerned, the *lex Pompeia* reveals a definite plan for doing so. In that province special officials, called by Pliny⁴ *censores*, selected the *bouleutæ* from among the *honestiores*. The method of recruitment in the other parts of Asia Minor is unknown to us, but we seem to detect, in some cases, a sort of co-optation and even imperial intervention through the medium of the magistrates. As a matter of fact this council was very large, including some hundreds of members according to certain

¹ Is. Lévy, **XXXIII**, VIII (1895), p. 203-205; XII (1899), p. 255-289; XIV (1901), p. 350-371.

² **LXXXII**, p. 205-216.

³ **LXXXII**, p. 195-205.

⁴ *Ep. ad Traian.*, 79, 80, 112, 114.

texts, and as the rich families could not multiply to such an extent, the preliminary examination (*docimasia*) could not have been very formidable to men of property; besides there were exceptions to every rule. A fee was paid for admission called the *honorarium*, but some individuals had the glory of their exemption from it engraved in marble, and a very amusing detail preserved for us in one long inscription is that a generous donor at Ephesus bequeathed the wherewithal to give each *bouleutes* every year the ridiculous sum of one denarius.¹

In practice the *probouleumata* of this higher assembly became decrees; in some departments above all—police, finance, road maintenance, public works—it seems even to have dispensed with the formality of popular ratification. Membership of it was therefore a real honour; but did it bring material profit as well, or was it on the contrary a burdensome duty? That depended on the town; but very often, in view of the obligation to be generous and the privileges derived from certain foundations, we see the same men giving with one hand and taking with the other, and behind this mask of solemn respectability we picture scenes which to us seem merely ludicrous.

Something the same impression is made by a new institution, peculiar to Asia Minor and very common in proconsular Asia, the *gerusia*,² of which we have several examples before the imperial era. Its real nature is imperfectly understood. Clearly it was an official body, since it is referred to on coins; but its attributes seem very vague to us and may have varied from town to town. Even the proceedings of the *gerusia* of Ephesus, the capital of Asia, are imperfectly revealed by the various epigraphical texts: it seems to have been occupied with the material interests of the sanctuary of Artemis, and we should say that its administration was not above reproach, seeing that Hadrian wrote to the proconsul on the subject and that the latter appointed a *logistes* to verify the accounts.

Besides this, these assemblies—consisting of old men, as their name implies—had also their own privy purses which were used both for speculation and for making gifts to the State. One *gerusia* owns a wrestling-school, which it doubt-

¹ *Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum*, III, 481, l. 129.

² **XXXIII**, VIII (1895), p. 231 *et seq.*; **LXXXII**, p. 216-230.]

less lets to the commoners; another, to help the municipal finances, looks after the supply of oil in the public *gymnasia*; while, as a set-off, it levies charges on those who frequent them, provides towels at a price for visitors to the baths, and has the management of a sort of canteen at the entrance to them. In certain communes, especially in Pisidia, it is the *gerusia* that receives the fines for the violation of graves.

It was not, like the *boule* and *ekklesia*, an essential part of the city's machinery; more than one *gerusia* did not come into existence until a late date—that of Sidyma, for example, under Commodus—and some inscriptions which give a list of its members show that the *bouleutæ* were predominant in it.¹ What then was the use of it? Mommsen supposed that its members regarded it as a club, and this may have been the case. The collegiate spirit was rampant in the Greek world, and vanity had a share in it.

This is proved by the existence of another sort of *collegium*, that of the *neoi*,² also peculiar to Asia Minor, which consisted of the young men just discharged from the *ephebeum*, who continued the same exercises in it and prepared themselves for public life. The *neoi* of Pergamus were already in existence under the Attalids, forming a small city in the big one, with their own magistrates and assemblies. Thus everything attests this mania of the Greeks for meeting together and talking, for acting a superficial part, making and recording idle decisions.

The public offices assumed a character that would have astonished ancient Greece. Besides the magistracies (*ἀρχαί*) she had already recognized "liturgies" or honorary obligations imposed on the richer citizens, and the official language expressed this distinction, just as at Rome *honor* was distinguished from *munus*. If the distinction survived in theory, many epigraphical texts prove that in practice it disappeared, being less marked between the offices themselves than between their holders, according as they had spent much or little money. A well stocked purse was the first requisite for a candidate, so it might be a woman who became hipparch or agonothete and supplied public banquets.³ Some in-

¹ XLIV, III, 582, 597-598.

² P. Girard, XLIII, art. *Nevi*.

³ LXXXII, p. 162.

scriptions of Sillyon (in Pamphylia)¹ complacently record the many titles to glory of a certain Menodora, daughter, granddaughter and great-granddaughter of men who have filled all sorts of offices, which she too has held, besides having given—the amounts are specified—so much for this purpose, so much for that, to the various members of the three great assemblies individually, to their wives, freedmen and the metoecs; alms and official titles are mixed together pell-mell. We note a personage who has discharged a liturgy “since childhood”; another is termed ἥρως in his epitaph—a dead man (heroified) whose patrimony served to defray the cost of some public service. Better still, a god can become a magistrate, provided that he has a fund: at Colophon Apollo is *prytanis* for the sixty-third time, and elsewhere he often figures as eponymous office-holder.

The *summa honoraria*, to give it its Roman name, or donative distributed on taking office, was of course *de rigueur*, but only its minimum can have been fixed. On the other hand, a fine title was an excellent recompense for a liberal bounty. The expenses of a dignitary during his term of office threatened to swell to such an amount that we find traces of a bargain, a division of costs between the individual's liberality and the resources of the public treasury. Since the citizens able to fill increasingly costly positions were not always very numerous, we find honours and offices accumulating simultaneously on the same shoulders, and there were magistracies tenable “for life.” In spite of the Roman legislation, reapplied to the Asiatics under Antoninus,² there was no longer any means of following a *cursus honorum* or securing promotion *gradatim*. A sort of plutocratic *nobilitas* was formed; more than one person, according to the inscriptions, prided himself on a father and a whole series of ancestors laden with magistracies and liturgies.

Just as the method of recruitment was made uniform, in view of the fact that wealth had become an indispensable condition, so the qualifications for office lost nearly all their importance and were entirely changed from what they had

¹ XLIV, III, 800-802. Cf. the inscription of Opramoas at Rhodapolis (*ibid.*, 933), whose honours and benefactions are summarized in several hundred lines.

² *Dig.*, L, 4, 11.

been in the past. As a matter of fact, in each city, at any rate from the beginning of the Empire, a handful of notables held the first place, remaining constantly in touch with the deliberative assemblies and the Roman authorities. Under the vague title *οἱ ἄρχοντες* it comprised, besides the city secretary, a synarchy¹ (for the collegiate system prevailed in many cases) of archons, in a restricted sense of the word, or *strategi*, titles which cover identical functions and are even used interchangeably as synonyms, representing no more than the purely formal fidelity of the Greeks to the old nomenclature of the period of independence. The survival of an eponymous magistracy can be similarly explained, seeing that from this time forward the chronology of the towns was based upon the system of eras.²

In the classical period there were occasions when the cities had need of ambassadors, but they were few and far between; under the yoke of Rome they were constantly sending deputies, either to the governor at the provincial capital, or to Rome herself to the imperial palace—inde-fatigable speech-makers bearing idle vows of homage or some petition due to a local catastrophe.³ Trajan had well said that a mere letter would suffice to express the desires of the provincials, but his advice was not heeded, and the municipal finances continued to be encumbered with very heavy travelling expenses, since the delegates did not travel at their own cost. These measures were not always taken out of mere politeness; on an occasion when the common interest was at stake the envoys were called syndics, and we see in them the prototypes of a permanent magistrate of the fourth century, the *defensor civitatis*.

The right of jurisdiction⁴ was not withdrawn from the local authorities, at least in matters of little importance; but the litigants showed small appreciation of the local tribunals; they seem to have attributed more impartiality to that of the governor, an itinerant *prætorium* which travelled at intervals through the various dioceses or *conventus*. Moreover, the appeal to the emperor, in more serious suits, provided a supplementary guarantee. The special agents who had

¹ LXXXII, p. 237.

² *Ibid.*, p. 382 *et seq.*

³ Premerstein, XLVII, XII, col. 1138-1141.

⁴ CLXII, X, p. 131; LXXXII, p. 125, 250.

control over the market were competent to deal with small offences. It was not this police work that seems to have caused most difficulty: order was easily preserved among the crowded population; but in the surrounding district which formed the "territory" of many cities there was never real security; some mountainous regions in Phrygia and Caria were wasted by brigandage to the last. There was no garrison except beside the Parthian frontier; and in any case the army had practically no duties except to suppress revolts, which did not occur in Asia; there were merely robbers and workmen inclined to riots and strikes.

Recourse was had therefore to a sort of *gendarmérie* but, as the *gendarmes* copied the thieves, or at any rate exploited the peoples they were commissioned to protect, Rome intervened, without much enthusiasm, and imposed officers of the peace (*eirenarchs*),¹ appointed in principle by the proconsul, only the *boule* found the candidates for him and committed the old follies in drawing up the list: an inscription of the third century records an infant *eirenarch*.²

But the most defective service of all was that of the municipal finances, and herein the Hellenes of Asia remained true to Greek tradition. Rome made large exactions from them; only one city seems to have enjoyed permanent immunity, *Ilium Novum*, which benefited by the fictitious identification of the *gens Julia* with the descendants of Æneas.³ Nevertheless the city treasures suffered still more from the taste for ostentation, the magnificent buildings of little use or too much luxury, the games, the statues and other rewards which private fortunes were unable to provide. In case of need the treasury of a god was drawn upon, and he practised usury like an ordinary banker.

The central authority took steps to correct these abuses. From the second century, *logistæ* or controllers of accounts appeared in certain towns; though usually Asiatics, they were high Roman officials, and their sphere of influence extended beyond their own cities. After the Antonines, the *logista* became regular and permanent, a mere agent of the imperial authorities. Yet the Empire was able to recognize the value of an institution at which Roman law had hitherto looked

¹ XLVII, Suppl. III, col. 419-423.

² X, VII (1883), p. 272.

³ LXXXII, p. 536.

askance. Cities could not receive gifts from private individuals without the permission of the emperor or of the Senate, which was not easy to obtain. Now endowments in favour of one's native place¹ were regularly and lavishly made in Greece. The government shut its eyes to the fact until the day when Nerva bestowed on all the cities of the Empire the right of receiving legacies, and the sums thus obtained were often a valuable aid to the cities of Asia in balancing their budgets.

It would be wrong, however, to judge the economic condition of Asia Minor as a whole from the finances of the towns. The prosperity of the State is dependent on private fortunes, and if the plutocratic *régime* drew heavily upon the resources of individuals, it did not exhaust them, since, as the inscriptions bear witness with a flourish of pride, there were families in which each generation consisted of magistrates. Commerce and industry continued to prosper,² at least until the invasions: the multitude of corporations,³ the wealth of the *Romani consistentes* leave no doubt on the subject; the adulation of the Cæsars and the favour with which the imperial cult was received are equally significant. It was more profitable then to live in Asia than in European Greece.

The intellectual life of the country⁴ was not to be despised: certainly we can point to no centre of study comparable with the Athens of that period or the Pergamus of former days; but if the masses remained ignorant, sunk in degrading superstition, and to a great extent faithful to the old dialects,⁵ a considerable number of cultured people were found here and there throughout the land. Many professors were honoured and exempted from the municipal burdens; if as a general rule they taught conventional and barren subjects, sophistic and rhetoric, some rose above this humble level, and the study of medicine remained true to the traditions of the Coan school. It was in Asia Minor that pagan Hellenism showed its last rays of light and Christianity recruited its first great apologists.

¹ Cf. Bernhard Laum, *Stiftungen in der griechischen und römischen Antike*, Leipzig-Berlin, 1914.

² CLXII, X, p. 138 *et seq.*; LXXXIII, p. 76-96.

³ Cf. Poland, *Geschichte des griechischen Vereinswesens*, Leipzig, 1909; CCXIV, III, p. 23-65.

⁴ CLXII, X, p. 144 *et seq.*

⁵ Karl Holl, XVI, XLIII (1908), p. 240-254.

VII

CYPRUS

A sort of annex to the country of Asia Minor was the island of Cyprus,¹ which, in ancient times, provided an asylum for so many diverse civilizations owing to its favourable position on the great trade routes. We have seen how it was conquered in the year 58 B.C. in consequence of a mission of Cato. The suspicious transactions which were then carried through must have given the inhabitants, whose impotence made them resigned, a foretaste of the joys in store for them under the Roman rule. Joined for administrative purposes to Cilicia, they thus had Cicero for governor in 51-50. It seems clear from his letters that he disdained to visit this part of his province; only complaints reached him from several towns which were being fleeced by certain friends of those in authority and were paying a high price for exemption from providing billets for soldiers. Moreover, Cyprus was specially sought after by the *publicani*, and by a company of speculators among whom, behind certain men of straw, we can divine the most prominent citizens of the Republic, such as M. Brutus, Cato's nephew. Cicero had to intervene against his will to restrict the usurious rates of interest which had been imposed in defiance of the law.

Finally a sort of separate governor, a quæstor, was put in charge of the island about the year 49, when it became an object of private bargaining for Cæsar and later for Antony, who ceded it first to the Lagid princes and afterwards to the famous Cleopatra. Actium decided this question like so many others, and Augustus kept Cyprus as part of his share. There too a little mercy and justice were confidently anticipated from the Principate, which was not kept waiting for proofs of loyalty, as we may see by certain local calendars in which the names of the months are so many tributes paid to the emperor.²

Thenceforward the history of Cyprus remains obscure to us—undoubtedly a good sign; except for some earthquakes

¹ V. Chapot, **XLVI**, p. 68-83.

² W. Kubitschek, **XIX**, VIII (1905), p. 111-116; A. von Domaszewski, *Abhandlungen zur römischen Religion*, Leipzig, 1909, p. 234 *et seq.*

and a revolt of the Jews who, in 117, destroyed the capital, Salamina, it lived peacefully by the exploitation of its copper mines. There was little municipal activity in the island and competition was slight; Paphos was the only other claimant to the title of capital. None of the fifteen towns coined money of its own; that of the provincial *koinon* alone has been discovered.¹ Finally, like England today, Rome regarded the island merely as a strategic base which might prove useful, but no permanent garrison seemed to be required there, for, from the year 22, Augustus left Cyprus permanently to the Senate.

¹ G. F. Hill, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Cyprus*, London, 1904, p. cxviii-cxxxiii.

CHAPTER VII

SYRIA, PALESTINE AND THE EASTERN FRONTIER

THE territories acquired by Pompey in 64 constituted a region with indefinite boundaries whose length, at any rate between Cappadocia and the frontier of Egypt, extended to about 700 kilometres. To assure peace there and the successful working of a regular government, at once new and uniform, was no light task, especially in view of the medley of peoples who had to be brought under the authority of Rome: Aramæans, concentrated chiefly in the north; Phœnicians, along the coast where their ancestors had lived; Arabs, on the other side of the littoral mountain chains and the rivers beside them; Jews, especially numerous in Palestine; Ituræans and Idumæans encircling them—all Semitic races, though more or less differentiated—and finally, to complicate the problem still further, a number of Greeks introduced by the Seleucids into all the northern and southern districts. Now the Romans were accustomed to give or leave the first place in their various oriental possessions to the Hellenic element, since this was the most highly civilized of all, the most adaptable, and, through its hereditary attachment to the municipal system, the best suited for the methods of provincial government.

All these peoples that we have just enumerated had become more or less intermingled through a sort of economic infiltration, a progressive extension of their dealings with one another in quite simple ways; but each group retained its own institutions: the Arabs formed nomad tribes obedient to semi-military chieftains; the other Semites were attached to an oligarchic system or to the rule of some priest-king; the Greeks remained faithful to the system of municipal organization, doubtless like that which we have studied in Asia Minor,¹ which, after the Hellenistic period, developed constantly along the same lines.

¹ This is an impression which we cannot avoid, though we are very poorly furnished with detailed information on the subject; cf. **LXVIII**, p. 458 *et seq.*

Administration, whether temporary or not, was a delicate matter, but fortunately the Romans possessed undeniable adroitness in dealing with circumstances like these. Pompey traversed the province and made a wise distribution of rewards and punishments there.¹ The Greek cities kept their autonomy, so long as a free government was maintained in them; those which, like Tripolis or Byblus, were ruled by a tyrant, a sort of parasite favoured by the troubles and "social decomposition"² of recent times, were relieved by aid of the axe. The Roman general affected great good will towards the Arabian Emir of Emesa, who had imprisoned and finally done away with the last of the kings of Syria; other petty kings, phylarchs or tetrarchs, showed their readiness to submit by seasonably purchasing the conqueror's mercy.

In Palestine two rivals, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, had come to a deadlock; Pompey's lieutenant, Scaurus, pronounced in favour of the second, who held the State funds; but Pompey took in hand the settlement of the dispute at the assizes which he held in Damascus, attended by deputies from all over Syria. It was impossible to remain indifferent and let things take their course, for each rival had his partisans. Since Hyrcanus had seemed the more docile, it was he who was established by force after the final assault on the temple of Jerusalem.

Hyrcanus was also high-priest, but the Hasmonæan dynasty, which had been tolerated by the Seleucids, was extinct; he only obtained Judæa in the strict sense of the word; all the towns of the coast, of Galilee and Idumæa, recovered their previous freedom, and Jerusalem, after its walls had been razed, had to pay tribute. There was a Jewish State, but it was certainly much reduced in size and rather sacerdotal than political in character. The country was restored for the time being to its old state of partition, which was deemed more advantageous to the Romans.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 444 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 441.

I

THE GREEKS OF SYRIA AND PALESTINE

Of all the towns of Syria only one was of really first-rate importance, namely Antioch,¹ the ex-capital of the Seleucids, which the Roman governor made his headquarters. Favours were constantly bestowed on it by its new masters, and a number of emperors passed through it, for it was a necessary stage in the journey of anyone undertaking an enterprise in the East. After the battle of Pharsalia the inhabitants pronounced themselves on Cæsar's side, and he rewarded them by building a basilica, a theatre and hot baths. After Actium also they made advances to the victor; Octavius appeared at Antioch in triumph and built new baths and a circus there, while Agrippa built several luxurious villas. A great street traversed the city in a straight line for a distance of seven kilometres, flanked on either side by a covered portico; Tiberius erected numbers of statues under the colonnades; Antoninus Pius caused Egyptian granite to be brought to pave the street, and conferred on Antioch the title of a Roman colony. The complete disappearance of these buildings is not only due to earthquakes—in any case the ruins were restored after each catastrophe; but the Orontes, which never ceases to bring down alluvial deposits, has buried much more recent monuments than those with which we are concerned; it has only respected the enclosure of Justinian which still survives beyond its reach on the slopes of Mount Silpius.

The emperors' lavishness was chiefly due to the charm of the country, the softness of the climate and the beauty of the scenery; the suburban garden of Daphne had its tall trees and sparkling fountains, and Antioch itself was abundantly supplied with water. A life of pleasure was led there, luxurious and free from care, which may perhaps be compared with that of the towns on the "Côte d'azur." But the "metropolitan" spirit was given free play; the habit of rubbing shoulders with the great ones of the earth had developed critical and satirical tendencies which some touchy

¹ CLXII, XI, p. 14 *et seq.*; N. S. Bouchier, *A Short History of Antioch*, Oxford, 1921.

sovereigns punished by inflicting unimportant and short-lived penalties on the city. In this respect Antioch resembled Alexandria, but not in its intellectual activity, which was far inferior. The games and theatre flourished there; the drivers of the circus formed a separate caste; but it was hardly the place for philosophic thought. Nevertheless Cicero boasts of the schools of Antioch; but the literature appreciated by this capital city, this rich society, frivolous and dissolute, consisted of romances inspired by Babylonian originals, light verse and epigrams. Even after Christianity had guided Antioch on the road to new destinies, the ironical and iconoclastic spirit survived there, and, if two princes of the Church had not intervened, Theodosius would have made the city undergo the terrible punishment which he was about to inflict on Thessalonica. According to Dion Chrysostom, she then had a population of well over 200,000.

No doubt her mint and her munition factories were only a small part of her commercial activity, from which the artistic industries must have profited, for the silk trade would find an outlet there.¹ Moreover, the requirements of Antioch explain the formidable labours undertaken for the defence and equipment of the port of Seleucia Pieria,² chief among them the great canal made to deflect a mountain torrent. Since it provided a harbour for ships of war as well as trading vessels, it was often visited by the prætorian fleets, and steps were taken to deepen it during Diocletian's reign.

A harbour, good for its time, also made the fortune of Laodicea,³ a free city and at length a colony, when Septimius Severus compensated it for the ravages of Pescennius and gave it for a moment the position of capital, in order to avenge himself on Antioch for its jibes. We have reminiscences also, in our texts, of Tripolis and its magnificent buildings, and the authors give us glimpses of many another busy centre, of which practically nothing remains; their ruins today are for the most part occupied by wretched villages.

Pompey had declared all the communities of Palestine

¹ Albert Hermann, *Die alten Seidenstrassen zwischen China und Syrien* (*Quellen und Forschungen* of Sieglin, XXI), Berlin, 1910.

² V. Chapot, **XXVII**, LXVI (1907), p. 149-226.

³ Honigmann, **XLVII**, XII, col. 718 *et seq.*

free, that is to say released from the Jewish domination; even the towns created by Herod and his sons were given a mostly pagan population. We know very little of their political condition, or of that of the towns about Mount Lebanon (Abila, Chalcis, Emesa), which retained for more than a century small dynasties of native princes. We only note, in order to contradict it, the very wide-spread belief that the ancient Phœnician republics, Aradus, Byblus, Tyre and Sidon,¹ had collapsed in final ruin; they still took rank as cities.

Among the most conspicuous towns we should naturally mention those which various Cæsars raised to the status of colonies—not those indebted to the Syrian emperors for a title made meaningless by Caracalla's edict, but those which obtained it much earlier: Berytus, honoured by Augustus, an unimportant town before the Roman period, but afterwards a great centre of trade owing to its vineyards and silk, and a place of learning thanks to the school of law founded in the third century;² Heliopolis,³ a holy city, which has retained until our own time its Semitic name of Baalbek; Ptolemais, honoured by Claudius, Cæsarea (Kaisarieh) by Vespasian, who had been proclaimed emperor there. This last town, founded by Herod, very soon became the most important in all Palestine and was the residence of the Roman procurators of Judæa;⁴ like Berytus it was a place of learning, and one of those in which the ever imminent storms between Jews and pagans exploded most violently. The respective status of the two rival populations generally baffles all research, but it seems likely at any rate that, so far as the towns are concerned, they enjoyed equal privileges, or else were alike excluded from the full right of citizenship.⁵

When we speak of Hellenic towns we include those founded by Herod, for the governors that he appointed bore Greek titles (archons, strategi, eparchs, ethnarchs); the Hellenistic system had long since been adopted everywhere and the

¹ Id., XLVII, IIa, col. 2226.

² Paul Collinet, *Histoire de l'École de droit de Beyrouth*, Paris, 1925.

³ Honigmann, XLVII, Suppl. IV, col. 715-728; B. Schultz and H. Winnefeld, *Baalbeck*, 1921.

⁴ Leo Haefeli, *Cæsarea am Meer, Topographie und Geschichte der Stadt nach Josephus und der Apostelgeschichte*, Münster, 1923.

⁵ CG, II, section 23.

Romans did not need to disseminate the urban organization of the Greeks in this country, where they renounced the idea of founding new cities and confined themselves to restoring the old ones or enlarging them by the settlement of veterans. But we must not misconceive this Hellenism, which was often quite superficial, or at any rate very much adulterated. The language of administration was Greek, but the old idioms had not disappeared and were still spoken in everyday life; and the proper names, whether of places or persons, were very often derived from Syrian words with hardly any modification. The Seleucids had taken too little interest in intellectual questions to give these new Hellenes more than a thin veneer of culture; while, as regards religion,¹ the Syrian practices of those days—and it is not less true of those of Anatolia and of most Roman provinces—reveal the fact that the ancient cults survived, as was very clearly shown by the epithets applied to gods with Greek names. Syria therefore remained the land of the Baals; the Helios of Heliopolis was no other than Baal, nor was the Heliogabalus (Elagabalus) whose name an emperor took.

To the same extent many Jews were hellenized.

II

THE JEWS²

The latter indeed had previously submitted to the domination of the Seleucids, who imposed the Greek language on their new foundations. Outside the Macedonian colonies, Aramæan had become the language of the people, but Greek must have been very widely known in the more strictly Jewish centres of Palestine, seeing that Judaism, which was disseminated throughout the ancient world by emigration, generally took a Greek form there. In proportion as the number of documents increases we are constantly better informed concerning the remarkable extent of this *diaspora*;³

¹ LXXI, chap. IX.

² G.-F. Lehmann-Haupt, *Israel, seine Entwicklung im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte*, Tübingen, 1911, p. 210-242; A. Schlatter, *Geschichte Israels von Alexander dem Grossen bis Hadrian*, 3. Aufl., Stuttgart, 1925.

³ CXLV, I., p. 180-209.

but it did not detract from the unity of the race which, moreover, the Roman government itself helped to strengthen by everywhere admitting the privileges of the Jews, except for some restrictions in the countries of the West, where indeed Judaism had made much more timorous advances.¹

These privileges were maintained by Rome for various reasons:² in many places they were already established, and Rome made as few innovations as possible; also there were treaties of alliance with the petty kings of Palestine which sanctioned respect for their traditions, and the Roman government judged it more imprudent to put constraint upon the Jews than to supervise them. Moreover, chance favoured them: in the great riot of Alexandria Julius Cæsar was helped by a Jew, the born enemy of the Alexandrians, whom he made king of Judæa,³ and whose son, the famous Herod,⁴ reigned there for thirty-three years (37-4 B.C.). It is true that he was a dissenting Jew, an Idumæan, and that the pure Israelites spurned him as being at once too Greek and too Roman; nevertheless his great deference to the Empire, for which he performed all sorts of good offices, was rewarded by an enlargement of his territory, and Augustus withdrew none of the privileges guaranteed by Cæsar.

These latter may be summed up in the words political independence and religious liberty, the right of Israel to have its own rulers and its own councils, the council of Elders, the great Sanhedrin, a body of seventy members at once political, legislative and judicial. A very original and exceptional institution tolerated by the Romans was that of the "sacred silver."⁵ Every Jew of Palestine or of the *diaspora* sent each year to Jerusalem a didrachma for the temple; this custom was authorized and protected by the Roman government, and all the contributions together made a large sum, for, thanks to the fertility of the race, it is clear that Palestine was very thickly populated, and the children of Israel scattered through the world amounted to some further millions.⁶ Whatever may have been the legal position as regards military service, we have evidence of many Jews

¹ CLXII, XI, p. 71 *et seq.*

² CXLV, I, p. 213 *et seq.*

³ CC, I, p. 543.

⁴ W. Otto, *Herodes*, Stuttgart, 1913 (extr. from XLVII, Suppl. II).

⁵ CXLV, I, p. 377 *et seq.*

⁶ For the possible estimates see *ibid.*, I, p. 210 *et seq.*

enlisting in the Roman armies. [Finally, a delicate problem for fanatical believers, whose religion—unlike that of paganism—bound their consciences, was skilfully solved: they were allowed to make their choice among the external forms of the imperial cult, and, except in the time of Caligula, equivalents or set-offs were accepted in place of those which shocked them: sacrifices to Jehovah on behalf of the emperors, or offerings and free gifts in their honour.¹

It does not belong to our subject to describe in detail the intestine tragedies of the Idumæan royal family, the difficulties experienced by the tetrarchs who succeeded Herod; we will only remark that the deadly feuds among the Jews compelled the Roman government to abolish the monarchy in Judæa, which became a Roman province (6 A.D.). The monarchy survived in the Haurân (until 34) and in Galilee (until 39). The troubles continued in spite of the respect proclaimed by Tiberius for the ancient customs: the burden of taxation and above all the census, which was regarded as a sign of servitude,² gave rise to violent agitation.

It was then that Caligula, an enemy of the Jews—who had no wish for the gift—restored the monarchy in favour of a friend of his childhood, Herod Agrippa, to whom Claudius granted the whole of Herod's former kingdom; but his authority (41-44), like that of his son Agrippa II (50-100) over some towns of Galilee, was purely nominal in view of the domination of Rome.³ Meanwhile the great crisis of the time of the Flavians came to a head, a crisis to which all sorts of factors contributed: the Roman agents' abuse of their power, the unbridled fanaticism of the "zealots," disputes between Jews and Greeks at Cæsarea, brigandage of partisan bands. At Jerusalem the most violent faction triumphed and overran all Judæa, where the Jews massacred the Gentiles at their leisure.

Rome determined to take stern measures and sent an imperial legate, the future emperor Vespasian, at the head of an army of nearly 50,000 men.⁴ He was compelled to undertake the conquest of the country bit by bit, but upon his call to the throne he left the command to his son Titus.

¹ *Ibid.*, I, p. 339 *et seq.*

² *CC*, I, p. 508-543.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 549-564, 585-600.

⁴ R. Cagnat, *XXXIV*, XXII (1891), p. xxxi-lviii.

Numerical superiority, military science, famine among the besieged, party strife in the city (zealots, brigands, adherents of the high priest and moderates) gave the victory to the Romans; during the siege itself the city and the temple had been burnt, so that the victors merely encamped upon a heap of ruins; at least one third of the population of Palestine had been destroyed.¹

The result of seven years of war was that—to use the language of our day—Rome endeavoured to separate things spiritual from things temporal. Jerusalem, an accursed city, must not be allowed to recover; the whole of her territory became imperial domain; the survivors were sold into slavery; some had to fight as gladiators at the festivities which Titus held in Antioch. There was no longer a Jewish State, no longer a Sanhedrin, no longer a supreme ruler in Palestine; but Judaism survived as a religion; it was allowed to have a patriarch, a spiritual head of all the Jews whether in Palestine or elsewhere. The fact that the great temple was destroyed and its rebuilding prohibited did not put an end to the annual contribution of each believer, but Rome appropriated it for Jupiter Capitolinus, and so Judaism paid the costs of the war.²

The people of the *diaspora* could see no tolerance in the imperial decision and could not resign themselves to the absence of any national centre. The religious bond, now the only one, became constantly stronger and more strict, and in 126, at the very moment when Trajan's new conquests were involving him in unexpected difficulties, the smouldering rebellion broke out.³ In Cyrene, Egypt, Cyprus, Mesopotamia, the Jews fell upon their enemies, massacring and torturing, and the example they set brought retaliation upon them at Alexandria, where the Greeks could make head against them. Fanaticism collapsed in the face of regular troops; but although the repression was stern, it did not discourage the rebels at all, for a new and more terrible revolt followed in Judæa itself (132-135).

Hadrian had supposed that the Jewish nation was finally destroyed and that it no longer remembered the position of

¹ CC, I, p. 600-642.

² H. Drexler, XXIII, XIX (1924), p. 277-312.

³ CC, I, p. 662-668.

Jerusalem in former days. This great builder thought fit to create a new town there, a colony of veterans, and to erect on the site of the temple a sanctuary to Jupiter Capitolinus, Jehovah's successor in so far as he benefited by the "sacred silver"; the name of *Ælia Capitolina* was to place on record both the emperor's work and this new dedication. This was the first grievance. A second arose out of a serious misunderstanding. Circumcision, an Egyptian custom which the Jews had borrowed, was by a remarkable confusion regarded in the same light as castration, which had been punished by law since Domitian; hence a general prohibition, under penalty of death, was issued to Arabs, Samaritans and Jews alike, having, in the emperor's opinion, nothing to do with religious belief.¹ But this was a religious rite, and Israel could make no compromise on the subject.

Chance determined that there should then be in Judæa certain men of indomitable energy, true mob-leaders, the priest Eleazar and the "prince of Israel" as he was termed on his coins, though in reality he was a prince of outlaws, Simon surnamed Bar-Kokheba or the "son of the stars," which were supposed to inspire him. There followed a war of three years,² a war of sieges like its predecessor sixty years before, and no less bloody, which made no change in the legal position, but exhausted the Jewish people's power of resistance. Thenceforward history tells only of acts of brigandage, no doubt connected to some extent with religion, but needing no more than police measures to bring them to an end. The Jews were forbidden to set foot in *Ælia Capitolina* on pain of death, and the province of Judæa, changing its title, became the province of Palestine.

But the policy of the Cæsars made no innovation affecting the conscience of the people. The Jews retained the right of establishing synagogues or meeting-places, of obeying their Elders and a leader whose character was purely religious. It is no longer believed, in spite of Mommsen,³ that Rome treated the vanquished as *dediticii*; in fact they became Roman citizens from the time of Caracalla,⁴ more than one

¹ CXLV, I, p. 264.

² CC, I, p. 670-704; J. Darmesteter, XXXIV, I (1880), p. 42-55; CXXVII, p. 215-221.

³ CLXIII, III, p. 418 *et seq.*

⁴ CXLV, II, p. 19 *et seq.*

of them from an earlier date. They were allowed to form local associations, within the limits prescribed by Roman legislation, just as the early Christians were; and further, Antoninus Pius cancelled the measures taken in regard to circumcision, which might be practised on children of Jewish birth. The Christian emperors, like the others, maintained the privileges of the Israelites, who in their eyes had kept the true faith until the coming of Christ.¹ In fact the imperial authority often intervened to protect this race from the universal hatred with which it was regarded by Greeks and Romans alike.

III

THE ROMAN ADMINISTRATION

From the time of Pompey until the establishment of the Principate, Roman administration in Syria did not bear the stamp of a regular and lasting *régime*. The governors were at first military leaders who had to establish a dominion, fix its boundaries, and prepare for or even begin wars against their new neighbours, Arabs or Parthians; besides, they were rather partisans than agents of Rome, so that it is possible to distinguish,² in this interval of less than forty years, one period when the influence of Pompey was predominant in Syria (with Scaurus, Gabinius, Licinius Crassus, Cassius Longinus, Bibulus, Metellus Scipio), another when the interests of Cæsar were promoted there (by his kinsman Sextus and Antistius Vetus), a third when the same Cassius came forward as champion of the threatened Republic, and, finally, a sort of monarchy of Mark Antony, who posted his lieutenants in Syria (Saxa, Ventidius, Sosius, Munatius Plancus).

After Actium, Octavian had to make certain regulations immediately in regard to these parts; then followed the division of the year 27, whereupon Syria became an imperial province,³ which it remained throughout. It was one of the most important provinces of the Roman world⁴ and it was

¹ CXLV, I, p. 226 *et seq.*

² CC, I, p. 304-316.

³ J. Dobias, *Histoire de la province romaine de Syrie*, I, Prague, 1925 (in Czech).

⁴ CLXII, XI, p. 2 *et seq.*

governed by some personages of the first rank,¹ such as Agrippa, Varus (destined to perish in Germany), Quirinius, who had to hunt brigands in Cilicia² and afterwards preside over the census of the Jews; Piso, whose memory is inseparable from that of the death of Germanicus; Quadratus, who retained his office for ten years; Corbulo, who conducted the war with Armenia; and some future emperors (Trajan, Hadrian, Pertinax) or candidates for the throne (Avidius Cassius and Pescennius Niger).

The legate of Syria had under his command³ four legions which, besides keeping watch on the frontiers, were also required to maintain order in the interior, where the spirit of insubordination was generally prevalent; at Antioch in particular a garrison was established. Rome thought it wise to avoid placing troops from other countries in these garrisons; the system of local recruitment, which was practised to some extent everywhere under the Antonines, seems to have been introduced much earlier in Syria. In Palestine Jewish *auxilia* were formed at once, and as early as Vespasian's reign, according to Tacitus,⁴ the soldiers of the legion *III Gallica*, a Syrian legion, hailed and saluted the rising sun. Though satisfactory in other provinces, the system proved to be a bad one here, for the natives were not inclined to obey discipline and were not encouraged to do so by the bad example of turbulent cities.⁵

From about the year 6 a new government was established in the south, and Judæa was placed under magistrates who were at first perhaps termed prefects and afterwards procurators.⁶ Whether they were completely autonomous or subject to the legates of Syria is still a disputed question⁷; if they were not actually subordinates, we cannot believe that their independence was absolute. They resided at Cæsarea, but must often have gone to Jerusalem. We have the complete, though short, list of these agents,⁸ who, though for the most part unimportant persons and not always very scrupulous, sometimes retained their post for many years.

¹ CC, I, p. 318-337; CXXI, p. 11-42.

² F. Bleskman, XXIII, XVII (1921), p. 104-110.

³ LXXXI, p. 72 *et seq.*

⁴ *Hist.*, III, 2.

⁵ CLXII, XI, p. 5.

⁶ CXXIX, p. 384 *et seq.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 406 *et seq.*

⁸ CC, I, p. 487, 565-585.

From Vespasian to Hadrian¹ only a few names have escaped oblivion, and yet, after the first insurrection, the governors of Judæa were legates, prætorian as a rule and consular in times of crisis, as for example was the Julius Severus who put an end to the rebellion under Hadrian.

The area of Syria often varied; as in Palestine, there were temporary additions to it, which were abandoned and then recovered again. Between the Euphrates and Cappadocia a mountain mass, the Nemrud-Dagh, formed as it were an isolated department,² where the sovereigns of Commagene, a Greek-speaking dynasty who called themselves Persians, though in fact they were half-breeds, stood fast for nearly two centuries. One of them, a certain Antiochus, caused a monument to be erected which admirably illustrates the composite nature of the dynasty and its subjects. Tiberius had laid hands on this territory—a harsh proceeding though politically well advised. Caligula renounced Commagene after it had been attached for twenty-one years to the Empire (17-38), but Vespasian reannexed it in 72, and this time the annexation was final.

The last of these Antiochuses, who had their capital at Samosata, possessed a part of Cilicia called *Trachea*. Cilicia *Campestris* then formed an integral part of the province of Syria, but certainly the position was changed by the beginning of the second century. We do not know when the change took place; it seems probable that Cilicia was united, not under Domitian or Trajan, as has been maintained, but from the time of Vespasian, and the foundation of Flaviopolis in Cilicia *Campestris* in 73 may have coincided with a general reorganization.³

Before the end of the first century the little kingdom of Chalcis, near Mount Lebanon, and the tetrarchy of Abilene, between Berytus and Damascus, had been annexed to Syria,⁴ and the dynasty of Emesa ceased to reign under Domitian.

¹ After Hadrian cf. S. Krauss, **XXXIV**, LXXX (1925), p. 113-130.

² **CXXXVIII**, p. 259 *et seq.*; **LXXXI**, p. 269 *et seq.*; Honigmann, **XLVII**, Suppl. IV, col. 978-990.

³ **CXXI**, p. 72-77.

⁴ **CC**, I, p. 707-725.

IV

ARABIA

The regions east of the Jordan and of Antilibanus were no less open to Greek influence, but, from the end of the Seleucid period at latest, that of the Arabs predominated there. An association of towns constituted the Decapolis, and it is so difficult to draw up the list that they must in reality have been more than ten in number. They were of Hellenic origin and in most cases numbered very few Jews among their populations; the most important of them were certainly Heliopolis, Philadelphia (Amman), Gerasa (Djerach) and Damascus.¹

The condition of this last town raises a further problem. Marquardt and Mommsen² assumed that it was a possession of the Arab kings of Petra until the foundation of the province of Arabia—from which it was excluded, strangely enough. More probably it was attached, with the other Greek cities, to Syria after the formation of that province, but under a system of municipal autonomy.³ Yet, in virtue of some imperial favour, it must at one time have belonged to the king of Arabia, for an ethnarch governed there in his name in the time of Saint Paul, and the series of Roman coins from Damascus is curiously interrupted between Tiberius and the year 64. The Empire often made friendly agreements with these sovereigns, the Aretases and the Malchi. In any case diverse elements of population lived side by side in this city; by way of exception, the Jews were very abundant there; Herod himself had presented it with a theatre and gymnasium.

These Nabatæan Arabs already resembled those of today, except that we find hardly any of them devoted to agriculture. Almost all nomads, they ravaged the fields of the Greek and Syrian peasants and held the caravans to ransom. They were practically uncapturable, since they lived with their flocks in veritable subterranean cities where it was impossible to

¹ Benzinger, **XLVII**, IV, col. 2042-2048; H. von Kiesling, *Damaskus*, Leipzig, 1909; C. Watzinger and K. Wulzinger, *Damaskus (Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen d. deutsch. türk. Denkmalschutzkommandos, IV)*, 1921-24.

² **CXLII**, p. 14.

³ Benzinger, *loc. cit.*, and **CC**, I, p. 734, 790. ⁴ **CC**, I, p. 726-744.

force an entrance, which in any case was difficult to find. King Agrippa (I or II) naïvely and vainly exhorted them to abandon this kind of existence.¹ The Haurân² suffered much from their depredations.

A considerable part of the trade of India and Arabia with the West followed the coasts of the Red Sea and, from the port of Leuce Come, was carried by road through Petra to Gaza.³ In order to protect the convoys, Trajan finally took possession of these lands, but there was resistance on the part of the Nabatæans, since this annexation was regarded as a conquest. It was carried out by the governor of Syria, A. Cornelius Palma, in 105,⁴ and soon a province of Arabia absorbed the realm of the Nabatæans of Arabia Petræa together with some towns of the ancient Decapolis, notably Philadelphia and Gerasa. The first known legate was governor in 111, but the annexation took place earlier, as is shown by the era of Bostra (22 March 106).⁵ This provincial era did not supersede the era of Pompey, or even the local eras, in some towns.

The frontiers of Arabia changed in the course of time. The eastern frontier, during the first period, can be traced by the milestones.⁶ Two great roads were in existence as early as Trajan's time: one, finished in 111, was carried in a straight line from the northern end of the Syrian coast to Bostra and Philadelphia, and thence, following the boundary of the province, to Petra and the Red Sea; the other, restored in 112 for military use, led by a *détour* from Philadelphia to Bostra by way of Gerasa and *Adraa* (Der'at). The frontier lay a little to the left of this road, between Gerasa and Adraa, leaving the Ajlun⁷ to Syria but the territory of Gilead to Arabia, as far north as the Jabbok. The northern frontier, not far from Bostra and Adraa, probably cut across the mountain mass of the Haurân where it rises to a height of about 1,800 metres, forming a sort of watershed, though

¹ An inscription of Canatha, **XLIV**, III, 1223.

² **CLXXXVII**.

³ Strabo, XVI, 4, 23, p. 780 C; *Peripl. mar. Erythr.*, 19; Plin., *Hist. nat.*, VI, 28, 144.

⁴ **LXXIII**, III, p. 249 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

⁶ P. Thomsen, *Die römischen Meilensteine der Provinzen Syria, Arabia und Palästina* [**XXXVIII**, XL (1917), p. 1-103].

⁷ Carl Steuernagel, *Der Adschlun*, Leipzig, 1925.

according to the evidence of epigraphy the springs were few and intermittent.¹ Finally, the south of the Haurân alone belonged to Arabia at first, but about the time of Septimius Severus some fragment of the northern part was attached to it as well.

In the south, Aila, at the end of the gulf which runs down the eastern side of the Sinaï triangle, belonged to the province; beyond that to the south-east any boundary would be arbitrary, and we do not know to which government the desert region south of Judæa belonged.

The Haurân (whose Greek name "Auranitis" was thus rendered by the Arabs) is even now covered with harvests at the end of spring, and people ignorant of all civilization can live there, thanks to the remains of that of the Romans. The ancient reservoirs, basins or cisterns, are still there to hold the water, and a number of houses, after more than fifteen centuries,² still provide precious shelter. Built of long grey volcanic stones, perfectly fitted together without mortar, they often have an upper storey, and are decorated with vine leaves and inscriptions; the roof is made of flat tiles; there is no woodwork, only stone. The artist who would paint scenes from the life of Christ and the Apostles may find there the elements of a faithful background for his pictures; the dwellings of the country would help him to place the great figures of the Gospel in their natural setting, and, to clothe them aright, he would be well advised to draw his inspiration from the costumes worn in the city of Palmyra, which will soon occupy our attention, with its sepulchral towers closely resembling the mausoleums of the Haurân.

Some Arabs, originally pagans worshipping a god whom they were led by Greek influence to name Dusares and assimilate to Dionysus (for the vine grew in these lands and Greek inscriptions have been discovered there), very soon embraced Christianity and were among the first to possess their monasteries. How far they admitted the ideas and usages of the West—although a system of organization in native villages was generally predominant—can be judged from the ruins of Bostra, the capital of the province, where

¹ LXXIII, III, p. 265 *et seq.*

² M. de Vogüé, *Syrie centrale, architecture civile et religieuse*, Paris, 1866-1877.

there remain not only fragments of the outer wall and a triumphal arch, but hot baths and some of the tiers of a very large theatre.¹ In the purely desert regions the only innovations made by the new masters were camps and fortresses: Dumer,² Daganiya near Maan, El-Ledjun, Kasr-Bcher, El-Kastal,³ Odruk in the neighbourhood of Akaba;⁴ these modern names of some of them still recall their ancient purpose (*legio, castra, castellum*).

As for Petra,⁵ the old capital of the Nabatæans, which had made such a magnificent resistance against the Greeks, it accepted a sort of protectorate of Rome some time before the formation of the province of Arabia had changed it from a royal capital to a town of secondary importance; the precise descriptions of Strabo and Pliny show the immediate effects of this earlier penetration. In this valley, which is today a desert, there was a magnificent theatre whose thirty-three tiers of seats can be counted by modern travellers; dating from the first century of our era, the façades of monumental tombs cut in the rock combine Palestinian and Hellenic (above all Corinthian) elements of a type that has been disseminated as far as the neighbourhood of Medina. Triumphal arches and temples of uncouth style but none the less imposing attest the prosperity of Petra, a place on the highway of commerce for several centuries. Later on, its position of capital was to be restored to it, when it was placed at the head of *Palæstina III* or *Salutaris*;⁶ but the advance of the independent Arabs ruined it, and caused the stream of traffic to follow quite different channels.

V

SECOND PERIOD IN THE HISTORY OF SYRIA

In 193 Syria had for legate C. Pescennius Niger, when Pertinax had just been assassinated and the prætorians had put the Empire up to auction. All the frontier legions showed

¹ LXXIII, III.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, II.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I.

⁵ L. de Laborde et Linant, Suppl. to the *Voyage en Syrie*, Paris, 1842; W. Bachmann, C. Watzinger, Th. Wilgand, *Petra* (*Wissensch. Veröffentl. d. d. türk. Denkm.*, III), 1921; see the plates of Alexander Kennedy, *Petra, its History and Monuments*, London, 1925.

⁶ CLXXXIX, p. 22-30.

their indignation; those of the East acclaimed Pescennius, the ruler of the most important province, without considering the lukewarmness of some neighbouring governors.¹ But when their champion was overcome, the victor, Septimius Severus, judged that the province of Syria was too large, giving too much power and temptation to its governors, and divided it, no doubt from the year 194,² into *Syria Cœle* (Hollow Syria) and *Syria Phœnice*, the former with two legions, the latter with only one. Hollow Syria, the more northern part, did not only or entirely include the valley of the Orontes; it is very difficult to trace its boundaries.³ The southern part seems to have been the larger, extending as far as Laodicea and Apamea in one direction and the region of Damascus in the other;⁴ but it was the further removed from the Euphrates and the Parthians. It included in particular the famous Palmyra.⁵

Today a motor-car will travel there from Damascus in a few hours, but quite recently the journey involved a long expedition, not without risks. Nevertheless the caravans had not ceased to pass through Palmyra.

It first appears in history when the Romans begin to take an interest in it, and its wealth had already tempted Mark Antony, who penetrated as far as the town in order to plunder it. We must not suppose that it was as isolated from the coastal regions as its ruins are now, or that it had no communication with Damascus save by a mere desert track barely indicated by a few watering-places; but it was certainly remote and distinct from the Syrian world, a fact which accounts for its special position of semi-independence. Islam with its practice of deforestation has made the desert round about it complete. It was a vassal republic organized like a Greek city-state and divided into tribes, one of which took the name of the emperor Claudius; it had a popular assembly, a council of elders, archons, decaproti and syndics; and among the population, which was motley enough, there were Syrians, Arabs, Greeks, Jews and even Persians—if we may judge from the formation of their names. It was a

¹ **CXXI**, p. 78-86.

² *Ibid.*, p. 87-90. For the known governors see *ibid.*, p. 53-64.

³ **LXXXIII**, III, p. 249 *et seq.*

⁴ Ulpien, *Dig.*, L, 15, 1.

⁵ **LXXX**, p. 14-20; cf. **XV**, 1925, p. 277.

trilingual town where the Empire tolerated official usage of the local Aramæan dialect, while the higher classes knew Greek and even Latin, which was useful in their dealings with the Roman authorities; this is proved by epigraphy, for very few inscriptions are drawn up in one language only.

From the point of view of the westerners, Palmyra was a great oasis in a very poor environment, but the natives had little fear of the steppes that surrounded them. According to Appian,¹ when Antony wished to plunder them he found only an empty city; the inhabitants had carried their goods across the Euphrates and were ready to defend themselves on the left bank. Thus they already held the line of the river, and recent excavations at *Dura-Europus* (Salihiyeh),² about 150 Roman miles distant from Palmyra, have yielded important presumptive evidence of the same colour. Hence it was an exceptional strategic position under the Republic: in the endless disputes between Romans and Parthians Palmyra might remain neutral (and Antony made this neutrality his pretext), or lend its aid to one of the two adversaries. As a matter of fact, its interest inclined it towards the Romans, masters of the Syrian territories which were nearest to it and most easy of access, provided that it was exempted from too rigid subjection. Rome cannot have forbidden it to maintain any armed forces of its own.³

Trajan's victorious campaign in Mesopotamia strengthened the bond between Rome and Palmyra; finally reassured by the general policy of Hadrian, the town thenceforward called itself *Hadriana Palmyra*, while in the third century it became a Roman colony. Its peculiar character was hardly altered: the great colonnade⁴ which traversed it from end to end was certainly influenced by Græco-Roman style, but did not cease to be Asiatic in type; the corbels attached to the shafts of columns for statues or busts owed nothing to classical decoration. The great temple⁵ combined the methods of Roman architecture, which its position explains, with a style of ornamentation attesting its dedication to a sun god. The sepulchral towers, family mausoleums, have inspired others,

¹ *Bell. civ.*, V, 19.

² F. Cumont, **XXXVII**, III (1922), p. 206 *et seq.*

³ **CLXII**, X, p. 271.

⁴ **LXXX**, pl. VIII.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pl. I-IV.

but were themselves original. Yet the funeral portraits,¹ which reproduce with so much realism the Semitic type of features and reveal an ostentatious and heavy form of jewelry, include men wearing togas; these natives, however, were Roman citizens for, if not the most beautiful, at any rate the majority of works in alto-relievo that have been preserved are later than Caracalla; they date from Palmyra's apogee in the third century.

The town had not ceased to prosper under Rome's protectorate; it was the headquarters of those caravan-owners who carried the trade from the banks of the Euphrates. The local treasury derived large revenues from the customs, which were doubtless independent, though authorized by the superior authority. A long inscription² dating from the reign of Hadrian has preserved for us their scale of dues.

It is well known that circumstances gave Palmyra in the middle of the third century a position out of all proportion to that which she had held hitherto. The monarchical tendencies which always prevailed in the Asiatic Orient had led to the appointment, at any rate in this period, of a sort of supreme ruler, above the municipal officials, who was a Roman senator and was termed in the inscriptions exarch or prince. One dignitary thus entitled, namely Hairanes, rendered remarkable services to Septimius Severus in his war against the Parthians. When Valerian was taken captive (260), the son of Hairanes, Septimius Odenathus, did good service by harassing the Persian troops who returned from Antioch making war on their own account. Gallienus, not yet made emperor, hurried to the point of greatest danger and responded to the advances of Odenathus³ who took the title of king, leaving the administration of the city to another notable, at once imperial procurator and royal official. Meanwhile this new sovereign, not content with seeing the Persians repulsed, opposed the Goths in Cappadocia and twice advanced some way into Iranian territory in order to attack the Sassanids; he had done nothing to break his apparent allegiance when, in circumstances which remain for us a

¹ D. Simonsen, *Sculptures de Palmyre à la Glyptothèque Ny-Carlsberg*, Copenhagen, 1889.

² XLIV, III, 1056; LXXX, p. 23-38.

³ Homo, XXXV, CXIII (1913), p. 235-248.

mystery, he was assassinated together with one of his sons.

The other, born of his second wife, Zenobia, was proclaimed king; she herself taking the title of queen and ruling in place of this Vaballathus, who was a child. We shall not attempt to retell here¹ the brilliant epic story of this six years' reign (267-273), the occupation of Egypt by the men of Palmyra, the establishment of their garrisons in Asia Minor as far as the gates of Byzantium. It was a sort of vigorous reaction of the Arab and Aramæan world, provoked by the disorder of the times and facilitated by the mandate which the Empire in its direst need had intrusted to the prince of Palmyra; the Roman officers on the spot had no very sure ground on which to oppose it. When Aurelian, in order to restore unity, broke with Vaballathus,² who was immediately proclaimed emperor by his supporters, the Roman troops in Syria did not all take the same side: the legions triumphed over the nomad squadrons, whose raids had been successful so long as the central authority abstained from taking action. The Syrian population of the coastal region were by no means inclined to separatism and did not oppose the ruin of Palmyra, which became a mere village, no longer frequented by the caravans.

Rome had clearly perceived where the danger lay: already, before these events, the legion *X Fretensis* had been transferred from Jerusalem to Aila; later, *III Gallica* was posted between Damascus and Palmyra, and *IV Scythica* in the immediate neighbourhood of the latter town, which, though ruined as a city, served as a camp for a supplementary legion stationed there by Diocletian.³

Nothing is more uncertain than the origin and delimitation of the smaller fourth century provinces in these lands.⁴ We have no information to speak of concerning the part which the provincial assemblies played in them: there is no evidence that such an assembly existed in Arabia, and only a few coins refer to the *koina* of Syria and Phœnicia.

The policy of recognizing Arab chiefs⁵ as vassals of the Empire was not abandoned after the fall of Zenobia. From

¹ Cf. *CLXII*, X, p. 290 *et seq.*; Homo, *De Claudio Gothico*, p. 60-68.

² *CXXXV*, p. 84-115.

³ *LXXXI*, p. 88.

⁴ *LXXIII*, III, p. 260, 271 and *passim*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 285; C.

various sources we know of several phylarchs called Imr al-Quais, who in the fourth century supplied the Romans with cavalry, and of a "queen of the Saracens," Mawiya, whose allegiance showed signs of wavering. At the end of the fifth and beginning of the sixth centuries, the relations between these Saracens and the Empire produced a whole series of embassies and negotiations. Finally Justinian had to approve the formation of a Romano-Arabic State to balance the Perso-Arabic State of Hira. Precarious services were obtained from it involving subsidies which the Treasury sometimes found a difficulty in paying. The Arab danger in Syria was one of the great anxieties of Byzantium.¹

VI

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS²

Since they have been administered by European powers in virtue of a mandate from the League of Nations, the census of Syria and Palestine has been taken afresh. The result is meagre: three millions of inhabitants, three capital cities (Damascus, Aleppo, Beyrout), and a certain number of medium-sized towns. There is no doubt that the numbers were very much larger in the Roman period. Islam has displayed in this happy land its indolence, its fatalistic acceptance of decay, its disregard of hygiene, its opposition to material progress. Moreover, many products of distant lands have changed their route and are now carried by sea. Syria today is less important than she used to be as a thoroughfare of trade; the tariff of Palmyra includes a number of articles that are no longer carried even along the coasts. Also the local products have diminished; the area of exploitation has been narrowed, especially in the north; round about Aleppo, an artificial centre owing its origin to that need for security which induces men to herd together, there is now everywhere desert land, and the right bank of the Orontes has been almost abandoned.

Antiquity allows us glimpses of quite a different picture.³

¹ LXXXI, p. 30-35.

² LXXXIII, p. 36-65; CXC *bis*, p. 242-253.

³ CLXII, XI, p. 26 *et seq.*

Where the wretched encampments of the tent-dwellers are now scattered, sheltering them, perhaps for a few hours, under a rag of coarse canvas, the traveller who ventures with a good escort sees numbers of cisterns and reservoirs cut in the rock, which the Ottoman Empire had not even the wisdom to keep in repair, and passes over the ruins of veritable cities representing a methodical conquest of the desert begun perhaps in the days of the Principate, though doubtless interrupted by wars, and in any case renewed between the fourth and sixth centuries, to which period belong delicately ornamented buildings, houses, convents, churches, revealing the very large part played by Syria in the development of oriental Christian art.¹ The dwellers in the Haurân did not content themselves in the Roman period with supplies of rain water stored in cisterns; aqueducts took the water from distant springs and brought it to the parched land.

Native products² have been no less diminished in variety and abundance. Corn grows thickly wherever it is sown, fruit trees and the market gardener's produce are constantly blessed by a fertilizing sun; the vine, reintroduced at a late date by Christian missions and foreign colonies, has taken root again in a soil that is among the best suited to it, whose produce in ancient times was as widely distributed in Persia as in Italy. The sheep which requires little attention is almost the only animal bred; what are the few buffaloes of the plain of Antioch in comparison with the famous stalls of oxen which, together with the royal stud, made the reputation of Apamea? The Syrians of antiquity were an industrial people working wool and linen, and sending to every market cloth valued for its delicacy, whose reputation was made by the Edict of Diocletian concerning the maximum price. We shall not be surprised at the disappearance of the purple dye-works; the Phœnician glass-manufacture is only a memory, in spite of the fact that the process of glass-blowing was perhaps discovered at Sidon; but it is true that the decline began as early as the fourth century.³ Syria had valuable building materials—basalt, limestone and the marbles

¹ H. Crosby Butler, *American Archaeological Expedition to Syria in 1899-1900 (II, Architecture and other Arts)*, New York, 1903; *Exploration to Syria 1904-1909*, Leyden, 1915 *et seq.*; Honigmann, **XXXVIII**, **XLVI** (1923), p. 149-192; **XLVII** (1924), p. 1-64.

² **LXXI**, chap. VII.

³ **XLIII**, art. *Vitrum*, p. 937, 938, 944.

of Sidon. The constructive activity of the ancients, road paving in the water-side districts, had promoted the exploitation of the quarries: those of Enesh, on the banks of the Euphrates,¹ still reveal the methods adopted, with the usual assistance of military labour. Today the European makes most use of these materials: the native would content himself with the primitive layer of pisé. Finally, the abundance of timber, an object of envy, supplied excellent material for shipbuilding; but the forest trees have disappeared both from Lebanon and from Commagene; trees of large growth are now only to be found in the well watered districts, such as the lower valley of the Orontes, or occasionally on the banks of the Euphrates.

Study of the past reveals the possibilities which Syria still offers under a more enlightened protectorate. The aptitude of the race, at any rate for commerce, induced the Syrians to leave their country and migrate wherever great enterprises could be set on foot.² Romans of the old stock bore witness to this veritable invasion by affecting indignation at it.

VII

ARMENIA AND MESOPOTAMIA.—THE FRONTIER OF THE EUPHRATES

The determination of the Empire's boundaries at its eastern extremity was involved in difficulties that were not encountered elsewhere. No natural barrier, river or mountain range, could be used throughout. Between the northern part of Syria and the Caucasus there is first of all, in the south, the vast plain of Mesopotamia with its gentle undulations stretching as far as the Persian gulf; further north rises the enormous mountain mass of Armenia, composed of several plateaux of 1,000 to 2,000 metres in height, cleft by deep defiles in which the rivers wind, and sometimes culminating in great volcanic crests, one of which, the Great Ararat, today the common frontier of three nations, reaches a height of more than 5,000 metres. The general direction of the plateaux is from west to east, so that this Taurus

¹ XCII, p. 151 *et seq.*

² CLXII, XI, p. 31; LXXXIII, p. 54 *et seq.*, and 253.

mass which constitutes a serious barrier between the north and the south provides only an indifferent one between Asia Minor and Persia. This explains the Iranian influence on Armenia, its language, usages and national customs; moreover, this influence was exercised at once through Media and Cappadocia, long before Greece and Rome had had time to make theirs felt. At first sight the great curve of the Euphrates, which flows between deep banks, would seem to provide a very suitable boundary from Sura to beyond Melitene, and modern historians have spontaneously adopted this expression: "the frontier of the Euphrates." But, except in its middle portion, the river on the contrary assisted invasion in two ways: near its source, by the two streams which unite to give it birth, one of them being practically a continuation of the Araxes; near its mouth, by its value as guide and water-carrier¹ across the immense and desolate steppes. Thanks to the Euphrates and the Tigris, Mesopotamia was itself no less of a thoroughfare than the rivers, and there was nothing in it to suggest where the frontier might be drawn between two States, both extensive in area and strongly armed.

Another volume of this series² has dealt fully with the Parthians, the successors of Alexander in Iran after the inevitable retreat of the Seleucids, the "Turks of antiquity," as they have been called,³ tolerant countryfolk, naturally inclined to liberalism, among whom Macedonian Hellenism long preserved its fading existence.⁴ Though little inclined to aggression, they were too often attacked and too slow to forget the recent domination of foreigners to refrain from taking the offensive themselves, if only as a means of defence; and small preparations sufficed for these archers, intrepid horsemen who rode to battle as if they were riding to the chase.

Still it was only immediate contact with them that made them hostile. Before reaching the upper Euphrates, Rome had to finish the war with Mithridates. We have noted the exploits of his son-in-law, Tigranes II, king of Armenia.

¹ So the Romans made a god of it: **XCII**, p. 247 *et seq.*

² C. Huart, *Ancient Persia and the Iranian Civilization*.

³ **CLXXXI**, p. 25 and 245.

⁴ See my *Destinées de l'Hellénisme au delà de l'Euphrate*, **XXVII**, LXIII (1904), p. 207-296.

He also termed himself "king of kings" and could not fail to bear a grudge against the Parthian sovereign, who was not sorry to see the Romans come to blows with him. King Phraates made a treaty of alliance with Pompey, who could thus compel Tigranes to make peace, get rid of Mithridates, and make himself master of Syria.¹

This was a sufficient annexation for the moment. Both parties agreed to accept the Euphrates as frontier, and Mesopotamia was left to the Arsacids. Nevertheless Rome was preparing the way for future conquests by imposing her protectorate on the princes of Edessa, and pushing southward the frontiers of Armenia, now reduced to the condition of a vassal State. The Parthian king showed his opposition immediately by declaring war on the Armenians; Crassus, governor of Syria, at once intervened in Mesopotamia and was defeated at Carrhæ (53); but his lieutenant Cassius stopped the enemy on the borders of Syria, and the general position was not altered.²

In the following period the interests of Rome gave place to those of rival generals and their partisans. Relations with the Arsacid power assumed another aspect: in the course of the civil wars some Roman generals did not disdain help from Parthia; Pompey refused it, judging it to be an encumbrance; but Parthians fought against Cæsar's legate in Syria, and Cassius was supplied with Iranian cavalry which took part, though ineffectively, in the battle of Philippi.³

When the opposite side had triumphed, a Roman exile, Labienus, took the place at the Parthian court which certain banished Greeks had occupied at the court of Susa. King Orodes clearly foresaw that he would be called to account; he took the initiative, and his son Pacorus invaded Syria, which Antony, enslaved by Cleopatra, had neglected; fortunately Ventidius Bassus drove the enemy back across the Euphrates and enabled Antony to form the plans which we have described elsewhere.⁴

His operations failed, but they left feelings of rancour and resentment which were to be the germs of new wars. Augustus could not refrain from intervention. At first he contented himself with establishing princes devoted to Rome

¹ See above, p. 28.

² **LIII**, p. 54 *et seq.*

³ **CLXII**, X, p. 179.

⁴ See above. p. 39.

on the throne of Armenia. Such action was an outrage on national sentiment, privately enflamed by the Parthians, and the princes were dethroned. Tiberius did not insist on their acceptance but, in order to make the Empire more secure in the East, he abolished certain vassal principalities and extended the direct rule of Rome as far as the Euphrates.¹

Then followed a barren period of monotonous repetitions;² Armenia continued to be an apple of discord. Rome claimed suzerainty over it; the Parthians replied that the country wished to be Parthian. A series of intrigues developed about the Taurus region: personal rivalry between oriental princes, between Roman generals, between Asiatic peoples, among whom Italian gold was sowing discord. After the two campaigns of Corbulo³ many policies might have been adopted, but Rome chose the one that had at first been rejected: the king of Armenia should be a cadet of the Parthian royal family and should receive his investiture from the Roman emperor. Above all, Nero claimed the right to defend at his discretion the defiles of the Caucasus, and as a matter of fact a Roman garrison was encamped, under Vespasian, at the fortress of Harmozica in Iberia, near the modern Tiflis.⁴ The Parthians had no cause to be disturbed by it, and peace reigned between them and Rome during the whole period of the Flavian dynasty.

We have spoken of Trajan's ambitions, to which he gave full rein on the first occasion for complaint, and of his conquests, which his successor was wise enough to renounce.⁵ Even theoretical suzerainty over Armenia alone had failed, under Hadrian and Antoninus, to rekindle the fires of discord, but it was the sole motive of a Parthian aggression in the first year of Marcus Aurelius. The legions of Cappadocia, composed of lazy orientals, allowed themselves to be beaten immediately after the Euphrates had been crossed; but when some western troops came to the rescue, the Armenian capital, which the writers call Artaxata, though on one coin⁶ it is given, together with the title of metropolis, the name of Artaxisata, was taken by storm and destroyed, and a former

¹ See above, p. 54.

³ See above, p. 56 *et seq.*

⁵ See above, p. 61 and 63.

⁶ Ern. Babelon, *XV*, 1911, p. 363-374.

² *LIII*, p. 81 *et seq.*; 85 *et seq.*

⁴ *XLI*, *III*, ad n. 6052.

Arsacid who had become a Roman subject and a senator was placed on the throne.

It will be remembered¹ that success in Mesopotamia was no less rapid, that Rome retained suzerainty over the princes of Osrhoene, and that the struggle for the Empire led Septimius Severus to annex the whole region as far as the river *Aborras* (Khabur), including Singara close to one of its affluents. Half of Trajan's province was recovered, with Nisibis for capital.² But Severus only retained the part of Armenia west of Lake Van, and we do not know whether he maintained the garrison which is found in the time of Commodus at Cænopolis,³ near Artaxisata and the modern Etschmiadzin.

Was this arrangement made to insure peace? It had been hard to keep peace with the Parthians, but it seemed impossible to preserve it when the Persian Sassanids became masters of Iran, for that fanatical race was far prouder, besides being hostile to Hellenism and everything occidental. Evidence discovered on the spot by travelling archæologists points to the conclusion that in the first centuries the works of fortification on the upper and middle Euphrates were quite inconsiderable. The camps of Melitene and Satala, one on the bank of the river and the other close by it, commanded certain cross-roads and were strongly garrisoned, but their garrisons were more often borrowed for operations elsewhere. It was after the coming of the Ardeshir dynasty that reliance was no longer placed on the lofty mountain chain to the north or the steep banks of the Euphrates, and before the reign of Justinian it was necessary to raise and strengthen the walls of Satala, Melitene, Sura, Nicephorium and Circesium—to mention only the principal fortresses among those enumerated by Procopius.⁴

Mesopotamia now becomes the theatre of almost continuous hostilities. It would be dull and tedious to describe in detail all the operations of the third century: a costly and indecisive war under Alexander Severus; wars under Maximin and Gordian; an undetermined or at least very little known situation during the time of Palmyra's expansion. In any case the frontier of Septimius Severus was re-established at the death of Carus, thanks above all to the internal troubles

¹ See above, p. 67.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 373; **XLI**, III, 6052.

² **CXCII**, p. 392.

⁴ **LXXXI**, p. 269-297, 347-355.

with which the Persian Empire too was afflicted. It was so far enfeebled by them that Galerius won a great victory, after which Diocletian, wise in his moderation, contented himself with making a few changes in southern Armenia.¹ The great interest of the operation was that it rendered possible the occupation and fortification of a dominant position on the banks of the Tigris at *Amida* (Diarbekir).

The Roman Empire thus established a threatening salient in the Sassanid territory, but we know that everything was unsettled again after 363: from the Khabur the frontier followed the shortest line to the Nymphius, a small affluent of the Tigris, and beyond that, in virtue of a later agreement (about 387), it was extended almost in a straight line to the mouth of the *Acampsis* (Choruk), on the Euxine Sea. Rome abandoned Nisibis but retained Amida, which was more useful, finally accepting the frontier of Severus with hardly any alteration, though it was slightly adjusted on both sides of the Tigris, to the detriment of Rome in the south, to her advantage on the left bank. This was the best frontier obtainable: it lasted more than two centuries, for it kept the balance between the two Empires. The fact had at last been recognized that the lower Euphrates was no better able than the Tigris to provide a good frontier; both alike had merely served as highways for invasion.² Rome supplied the important "Mesopotamian parallelogram"³ with a close network of roads, but no road crossed the mountain mass of the Taurus except from west to east.

Thus all our information concerning these territories so long in dispute is limited to a few wearisome details of warfare. Of the local life we know nothing before the complete triumph of Christianity, which lies outside our limits.

¹ See above, p. 72.

² LXXXI, p. 377 *et seq.*

³ K. Regling, XXIII, I (1902), p. 443-476.

CHAPTER VIII

EGYPT

THERE is a great temptation to devote many pages to this country in view of the multitude of documents that has been reaching us in a constant stream during the last third of a century. But the vast extent of the subject forbids us to think of giving more than a sort of synopsis or summary, which will not be in too violent contrast with the perspective of our general view of the Empire. After all, many of the institutions of Roman Egypt were merely borrowed from those of the Ptolemies, which have already been described in another volume.¹

I

HISTORICAL OUTLINE

We have already noted² the preliminary stages of annexation; though it was delayed by the civil wars,³ the way was prepared for it, without direct government, by a military occupation confined to the Delta, as was sufficient. Octavian himself did not venture beyond it: as heir to the authority of its kings, he was master of the country, and the province was in fact constituted (30).

The first governor, Cornelius Gallus, had to repress two revolts, one in the north, the other in the south. The native inertness of the inhabitants did not exclude an instinct to resist the foreigner. The Roman general easily triumphed; he caused statues of himself to be set up; inscriptions in his honour were cut on the pyramids, and a trilingual monument records that he advanced as far as the island of Philæ,⁴ where he received envoys from the Ethiopians. An agreement made with them placed their country under Rome's pro-

¹ P. Jouguet, *L'Impérialisme macédonien et l'Hellénisation de l'Orient*.

² P. 35 and 40.

³ LV.

⁴ Maspero, **XV**, 1896, p. 110 *et seq.*; **XLIV**, I, 1293.

tectorate, without armed intervention, and fixed the frontier at the first cataract.

Indeed Rome's command of the Nile valley was so rapidly obtained that Augustus was able to organize the economic mission to the Arabs of which we have spoken elsewhere.¹ It was perceived on that occasion that the only menace to Egypt came from her neighbours in the south. Taking advantage of the expedition to Arabia, the Ethiopians, who were supposed to be bound by a treaty, made several raids and even carried off some of the inhabitants. The governor, C. Petronius, deprived them of their plunder, took some of them captive and, before withdrawing, left a garrison of 400 men in the fortress of Premis. The Ethiopians were anxious to shake off this yoke, but the dispute was settled by negotiation: they had to abandon part of their territory, Lower Ethiopia, which was attached to Egypt for nearly three centuries. Nero had more extensive ambitions, but events in the Delta prevented him from realizing them.

The Egyptian population gave no more sign of direct opposition to the Empire, especially after the prohibition to carry arms, followed by a general search, had paralyzed in advance any desire for rebellion. But what could not be attempted against the Roman army involved less danger where an important but unarmed element in the population was concerned—namely the Jews.² As early as the reign of Caligula a violent anti-Semitic movement began in Alexandria. Claudius was at pains to check it,³ for Rome traditionally favoured the Israelites, and we have already referred to their privileges.⁴ The other elements of the population were jealous of them, and this jealousy was mingled with contempt. In order to find a pretext, the other citizens of Alexandria affected a loyalty which felt itself outraged by the refusal of the Jews to take part in the imperial cult. The complicity of a prefect enflamed their passions, and the troubles continued until another governor, under Claudius, took the opposite side and had the instigators of the anti-Semitic movement put to death.

A violent disturbance, worse than the last, occurred in

¹ See above, p. 48.

² **CIX** ; **XXXIV**, **LXXIX** (1924), p. 113-144.

³ **LVII** ; P. Jouguet, **XX**, 1925, p. 5-21. ⁴ See above, p. 220.

66.¹ The Greeks were assembled in the amphitheatre to elect an embassy which they desired to send to Nero. It was observed that some Jews had made their way into the assembly, and an attack was made upon them. The governor at that time, T. Julius Alexander,² was himself a Jew, but had abjured the Hebrew religion. Nevertheless they counted on his neutrality at least, and the whole community rose, stoned the anti-Semites and tried to set fire to the amphitheatre. Alexander ordered his troops to intervene; the Jewish quarter was sacked and set on fire, and fighting continued there even after the soldiers had left it.

At last the Jews seemed to have been overcome. Perhaps they realized their own weakness. The destruction of Jerusalem shortly afterwards would surely complete the ruin of their hopes. In reality their resentment lay smouldering under the ashes, and at the end of half a century it broke into flame (115), not at first in Judæa, but once more in Egypt, where the leaders of the movement in Palestine had been executed, and also in Cyprus and Cyrenaica. In these two regions, owing to the absence of a garrison, the insurgents had it all their own way; many thousands of Greeks and Italians were killed by their tortures. In the country of the Nile they expected the same success, for this time not only was the emperor occupied in a distant war against the Parthians, but the revolt had broken out almost everywhere, in the villages and in the open country as far as the Thebaid. At Alexandria itself it failed—the legions were too near—and the killing was done by the Greeks. Everywhere else its repression was slow and difficult; the many centres of disturbance had to be dealt with by a number of very mobile detachments. The district commanders were not equal to the task, and here and there they recruited a militia of fellahs, who showed themselves supremely indifferent. Regular troops had to be brought from a distance and these overpowered the enemy after a long guerilla war.³

It is hard to explain why the final revolt of Judæa in Hadrian's reign, which was repressed with pitiless rigour, should have had its counterpart—though an unimportant one—in Egypt (136-137). It only proves the unquenchable

¹ **CLII**, p. 21.

² Stein, **XLVII**, X, col. 153-157.

³ **CLII**, p. 24.

ardour of this race, which was a source of the gravest anxiety to the central authority.

The Greeks, who were privileged in every province of the East, had no ground for discontent. Among the natives there were a few occasional upheavals. The first, which took place under Antoninus and is little known to us, was due to those *ξένοι* who, in order to escape paying taxes on their real and personal estate, fled from their native villages, their *ἰδία*, and went to live temporarily in some other place, where they were badly received and adopted more or less the profession of brigands.¹ At the end of the second century a real national rebellion, though limited in extent, was made against the governor, under the leadership of a priest, by the nomad shepherds who frequented the marshy districts east of Alexandria.² The moment seemed propitious, since one of the legions had been sent to the Danube frontier. The legate of Syria, Avidius Cassius, hurried forces to the spot, saved the capital, and gained many partisans there who afterwards supported his ambitions. In 215³ the *ξένοι* appear once more upon the scene, this time with the connivance of the Alexandrians, which in the present state of our sources cannot be explained. Caracalla, who was present in person, acted with the cruel energy we should expect of him: after killing the insurgents and their families, he established in the city itself the troops which had hitherto been encamped in the neighbourhood of Alexandria.

This precaution did not prevent disorders due to the general incapacity of the Principate towards its decline. The Blemmyes, those Ethiopians of the North, who had made no movement since the time of Augustus, crossed the frontier *en masse* and made themselves masters of the Thebaid in about the year 262. Soon afterwards the operations of the rulers of Palmyra against the Delta inspired the Alexandrians with a wish for independence; perhaps they felt themselves more capable of thwarting the foreigners' ambition than the Roman government, which seemed sunk in anarchy; yet it was Rome's representative, the prefect Æmilianus, whom they proclaimed emperor of Egypt. An emissary of Gallienus restored the unity of the Empire in Egypt (263), but at a heavy cost. The second city of the

¹ CLII, p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Roman world presented a sorry spectacle after the fighting in her streets; many of her houses were destroyed, and the number of her inhabitants was greatly diminished.

Yet Rome was not really mistress of the town until the power of Palmyra had been overthrown. After being reconquered by Aurelian, Alexandria revolted again under a confederate of Zenobia called Firmus; but when the famous queen died, the great capital of Egypt surrendered, and the quarter inhabited by the rebels suffered further devastation. We know little of the causes and development of the revolt which lasted several years in Diocletian's reign, but it may have been inspired by the bitter rancour which these terrible reprisals left behind them. After Busiris in the Delta and Coptos in Upper Egypt had been destroyed, in order to punish the citizens and natives who had simultaneously revolted, it was still necessary to recover Alexandria by force; and such was the desolation of the province after these events that the emperor had to set a limit to the exportation of corn.

Elsewhere and at the same time other dangers came to a head: in the south the Blemmyes, in the west the nomads of the Libyan desert compelled Probus to undertake exhausting campaigns. Diocletian himself could only dispose of the former enemy by setting the Nubians against them, those *Nubæ* or *Nobades* who were numbered among the many barbarians on its frontiers to which the enfeebled Empire had to pay tribute (297).

II

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS¹

An old division of the country distinguished the valley of the Nile (ἡ ἄνω χώρα) from Lower Egypt (ἡ κάτω χώρα or τὸ Δέλτα). The Romans did not long retain this without alteration: at an uncertain date, probably under Vespasian, they interposed between these two a third division called Heptanomis because it comprised, at least originally, seven of the districts called nomes; other nomes were added to it later, but the old name survived although it no longer cor-

¹ CXXXI, Part I.


responded to the facts. These three divisions formed *epi-strategiæ*, so called after the high official—a creation of the Lagids, though there was only one under those kings—who was subsequently placed in charge of each of them.

Within these larger areas Rome retained the subdivision of the land into *nomes*, districts that were all designated by an adjective formed from the name of their principal centre of population. Their number would vary, for account would be taken of the total area of the province and the movements of the people, as well as of the different rates of progress in different parts of the country. The documents enable us to recover the names of about twenty-four *nomes*, but some of these may have changed their name in the course of time; Ptolemy only mentions forty-seven in the second century. The capital of each *nome*, its most populous centre, was called the “metropolis” and had no other privilege than that of being the usual residence of certain officials. The very large *nome* of Arsinoë¹ in the Fayyum, which was of great economic importance, was further divided into three *parts*, *μερίδες*; no other *nome* had more than one *strategus*. They were not all of the same size, however, for each one was divided into *τόποι*, *toparchies*, generally two in number—the upper and the lower (ἡ ἄνω, ἡ κάτω), sometimes three, with an intermediate area (ἡ μέση), sometimes even more, as for example in the *nome* of Arsinoë.

Finally the land was divided between various centres of population of which it contained an immense number—30,000 according to Diodorus,² who visited Egypt in 60 B.C. At any rate, in the time of the historian Josephus, seven and a half millions of people paid the poll-tax, from which Greeks and Romans were exempt, so that there must have been a total of eight to nine million inhabitants in a comparatively restricted area—a swarming mass distributed among a host of petty boroughs of a few hundred souls, comparable to the modern villages of the fellahs, though such density of population is not found in Egypt today.

As regards towns, there were very few of them in the Roman period, if by town we mean a city (πόλις) with the administrative machinery that makes it a State in miniature. This was the only country in which the Romans had no

¹ V. Martin, *V*, VI (1913), p. 137-175. ² Diod. Sic., I, 31, 7.



MAP VI.—ROMAN EGYPT.

desire to develop, or even shrank from developing, "municipal life." Quite a different system had insured the prosperity of the country under the Pharaohs; the Lagids had remained faithful to it; Rome imitated them and maintained without addition the three existing πόλεις—Alexandria, Ptolemais, Naucratis—until the day when Hadrian, to honour his favourite drowned in the Nile, founded in 130, near the place where the youth had disappeared, the city of Antinoe or Antinoopolis.

All other places were regarded by law as mere villages¹ (κῶμαι), having neither juridical personality nor communal property before the third century, administrative entities based solely upon the obligatory bond established by law between all persons born in the same place. Moreover, attempts were made to preserve a certain equilibrium between the rural populations of the various κῶμαι by transferring, if necessary, the peasants of one κώμη to another.² As for the μητροπόλεις, we must not be misled by the second half of their name; the word κωμόπολις, which Strabo uses, shows their insignificance. The termination was generally added to the name of some deity as a title of distinction (Crocodilopolis, Hermupolis, Nilopolis). Yet the metropolis of the nome occupied a position which was in fact much more prominent than that of the other villages. Apart from its superior population, which involved a division into quarters³ (ἄμφοδα, with amphodarchs), it possessed, in default of deliberative assemblies, certain local magistrates, and some branches of the imperial service had their offices in it.

The boundaries of Roman Egypt can only be determined approximately. On the Asiatic side it ended in the neighbourhood of Rhinocolura (El-Arish). In the west it comprised also, more in name than in fact, the nomes of Libya and Marmarica, whose population must have been sparse and loosely attached to the soil; neither of them shared in the benefits of the inundation. Like these, the desert oases were mere annexes; the Roman dominion extended, as the Greek had done, to the Arabian quarries east of the Nile and the ports scattered along the African shore of the Red Sea:

¹ CXL, p. 91 *et seq.*, 208 *et seq.*

² CXC, p. 212.

³ See for an example Hermann Rink, *Strassen und Viertelnamen von Oxyrhynchus*, Diss. Giessen, 1924.

Arsinoe, Myos Hormos, the White Harbour (Λευκὸς λιμήν), Berenike. In the south the boundary line was all the more uncertain because there was never an Egyptian *limes*. Could this frontier zone with its network of roads and post-houses be limited to the area of cultivation, so restricted in the region of the cataracts? Or, if it extended further, where could it end?

We have seen that the Romans were at first content with a protectorate over the part of Nubia adjoining their frontier of the Thebaid, but that the movements of the natives compelled them to adopt another policy. They therefore annexed the region called "12-mile-land" (Δωδεκάσχοινος, 120 stades), from Syene to Hiera Sycaminos (Maharrakah). For a short time, at the end of the second century, even Premis (Ibrim) was occupied; some way up into ancient Nubia a fortified building of the time of Septimius Severus has been discovered—the evidence of an ambition that was never achieved. Lower Nubia was apparently not even recognized as a separate district, but was merely attached to the southernmost nome. When Diocletian intrusted to the Nobades the fee'd service of which we have spoken, he abandoned the Dodecaschoinos and withdrew the frontier further north.¹

This emperor hardly made any divisions in Egypt; he only detached from it Lower Libya, which he placed in the same diocese as Upper Libya (formerly Cyrenaica); the Thebaid henceforward began a little further south, and the remainder, the valley and Delta, was divided between two administrations by a line running from north to south, Egypt in the strict sense of the word being west of the line, *Ægyptus Herculeæ* on the Asiatic side. According to other authorities these new provinces were identical with the old *epistrategiæ*.² Then, in 341, *Augustamnica* was detached on the eastern side; and the Fayyum was constituted a separate province (*Arcadia*) in 386. Soon afterwards the Thebaid and Augustamnica were subdivided, like the Delta, which came to include Egypt I and Egypt II; but this brings us to the Byzantine era.³

¹ CLII, p. 464 *et seq.*

² CXXXI, p. 89.

³ CXCI, p. 2 *et seq.*

III

THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION¹

Nowhere perhaps has the population been more strictly divided into a hierarchy of classes than in Egypt.

Naturally the Romans ranked highest, though a very small proportion of them were natives of Italy. The climate did not suit all, and Rome would not require a considerable nucleus of *consistentes* to reside permanently in this province whence the capital derived its corn supplies; the temporary presence of a small number of agents strictly subordinated to the central authority was more to her liking. To these were added, especially in the two first centuries, vast numbers of tourists² who came in the winter season to experience the thrills expected from Egypt—that land of mystery and enchantment, the home of a strangely exotic civilization. Their innumerable inscriptions are like a visitors' book, recording the ecstasies of foreign travel.

The Hellenes honoured by the *civitas Romana* remained essentially Greek and, having other privileges too, were the most favoured members of the permanent population. As far as they were concerned, Rome continued the work of the Ptolemies without any restriction, and their language was accepted as the language of administration. The principal offices were reserved for native Romans, those of the second order for Hellenes. Among the latter were many who had become new citizens of the Empire, either through enlistment in the legion or through discharge from the *auxilia*; but it has been possible to maintain that in this country "Romanism was changed into Hellenism,"³ and although in principle Roman law applied to these Romano-Hellenes, many concessions were made to Greek law.

Even the Jews⁴ were affected to a large extent by this predominant Hellenism. Their relations with the Greeks had been correct and peaceable in the time of the kings, but afterwards trouble began:⁵ some wealthy Israelites attained to

¹ I, V (1924), p. 100-102.

² CXCVI, p. 444 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 42 *et seq.*

⁴ A. N. Modona, I, II (1921), p. 253 *et seq.*; III (1922), p. 18 *et seq.*

⁵ U. Wilcken, *Zum alexandrinischen Antisemitismus* (Abhandl. der sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1909).

high positions and boasted of their relations with the imperial court. The Greeks despised these rivals with their genius for affairs, who hid their enmity under a cloak of Hellenism, spoke the Greek language, even possessed a whole literature composed in it, and bore names which might involve confusion. Moreover, there were very many of them: Philo in the middle of the first century estimates the total number of his co-religionists in Egypt at a million; they spread everywhere, principally in the *μητροπόλεις*; the papyri make special mention of them at Arsinoë and Oxyrhynchus; at Alexandria they alone were sufficient to occupy one of the five quarters of the city, besides overflowing into the others and having synagogues in them all. Thus there was no system of the ghetto; and yet they formed a community apart, with its head, the ethnarch, other magistrates and a council of Elders, the Sanhedrin; and the Mosaic law alone was enforced among them by their own tribunals. They do not seem to have obtained, unless at a late period, the rank of citizens of Alexandria. They paid the poll-tax, and, after the year 70, as we have seen, their didrachma went to the profit of Jupiter Capitolinus.

Notwithstanding all the harsh measures taken against them, the Jews never occupied so humble a position as that to which the Roman government relegated the native Egyptians. As a result of long contact or, to speak more accurately, intermixture in many places, there had grown up under the Lagid dynasty a mixed Græco-Egyptian population, with Greek names or at any rate terminations to their names, speaking the Greek language to the best of their ability in commercial transactions or dealings with the government, but remaining Egyptian in religion and mental background. Hellenism did not willingly admit this partial fusion, and the Roman government, favouring its opposition, decided to put each man in his proper place.¹ The personal status of every individual was, in the eyes of the government, a matter of the first importance and, in order to verify it and guarantee its consequences, a census (*λαογραφία*) was held every fourteen years of the *λαοί* or natives subject to poll-tax, while for the rest of the population privileges were created or affirmed by the *ἐπίκρισις*. We are inclined to think that these

¹ G. Glotz, **XX**, 1922, p. 221.

Græco-Egyptians paid at the most a reduced poll-tax. Were they often members of the class designated in the papyri by an obscure phrase—"the people of the gymnasium" (οἱ ἀπὸ γυμνασίου)? Must we suppose that by admission to this essentially Greek establishment they secured as it were a patent of partial Hellenism? Or on the other hand were these "people of the gymnasium" a small group within the exclusively Greek element of the population who ranked higher on account of their connexion, by kinship or otherwise, with the gymnasiarch? The question is still a matter of controversy.¹ At any rate these words bear reference to a select body, of which official lists were drawn up; and it is most probable that the Greeks were mingled in it with Hellenized natives.

The edict of Caracalla granting the right of Roman citizenship to a multitude of subjects might have had great significance for the Egyptian fellah, but we are becoming more and more convinced that the natives of the Nile valley were reckoned legally among the *dediticii*, who were excluded from this new favour.² An indirect test has been applied. Most of the citizens created *en bloc* after 212 entered the *gens* of Caracalla and became *Aurelii*. Now for the first twenty years after the edict, we can only find among the Αὐρήλιοι of Egypt either citizens of the Greek towns or, in the *μητροπόλεις*, certain of those enigmatic "people of the gymnasium."³ The fact can be explained by Rome's refusal to develop the municipal system in Egypt: to be a citizen of some town or other was the necessary preliminary to becoming a Roman citizen in that country.

A thoroughfare between several worlds, Egypt—and above all Alexandria—had, since the Hellenistic period, seen a cosmopolitan multitude constantly passing through or sojourning within her gates. We can distinguish very marked ethnical types in the little bronze and terra-cotta statues:—negroes from Africa, Asiatic races, and even, as some think, Chinese coolies. "Greeks, Italians, Syrians, Libyans, Cilicians, Ethiopians, Arabs, Bactrians, Scythians,

¹ CXXXI, p. 180; CXL, p. 78.

² M. J. Bry, *L'Édit de Caracalla de 212 (Études d'histoire juridique offertes à P. F. Girard, Paris, 1912, I, p. 1-42).*

³ CLIX, p. 137 *et seq.*

Indians, Persians"—such is the list, and it is not a complete one, which St John Chrysostom gives as late as the fourth century. Some of these would very rarely have visited the towns: the Arabs, for example, who were nomads then as they are today, and scoured the desert between the Nile and the Red Sea. Those most tied to their homes were the Troglodytes dwelling in the caverns of the coastal ridge.

IV

THE ROMAN OFFICIALS¹

We cannot lay too much stress on the exceptional status of Egypt in the Roman world. There were "imperial" provinces, but was this one of them? It was hardly a province at all; that name was avoided in official language and does not follow the governor's title in epigraphy.

All the necessary information had been obtained about this country in the years of the military occupation before it was annexed. *Aditu difficilem, annonæ fecundam, superstitione ac lascivia discordem et mobilem, insciam legum, ignaram magistratuum*: this phrase of Tacitus² is an excellent summary of current opinion, and enables us to understand the policy immediately adopted. Augustus thought there was nothing to be gained by emancipating a people whose age-long servitude had made the fortune of its masters, whether Pharaohs or Ptolemies. After being her kings' property, in the literal sense of the word, Egypt became the property of the emperor, who at the same time found in her the easiest means of dominating Rome. As a private domain she would logically have been administered by a procurator, but that title lacked distinction; there was a *præfectus Ægypti*, ἑπαρχος in the public documents, or even, more vaguely, ἡγεμών—which corresponds to the later Latin *præses*.³

This arrangement excluded Senators, and their exclusion was carried so far that they were forbidden⁴ to set foot on the soil of Egypt, even as mere sight-seers, without express

¹ CCXIX, I, 1, p. 28 *et seq.* ² *Hist.*, I, 11.

³ CXXXI, p. 8 *et seq.*, 260 *et seq.*

⁴ M. A. Levi, I, V (1924), p. 231-235.

permission. Under Tiberius, the heir to the throne, Germanicus, dared to infringe this rule and visit the Pyramids. A papyrus has preserved for us his letter to the Alexandrians rejecting the proofs of devotion which should only be offered to the emperor, and Tiberius did not disguise his displeasure.¹

In the eyes of the Egyptians even the prefect seemed to be a successor of the Lagids and, according to Strabo, royal honours were paid to him. His position, at the beginning of the Empire, was the highest open to the equestrian order, though they could not use Egypt as a field for exploitation, since the mode of collecting the taxes made this impossible.

Though a mere knight, the prefect had all the civil and military *imperium* of a proconsul; but he was not appointed for a short and definite period; his recall depended on the will of the emperor alone. In practice the duty was discharged for a long time by the same official: the emperor would only appoint a reliable man, and there were few errors of judgment. As supreme judge, the prefect delegated many cases to his subordinates, but he also went on circuit himself. Various edicts of these prefects have come down to us; more than one remained in force long after the signatory's departure.² The supreme command of the troops—until the separation of the civil and military powers at the end of the third century—gave him less trouble than the control of the finances, so the emperors often appointed former *præfecti annonæ* to this position.

We can follow the history of the prefecture of Egypt for nearly seven centuries, until the Arab conquest.³ It was generally intrusted to native Romans, the renegade Jew Alexander being an exception explicable on other grounds. In case of his death or sudden and unexpected recall, the prefect's place was occupied for the time being, under the title of vice-prefect, by the *juridicus Alexandræ* (δικαιοδότης Αἰγύπτου καὶ Αλεξανδρείας),⁴ who was also a knight, appointed immediately by the emperor and head of the legal

¹ CXCVI, p. 25.

² U. Wilcken, *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Rom. Abt.*, XLII (1921), p. 124-158.

³ A list of the prefects has been drawn up by L. Cantarelli, *Memorie dell' Acad. dei Lincei*, 1906 and 1910.

⁴ CXXXI, p. 198.

department in so far as the prefect chose to delegate it to him.

Less exalted, since their authority did not extend to the whole of Egypt, were the *epistrategi*.¹ This title, used in a different sense, designated under the Lagids a sort of viceroy of the Thebaid, at once military and civil. The Roman epistrategus found himself immediately restricted to a purely administrative rôle, which is still imperfectly defined, but was especially connected with the administration of justice and the collection of taxes. At an uncertain date, not later than 71, the epistrategia of the Heptanomis was created, which included in particular the Fayyûm; that of the Delta is not likely to have been later. These three epistrategi could not survive Diocletian, the creator of the three "provinces." With hardly an exception, all those whose names we know were Romans of the equestrian order, termed in Latin *proc. Aug. epistrategiæ* (*septem nomorum*, e.g.), and also called in some papyri ἐπίτροπος. They were thus the principal procurators of the emperors in Egypt, but many others were appointed to supervise the market, the mines and quarries, or the imperial estates confiscated from individual proprietors. Men of the equestrian order were not too proud to hold offices of this importance, but for other, more modest, positions freedmen had to suffice.

V

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN LIFE

Local life is the most attractive study in the history of Græco-Roman Egypt, and that part of it on which the new documents shed most light. Our many scraps of information are due to the abundance of written matter: the scribes of the Pharaohs had worthy successors in the γραμματεῖς. This was not a country of verbal procedure; fragments of documents and official letters accumulated unceasingly. Despite the busy preparation of papyrus leaves, the writing material would have been insufficient if it could not have been washed; the same paper was used several times before being stored away in some vase corresponding to the portfolios of our

¹ Victor Martin, *Les Épistratégies*, Geneva, 1911.

archives, or in the wrapping of a mummy. Yet we must guard against an impression that may be deceptive: the sands of the desert have preserved for us these relics of the past, but does it follow that formalism flourished—or raged—only in the Nile valley?

The first cell in the governmental organism was the village, *κώμη*, the township of the *χώρα*. Its usual appearance has been picturesquely reconstructed¹ from the modern associations of the fellahs, which are still suggestive of it: a dense cluster of mean houses or wretched huts. Mud from the Nile, mixed with straw, was made into unwrought bricks, hastily baked, and these were piled up to make the walls; the roof of thatch or clay rested on horizontal beams. The hut was easily overturned, whereupon new dwellings were raised on its ruins and on the heap where all deposited their rubbish, and this process was repeated indefinitely. As a rule the village was slightly higher than the surrounding district.

Its condition had not been improved since the Greek period: it remained a mere territorial unit administered in the sole interest of the State and consequently just the opposite of a commune. It was inhabited by the *λαογραφούμενοι*, those whose names had been enrolled for payment of the poll-tax, and besides them there might also be found a few Greeks, Roman citizens, forming separate castes with all the rights of the inferior caste and some others in addition.

The village officials² were agents of the central authority but natives of the land. The first in date was the *comarch*, a magistrate of the Ptolemies; but after the beginning of the Roman domination he was practically eliminated by his acolyte, the scribe or *comogrammateus*, whose influence was derived from the mere exercise of his profession: constantly drawing up innumerable schedules, reports, lists of names required of him by the treasury, he was better informed than anyone else concerning the population and the administrative machinery. Either an Egyptian or a *cleruch* (an old soldier or a soldier's son), he acted in the village and in its dependencies; the imperial chancellery, by which he was appointed,

¹ **CXL**, p. 202 *et seq.*

² Hohlwein, **XXVIII**, X (1906), p. 38-58, 160-171; XI (1907), p. 203-208.

paid his salary out of a tax levied for this purpose on the inhabitants. In the village, which was before all else a source of revenue, the scribe's first duty was to prepare and control the assessment of the tax, to receive declarations, verify land-measurements, keep the land-register, render an account to higher quarters of the husbandry and the profits derived from it, and forward any petitions relative thereto. The schedules of taxes to be assessed were transmitted by his care to the tax-collectors, *sitologi* or others, and he was responsible for the recovery of the tax. He took no part in the official acts of these various agents, but indicated their respective *rôles* in accordance with instructions received from higher authority. We shall see what changes were made in this mechanism by the reforms of Septimius Severus.

A varying number of villages constituted the toparchy, and at its head was a topogrammateus, who had no prominence in the Roman period, is rarely referred to, and sometimes also discharged the duties of comogrammateus in a village which was doubtless more populous than the others. The toparchy looks like a spurious division of little value; it seems to have had no capital, and its governor was as insignificant as a sub-prefect in France today. No doubt the same might be said of the meridarchs of the nome of Arsinoë.

The nome, however, was a real entity, a financial district of course, since all Egypt had to sweat money for the Romans. By a strange duality which has not yet been satisfactorily explained, the nomarch—originally its head, as his name implies—remained constantly present, but was supplanted as regards most of his functions by another agent, the *strategus*,¹ who was moreover his superior. Yet, strangely enough, the number of strategi was not identical with the number of nomes: here one nome had two strategi simultaneously; there one strategus controlled two or three nomes, though at other times each of them would have its own separate strategus. This official was a Greek, and his task was by no means an enviable one. General supervision of the district, judgments by proxy, publication of the prefect's edicts—all this would

¹ J. G. Tait, **XXI**, VIII (1922), p. 166 *et seq.*; N. Hohlwein, *Le Stratège du nome*, **XXVIII**, XXVIII (1924), p. 125-154 and 193-222; **XXIX** (1925), p. 5-38, 85-114 and 257-285.

be a mere trifle; but the finances (the everlasting preoccupation!) laid a formidable responsibility on his person and property. It was a duty that must have been shunned rather than sought for, and the people of Alexandria congratulated themselves on the general exemption which they enjoyed in this respect. The office of strategus which was conferred—or, to speak more accurately, imposed—for three years, became in fact a “liturgy” (as also did that of nomarch).

Another important personage, who in case of need would act as temporary strategus without being exposed to as many risks, was the chief scribe, called, even under the Romans, βασιλικογραμματεὺς;¹ a sort of secretary-general supervising a company of scribes and appointed for the same length of time as the strategus, to whom he had to furnish, as chief keeper of the tax-schedules and land-register, all the necessary information.

Both of them lived in the “metropolis,” though we do not know in which “metropolis” they lived when they were placed in charge of several nomes. The Egyptian “metropolis” was a curious mixture, a town of an original type that has no analogy elsewhere.² Though deprived of legal rights, like the village, it had in fact a δῆμος, a nucleus of Hellenes intermixed with hellenized Egyptians, subject to conditions and within limits that are unknown to us; at long and irregular intervals it must have assembled to honour the emperors or distinguished personages who paid it the compliment—a compliment that cost it dear—of coming to visit it. It had a college of professional magistrates, but they were agents of the town and not of the central authority, with which as the town’s representatives they were in constant communication.³ Some Romans were invested with these metropolitan offices, from which they derived material profits; but they showed less deference to authority than the native, and certain letters from the prefect require them to respect the orders of the strategus.

This κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων, whose responsibility was solidary, comprised (1) an ἐξηγητής, who supervised the

¹ Cf. Erhard Biedermann, *Der βασιλικὸς γραμματεὺς*, Berlin, 1913.

² For examples cf. Georges Méautis, *Une métropole égyptienne sous l'Empire romain, Hermoupolis la Grande*, Lausanne, 1918, and, for Lycopolis, A. Calderini, *I, III* (1922), p. 255-274.

³ CLXXIX.

drawing up of the lists of *ephebi*, acted as guardian of minors, and prevented the title of citizen from being usurped; (2) a *κοσμητής*, who organized the games and public festivals; (3) an *ἀγορανόμος*, who presided over the market, drew up the agreements between buyers and sellers, and consequently was at the head of a bureau where private acts were registered; (4) an *εὐθηνιάρχης* or *ἐπὶ τῆς εὐθυνίας*, a commissary of victualing, by whose direction corn was sold at a low price or even distributed gratis to the poor; (5) most prominent of all, the gymnasiarch;¹ not to speak of various trusteeships and offices of which we know nothing but the name.

This last title was monopolized by certain families, even to the extent of conferring it on women or children, so that a sort of local nobility was created, to which admission was eagerly sought in spite of all the expenses involved. When he entered upon office, a solemn ceremony took place, at which the gymnasiarch was publicly crowned by the strategus, and in Alexandria he was distinguished by his *φαικάσια* or white sandals! He directed the exercises and games of the gymnasium, administered the establishment with the help of many specially trained assistants, and met the expenses—provision of oil and ointments, upkeep and heating of the baths, lighting of the annexes and *piscinæ*. The expenses must have fallen to a great extent on his shoulders, though sometimes, according to certain texts, they were shared by the archons; also there are traces of endowments for this purpose, and the donors may have been those whom we find described as permanent gymnasiarchs. All the same, the whole of the gymnasiarch's property was liable for the costs of his administration.

No doubt it was the possession of a gymnasium that raised the "metropolis" above the other most populous villages. But the capital of the nome was also the economic centre; through it the caravans passed, in it the local market was held, there the strategus or his deputy administered justice, and thither in consequence flocked a number of litigants and lawyers. It contained the imperial bank, the public granary, the accountants' offices and archives; and thither finally the people came to hold the Greek or Egyptian

¹ B. A. Van Groningen, *Le Gymnasiarque des métropoles de l'Égypte romaine*, Paris-Groningen, 1924.

religious festivals, which were all the more imposing in each nome because no provincial cult was celebrated there.

Above the *μητροπόλεις* ranked the cities,¹ whose picture we are unable to draw. The simple villages, which have remained poor, provide a more accessible site for excavations than the big towns, now covered once more with important buildings. Nevertheless one fact emerges: if the city bore a much closer resemblance to the usual Hellenic type than the "metropolis" of the nome, it still retained some exceptional features. The Pharaohs knew nothing of the municipal system; the Lagids introduced the Macedonian spirit, which was not that of Greece proper. This was the chief reason for the extreme rarity of the institution, and the Romans did nothing to extend it further. Still it is probable that they made some innovations in the urban system, but the curious chance that has allowed the recovery of only a comparatively small number of papyri dating from the last century before the Christian era and the first century after it has concealed from us the stages of that transformation.

As opposed to the *μητροπόλεις*, whose *régime* must have been practically uniform, the cities had their individual charters; but it seems that they came to bear an ever closer resemblance to one another. None of them had a popular assembly: the word *ἐκκλησία* is a stranger to the vocabulary of the papyri. Under the kings there was only a *βουλή*, evidently an aristocratic body, and we are inclined to think on the whole that Naucratis retained it under the Romans, perhaps because the town did not cease to decline from the time of Alexander. Whether Ptolemais had one is doubtful; but Antinoë, founded by Hadrian,² or, to speak more accurately, raised to the status of *πόλις* in order to unite many scattered Greeks, might safely be granted this favour, since no communal spirit existed in it. But Alexandria, three centuries old, with a very large population made up of diverse elements all quick to raise a disturbance and jeer at their rulers, certainly lost her *βουλή* at the beginning of the imperial era and tried in vain to recover it from Claudius, who made an evasive reply.³ Therefore, since in

¹ I, V (1924), p. 97-100.

² Cf. Ernst Kuehn, *Antinoopolis*, Goettingen, 1913.

³ LVII; Jouguet, XX, 1925, p. 5-21.

the other cities the *βουλή* acted as a deliberative assembly and chose the *ἄρχοντες*, we should conceive the administration of Alexandria to be modelled on that of the *μητροπόλεις*. Still the question did not concern all the Hellenes in the town; the group of *ἄστοί* may have been composed of semi-citizens who had the full Greek citizenship but no political rights; their position, however, is quite obscure.

A royal city but now, with a Greek sovereign, a centre of art and study, where Hellenism took new forms and received its last embellishment,¹ did this great capital suffer no change when it passed under the dominion of new masters, foreigners both by race and language? It is true that they preserved its Museum, of which Strabo still speaks,² where scholars were provided with board and lodging and implements for their work; but the spirit of the old establishment was gone, and henceforward it only gave shelter to professors of mediocre quality, who acted independently and did their teaching in private schools outside its walls. The town could not have been much increased in size, since it was hemmed in by the Libyan desert on one side and the lagoons of the Nile on the other; we must therefore always picture it as containing in its principal quarters lofty houses let off in flats. It must have retained its two great main roads, its Tetrapylon, where they intersected, its swarming market, its spacious streets for carriages, its ever busy wharves, whose exact position is an insoluble problem. We are also imperfectly acquainted with the line of its boundary wall, 15 kilometres in length, which was moreover rebuilt by Hadrian and Antoninus; it appears that Caracalla built a second wall within the first, which Aurelian caused to be thrown down. The devastations of the third century, consequent upon the revolts, would especially afflict the humbler, unfashionable quarters in the neighbourhood of Rhakotis, the primitive Egyptian borough; the siege of the *Brucheion* at the other end of the town must certainly have caused far less destruction. Nevertheless, gradual reconstruction would alter the appearance of the city: the reddish baked brick of the Roman period would replace the

¹ See P. Jouguet, *L'Impérialisme macédonien*, etc., **CLIV**, and Ev. Breccia, *Alexandria ad Ægyptum*, Bergamo, 1922; P. Perdrizet, *Bronzes d'Égypte de la collection Fouquet*, Paris, 1911, p. x et seq., and *passim*.

² *Geogr.*, **XVII**, p. 793 C.

grey dried earth, and the growing luxury would increase the use of stone, which had at first been restricted to public buildings and to the portals of wealthy burgesses. Finally, pouring back from the suburbs to which Caracalla had restricted them, the soldiery penetrated almost everywhere.

The extreme scarcity of papyri dug up in the town itself deprives us of information concerning the population of Alexandria. It seems that in the time of Augustus 300,000 free men lived there. Does this mean men or human beings, Greeks of all sorts or only full citizens? Even on the narrowest interpretation the second city of the world of that day must have numbered almost a million inhabitants: a very dense population doomed to a system of hygiene which would have been disastrous but for the proximity of the sea, and the habit of living much in the open air and passing the night on the flat roofs.

The houses¹ were let off in very small portions; overcrowding continued even in the secondary towns, where there was more room; thus twenty-seven persons occupied the tenth part of a house in Arsinoë. However, the rectangular court, always to be found in the centre of these blocks of houses, provided an opportunity for taking the air, and the small amount of furniture did not add to the obstruction; but in these commodious rooms pet animals—a peacock, birds, dogs, cats, even monkeys—frolicked among the human beings. The houses were not invaded by commerce and contained no store-rooms for merchandise; fresh purchases were constantly made from pedlars and small shops.

Street fights and murders reached a total which would be easier to understand in lonely districts where supervision was difficult. But passions were quickly roused and mobs soon collected; slander and delation, endemic evils, helped the government to detect frauds on the treasury; actual associations organized nocturnal rioting and planned criminal adventures.

A certain ostentation may be divined in this double-faced city where activity, the source of wealth, stooped to unbridled pleasures. Since the Greek period display had been made of showy materials, but Hellenic taste would cause a certain simplicity to prevail; under the Romans, led astray

¹ Cf. Fritz Luckhard, *Das Privathaus im ptolemäischen und römischen Ägypten*, Giessen, 1914.

by oriental prodigality, we find a medley of styles, the wide ornamental belts, the heavy embroidered decoration, against which St. Clement's indignation would inveigh. The same influence had its effect upon the traditional festivals, supplementing the exercises of the stadium with the bloody fights of the gladiators and the games of the circus, whose factions were to rend this town before they became rampant in Byzantium.

We know little of the outward life of the rest of Egypt. In the Thebaid, where the Egyptians were especially numerous, those of the Greeks who were not assembled in Antinoopolis lived for the most part in Ptolemais, which was probably the centre of the community referred to in an inscription¹ as οὐ τὸν Θηβαικὸν νομὸν οἰκοῦντες Ἕλληνες. It has been possible to prove² the persistent vitality of this little nucleus, which survived in a hostile environment until a late period. This region gave birth to scholars; at Thebes Greek books were still read in the fifth century; a Greek of Aphrodito possessed a new edition of Menander, an author dating back some eight centuries.

There were few cities in the Fayyûm, a district colonized by soldiers, where the Roman government did not continue the Ptolemaic system of cleruchies; and yet Arsinoë, the former Crocodilopolis, did not fall into decay; in fact it was under the Empire that it attained its fullest development, that commodities of every kind were accumulated in it, and water-works supplied it with an abundance of hot baths, artificial fountains and cisterns. The names given to its streets and buildings bear witness to the benevolent treatment that it received. Nevertheless, in spite of constant efforts to unite the descendants of the original colonists, to blend together Thracians, Macedonians, Thessalians, Mysians, Ætolians, and to facilitate the acquisition of landed property in the district by discharged soldiers, a papyrus of the Empire records no more than 6,475 Greeks of both sexes established in the Fayyûm.

Magistracies (ἀρχαί) and "liturgies"³ appear again in Egypt where, according to the usual principle, an illusory distinction was drawn between them. As elsewhere, by a natural evolution which the current language expressed very

¹ XLIV, I, 1070.

² CXCVI, p. 331 *et seq.*

³ Friedrich Oertel, *Die Liturgie*, Leipzig, 1917.

inadequately, since its terms had lost any strict meaning, other duties were supplanted by burdens on property. The gymnasiarch passed for a magistrate, but in fact he was burdened with the expenses of a liturgy. Individual exemptions went to those we have noted already: athletes, artists, "intellectuals" of various kinds, but apparently not to priests. Since the liturgies were imposed upon owners of property, the question of *origo* was superfluous; it was enough to be a proprietor. Those called upon to undertake them formed the class of *εὐποροὶ* which, according to the texts, was very variable, since the amount of property required depended on the use to which it was to be put and on the importance of the locality. The great flexibility of the system made it possible for a single office to be held by one person alone or shared between several, according to circumstances; for total and final exemption to be granted, on the score of age for example; for temporary exemption to be allowed for five years in the case of discharged veterans; and, finally, for differences to exist between the four cities of Egypt: Hadrian exempted the people of Antinoë from any liturgy outside their own town, but as regards Alexandria,¹ the texts on this point seem to be contradictory. Romans were of course exempt, unless they volunteered of their own accord for the sake of acting handsomely.

All who were bound by their *ιδία* to a village, *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κώμης*, were required to draw up every year the list of candidates for the vacant liturgies, candidates who either volunteered or were inscribed officially on account of their credit. They could appeal against inscription by making a petition to the higher authorities, but the "men of the village" did their work conscientiously, since they were jointly responsible for each individual's performance. The same practice was observed in the *μητροπόλεις*, but there this duty fell upon the archons. The list drawn up was a provisional one and included more than the necessary number of candidates, since the local scribe made a selection in accordance with rules fixed by the emperor himself, retaining some names and noting their incomes over against them; then he transmitted his proposals through the strategus to the epistrategus, who selected by lot as many of the names as were required and

¹ **CXL**, p. 105 *et seq.*

announced the result in a letter, which was at once posted up in each place concerned.

Such was the procedure at first, but it was modified by a reform, embracing other subjects as well, which was due to Septimius Severus and probably consequent upon his visit to Egypt in 199-200.¹ What the *Historia Augusta*² reports of Alexandria alone has since been verified in respect of several *μητροπόλεις* and was probably true of all: a sort of autonomy was given to them by the grant, not of a popular assembly, but of a *βουλή*, until Caracalla, twelve years later, bestowed the title of city on all Egyptian townships inhabited by Greeks—a satisfaction to their vanity, but a spurious liberty, seeing that the prefect and the strategus continued to apply their methods of administration. Desire to injure the inhabitants of Antioch, which Mommsen³ suggests, is a poor explanation of these late established *βουλαί*; the papyrologists have seen more correctly that a financial consideration underlay the decision of Severus, which was a daring experiment since it developed the spirit of insubordination. The former college of archons, which administered the urban finances, hardly included more than five to ten persons; the joint responsibility of all wealthy citizens was more satisfactory. It was evidently from among them that the *βουλή*, which included a much larger number of members, was recruited; the appointment of candidates to the liturgies was henceforward ratified by the *βουλή*, and selection by lot was abolished, except for liturgies of the provincial order. Practically substituted for the archons, this assembly was even intrusted with State affairs, since it collaborated with the strategus in his administration. Finally, in the townships, the collective responsibility was borne by all residents without regard to their *origo*. The comogrammateus and the body of Elders (*οἱ πρεσβύτεροι κώμης*), the spokesmen of the village, disappeared.

Thus there was only an appearance of liberalism in these innovations; yet the *μητροπόλεις* now ranked as moral persons, and the organization of the various offices and departments, now more clearly defined, was freed from that disorder which had invaded it since the time of the Ptolemies.

¹ CXXII, p. 121 *et seq.*

² Spartian., *Vit. Sev.*, 17.

³ CLXII, XI, p. 159.

VI

MEANS OF DEFENCE

Although the Roman army in Egypt occasionally contributed a few detachments to expeditionary forces, its principal duty was to guarantee the submission of the inhabitants and preserve order on the spot. The only external enemy, the Ethiopian of the Upper Nile, had been mastered from the beginning, and gave no anxiety except in the anarchical period towards the end of the third century; the troops, very few in number, who were posted at Syene over against the island of Philæ, were not only engaged in watching the movements of their neighbour. Except in the time of the great revolts, when contingents had to be called in from outside, this army never exceeded the number of 18,000 men, and it was reduced as low as 13,000 in the second century. Its task was to maintain the security of the great river route and communications with the Red Sea, which were always threatened to some extent by the nomads; and this explains both the position of the garrisons, little or big, and the composition of the forces.

Two legions, *III Cyrenaica* and *XX Deiotariana*, were united in the reign of Claudius at the gates of Alexandria, the great city which required most supervision; though, since they were composed only of orientals, they were not regarded as picked troops. They were only given officers of the equestrian order, a fact which has been observed nowhere else; but of course their commander could not be a senator when the prefect of Egypt himself was not one. Each had originally a *præfectus legionis*, together with a *præfectus castrorum* who, according to a tenable theory,¹ finally supplanted the former when these troops had been transferred to Nicopolis. There at any rate they had their centre and depot; but the legions had to send *vexillationes* to various stations in the Delta, notably to the strategic point of Babylon, on the site of old Cairo, destined some day to be revealed by the Byzantine ditch (*φοσσάτον*) from which the Arab settlement of Fostat has derived its name.

With the exception of these two legions, light troops and

¹ *CLII* p. 119.

cavalry were chiefly employed, since operations in level country by small and very mobile contingents had to be contemplated.¹ These were posted in detachments along the road which follows the windings of the river, except for some observation posts on the edge of the desert. The principal cantonments can be traced beyond all doubt: Coptos, a meeting-place of the main routes by which the Arabian trade was carried,² and Thebes, the ancient capital of the Pharaohs, poor and greatly decayed, but still perhaps haunted by the old spirit of the holy city, which looked askance at foreigners. The vicinity of mines and quarries, especially those from which the red granite of Syene was extracted, enhanced the importance of the southern posts, where the troops served as a garrison and even took part in the work;³ in Egypt as everywhere else their leisure was devoted to public works, those for example which the Nile, the harbours and the roads rendered necessary. The same labour must have erected the small fortresses whose ruins or foundations are still to be found in the Libyan oases. It may have helped to construct the *ὕδρένματα*, fortified watering places, wells or cisterns, which marked out the roads between the Nile and the Red Sea;⁴ there were many of them in the southern region, and they were supervised by the "prefect of Berenike," who derived his name from the harbour at which cargoes were unloaded. Traces have been found of these curious establishments, which were rectangular and, like the "khans" of today, provided with rooms round the interior court where the *lakkos* was dug, either in the centre or in one of the corners.

This is not the place to dwell upon⁵ the system, now clearly understood, of these Eastern roads extending from the Nile as far as the zone of the Troglodytes, whose caves were made use of by the soldiers themselves. They were very well built to bear the chariots mentioned in the tariff of Coptos, but most of the carrying was done by camels, as is

¹ For particulars of the units, *ibid.*, p. 39 *et seq.*

² M. Rostowzew, *Zur Geschichte des Ost-und-Südhandels im ptolemäisch-römischen Ägypten* [V, IV (1908), p. 298-325].

³ K. Fitzler, *Bergwerke und Steinbrüche im ptolemäisch-römischen Ägypten*, Leipzig, 1910.

⁴ G. W. Murray, *The Roman Roads and Stations in the Eastern Desert of Egypt*, XXI, XI (1925).

⁵ See CLII, p. 436 *et seq.*

proved by the customs dues levied for maintenance of the *ἐρημοφύλακες* (the escort of the caravans), for which a receipt was given called the *σύμβολον καμήλων*. These animals also served as remounts for the troops, so a census was taken of them every year and they were liable to be requisitioned, sometimes being hired and sometimes bought from their owners.

In other countries the army is known to us from inscriptions and texts, but with the help of the papyri we can penetrate much more deeply into the details of its recruitment, its inner life, and the questions of private law concerning it. Moreover, in Egypt it had very peculiar characteristics.

Alone in the Empire, the natives of this country were excluded from the army: the Roman government profited by the experience of its predecessors who won the battle of Raphia with the help of their Egyptian subjects, but found that they became less docile afterwards. Yet on one occasion, the only one we know of, some fellahs were enrolled against the Jews, who were traditionally detested in the Nile valley; but these peasants suffered defeat, and that was one more reason for not repeating the experiment. At first the army of occupation consisted principally of Anatolian mountaineers, Phrygians and Galatians, who were by preference drafted into non-Greek countries like Africa; but from the beginning of the first century recruitment became more and more local.

The soldiers of Egypt were therefore Hellenes, reinforced perhaps by a very few Romans and by men exempt from the poll-tax. Their personal status was established by the *ἐπίκρισις*, an annual operation supervised by the prefect or his deputy and conducted by commissaries whose rank was at least equal, in the hierarchy of classes, to that of the *ἐπικρινόμενοι*; according to the most recent researches,¹ their capacity seems to have been at once military and fiscal. In principle the recruits received the right of Roman citizenship on joining the legion, or on the day of their discharge if they had served in the *auxilia*; but it has been proved that, at any rate from the beginning of the second century, there were Roman citizens in the *alæ* and cohorts. Thus the political and social distinction between legionaries and auxiliaries

¹ CLII, chap. VI.

was abolished in Egypt much sooner than elsewhere; all recruits were on the same footing.

On the other hand, from the time of Augustus the legions had "children of the troops," *ex castris, castrenses*, whereby also a tradition was maintained and a future development anticipated. The Ptolemaic system of cleruchies, allotments of land hereditary in soldiers' families, provided that the sons served in their turn, had not been retained by the imperial government, but something of it survived in this new form, until the organization, on the frontiers, of the *limitanei* or soldier-labourers.

The Egyptian documents are full of information about the soldiers' way of life.¹ Any kind of marriage was forbidden to all categories of soldiers on service, at least until the reign of Septimius Severus, but they tried to elude the law by securing the results of a legitimate union for concubinage with a freeborn woman or *contubernium* with a slave. In case of separation or death on active service, the wives and children might find themselves suddenly reduced to beggary. Now the native legislation allowed certain transactions to be carried through by means of a fictitious loan; so the soldier acknowledged himself to be his wife's debtor in respect of an imaginary loan or deposit, and she had the right to claim its repayment. When such a claim was made in either of the circumstances mentioned above, the authorities contended that a real dowry was masked under this artifice; but, in the interest of recruitment, they did not always enforce the claim.

They were more anxious to secure a supply of conscripts in advance. The child of the legionary, being a bastard *ex jure civili*, could not receive Roman citizenship; the child of an auxiliary was the fruit of a punishable act of disobedience, but was legitimate *ex jure gentium*; the father became a Roman citizen on his discharge and the son became one at the same time. Thus the inferior troops were privileged. Then, from about the year 145, Roman citizenship was refused to the children of auxiliaries born during the father's service, except when he had volunteered to serve, an act which the government wished to encourage. In default of the Roman right, they obtained Greek citizenship, which

¹ CLII, p. 262 *et seq.*

was also an honour; many of them were given this status in the city of Antinoë.

Police duties¹ were discharged by the army principally, but not exclusively. There were local militia, officials specially appointed for this purpose, but their nature has never been clearly determined. In particular, we are very imperfectly informed about the "master of the night-watch," created at Alexandria by the Lagids and still referred to by Strabo; he had his equivalent in the *μητροπόλεις*, and it is doubtless a mere accident that this fact is not attested by our sources until the reign of Gallienus. In any case, if it is true that the *præfectus vigilum* at Rome was created by Augustus in his image, this magistrate must have held a position of the first importance at Alexandria. We can hardly suppose that he was not supported by a body of *νυκτοφύλακες*, which is found in other provinces, or of those *φύλακες* whose *ὀψώνιον* (ration or salary) is mentioned in the papyri.

Apart from the great centres of population, it was mostly outside the towns that police measures had to be taken, and to this end all citizens were required to help the authorities in case of need. A particular task was certainly assigned to the *ὄρεοφύλακες*, whose duties lay in the rocky districts which provided a refuge for suspicious characters and helped them to elude pursuit. Sometimes the full title indicates the area of supervision; the *ὄρεοφύλαξ ὁδοῦ 'Οάσεως* lent the support of his escort to caravans travelling westward from the Nile. Others maintained order in the imperial domains, and apparently the police came to the assistance of the State postal service.² Everything in this sphere was remarkably specialized: there were guards for the fields (*ἀγροφύλαξ*, *πεδιοφύλαξ*), the vineyards (*φύλαξ ἀμπελωνῶν*), the water-works (*αἰγαλοφύλαξ*), the quays (*ὀρμοφύλαξ*), the towers of refuge (*μαγδωλοφύλαξ*), the town gates (*πυλωνοφύλαξ*)—nothing lacked them.

In the little townships the post of officer of the watch (*ἀρχέφοδος*) was intrusted to a liturgical agent and therefore to a man of property—perhaps as being least open to corrup-

¹ N. Hohlwein, **XXVIII**, VI (1902), p. 159 *et seq.*

² M. Rostowzew, *Angariæ*, **XXIII**, VII (1907), p. 249 *et seq.*; cf. A. M. Ramsay, **XXII**, XV (1925), p. 60-74.

tion. He protected the various employees of the treasury, who were of necessity little beloved by the burdened taxpayers; he caused the prefect's edicts to be posted up, arrested offenders, and even proceeded as far as a first inquiry into the delicts committed in his district. He had no official capacity to decide disputes, but sometimes, when small sums were at stake, the litigants preferred to have recourse to his good offices than to bear all the expense and inconvenience involved in the ordinary procedure. His superior officer was the usual eirenarch of oriental provinces, a liturgical State official at the head of the nome, whose title lost its value later on and was substituted for that of the modest ἀρχέφωδος. It was also in the Byzantine period that the ῥιπάριος appeared in the cities.

Finally we must mention the duties, imperfectly defined by the texts but very various, which were discharged by the arabarch, who was head of the customs-officers (originally recruited from among the Arabs) in the desert zone between the eastern coast and the Nile.

The police of the interior were supported, at any rate from Hadrian's time, by the *classis Augusta Alexandrina*¹ with flat barges constructed for this purpose, which certainly resembled the modern "dahabeeyahs"; the legions of Nicopolis provided the crews for this river fleet. As regards the Mediterranean squadron, the famous Ptolemaic fleet must have constituted its nucleus, for all the ships were not sunk in the final operations against Octavius, and it may well be a mere chance that we have no mention of it before the middle of the first century A.D. It guarded the Delta, and even operated further west, until the *classis nova Libyca* was created, which appears in the reign of Commodus and must have had its base on the coast of Cyrenaica. Ships of the Alexandrian and Syrian fleets might concentrate simultaneously at a harbour as far west as Mauretania. Since piracy never completely ceased, we must suppose that vessels from Alexandria convoyed the transports of corn for a considerable distance on their voyage to Italy.

¹ CLII, p. 98 *et seq.*

VII

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

This was a duty of supreme importance with which all the agents of Rome at any rate were invested. The prefect had his tribunal at Alexandria, where he was supported by deputies from the *μητροπόλεις*; moreover, in theory, he made judicial circuits through the whole of Egypt, but in fact the epistrategus presided over the travelling assizes, each in his own district, as also did the strategus in his nome, the latter acting more frequently, probably once a month, though legally he was a mere deputy in these operations.

But this was not all, for the number of parallel and, as it were, rival jurisdictions fills us with astonishment. What need was there, besides the ordinary magistrates, for the *δικαιοδότης Αιγύπτου καὶ Ἀλεξανδρείας* (*juridicus Alexandreae*¹ or *Ægypti*, according to the texts), whose tribunal was the resort of litigants from every part of Egypt? And was there only one *juridicus* or were there several? Why again was there an *ἀρχιδικαστής*, head of the tribunal of bankers under the Lagids, the disappearance of which should logically have involved that of its president? This dignitary sat permanently in Alexandria and doubtless took cognizance only of civil suits; being at the same time keeper of the archives, he had within reach the legal documents relative to each case. His jurisdiction also extended through the whole province, and this wealth of tribunals is hard to understand; perhaps some supplementary documents will show us how these departments were distinguished from one another. Both *juridicus* and *ἀρχιδικαστής* belonged to the equestrian order. All these judges were therefore prominent persons of great distinction. The Greeks must have preferred, at any rate in very important cases, to have recourse to the power of decision which belonged to the strategus, a man of their own race and more easily accessible; while the poor fellah, in minor disputes, appealed for help quite simply to the police officer, who did not trouble himself with complicated formalities and understood the spirit of the people

¹ Rosenberg, **XLVII**, X, col. 1151-1154.

better, thanks to his daily contact with them. Here we have a sort of arbitration, which must in practice have given excellent results.

VIII

ECONOMIC RESOURCES

Egypt was a favoured country, able if necessary to dispense with imports and provide the native with all that was required to satisfy his needs and his tastes. The products of national industry were mostly exported. The Greek conquest had already opened more foreign markets to them, and the Romans had no innovation to make in this sphere.¹ They favoured rather the entry of Asiatic products into Egypt—ivory, spices, etc.—by their pacification of the Erythræan Sea, which is attested by a log-book that was finally put into shape at Alexandria and has come down to us under the name of the *Periplus*.

The great product of the Nile valley was corn. Transport barges brought it up the river, which provided an ideal highway for them, and the north wind made their return easy when the cargoes had been discharged; the roads along the banks were used especially for military purposes. Other vessels could carry the precious commodity to Ostia and Puteoli, and to Constantinople in the later period. Barley also was grown in abundance and served to make the beer (*ζυθος*) which was the national drink of the humble folk. Nevertheless the vine flourished, as well as the date palm, and all sorts of vegetables, especially vetches, beans and lentils, together with certain oleaginous plants by the use of which the natives endeavoured to dispense with the too costly importation of olive oil. Another important and valued product was flax, which took the place of our cotton; the weaving of the fibres gave employment to many hands, material for clothing or shrouds was manufactured from it, and the finest variety of the plant grew in Egypt. It was in Egypt too, and nowhere else, that the papyrus leaves were produced, of which an enormous quantity was used in the Roman world. The glass-making industry supplied many

¹ L. C. West, *Phases of Commercial Life in Roman Egypt*, **XXII**, VII (1917), p. 45-58; **CXCVI**, p. 51, 65, 214, 227, 444; **LXXXIII**, p. 16-34.

articles for export, which were luxuries in the time of the kings, but more common after the discovery of the art of glass-blowing. But for the everyday life of the natives the potter continued to work up his humbler material, though there continued to be at least some demand, at Alexandria and in Europe, for the luxurious metal workmanship of which the tradition had not been lost.

As regards local trade—the industry, in shop or factory, which was concentrated in the country towns rather than the big cities—we have fewer data than we have concerning the methods of agriculture which, thanks to the extreme fertility of the soil, could retain their rudimentary forms; in fact they have remained practically unchanged until our own day. The regularity of the inundation was insured by a formidable network of canals, big and little, to carry the water far from the river; they were fenced in with dikes which served to prevent the overflow of the water and preserve the connecting roads. The “architects” referred to in the papyri are those who raised these dikes, kept them in good repair, built bridges between them at various points and dug sluices to distribute the rising flood to the best advantage. The upkeep of the dikes was neglected under the anarchical government of the last Ptolemies, but great care was devoted to it from the time of Augustus, and the Roman authorities never relaxed their supervision. They made few innovations, but they were wise enough to see that the essential precautions were not omitted.

IX

THE LAND SYSTEM

As early as the period of the Pharaohs, it is said, and undoubtedly under the Lagids—from whom Rome took it over—there was a threefold division of the soil: domain land, sacerdotal land, and finally private holdings.¹

The *γη βασιλική* kept this name under the Empire; it comprised the former domain land of the Ptolemies, whose successors and heirs the emperors were, *plus* certain additions to which we shall have occasion to refer later. The *ἱερὰ γῆ*, sacred land, belonged to the temples and remained nominally

¹ CXC, p. 85-228; CCXIX, I, 1, p. 287-309; CXC bis, p. 265 *et seq.*

their property, being moreover considerable in extent; but the emperors did not regard them with the respect of the Pharaohs or even of the Lagids; they knew how to make the most of their divine title, to instal themselves in the temple beside the other god and relieve him of the cares of his domain, so that the cultivators of the sacred land very soon came to be called *δημόσιοι γεωργοί*, like those of the royal domains, and these two divisions became one. Private ownership appears to have been developed, but a very complicated and mysterious terminology prevents us from grasping the processes of its development; certain terms suggest the idea of gift or allotment, which leads us to regard it as a present from the emperor or as a means of remunerating officials.

The *γῆ βασιλική* was increased by confiscations for which a punishment served as ground or pretext, and these new properties were controlled by a special official, the *ιδιόλογος*, whom we are able to watch at his work, thanks to the discovery of a very important papyrus of the second century.¹ Nevertheless a part of these confiscated lands—we do not know exactly how much—formed a separate division under the name of *δημοσία γῆ* and was controlled by the minister of finance, the *diœcetes*. Apart from the general control of the land, both categories alike were worked by farmers (*βασιλικοὶ* or *δημόσιοι γεωργοί*), who had to pay a rent in kind. The ground was leased by auction in numbered sections called *cleruchies*, and the mode of cultivation was determined in advance in the lease. It would be difficult to imagine the wealth of details specified in these contracts. They distinguish the lands cultivated on a large scale, sown with wheat or barley, the allotments planted with vines, oil seeds, or palms, the gardens (kitchen gardens), the pastures, natural or artificial, the fields lying fallow one year in every three to rest the soil, and the sites for buildings.

The instructions given to the farmer were the result of an agreement between the college of *πρεσβύτεροι* and the *comarch*. The amount of the rent varied with the quality of the proprietor, some being more efficient than others, and with the value of the piece of ground. In the very detailed formulary, which was determined unalterably by

¹ CLXXXIV; cf. G. Glotz, **XX**, 1922, p. 215-224.

the scribes, a clear distinction was drawn between fertile land, subject to taxation at fixed or varying rates, and land which was unproductive, either by nature or as being traversed by a dike or footpath. Strict account was kept of the consequences of the inundation,¹ for there were areas which failed to benefit by it, either on account of their height or their distance from the canals, while others were merely covered with brushwood or sand or a crust of salt, and, finally, the marshes were only suitable for the growth of papyrus. In contrast to the lands left dry were those from which the flood had not receded, or from which it had receded too late for the annual double harvest to be possible. Allotments of this kind, whose fate was uncertain, occasioned constant renewal of the contracts; for those on high ground artificial irrigation was stipulated in the lease. A declaration was accepted concerning disappointments due to accident, but it was subject to investigation.

The rent was fixed in theory, subject to investigation of claims, at so many *artabæ* (about 30 litres) per *arura* (a little more than a quarter of a hectare). In principle the allotments were hereditary in the case of a long lease, and they might even be sub-let or held in common by a society of farmers; but the latter were always exposed to the risk of an arbitrary annulment of contract through the greed of the fiscal authorities, if these had received or expected to receive a higher offer. Nevertheless they were bound by oath and jointly responsible for their debt through the whole extent of the village, and if the voluntary farmers defaulted, the domain officials requisitioned the amount due from a number of villagers selected by lot, the whole village being liable. The prefect Alexander agreed to exempt women; priests also were free from this obligation, and afterwards cleruchs and catœchs, between whom we can perceive no distinction, both alike being descended from the old soldier-settlers of the Ptolemies and bound to serve in the army, if called upon, by the mere fact of their tenure. Some of them had been expropriated; the rest, who were left in possession, became definitely proprietors, and their allotments, which always bore the name of the first holder, were trans-

¹ W. L. Westermann, *XIV*, t. XII, XV, XVI and XVII; A. Calderini *I*, I (1920), p. 37 *et seq.*, 189 *et seq.*

ferable with the consent of the treasury, which was in constant fear of being cheated.

For private land was burdened with a tax, just as farms on State territory were, and had to be inscribed in the *βιβλιοθήκη ἐγκτήσεων*, a sort of registry office in the capital of the nome, where the contracts between individuals and the title-deeds of real estate were preserved. Of course the value of each individual's property had to be known with a view to the assignment of liturgies. No allotment could be sold without the registry's endorsement, guaranteeing that there was no distress on the real property. Many papyri refer to these registries: they contained separate files for each locality, in each locality the different categories of property were distinguished—fields and houses, for example—and under each category a list of the proprietors was drawn up in alphabetical order; a distinctive label, revised every five years, summarized the contents of each file. We have no trace of this registry after Diocletian, in consequence perhaps of the progressive development of ownership on a large scale; but the control of private estates¹ was still maintained through the land-registers of the nome and village respectively, which were kept by the scribes and used in drawing up the principal register of the survey of lands at Alexandria. The classification of tenures, in accordance with the distinctions noted above, was carefully entered in it and kept up to date by annual revision after the inspectors had made their rounds.

Thus private ownership was strictly supervised and also mercilessly taxed, at the usual rate of one *artaba* of wheat per *arura*; only the purchasers of unproductive lands belonging to the State, which were sold to them at a fixed price by the prefect, were exempted from this tax for two years. Some lands suitable for vineyards or gardens were sold on the express condition that they should be thus planted. Not everything could be privately owned. The State reserved possession of water-courses and lakes (and consequently let the fishing), of underground wealth, mines and quarries, and probably also of brine-pits and nitre-beds, whose mineral alkali was so useful in various industries, particularly in that of the embalmers and dressers of mummies.

¹ Hans Lewald, *Beiträge des römisch-ägyptischen Grundbuchsrechts*, Leipzig, 1909.

X

TAXATION AND FINANCE¹

An exploited country in the fullest and gloomiest sense of the term, Egypt paid formidable taxes to her successive masters, to the Romans not less than to their predecessors. Every official was also an agent or informer to help the financial administration; and we wonder how the tax-payer bore the weight without sinking under it.

A supplementary burden was inflicted on him by the declarations that he was required to make. The head of a property-owning family sent to the authorities an *ἀπογραφή κατ' οἰκίαν*, describing his house and giving the number of his family, slaves and lodgers, with his signature and pledge of sincerity at the bottom. This was repeated every fourteen years, since fourteen was the age at which liability to the poll-tax began; but the connexion between these two facts is not very clear, since each person's age was stated in the declaration, together with his physical description, including even hidden corporal defects, his occupation and his position as regards tribute and military service. Several copies of the *ἀπογραφή* were drawn up² and sent to several agents, with the address of the office at which any signatory who had changed his dwelling-place had previously been registered. Declarations of births and deaths completed this important document of civil status.

Besides the inventory of persons, there was an inventory of property, based upon other *ἀπογραφαί* (declarations), though we are still uncertain at what intervals these were made.³ Presumably they were made more frequently in respect of moveables, of which the particulars are harder to grasp: as for immoveables, the land-register kept a record of them, though changes gradually brought confusion into it. Then the prefect required a general *ἀπογραφή* of all immoveables throughout the country, this being merely a

¹ CXXIX, I, 1, p. 153-161, 185-219.

² A. Calderini, I, II (1922), p. 341-345; Id., *Rendiconti dell' Istit. lombardo*, LV (1922), p. 533-541; A. Caldara, *Studi della Scuola papirologica*, Milano, IV, 2 (1924).

³ O. Eger, *Zum ägyptischen Grundbuchwesen in römischer Kaiserzeit*, Leipzig, 1909.

check taken at long intervals, since any transfer of ownership was declared by the purchaser within six months of the transaction, together with the mortgages burdening the immoveable and the names of the creditors.

The assessment of the tax involved a division of duties. The total amount due from Egypt was determined at Rome, and the prefect, who guaranteed its recovery, determined the amount due from each individual with the help of a crowd of specially trained procurators (*ἐπίτροποι*) and of the *ecologists* who, at Alexandria where they resided (doubtless in order to submit cases of difficulty to some higher authority with the least possible delay), drew up, each for his nome, the twofold list of contributions to be obtained and individuals to be taxed. The amount to be exacted from each man was then arrived at by a sum in division. Lists of names (more than one of which has come down to us) were distributed to the various tax-collectors, and others, containing only the names of taxable persons in a single locality, were drawn up for each registry office. Copies of these two parallel series of lists were preserved in the central archives at Alexandria. Since most of the receipts were written on fragments of pottery, the vast number of *ostraka*¹ dug up in Egypt has given us some precious information.

The personal contribution (*ἐπικεφάλαιον*), which dates back to the earliest days of the Roman occupation, was paid, as we have seen, by all except the higher classes—Romans, citizens of Alexandria and descendants of the cleruchs; every one else paid it between the ages of fourteen (twelve in the case of women) and sixty-five, its total amount varying even from one locality to the next. There was also a sort of poll-tax imposed on slaves and domestic animals—oxen, asses, camels, sheep and pigs—in accordance with a declaration required of their owners. The land-tax was in principle fixed, but the yield of the land was taken into account, so that we find it increased or reduced according to the value of the harvest. There was a duty on land that had been built over, and it was augmented by a tax on the rent.

The slave, who was taxed as a beast of burden, might also be taxed as an artisan, if he plied some trade; but this sort of license, required by all traders, was no doubt paid

¹ CCXVIII.

for by the master who benefited from the work. This *χειρωναξίον* (called *chrysargyron* outside Egypt) was paid monthly according to a tariff which remained constant for the same occupation, but was higher for luxury trades. Fiscal law regarded the priests,¹ who lived by their cure, as men of business; many benefices were sold by the State, which required further payment for induction, and claimed a share in the various "perquisites": a tax on the sacrificial altars, a tax for the seal affixed to a victim judged to be without blemish, etc. Among all the licensable persons, very few were so harshly treated as the clergy.

The sum demanded by the State was clear profit without any deduction for costs of administration, since the proprietors paid a tax for the survey of their land, and the allowance (*ὀψώνιον*) granted to a number of agents served as a pretext for still further impositions. In the same way the salaries of doctors, lawyers and police officers were paid, implements for hunting the hippopotamus were provided, office and market expenses were met, and the costs of guarding the Nile were defrayed—not to speak of many others.

In contrast to the liturgies, which were burdens on the richer classes, Roman law had devised the *sordidum munus* or statute-labour for the building and repair of the dikes and canals, which had to be constantly renewed, lest their gradual wearing down should prevent the inundation from producing regular results. Apart from the imperial officials and the Alexandrians, all were liable for statute-labour; the privileged classes freed themselves from it by paying a tax instead, and more than one native tried to do the same, since some artisans found the work too hard. But the government experienced difficulty in finding the labour, so the diœcetes of 276 sends the following instruction to the strategi: "Let no one under any pretext offer money as a substitute for work."

Besides being thus burdened, private industry had to compete with State enterprises which were less encumbered. The State manufactured perfumes and a considerable part of the oil of sesame that was consumed in Egypt; the emperors had their presses, mortars and workshops; they owned—probably from the days of the Principate—linen cloth and

¹ CLXX, II, p. 245 *et seq.*

papyrus factories.¹ If it is true that the monopoly extended to beer, the State engrossed not only articles of export but those which were essential to the life of the people. The cost of living² was further increased by customs and harbour dues, tolls and town-dues, though it is true that the latter procured some advantages for the communes. Men had to pay for travelling—even by their own conveyances—and for transporting merchandise by land or by water, the toll varying according to the animal used and the status of the user. The transport industry was greatly handicapped by the fact that government vessels were exempt from tax. Modern States collect dues on the highways of commerce, but they have established those highways themselves, or at least guaranteed their maintenance; the Egypto-Roman State drew on a source of profit that was maintained only by the muscles of the fellah.

We are less surprised, in view of modern practice, by the duties on contracts, sales, gifts and inheritances. The *vicesima* on enfranchisements could have troubled few people in the Nile valley, since slaves were not plentiful there and were employed for the most part in domestic service.

Worst of all perhaps were the incidental taxes, those kinds of supplementary exaction that were all the more annoying because they could be made to appear like voluntary subscriptions. The *στέφανος*, a subscription towards the purchase of presents to be offered to the sovereign on some special occasion, dated from the regal period. Under the emperors, the exaction of this *χρυσὸς στεφανικός* (*aurum coronarium*) became more frequent, at length annual or even monthly; but some of them were pricked by their consciences and renounced it. Another extraordinary tax was paid for the erection or restoration of the emperors' statues, principally in the temples. Further, the *annona* weighed heavily on those who were liable to supply it (though we are still uncertain who these were), whether its object was the revictualling of Alexandria or Rome, or the rationing of an army: cereals, vegetables,

¹ On the monopoly of the manufacture and sale of papyrus in the Roman period see Fr. Zucker, **XXX**, LXX (1911), p. 79-105.

² L. C. West, *The Cost of Living in Roman Egypt*, **XIV**, XI (1916), p. 293-314.

wine and fodder were all included in it, not to speak of contributions in cash. The emperors rarely visited Egypt,¹ but the governor travelled about the country on his professional duties. And he did not travel alone: a whole company escorted him, requisitioning lodgings, food, horses and beasts of burden. More than one prefect tried to limit the abuses: Petronius Mamertinus, in the time of Trajan, directed soldiers and civilians to show moderation under pain of heavy penalties.² The exploitation passed all bounds when an emperor chanced to make the inspection in person: it was urgently necessary to build a house for him, if the locality possessed none worthy to offer, and forced labour provided it, while his suite robbed and made requisitions. At Arsinoë a pompous escort accompanied the emperor to the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. The bestowal of some favour and the granting of a few petitions were no excessive compensations for this wholesale plunder of the district.

The imperial government desired at any rate not to aggravate the burden of the taxes by the manner of their collection. Farming, which had been the regular system under the Ptolemies, was no longer applied to any but indirect taxes, and it did not admit of robbery on a large scale, since the contract only covered a single nome, sometimes a single village; but even within these limits the farming was almost always undertaken by a society, although the latter was represented by an individual in order to simplify procedure. The ordinary authorities and a body of special surveyors were on the watch to prevent exactions by the farmers. Collection of the direct taxes constituted a liturgy—certainly one of the most unpleasant for its holder—which seems to have been prolonged for several years, and placed the *πράκτωρ*, as he was called, in an unique relation to the people of his town and village who were known to him; he had to hear many grievances without being influenced by them. He was chosen from the whole Græco-Egyptian population, and the receipt of certain categories of tax devolved *ex officio* upon the *πρεσβύτεροι* or elders of the village. After Septimius Severus, the *βουλή* became respon-

¹ On the other hand, they often sent letters to their Egyptian subjects; cf. U. Wilcken, **XVI**, LV (1920), p. 1-42.

² **XXIX**, I, 2, p. 42 n. 26.

sible in each "metropolis" for the collection of the taxes, and for this purpose it appointed liturgical representatives, the *δεκάπρωτοι*, two of whom acted in each toparchy.

The contributions were brought to account by an exceedingly complicated procedure, our knowledge of which is derived from the papyri alone.¹ Payments in money went to State coffers organized like banks, of which they bore the name, *τράπεζαι*; they were called *δημόσιαι* or *βασιλικαί*, because all these sums belonged to the imperial treasury. There was a coffer in each "metropolis"; the excise officers or farmers brought the cash to it, together with an account drawn up and countersigned by several officials; the receipts were certified by an eye-witness of the payment. The coffer also settled State debts after certain strict formalities had been observed: a detailed account of the expenditure preceded the written order of payment, and the order bore many signatures attesting its transmission through a hierarchy of officials. A great day-book and a monthly balance-sheet facilitated constant control by the authorities.

The mass of contributions levied in kind, principally in corn (*σιτικὰ*), necessitated a special organization in addition to the banks but analogous to them. The granaries destined to receive the harvests were called *θησαυροί*, some being private, others official (*δημόσιοι*), and they were established even in the villages, since corn was more cumbersome than cash. Buildings of this kind are frequently depicted in reliefs dating back as far as the Pharaohs:² they were huge structures of brick or lathwork, rough-walled with unwrought clay and standing in a great court, shut in by walls, which enclosed various magazines, cellars, vaults and depositories for the straw. These receptacles, shaped like a tall sugar loaf, had two openings, one near the top into which the corn was thrown, the other near the ground from which the grain was extracted. The biggest of these "treasuries," supervised by a staff of procurators and overseers, were at Alexandria; those of the nomes were intrusted to colleges of *sitologi*, with scribes to draw up the inventories and labourers to handle the corn. The book-keeping was not less scrupulously exact here than in the banks.

¹ Fr. Preisigke, *Girwesen im griechischen Ägypten*, Strasburg, 1910.

² XLIII, art. *Thesaurus*; cf. fig. 6879; A. Calderini, *ΘΗΣΑΥΡΟΙ, Ricerche di topografia e di storia della pubblica amministrazione nell'Egitto greco-romano*, Milano, 1924.

XI

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS (8RD-5TH CENTURIES)

Thus we have a rich country, a hard-working and submissive population, a well-equipped administrative machine under the careful management of expert officials; and yet we cannot consider it free from defects—the abuse of “red tape,” the law’s delays, the multitude of decisions on points of detail. These things, however, were not new; they were all inherited from the Ptolemies. Already in their time we find a diœcetes blaming the officials for their arbitrary methods, their idleness and lack of intelligence. Various precautions were taken against them; they were forbidden certain acts in their district, but nothing checked their corruption and violence. For the economic disorder Rome herself was responsible, and although her procedure brought similar disorder everywhere else, it will not be without value to study it more closely in Egypt.

The old money of the kings continued to circulate—money of good quality, surpassing the Roman coinage, which became more and more debased; until Diocletian’s reign, some contracts stipulate payment in Ptolemaic coin. The depreciation of the denarius and other coins produced, in the third century, a staggering rise in prices; the private banks refused some specie, in spite of the compulsory currency and the prohibition of a premium on the official value; such vain enactments yielded to the force of circumstances. One document speaks of a single gold coin exchanged for 20 million drachmas; a catastrophic depreciation which no longer astonishes us and leaves us to suppose, in the absence of formal proof, that the ancient standards had ceased to have any value except for reckoning, and that paper had taken the place of metal.¹ Then Constantine had his gold “sous” (*solidi*) minted, but the number put into circulation was quite inadequate to meet the need. The consequence of the errors which had destroyed the instruments of exchange was an anticipation of what we have lately witnessed again among certain peoples—a return to the economy of nature, to simple barter; at any rate all small transactions were effected in this way.

¹ CXCVI, p. 70 *et seq.*

And, as in our day, the persons least exposed to the storm were those who lived on their own land and derived from it at any rate the commodities most indispensable to life. On the other hand, the crisis brought great suffering upon the towns. The grant of a βουλή to the μητροπόλεις¹ had developed in them that curse of municipal vanity, which we have already condemned: towns with practically no income spent money foolishly on pomps and vanities. Alexandria, a commercial city, never recovered from the debasement of the currency; she was eclipsed by Cairo, all the more noticeably after the Saracen conquest, because the Arabs were not a seafaring people.

In the fourth century the power of the officials was systematically decreased by a diminution in the size of their districts;² we have already seen how this affected the province under Diocletian. About 310 Maximin Daza split up the ancient nomes into *pagi*, new fiscal districts, and the pagarch appeared, though he was not master of the whole *pagus*, part of it being governed by the "metropolis" through its βουλή, while another part was the domain of the great landlords, owners of *latifundia*, who were no longer submissive to authority. The pagarch himself was rather a military commander than an official of the treasury. The taxes of the Principate disappeared, notably the poll-tax; but we are imperfectly informed as regards their successors, which are vaguely named³—"sacred" taxes, *annona*, revenue from *largitiones*—and as regards the precise manner of their collection. The δεκάπρωτοι must have disappeared in the fourth century, like the βιβλιοθήκαι ἐγκτήσεων; there is no more mention of them in the texts; the written declaration of the tax-payer is received by a *censor*. Obviously the tax-collectors sowed confusion in the service and were keen rivals in theft; the tax-payer evaded payment, and even found it profitable to leave all his land fallow. Thus there was great anxiety in Constantinople when the time approached for the corn ships to arrive. Would it be enough? How much of it would already have been appropriated by

¹ Pierre Jouget, *Les βουλαί des cités égyptiennes à la fin du III^e s. apr. J.-C.* [*Revue égyptologique*, I (1919), p. 50-80].

² CXCI, Introduction.

³ André Piganiol, *L'impôt de capitation sous le Bas-Empire romain*, Chambéry, 1916, p. 74-77.

the *navicularii*? Even in Egypt food became scarcer, for there were not enough hands to cultivate it; since the fourth century this shortage of labour had involved the diminution of the imperial domains; then the small estates disappeared and the large estates became still larger, sometimes causing the complete disappearance of formerly prosperous villages. Finally the history of Egypt followed the same course as that of the rest of the world.

The great landowners, who were in practice independent and even invested with high offices, made themselves respected by means of the private militia which they maintained. The small landlords were reduced to the necessity of finding a "patron"; losing their previous title, they became mere "occupiers" or "cultivators,"¹ from whom, after 415, the patron himself was allowed to collect taxes. This was *auto-pragia*, a form of brigandage from the fiscal point of view. The cultivator was no less squeezed than before, and where could he take refuge in the last resort? Either in the army or, better still, since the lands of the Church enjoyed some exemptions, in monastic life.

XII

CULTS²

The twofold nature of the population, so striking in profane matters, is not less so in the matter of religion. It is true that there were mutual attractions; the Greeks felt themselves drawn towards the mysterious rites of this Egyptian people, which was thought to be the most religious in the world, and on the strength of some vague resemblances they assimilated the native deities to the gods of Greece. But these divinities with Græco-Egyptian names remained fundamentally Egyptian; only one of them perhaps formed a connecting-link, especially under the Empire: Serapis, or Osiris-Apis, who had become the god of Alexandria, and united himself with his worshippers at the sacred festivals through a sort of communion service. We have to distinguish between external forms and inner feeling; all that

¹ Cf. H. I. Bell, **XXI**, IV (1917), p. 86 *et seq.*

² **CCXIX**, I, 1, p. 113-130.

separated the Greeks from the natives must be taken into account. The fellahs were constrained by a need for self-expression, and sought in their hardships for something to which they could pin their faith and make their supplications. Their naïve cults, half magical and still full of survivals of primitive totemism, did not always promote peace between one nome and the next: battles were fought over the precedence of the ibis, the cat, the monkey or the crocodile.¹

Unlike the Greeks and Romans, the Egyptians had a hierarchy of clergy, almost a caste, for the priesthoods, which were hereditary, required some theological knowledge, and there were at least 100,000 priests in Egypt. In order to reduce their importance, Rome² sold the priesthoods which carried a benefice with them, and placed over the temples, less wealthy henceforward and generally deprived of the right of asylum, a Roman knight whose duty it was to inspect them, and whose visits of inspection were dreaded. The imperial government watched to see that the sacred ritual was exactly performed (witness the instructions given to the *idiologus*), for when omissions were noticed they served as an excellent pretext for the infliction of fines. Otherwise it remained strictly neutral: the prefects did not imitate the Ptolemies, who attended the ceremonies in honour of Apis and the burial of the slaughtered bull. The emperors received unwonted titles from their subjects—"Cæsar the eternally beloved of Ptah and Isis," "King of kings chosen by Ptah and Num"—but these titles merely became hieroglyphics. Honour was paid in preference to the emperors who had set foot in Egypt—Augustus and Hadrian, who sought to connect Antinous with Osiris the god of the dead. The official vow pledged to the lord of the world was secularized; Isis and Serapis no longer appeared in its formula, as they had by order of the Lagids.

We have little information about the Greek religion of the Nile valley, but between its priesthoods and those of the other provinces no contrast strikes the observer. There was a director-general of cults, the ἀρχιερεὺς Ἀλεξανδρείας καὶ Αἰγύπτου πάσης, who was identical, at least in the second

¹ For the cult of the crocodile in the Fayyûm at this period see J. Toutain, *Revue d'histoire des religions*, LXXI (1915), p. 170-194.

² CLXX, I, p. 386 *et seq.*; II, p. 276 *et seq.*; I, V (1924), p. 95-97.

century, with the idiologus. In the *μητροπόλεις* and the cities there were personages whose character was at once religious and secular, such as the exegete; we hear of an ἐξηγητῆς Ἀντινόου.¹ Dynastic cults disappeared; only that of Alexander continued to be celebrated.² The Roman magistrates showed every respect to the Greek ceremonies, and the prefect took part in those which were held at Alexandria.

The cult of the emperors³ was accepted by the Greeks with polite interest, by the natives with an indifference which they disguised to the best of their ability. Even before the conquest, Octavius had claimed the same honours as Alexander and the Ptolemies; as soon as he became Augustus, he took his place as *σύνναος* in the temples of Egypt. A *Καيسάρειον*, mentioned by several authors, was built at Alexandria, and it must have been completed by Augustus; there his successors became *σύνναοι θεοί* in their turn, but many of them had also their own particular sanctuaries, which have been found even in the extreme south, in the island of Philæ.

This imperial cult never secured in Egypt the remarkable ascendancy which it acquired in some other parts of the Empire. In the absence of a provincial assembly, which was the meeting-place of the worshippers elsewhere, it remained in the Nile valley a municipal cult, whose ministers, the *ἀρχιερεῖς*, were merely local magistrates. It was their duty to celebrate the *ἡμέραι σεβασταί* on the anniversary of an emperor's birth or accession; but, in consequence of their multiplication, these "eponymous" days fell into discredit after the reign of Trajan. As for the cult of the Augusti in the strict sense of the word, it has been shown that it was in a fair way to disappear by the end of the second century. The economic decadence of the *μητροπόλεις*, which was in no wise checked by the reform of Severus, forbade them to incur heavy expenses in honour of a remote and foreign sovereign, whose religion moreover was first threatened and then abolished by a formidable rival.

Christianity⁴ was in fact introduced at an early date into

¹ G. Blum, **XXXII**, XV (1913), p. 456 *et seq.*

² G. Plaumann, **V**, V, 4 (1913), p. 77-99.

³ Fr. Blumenthal, **V**, V, 3 (1911), p. 317-345.

⁴ **LVII**, CXCVI, *passim*.

this country, where it numbered a host of martyrs;¹ it is from the papyri that we have acquired a better knowledge of those *libelli* or certificates of pagan sacrifice that were required of all during the Decian persecution. But there were in truth two Christianities in Egypt. That of Alexandria—learned, theological and casuistical—was a product of the refined Hellenism of the Museum; its patriarchal chair was honoured by some men of high culture who attained to a position which was in practice far superior to that of the civil governor. In contrast with this was the Christianity of the countryfolk, especially in the Thebaid. It also numbered Greeks among its adherents; more than one, impressed by the native mysticism, was inclined to withdraw from the world to the borders of the desert, on the extreme verge of human life in the neighbourhood of a necropolis. We have seen that the oppression of the great landowners and of the agents of the treasury induced some of those who were liable to forced labour to adopt the monastic life; the cenobites, owing to their large number, were capable of protecting themselves, and their communities were allowed certain privileges. When the choice lay between turning monk or turning brigand, a man of peaceful disposition would not long remain in doubt.

But most of these monks were Egyptians without precise dogmas, who retained none of the doctrine except the virtues of renunciation, and looked upon Jesus and the saints as successors to Osiris and the good demons. This Christianity without substance served at any rate, like the land itself, to maintain the Egyptian type and traditions: to win this illiterate people, the new religion had to speak to them in their own tongue. Of the hieratic language there could be no question; the demotic itself became too learned and died of old age towards the middle of the fifth century. For the use of the poor labourer the Coptic speech came into being, and it was written in Greek letters with additional signs to supply the place of those that were wanting in the Greek alphabet. All Egypt was Coptic by the time of the Arab conquest, but the idiom of the newcomers triumphed over its predecessor, though the latter did not finally disappear until the seventeenth century.

¹ H. Delehay, *Analecta Bollandiana*, XL (1922), p. 5 *et seq.*

To sum up, Egypt was not romanized to any real extent; she was only hellenized in part and for a very short time;¹ the Greek elements did not emigrate but were exhausted. A very satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon has been given: "In the long run Africa consumed a race that had come from Europe and was not fitted to reproduce itself and multiply in the country of Ra and the simoom. The Greek families settled in Egypt rarely endured for more than a generation; the heat of the dog-days killed many of the children."² Only the half-caste could found a family, but in the long run he became a pure Egyptian. And that is why the man we see there today at the plough, at the shadoof or on the dahabeeyah is very like his ancestor of the Pharaohs' frescoes; the passing centuries have made no impression on the unchangeable soul of the fellah.

With Egypt we may associate Cyrenaica,³ its old dependency, a Greek-speaking province which finally remained a part of the Eastern Empire. After Apion's legacy, Rome tried to maintain a sort of simple protectorate, which had to be given up at the end of twenty years (75). Bestowed by Antony on a daughter of his own by Cleopatra, Cyrenaica was restored to the Romans under Augustus, and the plateau of Marmarica was annexed to it (20 B.C.). In the early days of the Lower Empire both were separated from Crete. Their history under Roman rule is unknown; we have only a very clear impression of their uninterrupted decadence, which may be explained by the disappearance of the silphium, the fickleness of the soil, the invasions of locusts, the inadequately curbed brigandage, the incessant strife between Jews and Greeks, and above all, for Cyrene, the fatal rivalry of Alexandria.⁴

¹ Cf. Fr. Oertel, *Der Niedergang der hellenischen Kultur in Ägypten*, **XXIX**, XXIII (1920), p. 361-381; H. I. Bell, **XXI**, X (1924), p. 207-216.

² P. Perdrizet, *Les Terres cultivées grecques d'Égypte de la collection Fouquet*, Nancy, 1921, p. xxxi and 23.

³ G. Costa, **VI**, XIV (1912), p. 97-144.

⁴ **CXXXVI**, II.

CHAPTER IX

THE GAULS AND THE FRONTIER OF GERMANY

OUR readers will find the natural introduction to an account of Roman Gaul in the volume of this series which is devoted to the Celts. Moreover the circumstances of the conquest have been described above, so that it only remains for us to study the occupation and its effects on the country.

I

HISTORICAL OUTLINE

At first the dominion of Rome did not extend beyond the province of Transalpine Gaul,¹ formed about 121, which reduced to the status of subjects the principal Arvernian allies, in particular the Allobroges and the Volcæ. The original idea seems to have been to guarantee free land communications with Spain by means of the road followed by Hannibal, which was henceforward called the Via Domitiana after the name of the first proconsul. In the unexplored regions of the Alps the boundaries were left undefined. To the north they reached the Lake of Geneva and the Rhone, encroaching considerably on the right bank of the river and including to the south-west a large part of the land of the Rutheni, a sort of advance position to guard against a flank attack from the Garonne.

Rome simply applied the principles which were then habitual with her. In theory she governed only a part of the peoples included within these frontiers, while the "allied" States, though few in number, retained possession of vast territories. Marseilles, overjoyed by the ruin of Carthage, received the recompense for her friendly attitude towards the Romans. She became mistress of all the mountainous region in her neighbourhood, and saw during the next half-century

¹ LXV, p. 79 *et seq.*; CLXXXIII, p. 169 *et seq.*

several peoples, including even allies, despoiled for her benefit; her territory was extended beyond the Rhone and included the whole of its southern valley up to the point where it begins to contract. The Volcæ and afterwards the Vocontii, in the neighbourhood of the Drôme, obtained a privileged position; elsewhere there were subject towns, left in practice to their own customs and their own hereditary princes, but without positive rights and liable to exactions.

The attempt to introduce a Roman population was confined to one centre. A colony, *Narbo Martius* ("town of the god Mars"), founded in 118, easily acquired, through lack of competition, an important position which was emphasized by the subsequent name of the province, *Narbonensis*. Marseilles was destined to suffer from this unforeseen rivalry. Towards the south-western and south-eastern boundaries only two strong positions were established: *Tolosa* (Toulouse) and *Aquæ Sextiæ* (Aix), the "waters of Sextius" (Calvinus), who had vanquished the people of the district.

When the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones had been repelled, the Gauls of the south recognized what a powerful protector they could count upon henceforward, though they could not forget how hatefully they were being exploited: the great speculators had accomplices—and rivals—in certain governors, such as Fonteius, a sort of Verres, whom Cicero defended with the same zeal with which he had prosecuted the governor of Sicily, and with the same success (69). The considerable fragments of his speech that have been preserved recount all the grievances of the natives as if they were so many calumnies. All that we can read between the lines, and all that we know from other sources about this kind of suit, suggests merciless oppression during the three years of this governorship (79-76) and even afterwards.

Hence we are the more surprised that the Gauls did not find more occasions for insurrection during the civil wars; but the support which they gave to Sertorius, precisely at the time when Fonteius was ill-using them, did not save the partisan and had only unpleasant consequences for themselves. Perhaps also they feared worse enemies than the Roman financial bandits: the Germanic hordes which were making irruptions not far off among the Celts of the north

seemed to threaten the peoples of Narbonensis in their tranquillity. The danger was finally overcome by the man who made himself master of the whole of Gaul; there were eight years of hardship, but the last of them put an end to the trials of the Celts, who secured peace and prosperity at the cost of independence.

Except for some acts of inflexible sternness, which the conqueror deemed indispensable to the fulfilment of his plans, we may say that Cæsar showed himself humane. It is true that he exacted heavy tribute from the Gauls, relying on Gallic money to make him master of Rome; but Hirtius says that he treated the cities with honour and even tried to improve their lot: they were religious entities¹ whose gods and cults were worthy of respect. Their names, their organization and their traditions were spared, provided that in each of them a new party was given control, if its predecessor had shown itself hostile to the Romans. These inhabitants of "long-haired" Gaul were destined to experience the same fate as Narbonensis and Gallia Cisalpina, a formerly Celtic country which had at length been assimilated; the political organization of these two countries was not very different from that of the Roman capital, except that something rather primitive about it recalled the Italian institutions immediately after the expulsion of the kings.

Gaul remained true to Cæsar, although he had left the country and had little opportunity of returning to it in case of need; one of his legates sufficed to repress the single and brief revolt of the Bellovaci (46). Besides tribute, Rome required military service; and the Gallic militia, footmen and horsemen, requisitioned by Cæsar himself in various places on account of their manner of fighting which suited his requirements, gladly entered the Roman armies and took part in the great battles of the following years. They had been less willing to serve in the private bands of their former patrons.

The newly conquered territory did not at first form a distinct province;² Cæsar merely attached it to Transalpine Gaul, and they were not separated until the year 44. "Long-haired" Gaul retained its political geography; its vast territories were not cut off from it. No colony was established

¹ CXLII, IV, p. 14 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

beyond the Cévennes, but in Narbonensis veterans were distributed among the various peoples, especially on the sites which commanded the great natural highways. Cæsar did not hesitate to confer the right of citizenship on a number of southern Gauls; he gave it to every member of the legion *Alauda*,¹ and many gained access to the Senate, so strangely reconstituted by the Dictator, who bore with equanimity the charge of having become too Gallic. Moreover, as early as the year 48, this Senate created two colonies: one of them, *Raurica*² (Augst), a strategic point commanding a line of invasion through the Belfort pass; the other, of a more ideal and symbolical value, *Lugdunum* (Lyons),³ at once the capital of the Gauls—hence it retained its Celtic name—and a centre of Roman life, built on a height (Fourvière), as being a holy city, and near a confluence of rivers which presaged its commercial future. Its founder, the governor Plancus, by siding with the triumvirs, guaranteed the maintenance of the *pax Romana*.

Augustus consolidated the work that had already been accomplished.⁴ He visited Gaul on five occasions, each time for several months, and showed himself an active ruler and an impartial judge. At other times his son-in-law and invaluable helper, Agrippa, established good order on the borders, reduced the Aquitani, who were still recalcitrant,⁵ to obedience, strengthened the Rhine frontier by subduing the Treviri, and solved an outstanding problem in the region of the Alps. For this work nearly twenty years were needed (25-7 B.C.): a series of operations of which we know little ended in the capture of a few savage villages high up on the mountains.⁶ These in their turn were reduced to the condition of a province, but without being included in greater Gaul; *præfecti*, military officers, replaced after the reign of Claudius by procurators, were set over a number of small districts:⁷ *Alpes Maritimæ* in the south; *Graia*, commanding the upper Isère; *Pœninæ*, between the upper Rhone and the Val d'Aosta. Only the *Cottia* retained the appearance of a small independent kingdom, where the Cottii, father and

¹ CXLII, III, p. 574 *et seq.*

² Tkac, XLVII, Ia, col. 289-296.

³ CXXX, p. 133-153.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112-126; XCVI, p. 405.

⁵ CXXX, p. 209-238.

⁶ CLXVIII.; CLXXXIII, p. 159 *et seq.*; XCVI, p. 409.

⁷ LXV, p. 132 *et seq.*; CXXIX, p. 382 *et seq.*

son in succession, were glad to act as agents for Rome, making roads and setting up at their capital, Suza, buildings in the purest Latin style. The completion of this work was commemorated in the trophy of the Alps on the Turbian rock.¹

The general reorganization of the year 27 involved the distribution of the Gauls between several provinces. Narbonensis, which then first took that name, became in 22 a senatorial province, which it remained to the end. "Long-haired" Gaul was divided into three governments of equal importance: Aquitania, Celtica and Belgica. No previous grouping was used as a foundation, but everywhere the actual relations between the peoples were taken into account. Aquitania alone, extended northward as far as the Loire, was considerably larger than the district of that name known to Cæsar, which was limited to the country of the Iberians between the Garonne and the Pyrenees. Belgica united all the regions north of the Seine and was, practically speaking, bounded to the south-east by the Saône. There remained for Celtica, which became Lugdunensis, a square piece of territory between the Loire, the Saône and the Seine.

The originality of this arrangement lay in the fact that a governor-general, resident at Lyons, where all the districts practically converged, became legate of the three Gauls. But, besides him, each province had its own legate, of whose relations with his superior we have very little knowledge. This important position of legate of the three Gauls was successively occupied by some very distinguished personages: Agrippa, the future Tiberius, son-in-law of Augustus, then his brother Drusus, then Varus and Germanicus, all near relations of the emperor. Their mission was to conquer Germany, which accounts for their frequent presence on the banks of the Rhine; but, when this rash project was abandoned, the great commands came to an end; the three provinces were left independent (17 B.C.) and Lyons became capital of Lugdunensis only. But at any rate the altar of Rome and Augustus, which was established there, continued to be a centre of reunion for them all and, thanks to this, the expression "the three Gauls" remained in use.

Notwithstanding their title of legate, the governors had practically no army; the troops were concentrated in the

¹ J. Formigé, **XV**, 1910, p. 76 *et seq.*

neighbourhood of the Rhine, and this led to the creation of a new command which was itself too important to remain undivided. The military areas were detached from Belgica, though the precise line of demarcation has not been traced; in the language of today we should say that one of them embraced the whole of Alsace and the Bavarian Palatinate; the other, the eastern half of Belgium, the remainder of the Rhine province, and finally the Low Countries as far as the mouth of the Rhine. It is a remarkable fact that, as far as we know, they were not officially termed provinces before the second century;¹ until then they were subject to the legates "of the army of Germany" (Upper or Lower), who as consular legates took precedence of the prætorian legates of the Gauls, and hence were allowed to act in case of emergency outside their normal areas; a revolt in the interior justified their intervention.

This was hardly ever called for; the petty local and episodic disturbances bore no resemblance to a real insurrection. No doubt the census of the population and the register of their property, being visible signs of subjection, did not fail to arouse anger, even during the visits of Augustus; swindling, which was not checked in a day, usury and the exactions of the imperial freedmen had fostered secret ill-feeling. Only an occasion was wanting. Now the Ædui and the Treviri, free and allied peoples and therefore exempt, found themselves burdened with a tribute, probably for the German war, which Tiberius persisted in exacting. The revolt, which was quickly repressed elsewhere, took a more serious form among these peoples: the Æduan Sacrovir and the Trevir Florus, both members of great families, citizens of Rome and officers of her army, placed themselves at the head of the movement. They found little support among the nobility, who were too closely attached to the Roman cause, but the lower orders provided contingents armed to the best of their ability. Lack of discipline and cohesion made them no match for the strong forces from Germany, and the rising was very soon brought to an end by the suicide of its leaders and the massacre of the rebels, who could make no resistance (21).

¹ But the change seems to have been planned between 82 and 90 (CXLVII, p. 70).

It caused no lasting resentment at headquarters. Caligula, son of Germanicus, wished to take advantage of the great memories left in Gaul by his father and his grandfather Drusus, and there exhibited the vainglorious crotchets of a semi-lunatic mountebank, a precursor of Nero. Then Claudius, who was born at Lyons when his father Drusus raised the altar of the confluence there, was also tempted to make a journey into Gaul, and induced to prolong it by the expedition to Britain. His journey was coincident with a marked advance in romanization: the cities lost their old national titles, the rites of druidism were totally and finally prohibited, while on the other hand the right of citizenship, which had been granted parsimoniously since Cæsar's death, began to be widely distributed among the allied peoples. A strange speech of Claudius to the Roman Senate, which has come down to us in a fragmentary form,¹ proposed to admit the Gauls, who had remained so constantly loyal, to the Senate and the consulship. Being the emperor, he gained his plea, at least as regards the Ædui.

It would be wrong to see a contradiction of his statement in the events that followed. Nero disgusted all the world by his ruinous and bloodthirsty follies. It is true that the idea of driving him from the throne had its birth in Gaul: the governor of Lugdunensis in 68, Julius Vindex, an Aquitanian of royal descent, wrote to his colleagues in the neighbouring provinces and supported the candidature of Galba, legate of Hither Spain. But the old Celtic spirit of independence was only partially awakened in the southern half of Gaul, excluding Lyons, which was just recovering from the effects of a disastrous fire. The peoples of the north refused to lend their aid, for the proximity of the Germans made them regard as dangerous any movement against a Cæsar. Once more the Gallic militia foolishly tried conclusions, near Besançon, with the disciplined forces of the army of the Rhine; as in the time of Sacrovir, the men were slaughtered and their leader committed suicide.

But now all the provinces desired to share in choosing their common master, and even in the Gauls there was con-

¹ **XLI**, XIII, 1668; translation in Allmer and Dissard, *Musée de Lyon*, I, p. 81 *et seq.*

stant disagreement on the subject.¹ Galba was tactlessly lavish of his favours in Narbonensis and offended the Celts of the north, who acclaimed Vitellius, legate of Lower Germany, while those of the south accepted Otho after Galba's assassination. As the Vitellians were marching towards Italy, plundering, burning and slaughtering all who resisted their advance, an infatuated Boian peasant, Mariccus, proclaimed himself a prophet and even a god, and gathered together, "to restore the freedom of Gaul," 8,000 peasants, who were massacred at Autun by the Ædui, supporters of Vitellius. As soon as the latter got to Rome, he thought it best to send back to the Rhine the semi-barbarian troops that he had brought with him, thus grossly deceiving them, especially the Batavi, a people far more German than Celtic, whose leader, Civilis, stirred up his fellow-countrymen and formed an alliance with their kinsmen in Germany. A prophetess, Velleda, preached and foretold the annihilation of the legions. Civilis knew how to flatter the Gauls and talked to them of independence; he dreamed of an empire bestriding the Rhine, and succeeded in seducing some chiefs of the Treviri and Lingoni who held commands in the Roman army. Their cities followed them in their defection; two legions, partly recruited on the spot, yielded to the rebels and pledged their service also to the "Empire of the Gauls." But Civilis had other views: he was a pure-blooded German, and it was to the right bank of the Rhine that he looked for support. The less fanatical Gauls began to reflect: the dominion of Rome seemed to them less formidable, and order had just been restored in Italy by Vespasian. The Remi formed the idea of holding a solemn congress in their territory, which gained a crowd of adherents. The delegates debated, and it very soon became apparent that in an independent Gaul all the old rivalries would spring up again; "peace" (submission) was preferred to "liberty" (revolt). When Vespasian's legate, Cerialis, arrived with a promise of pardon, the Germans alone ventured to make an idle resistance, for they alone represented the foreign element in this great conflict; the rest, whether mere supernumeraries or ringleaders (Classicus, Tutor, Sabinus), showed clearly enough

¹ Bernard W. Henderson, *Civil War and Rebellion in the Roman Empire*, London, 1908.

that the imprint of the Roman stamp was deeply marked upon them.

Thus it was only necessary to restore the principle of union, to repress regional hostilities and the conflict of local interests, and it was important that Rome should show herself stern and unwavering; the instigators of the recent rebellions had to disappear. When Sabinus was discovered in the cave which had sheltered him and his wife Eponina for nine years, they were put to the torture, and the two children who had been born to them in this hiding-place were exiled far from Gaul.

The accession of the Flavians marked the beginning of an era of peace which was to last for more than a century. Moreover, their position in Gaul was strengthened by a more complete occupation of the island of Britain and by an extension of Roman power across the Rhine.¹ Though they no longer dreamed of conquering Germany, Vespasian and afterwards Domitian, by organizing the *Agri Decumates*, created an excellent bulwark against the lines of invasion north of the Jura.

A revolt of the legate of Upper Germany, Antonius Saturninus (88), was easily repressed by the man who was destined afterwards to wear the purple, namely Trajan. Though busily engaged elsewhere, this emperor did not forget the Gauls, but, with a view to maintaining stability in the northward regions, founded the two Ulpian colonies there, one by the confluence of the Lippe (Xanten),² the other in the territory of the Batavi, *Noviomagus* (Neumagen). Like his predecessor, Hadrian energetically pressed on the work of the *limes*; it was through "Germany" that he began his visits to Gaul; but of his many travels in that country only vague memories are preserved by inscriptions and by the coins which this "preserver" and "restorer of the Gauls," as he liked to call himself, caused to be minted.

Though a stay-at-home, quite the opposite of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius had at any rate family connexions with the country: his grandfather came from Nîmes, and to that fact the town was indebted for favours which were extended to the whole of Narbonensis. He brought its road system to

¹ **CL.**

² **IX, CXIX** (1910), p. 235 *et seq.*

perfection and personally bore the cost of restoring Narbonne after its destruction by fire.

With Marcus Aurelius difficulties began again. The martyrs of Lyons did not cause very serious troubles in a country where Christianity had as yet gained few recruits; but the invasions of the Barbarians, which caused so much anxiety on the Danube, had their repercussion on the Rhine frontier. It was necessary to wage war against the Chatti of Hesse and the Chauci of Hanover. For this period we have only the obscure and more or less suspect narratives of the *Historia Augusta*; but buried treasure,¹ in Belgica as well as in Franche Comté and further in the interior, and the visible traces of destruction are sufficient evidence of a troubled condition of affairs. Buildings become fewer and betray some degree of decadence; certain industries disappear, that of figured pottery for example. The Roman civilization in Gaul becomes changed and takes on an irregular appearance through the invasion of oriental elements.

First there was the brigandage under Commodus, and then followed the various competitions for the throne. In 193 Gaul was torn asunder: the north supported Albinus, governor of Britain, who carried his success as far as Lyons; in the south Septimius Severus profited by the pleasant memories which his governorship of Lugdunensis had left behind it. The great battle of Lyons, where Severus triumphed, was a terrible event for the nation: many of her sons were serving in both armies. At the same time armed bands scoured the country plundering for their own benefit alone; and finally the victor inflicted heavy punishments on the many local oligarchies which had opposed him.

The burning of the capital of the Gauls by the soldiers of Severus was symbolical of a process of decay that could not fail to continue. Though a man of order and discipline himself, he took little care to raise the provinces to a uniform level; far from finding fault with the survival of old native practices, he helped to revive them. During his reign we see the Gallic league become the official standard of measurement, replacing on the mile-stones the Roman mile which alone had been admitted hitherto; Latin is supplanted by Celtic in the law courts; the local gods resume their old

¹ LXIII.

shapes, and a caricature of Druidism is again offered to the people for their devotions. At this time the names of the old tribal states begin to prevail in many cases over those of their capitals, which were of Roman formation; the classical example is that of Paris, city of the Parisii, substituted for Lutetia. Was this a consequence of Caracalla's edict¹ extending the right of Roman citizenship? No doubt since every city henceforward contained Roman citizens, the capital of the district, where the *cives Romani* had generally been collected, thereby lost its pre-eminence; nevertheless a number of aristocrats who were among the first to be granted Roman citizenship had already been living in their isolated villas. These changes of name occurred in few of the cities which are known to have been busy, populous and full of life; perhaps their occurrence was an indication of the others' impoverishment. In any case it was peculiar to Gaul, and it certainly attests the persistence of ancient memories, and forbids us to suppose that the favour of Roman citizenship had turned the heads of its recipients.

Nevertheless there was no disaffection, or we have no evidence of any at that time. The Empire kept a constant watch on its frontiers, but the task of maintaining them was to become much harder. The barbarous hordes of Central Europe had at first neglected the territories of eastern Gaul; they preferred to push towards Italy. Caracalla, who was born at Lyons and bore a *cognomen* due to the Celtic garments which he liked to wear, had no more need than his father to deflect the torrent of invasion from the Gauls; but the omens of approaching disaster began to multiply.

The Barbarians were joining forces: their names—Franci and Alemanni—covered an amalgamation of peoples who had previously been known under various appellations. In their many and diverse schemes the desire for plunder and conquest seems to have predominated. A great expedition into Germany under Maximin² still diverted from the Celtic lands a plague which Rome endeavoured to contend with in its own home. When the Barbarians subsequently hurled themselves upon the frontier stations, they found the *limes* in good condition and adequately garrisoned; but by the middle of the third century conditions had changed: according to

¹ CXLII, IV, p. 525 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 547 *et seq.*

our few and laconic texts, the Franci and Alemanni then crossed the Rhine, penetrated into the heart of Gaul and even advanced beyond the Pyrenees.

With Valerian a prisoner in Persia and Gallienus impotent, the central authority was no longer equal to its task and the peoples were left to protect themselves: hence a secessionist empire came into being in Gaul and attached to itself by a somewhat unstable alliance the neighbouring countries of Britain and Spain.

A commander on the Rhine frontier, Postumus, was acclaimed by his troops, but—and this was a remarkable innovation—instead of desiring the mastery of the whole *orbis Romanus*, he aimed only at the countries grouped behind the frontier which he was commissioned to defend, that is to say at the various Gallic provinces which, as history was to show, formed a geographical unit. That frontier he defended without retreating from or advancing beyond the Gallic boundaries; and yet he took the title of Roman emperor, not emperor of the Gauls. In short he had an inkling of a solution which was to be tried systematically later on: a single Empire with several emperors, each supervising one part of the enormous whole.

Gallienus tried in vain to re-establish his authority in Gaul; it was not he who, ten years later (257-267), put an end to the reign of Postumus, or to that of Victorinus, whom the former had made his associate. Besides, no one then dreamed of separation from Rome, for the native troops of Postumus, so far from supporting the leader they had chosen against all comers, assassinated him one day in some paltry quarrel about the refusal of plunder. Our late and inadequate sources at least enable us to understand that the time was not yet ripe for the experiment of later days. Fortunately the successive Augusti of this empire of the Gauls were on the whole wise and energetic men; but their troops had no political instinct, and it was by their troops that they were almost all put to death. The soldiers were content with making emperors; it was the emperors who restricted their ambitions to the countries of the West.

But there was a second innovation: the mother of Victorinus conceived the idea of a purely civil authority, and caused the purple to be given to Tetricus, a rich but peaceful

landowner of Bordeaux. In those days this was a mere delusion; it was impossible to reign without holding a turbulent army well in hand, for the barbarian menace rendered any other system impossible. In Gaul itself the disillusion began: the town of Autun, one of the most Roman in the whole country, showed its preference for the sovereigns of Italy and pronounced in favour of Claudius II, who had just been proclaimed emperor at Milan. But he was occupied elsewhere and could not seize the opportunity; before his two years' reign was ended the Gallic troops rushed in fury on Autun and made it a heap of ruins (269). They were little interested in the dynastic question; and, being as much Gauls as they were Romans, they recoiled from the prospect of going far from their country to fight, like so many other legions, in Syria or on the Danube.

Claudius's successor, the gallant Aurelian, at last made the necessary effort to restore unity. Tetricus, weary of a fruitless authority, made no more than a pretence of resistance and, abandoning his troops in disorder, surrendered of his own free will. As a reward for his complacency, the ex-sovereign of Aquitania received an imperial governorship in an Italian district. His attitude was typical of the point of view of a whole class; the great personages, rich men and landowners, who owed much to Rome, regarded her only with instinctive deference and loyalty.

The importance of preventing secession by consolidating the western provinces was not overlooked by Aurelian, who seems to have given a sort of supreme command over them to one of his lieutenants, Saturninus. New measures were also taken against the German hordes, who were only formidable on account of their numbers. It was thought that the towns would be able to resist them behind strong walls, which would form an inviolable girdle, and almost everywhere the Gallic cities, following the example of Rome, began to raise ramparts.¹ Sarcophaguses, columns, statues, anything would serve to fence in the *burgi*, and all was plastered together pell-mell; but the work was hardly planned before a terrible wave swept over the country (275-276). The testimonies to it are brief, but in strict accord; they do not even mention the Roman army, which either could not or would not make

¹ LXII.

any resistance. The disaster was overwhelming; sixty cities, we are told, fell a prey to the invaders, which means almost the whole of Gaul, and we can estimate the destruction wrought from the buried treasure¹ and the charred fragments preserved in local collections. Men hid their wealth before the storm, and the ruins of the great buildings then burnt were used again as humble ingredients in those of later ages. Not only did the towns lose their ornaments, but commerce and industry were deprived of their offices. If a host of marauders scoured the country, it was because the artisans and labourers were left without employment. Even the fields and estates outside the area of destruction were overrun by vagrants.

History has shown too little gratitude to the sovereign, Probus (276-282), who found a remedy for this terrible state of affairs. In a short space of time he imprisoned the barbarians in Gaul by strengthening the *limes*, and then hunted them down, killing the most recalcitrant and making prisoners of the rest with a view to obtaining soldiers or colonists. Moved by the resounding fame of his triumphs, some German kings became his tributaries then and there, and sent him hostages. With the same zeal he worked at the economic restoration of the devastated areas. But many heads were still turned by the recent disturbance: a certain Proculus and a certain Bonosus won over troops of adventurers to support their ambitions and were proclaimed emperors by them, the former at Lyons, the latter at some place unknown. Their revolts were quickly suppressed, but they set a bad example to the soldiers on the Rhine, who would not work without grumbling and put the heroic Probus to death.

A renaissance could only be the fruit of a far-reaching reform, and this above all was the task of Diocletian.

First of all he ratified the spontaneous grouping of the previous century: the prefecture of "the Gauls" included, besides them, Britain and Spain, to which he added Tingitana; and its capital was not Lyons, which had fallen into decay, but Trèves, whose pre-eminence had already been asserted in the face of danger, although it was replaced by Arles in the fifth century. Moreover, the policy of subdivision triumphed there as elsewhere, the emperors being more

¹ LXIII.

distrustful of their officials than of their subjects.¹ This was a mistake in Gaul, where it would have been better to strengthen the bonds of union; the Roman spirit was best qualified to maintain concord, which was always precarious there without its support. Before the end of the third century, nine peoples of Aquitania who, in spite of the Pyrenees, felt themselves to be a part of the Iberian world, obtained their separation from "the Gauls"² and formed the province of *Novem-Populi*, with its capital at Eauze, which in the fifth century comprised twelve cities, though it kept its original name none the less. The two Germanies, Upper and Lower, remained unchanged under the new names of First and Second. Diocletian created three Belgicas, two known by numbers and the third called *Sequania*, with their respective capitals at Trèves, Rheims and Besançon; a *Lugdunensis I* (capital Lyons) and a *Lugdunensis II* (capital Rouen). Aquitania, with its capital at Bourges, remained a very extensive province, being deprived only of *Novem-Populi*; but a century later an *Aquitania Secunda* was carved out of it, with Bordeaux for capital. Similarly, from *Narbonensis* Diocletian only detached *Viennensis*; but, later, a *Narbonensis II* was formed about Aix, and from the end of the fourth century there were *Lugdunenses III* (capital Tours) and *IV* (capital Sens). The Alpine provinces were rearranged: the *Graiæ* and *Pœninæ* were united, with Moutiers for centre; the *Alpes Maritimæ* (capital Embrun) remained unchanged, but the *Cottiæ* became a district of Italy. Finally, a line of demarcation between two dioceses (capitals Vienne and Trèves) helped to create an ever widening gulf between the North and the South, though there was no urgent necessity for it even from the point of view of the official hierarchy, since the "vicar" of the North was no other than the prefect of the Gauls himself.

All this rearrangement and the separation of the military from the civil power, which was expected to work wonders, failed to produce the happy results anticipated. The same troubles continued to occur under the Lower Empire³ because the external conditions remained unchanged, the weaknesses of the imperial power, for instance, and the racial tendencies of the Celts; and because the part assigned to this country

¹ LXV, p. 275.

² CXXX, p. 217 *et seq.*

³ LXV, p. 320 *et seq.*

by nature still kindled the same ambitions and inspired the same endeavours. The revolt of Carausius¹ was only an episode, but it was important on account of its novelty and its duration (ten years). Yet we might have supposed that when Gaul itself was assigned for residence to a regular sovereign, the tetrarchy would have enabled him to develop to greater advantage provinces that ranked among the most vigorous and the most advantageously situated in the Empire.

Under Constantius Chlorus and his son Constantine, Gaul enjoyed a period of prosperity favourable to the works of peace; but then followed a recurrence of those military plots that had become habitual in an army still Roman by training, but no longer Roman in spirit. For emperor it chose a pure German, Magnentius, who was at last hunted down by his conqueror, Constantius the son of Constantine, and ended his days by suicide at Lyons. Then it chose a Frank, Silvanus, who was moreover a high official of the Empire, but he was soon betrayed by the very men who had raised him to power. Private ambitions took precedence of everything else; in order to make a quicker end of Magnentius, the Rhine barrier was stripped of troops, leaving the barbarian hordes to cross the river, occupy the fortresses and drive back what remained of the Roman garrisons.

It was at this moment that a survivor of the imperial family, which had been almost annihilated in the massacres perpetrated by order of Magnentius, namely the young Julian, the future "Apostate," was associated by Constantius in the government of the Empire. He found Gaul ravaged and in complete disorder. In a strenuous first campaign he drove back the Alemanni, and in the next year (357) he won a resounding victory at the gates of *Argentoratum* (Strasbourg). Invasion was checked as long as he remained in Gaul,² that is to say for nearly five years; he supervised the frontiers, and also tried to secure some justice for the fleeced taxpayers. He made Lutetia his usual place of abode, and his preference for the growing city prepared the way for its future greatness. It was from Lutetia that he governed, with a firm but equitable hand, winning all men's sympathy. When Constantius, envying

¹ See below, BRITAIN.

² **LII**, I, p. 440 *et seq.*

this popularity, wished to send him against the Persians, the army with one voice proclaimed him Augustus, and Julian yielded to their request.

A further appeal by Constantius to the barbarians, to whom he had appealed for help against Magnentius, aroused no response; but Julian died in Asia. When Valentinian obtained the empire of the West (364), that rough soldier found the Alemanni established in the valley of the Marne. He drove them out and defeated them on their own territory, but, in spite of that, his young successor, Gratian, had to fight another battle between the Rhine and the Vosges.

Subsequent events have scarcely any local interest; the emperor of the West continued to maintain his headquarters at Trèves, but the contests of rival aspirants were decided elsewhere. The death of Theodosius I (395) really marked the end of "Roman" Gaul. His son Honorius, emperor of the West, a child eleven years old, had for his tutor the Vandal Stilicho; and soon (406) the great final invasion began which nothing could hold back any longer. The flood-tide of Suevi, Vandals and Alani at last began to recede, but only when their hordes went south of the Pyrenees to seek the plunder that was becoming scarce on the northern side because they had laid all waste. It mattered little that the two successors of Alaric the Goth, Ataulf and Wallia, great admirers of the Empire, at first took service under Honorius and fought against the usurpers who arose on every hand. The states between which Gaul was divided, the kingdoms of the Burgundians (413), the Suevi and the Visigoths (419), did not deprive her of her Latin features in a day, but they immediately changed her future destiny.

II

THE GOVERNMENT OF ROME

We have seen how the territory of Gaul was split up, being too large for a single province. Augustus was the first who could organize it at his leisure; without any pre-conceived ideas, he readjusted his work more than once, and the administrative system that he established depended for some time on the projects to which contact with Germany

gave rise. When a strictly defensive policy was adopted in regard to that mass of peoples, who so stubbornly resisted invasion, the task of defending the Rhine frontier remained none the less essential.

Hence the creation of the *limes*,¹ a frontier line, as its name implies, and above all a military road, with which the Romans flanked their new territories, just as roads skirted their private estates. Patient investigation of the traces of this barrier and of all the works connected with it is a heavy task to which German learning has resolutely applied itself.² As a result of the enquiry, the construction of some parts of it has to be dated as early as Domitian,³ whose activity was especially marked in the neighbourhood of the Chatti, while some indications even suggest that Tiberius and Claudius retained at any rate a few advanced positions on the right bank of the Rhine near Mainz. The annexation of the Agri Decumates changed the nature of the problem: it was no longer possible to remain behind the two natural barriers of the Rhine and the Danube; but if the new "crescent" made works of fortification imperative, it diminished the risks to which the Roman territory was exposed by reducing to almost nothing the German salient pointing towards Switzerland.

In official language a distinction was drawn between the *limes Germaniæ* and the *limes Ræticiæ*, which met near Lorch at about the vertex of the angle; yet the two were continuous, and the subsequent abandonment of the lands east of the Rhine necessarily involved that of the area north of the Danube. The *limes Ræticiæ* followed a curved line pointing towards Germany, but the *limes Germaniæ* was more complicated in form: from Lorch it was carried straight forward to the Main, coinciding with that river up to the point where it turns westward; then, making a wide circuit round the site of the modern Frankfort and passing the Taunus mountains, it ran parallel with the Rhine but at a short distance

¹ CXLVII, p. 56 *et seq.*; XC, p. 31-49; Stuart Jones, *Companion to Roman Studies*, Oxford, 1912, p. 244, map 7; XLVII, XIII, col. 582-605.

² Von Sarwey, Fabricius and Hettner, *Der obergermanisch-rätische Limes des Römerreichs*, Heidelberg, 1894 *et seq.*

³ The evidence is provided by the legionary bricks, showing what legions were employed on the work, while the dates at which these legions occupied particular camps are already known to us.

from it, rejoining it a little north of Brohl at the boundary of the two provinces of Germany.

Not far behind the *agger*, a material witness to the Empire's frontier, the line of *castella* was created. The earliest, dating no doubt with the *limes* itself from Domitian's time, were, like it, made simply of earth; then others made of stone were added to these or took their place, being built at an average distance from one another of about 10,000 paces. Small garrisons could be established in them, which were given warning in case of need from the summit of the far more numerous watch-towers, at first frail structures of wooden scaffolding, but afterwards real stone turrets. There was nothing in the barrier itself to form a serious obstacle—nothing of the kind was contemplated; its rectilinear construction regardless of the lie of the land leaves no doubt on that subject. But the incursions of robbers were made more difficult by it, and a real attack on the line was checked for a moment, while the news of it was conveyed all the more quickly to the army of defence. Besides, it has been repeated too often that a weak barrier sufficed, so long as it was everywhere visible.¹ Research has revealed two clearly distinguished periods in the organization of this *limes*. Hadrian was content with a simple palisade, about 3 metres in height, made of the trunks of oaks. It was brought to its maximum strength under Commodus, even a stone wall being substituted for it at certain points in Germany; but for the whole distance between Lorch and the Rhine a *vallum* was dug, probably in Caracalla's reign, behind the palisade on the Roman side. What was the reason for this arrangement, which at first seems surprising? No doubt the palisade somewhat obstructed the sentinels' view of the country beyond; but if the principal work, the ditch, had been made in front of it, hostile forces might have been able to gain a lodgment in it under cover of darkness, whereas the arrangement adopted made this impossible; it would have been necessary first to break through the palisade. Further, this *vallum* was to serve especially as an obstacle to cavalry, the most important part of the German troops. From Lorch to the Danube a more imposing rampart seems to have been deemed necessary. At any rate,

¹ LXV, p. 143.

from the same period, the *limes Rætiae* began to take the form of a continuous stone wall; but this may have been due to the fact that the *castella* of the second line were here placed further apart than on the Rhine frontier.

We know, however, that all these precautions failed to prevent the grave disasters of the third and following centuries. Nevertheless the barrier made the control of customs more easy; thanks to it, only certain roads, directly supervised by the *castella*, could be used even in times of peace for the conduct of commercial dealings with the barbarians. Thus the Empire's economic regulations were better obeyed, and a constant obstacle was placed in the way of smuggling.

For the security of Gaul the Roman authorities relied chiefly on the military forces, and their reliance was strengthened by the fact that the armies of the Rhine were really Gallic armies. It is true that they were inclined to make what would some day be called *pronunciamientos*, and that they had no affection for leaving their country to fight at a distance from it, but on the national frontier they generally gave proof of great solidarity. Military service was only nominally compulsory: in practice not only were German mercenaries enrolled, but there was never any deficiency of volunteers, and the recruiting officers could pick and choose among them. The Gauls were naturally warlike and esteemed the military profession more profitable than that of the agricultural labourer or humble artisan; moreover, the legion provided a means of acquiring Roman citizenship. It was only to a very small extent possible to enlist the Gauls in the neighbourhood of the country where they would be stationed, since hardly any forces were maintained except on the Rhine frontier, and if a considerable number of auxiliaries came from Belgica, they were also recruited from the Alpine provinces. The largest contribution to the legions was derived from Narbonensis. With his wife at his side—tolerated by the authorities—the soldier felt himself to be, if not in his native land, at any rate in his own family.

The estimate of the number of troops stationed in Gaul varies between 60,000 and 100,000 men; in any case they formed one of the most important armies of the Empire.¹

¹ F. Drexel, *Die Grenztruppen des obergermanischen Limes im II Jahrhundert* [Germania, VIII (1924), p. 13-19].

The number decreased after the annexation of the Agri-Decumates: from eight legions it was reduced to five under Trajan and four under Hadrian. The chief garrisons were established partly in the territory of the Ubii—at *Novesium* (Neuss)¹ and *Bonna* (Bonn) and, further north, at *Vetera Castra* (Xanten) and *Noviomagus* (Neumagen); partly in Upper Germany—at *Argentoratum* and *Vindonissa* (Windisch). *Vexillationes* were of course stationed almost everywhere.

For naval defence there was the Rhine fleet, which only disappeared with the Empire itself, the fleet of *Forum Julii*, abandoned in the second century, and, later on, several small river flotillas.² In this department the Roman State lacked initiative; it made only moderate efforts to improve the highways of navigation;³ but as regards terrestrial highways, with which independent Gaul was by no means unprovided, the imperial government devoted its usual care to them,⁴ especially under the influence of Agrippa and afterwards of Claudius. Each capital was connected with the neighbouring capitals by State highways, not to speak of the secondary roads for whose upkeep the cities were themselves responsible.

As regards taxation there were no peculiarities in Gaul. There was the *stipendium*, a direct tax imposed as a mark of subjection, from which favoured towns were exempt; the land tax, based on a census—of persons under Augustus, of property under Trajan—and revised periodically by special procurators; exactions in kind, some well known indirect taxes, customs and tolls—all of which seemed burdensome to the population. The Empire had suppressed the farming of direct taxes, and reformed it in other cases; but abuses began again in the third century, when the country was also impoverished by insecurity. The fiscal agents were distributed in accordance with a system of great flexibility which was not coincident with the division of the country into provinces.

In the administration of justice⁵ a complete breach was made with the earlier practice of the Gauls: for the simple Celtic customs, interpreted by the Druids and the nobility,

¹ Niessen, **IX**, CXI/CXII (1904).

² **LXV**, p. 292.

³ **CXLII**, V, p. 129.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81 *et seq.*; for the road system, p. 85 *et seq.*

⁵ **LXV**, p. 146 *et seq.*

there was substituted a secular law, written and uniform, except for a few special cases which required a new ruling by the emperor or were covered by certain regulations announced in advance in the governor's edicts and applied with due regard to local usage. In the course of time, however, all innovations of this sort were reserved more and more to the emperor himself. The legates (except in Germany) and the proconsul of Narbonensis had enough leisure to be able to devote plenty of time to judicial duties, but we cannot determine the boundaries of any *conventus* in Gaul. Neither do we know what scope was given to the natives as judges in private civil suits; we are only informed by an inscription from Narbonne¹ that Augustus allowed their selection from all classes of the population. Finally the right of appeal, sometimes extending (except in the later period) as far as the emperor himself, gave the provincials a safeguard which they must have appreciated.

III

LOCAL POLITICAL LIFE²

The Romans hardly altered the distribution of the peoples of Gaul among *civitates* except in Belgica, where they enfranchised some vassal tribes, in Narbonensis, where subdivision was carried still further, because the peoples seemed to own too extensive territories, and in Aquitania, where the reverse was the case. But most of the *civitates* already contained subdivisions which were termed *pagi*. In the course of time, however, without any sudden revolution, a change took place in the relationship of the town to its territory: the former gradually became more important than the latter, which was the reverse of the Gallic conception. Naturally this change was brought about most rapidly in Narbonensis and most slowly in the Germanies, while in the Agri Decumates it could never be completely accomplished. For a long time the distinction persisted between the administrative agencies of the whole *civitas* and those of its capital.

¹ XLI, XII, 4333.

² LXV, p. 176 *et seq.*; CXLII, IV, chap. VIII.

The cities of Gaul that were founded or romanized under the Empire knew nothing of any representative system; they had no assembly except the aristocratic college of decurions which elected the magistrates. The latter, the duovirs—judges, police officers, commissioners of finance—had the meaningless insignia of the Roman consuls. Appointed every five years under the title of *quinquennales*, at any rate in Narbonensis, they then conducted the census. The two *ædiles* supervised all the minor municipal affairs, and two *quæstors* served as treasurers.

Religion was organized strictly in the Roman fashion, the priests being appointed like officials and bearing the titles of pontiffs or augurs; the *flamen* or *sacerdos* of the *divi* (deified emperors) took precedence of all the rest, especially of the humble ministers of the old national gods. Their duties, like those of a member of the *curia*, could only be discharged by rich men, and were generally undertaken by the great landed proprietors, who were involved in heavy expenses by the acquisition and responsibility of their office. To the middle-class shopkeepers and freedmen were left the honours of the *augustalitas*,¹ which also were an object of envy.

The manifestations of loyalty through the imperial cult derived all their importance from the provincial organization,² though they were also regulated from headquarters. An occasion for them was provided by the assemblies of the Gauls.

From the time of Augustus³ there existed a *concilium provinciae* of Narbonensis; its members, delegates from the cities, were presided over by a high priest, the *flamen* of the province, who discharged his duties at Narbonne in the temple of Augustus, an institution consistent in its main outlines with what we find in other provinces of the Empire. But what was peculiar to our country was the establishment of a council “of the Gauls,”⁴ attended in varying numbers, which have not been clearly explained, by representatives of the whole country, excluding the former Gallia Transalpina. Every year on the first day of August, the month consecrated to Augustus, the great session presided over by

¹ See above, p. 109.

² LXXIX.

³ CLXII, IV, p. 426.

⁴ CXXX, p. 127-132.

the *sacerdos* was held at the confluence of the Saône with the Rhone, in a sort of sacred precinct, of which we shall speak again later. Thus Rome made a great show of liberalism by countenancing an assembly of representatives from the whole of once independent Gaul, though she did not fail to observe what took place there from the vantage-point of the citadel of Lyons, the only town in the interior where a permanent garrison was stationed.

It is certain that these religious assemblies soon began to indulge in the expression of political views and in complaints against retiring governors who, as a general rule, took care to insure by some means or other the presence of their own partisans and advocates at the council. The complaints might come from the lower classes of the population, which were the least well treated; but the delegates, like all the local politicians, belonged to the aristocracy, and this made it all the easier to arrive at a compromise. Indeed we do not know of any process that resulted in the conviction of a legate of Gaul, and the celebrated monument of Thorigny¹ shows us that as a general rule the deliberations at the confluence tended rather towards the eulogy of those whose administration was being discussed.

In the Christian period the high-priest of Lyons, distinguished by the less definite title of *sacerdos provinciae*, retained only the position of a figure-head. The provincial assemblies lost their religious character; imperial legislation made a show of sanctioning their objects and facilitating their meetings, but the indifference of the masses and the increasing corruption could not fail to paralyse them, so that they too became mere shams. After the assembly of the three Gauls had disappeared, it seems probable that each province had its own; but above them all ranked the diocesan assembly, which was regulated by an edict of Honorius² and had its meeting-place at Arles.

The disintegration which became evident after Diocletian in the increasing number of provinces had its counterpart in the multiplication of cities; but here the agency of the central power seems less certain. Many great centres of population had been destroyed; in the general disorder it was a less hazardous undertaking to reconstitute them on a smaller

¹ XLI, XIII, 3162.

² LXV, p. 304.

scale. From every other point of view their administrative system experienced the vicissitudes which we have described as common to the whole Empire.

IV

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS¹

There is no doubt that one consequence of the Roman occupation was an increase and renewal of the population.² The establishment of colonies, the influx of people from every quarter, attracted by more stable conditions and the settlement of inter-tribal disputes, the introduction by great Roman or romanized landowners of cultured men, of whom the uneducated Gauls had no need, and of slaves, who were essential to the rich Italians' way of living—all this, apart from the fecundity of the Celts at that period, has given rise to the statement that the Gallo-Roman population must have been at least equal to that of France today, though it is difficult to see how such a statement can be proved.

On the other hand, it is quite certain that the population was redistributed. In many parts the town steadily gained precedence of the country: a result due to its comfort (formerly unknown), its greater material advantages, and even its pleasures and recreations, such as the shows of the amphitheatre. The life of independent Gaul had been predominantly agricultural; as commerce and industry developed, many workmen were drawn to them from the fields. Finally, the improved communications enabled some landowners, thanks to the road system of which the excellent native carriages made good use, to return to their town house after inspecting their estates, though most of them lived on their land—a fact peculiar to Gaul.

Work in the towns tended very often to become corporate in form. Though she recognized so many professional *collegia* in Italy, Rome showed less appreciation of them in the provinces, but those of Gaul did not seem to her very dangerous; they swarmed in Narbonensis and in the neighbourhood of Lyons.³ They did not always wear a professional

¹ *CXC bis*, p. 202-212.

² *CXLII*, V, p. 10 *et seq.*; *XXXII*, XXIV (1922), p. 57.

³ *CCXIV*, III, p. 520-582.

aspect; but, when nominally religious or burial societies, they often in practice united men of the same trade. The commercial *bourgeoisie* of *negotiatores* or *artifices* amassed a very considerable fortune, to which their tombs bear striking witness. Among these corporations the most powerful seem to have been those of the builders and carpenters (*fabri*), the timber-merchants (*dendrophori*), the ship-owners and watermen (*navicularii*), chiefly on the lower Rhone and its tributaries,¹ and the *centonarii*, manufacturers of clothing for the poorer people. The organization of these *collegia* made them real societies or commonwealths maintained by influential patrons. Mere tolerance of them by the government gave place to marked favour when the idea was formed, in the third century, of using the corporations as agents to facilitate the control of the populace and the recovery of the taxes.

The wealthy class included knights and senators; but these titles, in their local acceptance, did not satisfy the ambition of the leading men, who aspired to the status of Roman senator, a barren title which many of them obtained and could bequeath even to women. Ultimately there was no municipality without these Gallic senators. For the most part they were great landed proprietors, enriched by the social and economic development that was so general in the third century; their villas, where a host of workmen were employed, formed the nucleus of many villages and townships whose name today recalls the existence of a great ancient estate and even the name of its owner. The latter might derive from his Celtic origin a passion for the chase and from his Latin education a taste for study and literature. Such were the poet Ausonius and Paulinus, who became bishop of Nola, though he was a native of Bordeaux.

Strabo was exaggerating when he said that the Romans taught the Gauls how to cultivate their fields. It was not in that direction that their Celtic subjects most needed education, and perhaps the only innovation due to the Romans was a much more extensive cultivation of the vine; access to new markets caused it to take the place of cereals wherever the substitution was possible. But we must remember the

¹ L.-A. Constans, *Arles antique*, Paris, 1921, p. 184 *et seq.*

interdict of Domitian,¹ which checked this propensity until the time of Probus; it was only from the latter's reign that the vintages of the Bordelais and the banks of the Moselle gained their high reputation. Neither were there any new secrets worth mentioning to be learned about cattle-breeding; but the Roman water-works benefited this mode of exploiting certain soils no less than they benefited agriculture.

The Romans did not find so much subterranean wealth in Gaul as in Spain and Britain, notwithstanding the busy industries to which metallurgy gave rise in many parts of the country. The natives learnt from their new masters how to work the quarries and use all the resources of the builder's art, which they had allowed to remain in its infancy, caring little about their places of abode. All the most refined technical devices in this branch of art became customary with them, and it has been said that, in the Flemish language, a considerable part of the technical vocabulary relative thereto is obviously of Latin derivation.² Finally, the interiors of the Gallic houses were embellished with less primitive furniture. In matters of dress there was a more stubborn conservatism: a certain affectation of Latin styles by the upper classes does not conceal the fact that the old national garb remained the most popular, and the manufacture of tunics suitable for the wear of poor people in wet climates contributed not a little to the export trade. The Roman influence merely banished that taste for bright colours which was so marked even in Cæsar's time.

The poor earthenware of the independent Celts was a very different thing from the figured pottery,³ copied from types of Arezzo, whose manufacture in innumerable series was to occupy so many Gallic workshops. From the purely æsthetic point of view and in comparison with the models this was obviously a poor counterfeit, but from the economical point of view it marked an indisputable advance. Similarly, tile-works and brick-making gave employment to numbers of artisans from the day when wooden huts were abandoned; and, in the use of clay, Mediterranean influences gave rise

¹ S. Reinach, *Revue archéologique*, 1901, I, p. 350 et seq.

² **XCI**, p. 40.

³ J. Déchelette, *Les Vases céramiques ornés de la Gaule romaine*, Paris, 1904.

to a new industry, of which the devout had hitherto felt no need, namely the manufacture of those earthenware statuettes which played so large a part in the religious observances of the Græco-Roman world.

The exports of merchandise¹ exceeded the imports. To Italy Gaul exported various foodstuffs, living animals for the chase or the games or for transport, woollen clothing for soldiers and peasants; to Germany and the Celts in Britain she sent the cheap wares which the barbarians of those lands did not manufacture themselves, the equivalent of what the African peoples receive from Europe today. The wealth of Gaul increased rapidly until the beginning of the invasions; the artisan class enjoyed great prosperity, which was promoted by the use of uniform coins, weights and measures throughout the land, and by a system of taxation which involved no element of surprise.² Great financial undertakings were not suited to the Celtic temperament; they were left to Italians or orientals, especially Syrians; but the strength of the country lay above all in its rural population and its middle classes, and in that respect Gaul was already France. Moreover the well-being seems to have been general; there were very few poor and many well-to-do families, and there was no impassable gulf between the classes separated by distinctions of wealth; they mixed freely at the public baths, the great games, and above all the gladiatorial shows, which were no less popular among our ancestors than in Italy.

V

IDEAS AND ART

The Roman influence on the religion of the Gauls³ affected their beliefs less than the manner in which these were manifested. Both peoples felt a spontaneous inclination to conciliate divine beings, and both were inclined to form abstract and naturalistic conceptions; there was a tendency towards childish devotions and the quest of little recipes for obtaining good luck and escaping misfortune. Already converted to anthropomorphism by the Greeks, the Romans

¹ LXXXIII, p. 191 *et seq.*

² CXLII, V, p. 344.

³ *Ibid.*, VI, p. 3 *et seq.*

converted the Gauls in the same way, without pressure or entreaty. They brought their idols with them, and their statues impressed the natives as a new form of luxury.¹ The Græco-Roman mixture had its counterpart in a Gallo-Roman mixture attested by such names as *Apollo Borvo* or *Mars Camulus*. Just as in the former case some assimilations were found to be too difficult or impossible, so there were some deities that remained Celtic: Belenus, Epona, Esus, Teutates were of the number, and, under the lineaments of the last mentioned, Mercury remained always a native creation; the old emblems, the horns of Cernunnos, the mallet of Sucellus, the horses of Epona kept their original properties, since they had no analogies in the classical religion. Yet some strange adaptations have been pointed out; that, for example, which made of Apollo the usual god of springs and fountains.² Finally, through an instinctive or interested loyalty, certain abstractions were accepted: the Genii, especially that of the emperor, the Lares, termed Augusti, the Tutelæ, municipal deities, to whom the devout addressed their prayers with the same purpose no doubt as to the deified Cæsars. This readiness to receive new gods must have led to the admission of oriental cults which, more successfully than those of Rome, prepared the way for Christianity. It is curious to observe that they gave rise to an original type of monument: the knight overthrowing the dragon-footed giant,³ an obvious prototype of St. George and the dragon.

On the other hand, in the organization of worship a real revolution took place. The druids disappeared, only retaining a slight and strictly private influence as sorcerers and diviners. There were no more gatherings on the hill tops or in the forests, in enclosures under the open sky; henceforward the Gauls had their temples, like all the Mediterranean peoples.

Rome left her mark no less evidently on the moral life of the Gauls, though she could give them nothing except what she herself possessed. Conquered almost at the moment when a new order was about to arise with the Principate, this

¹ Adr. Blanchet, *Les Figurines de terre cuite de la Gaule romaine*, XXVII, LI (1891), p. 65-244; LX (1901), p. 189-272.

² Espérandieu, *Conférences du musée Guimet*, 1912, p. 1-57.

³ Friedr. Hertlein, *Die Jupiter-Gigantensäulen*, Stuttgart, 1910.

country from the very first knew none but disillusioned and profligate Italians. The Empire very quickly attained its maximum of power and extent; well balanced characters disappeared from a society that was merely polished and refined, very much preoccupied with its own comfort but very little influenced by any lofty ideal. Its religion was scepticism allied to ritualistic formulæ and conventional practices. Its sentiments were not, as a rule, wicked or hateful, but rather mean and commonplace. The Gauls modelled themselves upon it. A sort of universal egoism invaded men's souls, and it was not displaced by the municipal or collegiate spirit; loyalty to the convenient organizations of the city or the corporation was due to the advantages which these might offer, or in some cases to the honours derived from them, so that this deference to institutions could not be mistaken for a sense of civic duty; it was merely a sign of panic when the civic burdens seemed too heavy. Effort of any kind was the hardest thing of all.

It did not require very much of this to undertake the study of Latin, which was useful even in commercial dealings and indispensable to the man who aspired to become a Roman citizen or even to improve his position in his town. The schools¹ played an important part, though we can only dimly perceive it without being able to follow the details, at any rate as regards elementary education. Certain legal texts bear witness to State intervention at a more advanced stage, and we have the works of the rhetoricians—men like Eumenes and Symmachus—who speak of the establishments which they attended. The traditional title of University requires explanation: at Marseilles, Autun, Rheims, Trèves, Bordeaux, the instruction given was very similar to the modern French "humanities" for young boys, with grammar included. There was no centre of research anywhere; study of the great authors, aided by the foundation of certain libraries, practical exercises and rhetorical contests made up the invariable programme, which produced subtle, eloquent and learned men, though their minds were cast in a uniform mould. At Marseilles Greek culture held the first place; but it was nowhere absent, for Greece provided teachers everywhere, even at Autun, in spite of its isolation and very

¹ Th. Haarhoof, *The Schools of Gaul*, Oxford, 1920.

Gallic character. These establishments were controlled by the emperors, who imposed their will upon them and fixed the teachers' salaries—with all the more liberality because they left the duty of paying them to the cities. There was no lack of students; the literary training was more valuable than any other as a preparation for the discharge of public duties and the higher administrative career, a fact which reminds us of the social importance of Chinese literature with its sterilizing influence.

It is hardly surprising that no originality could break the bonds of such a deadening convention. All the writers of Gaul are "second-hand," imitators of the Greeks and Romans, whose best methods they failed to borrow. *Argute loqui!* That tendency had been noted from the very first among the Gauls, and in consequence there was an abundance of rhetoricians, though they were so obsessed by Latin fashions that many of them left their country. Still, in the general decadence of the fourth century, their names are among the least tarnished;¹ but we could well spare the frantic toadyism of the panegyrists of those days, the blind devotion of Namatianus to a decadent Rome, the funambulatory displays of Ausonius, happily atoned for by his praises of Bordeaux or the Moselle, through which he alone acquires some resemblance to a national poet.

In art² also the instructors, who were themselves imitators, worked upon a *tabula rasa*: the Greeks repeated themselves incessantly; the Romans advanced no further than some unimportant architectural inventions. They did not conceal from the Gauls any of their methods of adding to the pleasures of life and the pomp of cities. Temples, basilicas, theatres and amphitheatres, monumental gateways or triumphal arches, tombs, towers, mausoleums, pyramids, chapels, altars and sarcophaguses—none of these could seem at all strange to the Roman visitor. Greek statues reminded him of the collectors' galleries in the capital; in Gaul as in Italy, foreign artists came to seek orders on the spot. The colossal Mercury of Puy-de-Dôme, made by the Greek Zenodotus, assuredly

¹ R. Pichon, *Les Derniers écrivains profanes* [dans les Gaules] Paris, 1906.

² Adr. Blanchet, *Étude sur la décoration des édifices de la Gaule romaine*, Paris, 1913.

had nothing Arvernian about it except its epithet. The invading mythology did not spare Gallic sculpture, though sometimes it was intermingled with themes taken from everyday life. These latter, and the funeral busts, poorly executed in some inferior native stone, are more attractive than the wearisome stock-pieces. In Belgica especially we find some power of fresh observation and some feeling for truth: the life of the middle-class countryman or of the artisan is portrayed for us in scenes from the family or the workshop. But, no less in stone than in clay, the style of decoration most pleasing to the Celt—interlaced ornament, openwork, curved and capricious outline—disappeared from Gaul, except in a very few places; and it was only in Britain, where the influence of classical art was less overwhelming, that the tradition was preserved and transmitted to the Middle Ages.

VI

THE REGIONS OF GAUL¹

Our country is not one of those where, except in a few specially explored localities, all traces of antiquity have disappeared. The abundance of texts and the multitude of explorations give us at any rate a rough idea of the life lived in each district and of the appearance of the chief centres of population.

Let us begin with Narbonensis,² the first region to be conquered and the quickest in its development, thanks to the proximity of Italy, the Mediterranean character of part of the country, the earlier Greek colonies, and the creations of Caesar and Augustus.³ The work of Rome before Cæsar remains obscure; she may have confined herself entirely, or almost entirely, to the foundation of three towns,⁴ but the facts do not become clear until the dictator's entry upon the scene. First of all circumstances impelled him to ruin the proud city of Marseilles. Pompey could not be defeated

¹ **LXV**, p. 333-384; **CXLII**, VI, p. 302 *ad fin.*

² **CXXX**, p. 19-39 and 47-95; **CLXXXIII**, p. 189 *et seq.*

³ J. Kromayer, **XVI**, XXXI (1896), p. 1-18.

⁴ See above. p. 293.

unless he was deprived of this base; hence the terrible siege, the surrender of the city, and the loss of its territory and naval apparatus. To tell the truth, it had been of little service to its inland possessions, which gained by this separation from it. In its empty harbour all activity ceased almost at once; but its favourable situation, its good climate, the intelligence and high culture of its inhabitants brought about a renaissance. We have already mentioned its University; young Italians came there in crowds to receive the Greek education which retained all its prestige, and there they found fellow countrymen who had compromised themselves in politics and had been banished from Rome after the old fashion of Athenian ostracism.

Two cities inherited the fortune of Marseilles. *Forum Julii* (Fréjus),¹ the "market of Cæsar," was less indebted to him than to Augustus for its transient prosperity. There the emperor established the sailors who had won the battle of Actium, and in the bay he anchored the ships that had been captured. A purely military town, as its inscriptions (soldiers' epitaphs) attest, it commanded the neighbouring country and the main lines of communication; but the harbour made by Augustus—a purely artificial one that was constantly in danger—became so quickly blocked with sand that continual labour was needed to maintain it, and the central government finally gave up the attempt. As we have said, the fleet disappeared in the second century, and this marked the beginning of an irremediable decay from which the city has never recovered; its majestic ramparts, its subterranean arsenals and the ruins of its two citadels are even more suggestive than its pleasure buildings of its former character. All that Fréjus gained by the ruin of Marseilles was its importance as a naval station.

In the sphere of commerce it was Narbonne that supplanted that famous city. *Narbo Martius* had twice received colonists from Rome and was already a flourishing town. Like Fréjus, only more so, it is now at a distance from the sea; but in Roman times, thanks to the lakes that surrounded it and joined the pool of Sigean, it had communication by water with the Mediterranean, and for the flat-bottomed vessels of those days all these connected basins formed an

¹ C. Jullian, *Fréjus romain*, Paris, 1886.

adequate, even a spacious harbour. Moreover, it commanded the road to Spain and the mouth of the pass connecting the two slopes of the Cévennes. But after being burnt down in the middle of the second century and degraded from the rank of capital, it lost all its importance, like the other cities on the coast. Its magnificent buildings, now entirely destroyed, won the admiration of Sidonius Apollinaris as late as the fifth century, though they must have appeared very old even to him.

The course of trade was altered; it followed the valley of the Rhone, and the cities nearer the river profited by the change: not so much Aix (*Aquæ Sextiæ*),¹ a middle-class town full of old families but pre-eminently agricultural, as Nîmes and Arles. *Nemausus* (from the Celtic *nemetum*, a sanctuary) was sacked, like Aix, at the time of the invasions, but it was less completely laid waste, and it is at Nîmes that the traveller in France finds most monuments of antiquity.² The Gallic city did not prosper until Augustus introduced there as colonists after the battle of Actium some Greeks from Egypt³ who had been captured on Antony's ships; the palm-tree and crocodile used as emblems on its coins were long reminiscent of this origin.

The sacred spring that watered the neighbouring slopes gave it a religious standing. This fountain (*Nemausus*) had its temple, which has perhaps been identified near the baths; and many others were built, in particular a Capitol and the famous "Maison Carrée," whose Greek style no doubt reflected the origin of a section of the inhabitants. A spring was a godsend in this arid, poorly watered district; but instead of remaining content with it, the Romans, on the initiative, as it is thought, of Agrippa, brought thither also the waters of two small rivers by means of the "Pont du Gard" which is still standing. It would be hard to account for the presence of men from all lands if Nîmes had not been a commercial city, but we know nothing of its industry. Its huge arenas, entirely artificial and unassisted by any natural declivity, imply a considerable population which did not shrink from costly undertakings.

¹ Michel Clere, *Aquæ Sextiæ*, Aix, 1916.

² H. Bazin, *Nîmes gallo-romain*, Paris, 1891.

³ CXXX, p. 40-44.



MAP VII.—THE GAULS.

Yet it was not Nîmes but Arles (*Arelate*) that represented from the first century of our era "the economic capital of Provence and its most important intellectual and artistic centre,"¹ though it only gradually eclipsed its rivals, Narbonne and Lyons. It had already profited by the overthrow of Marseilles, upon whose former territory its own encroached, being so much enlarged as to join that of Fréjus. The famous "Marian trenches," a canal dug by Marius to supply his troops when marching against the Teutones, subsequently enabled this landlocked post to add maritime commerce to its river-borne trade. Nevertheless the troubles of the third century would have dealt a fatal blow to Arles had it not been for an unforeseen event which revived the city and added still further to its natural advantages. Struck by its favourable position as a junction of many roads, Constantine made it "the Rome of Gaul" and paid it several visits; while, less than a century later, it was the residence of a prætorian prefect. Thanks to these privileges, Arles was not merely a town of ship-owners; in the century when the Empire accepted Christianity its buildings were prominent among the works of art inspired by the new faith.² No remnant of its basilicas has survived; but we still have a good number of its sculptured sarcophaguses, and although, as a matter of fact, they are thought to have been the work of Roman artists, the presence of the latter proves at any rate the wealth of the town at this period.³ Above all, it was at Arles that, through a happy commixture of Celtic, Greek and Latin elements, the Provençal civilization had its real origin.⁴

Along the Rhone, north of the Durance, there was a succession of agricultural towns; only one of them has preserved any remarkable memorials of this period, namely the colony of Orange (*Arausio*), with its theatre almost intact, of which recent excavations have revealed the entries,⁵ and its triumphal arch which could, without giving offence to

¹ Constans, *Arles antique*, Conclusion; Id., *Esquisse d'une histoire de la Basse-Provence dans l'antiquité*, Marseilles, 1923.

² H. Leclercq, **XLII**, art. *Arles*.

³ Edm. Le Blant, *Étude sur les sarcophages chrétiens antiques de la ville d'Arles*, Paris, 1878.

⁴ Constans, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

⁵ J. Formigé, **XXVI**, **XIII** (1923), p. 21 *et seq.*, 201-223

anyone, record the fact that the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir had been repressed.¹

Further on was the colony *Julia Vienna* (Vienne),² Latin rather than Roman, the capital of the powerful tribes of the Allobrogi, whose nobility lived there in great splendour, as we may learn from the fragments of works of art that have been dug up almost everywhere. The Italian element was not plentiful there, since the colonists were drawn from the auxiliary troops; and yet Vienne became a Roman colony under Caligula, while the temple of Augustus and Livia had already been raised in proof of its loyalty. It owed its prosperity and influence to its very extensive territory, which stretched as far as the Isère and included areas on both sides of the Alps. Within its jurisdiction lay some towns of the future, then in process of formation, such as Aix-les-Bains, Annecy, Geneva and Grenoble.

Beyond the right bank of the Rhone, Béziers (*Bæterræ*), founded by some veterans, immediately became the great wine market that it has remained ever since; and further on, included in Narbonensis for strategical reasons, though looking in quite another direction, *Tolosa* (Toulouse) deserves mention, not for its insignificant remnants of antiquity, but as an intellectual centre vouched for by Martial, who called it the "town of Minerva," and by Ausonius long afterwards.

We have already seen that Narbonensis retained its original boundaries until Diocletian's reign, but the current speech showed that some of the western districts were arbitrarily connected with it. After that emperor had detached a new province from it, namely Viennensis, it was only the south-eastern part of the ancient *Provincia*, the typical province, most Latin of them all on account of its numerous colonies, which gave its name to our modern Provence.

Next in order, chronology bids us recall the distinguished position of Lyons, capital of the Gauls,³ whose imperfectly interpreted Celtic name, *Lugudunum*, implies the existence of an earlier town, though a very unimportant one, since the choice of Rome, which was made almost at once, gave all its significance to this acropolis of Gaul, as Strabo afterwards

¹ L. Chatelain, *Les Monuments d'Orange*, Paris, 1908.

² H. Bazin, *Vienne et Lyon gallo-romains*, Paris, 1891.

³ *Ibid.*; A. Steyert, *Nouvelle histoire de Lyon*, Lyon, I (1895).

called it. Not that it could have contained a population equal to that of today; besides, the great fire of 65, if it did not check, at any rate delayed its development; but the crowd of visitors present within its territory on great occasions may have been equal in number to the stable and permanent population. The advantages of its happy situation were all the more striking on the morrow of a rapid conquest, when so much of its vast *hinterland* was unknown and, in a country still new, the easiest and safest lines of communication were the principal river valleys. The confluence commanded these lines in three directions and, in order to hold them, it was necessary to occupy the high ground dominating the Saône; there the Roman city was built, with its colonists, its garrison and the *Forum vetus* made by Trajan, which the French language has changed into Fourvière. Nothing has survived of the public buildings on the side of the hill; excavations have proved that the plateau itself was covered with private houses worthy of their site; but, except for the foundations, only coins and fragments of pottery have been found.¹ Indeed, the only remains on a large scale are the imposing ruins of the aqueducts which supplied the city on the hill-top.²

Below Fourvière lay the Celtic quarter, a place of business and an emporium through which there was incessant traffic; in the island of the Rhone and the neighbouring districts, which were first of all drained, the corporations soon replaced their wooden huts by substantial buildings: wine-merchants and watermen from both rivers had their offices and warehouses there. Not all were of Gallic origin; international trade had brought in a number of foreigners, and many of them, attracted by the position of the town and the facilities for making profits, lost any desire to return. Thus a cosmopolitan crowd was collected, Greeks, Syrians and orientals of all kinds, through whom Christianity found its way into the city, fervently resisting the persecutions of Marcus Aurelius and Septimius Severus.³

Finally, to the north of the lower city there was a sort

¹ C. Germain de Montauzan, *Annales de l'Université de Lyon*, N.S., II, Nos. 25, 28, 30 (1912-1915).

² Id., *Les Aqueducs antiques de Lyon*, Paris, 1909.

³ CXXX, p. 154-185.

of sacred enclosure, the federal territory, into which the delegates poured every year to attend the provincial Council. In the centre rose the vast altar of Rome and Augustus, gilded, carved and resplendent, flanked by two columns, whose form is preserved for us on the local coins; and round it were the temple of the *divi*, the quarters for the priests and those who entertained the deputies, the circus, and the amphitheatre where the games were held, for the spirit of Hellenism presided at these panceltic festivals, though it did not make of Lyons an intellectual centre.

The great battle of 197 inflicted losses on the city which were to be increased by the troubles of the third century. In the fourth century the imperial cities of Trèves and Arles eclipsed one which had at any rate served its purpose as a centre of unification.

When they entered "long-haired" Gaul, the pure Romans felt less at home; we can easily see that life underwent fewer changes there before the Middle Ages. Inscriptions are much rarer and archæological monuments more concentrated; the towns are further apart, five or six times as far, on an average, as those of Narbonensis; often they are poorly built and seem to be mere alien centres. Judging by the reliefs, the natives kept their traditions and peasant garb, and the tribes their ethnical titles.

Except for the Pyrenæan province of Novempopuli, the Ibernian centre of resistance, thanks to which the Basques and Béarnais still retain their local idioms, it was in Aquitania¹ that the process of transition was least rapidly effected. As regards soil and climate, the great triangular plain divided in two by the Garonne had few surprises in store for the men from the South. Nevertheless urban life was backward there, and Bordeaux alone² attained the dimensions of a metropolitan city. Its first name, *Burdigala*, was derived from the Iberians, but the Celts of the central plateau established themselves there and, without help from Rome or military colonists, knew how to profit by the agricultural

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 209-238.

² C. Jullian, *Histoire de Bordeaux*, Bordeaux, 1895.

wealth of the whole surrounding district and make the best use of the harbour deep-set in the estuary of the Gironde. Bordeaux owed nothing to the Romans except increased facilities for trade in consequence of the annexation of Britain to the Empire; few Italians were attracted there by the administrative services of the province. The influence of the latter was only felt after a long time, when the city had been much increased in size, and it was not until the third century that it began to be filled with pretentious buildings. The blatant luxury of the *nouveaux riches* sprung from this rural neighbourhood found expression in the ponderous architecture and the affectation which emperors from Africa or Syria had brought into fashion. Then misfortune changed the appearance of Burdigala, which had to be encircled with walls; and since its trade was obstructed by the troubles of the time, it became, like some other towns, a place of study for men of letters, poets and orators.

At first Bordeaux had had a rival in *Mediolanum Santonum* (Saintes), the centre of one of the most prominent Celtic tribes. The favours obtained by this town from the family of Drusus and Germanicus and the designs of Augustus combine with the fertility of its soil and the industry of its clothiers to explain a prosperity to which its ancient monuments bear witness.

Roman Aquitania also included the whole central plateau, which differed much from the rest of the province: on its circumference there were a few very unimportant towns, while, to the north, *Avaricum* (Bourges), capital of the Bituriges, a leading tribe before the occupation, had lost much of its Gallic splendour. The sheer mountain mass had no attraction for the peoples of the South, and their great trade routes avoided it. At Arvernes,¹ the last buttress of independence, there were still the fertility of the Limagne, the hot springs caused by extinct volcanoes, and a ceramic industry whose renown spread far and wide. Finally, religion gave an exceptional position to *Augustonemetum* (Celtic for "temple of Augustus"), thanks to the national sanctuary built at great cost and in magnificent style on the neighbouring hill, the Puy-de-Dôme, whose fame throughout Gaul explains its title, "the famous mountain" (*Clarus Mons*),

¹ CXXX, p. 186-208.

which was bequeathed to the last centre from which the pilgrims started (Clermont).

Lugdunensis comprised the country of the Ædui,¹ a dominant and tyrannical tribe in Cæsar's time. On their territory only one notable town arose, "the citadel of Augustus," *Augustodunum* (Autun),² which was a citadel from the beginning and not merely from the third century, for its ruins reveal the workmanship of the better period. It was a sort of advanced fortress of Lyons, and it was not placed on the site of the old Celtic *oppidum* of Mount Beuvray, Bibracte, which was abandoned, but a new town was built on virgin soil within 15,000 paces of this, in accordance with a regular plan which allowed for wide streets. Its good understanding with Rome was emphasized by costly buildings, purely Roman in style—a monumental gateway, a theatre and amphitheatre on a great scale—and by a renowned establishment for teaching Græco-Roman literature. But the Celtic spirit held its ground in the schools; the great majority of the students were Gauls, and very few foreigners came to mix with them. Nevertheless, in the final crisis of the Empire in Gaul, it was Autun that remained loyal to the Roman cause; though, as we have seen,³ it had to pay dearly for this proof of good sense. The emperors of the fourth century tried in vain to bring about its renaissance; too far removed from the great highways, the "Celtic Rome" seemed henceforward a merely artificial creation and retained hardly a shadow of its past greatness.

In the valley of the Yonne, whose source was hard by, we find no real town until we come to *Agedincum* (Sens), the capital of the Senones. A museum of statuary proves its importance in the first centuries of our era, and its bounds in the Middle Ages were still those of the third century. As the capital of Lugdunensis IV and afterwards the see of an archbishop, primate of the Gauls, it took precedence on these grounds of Paris itself.

Nevertheless Lutetia⁴ had already extended far beyond its original cradle, the islet where the great fraternity of

¹ *Ibid.*

² In old French *Ostedun*. Cf. Harold de Fontenay, *Autun et ses monuments*, Autun, 1889.

³ See above, p. 305.

⁴ F.-J. de Pachtère, *Paris à l'époque gallo-romaine*, Paris, 1912.

nautes or watermen still kept their offices, and the left bank of the river especially had profited by its first enlargement. Mount Sainte-Geneviève close at hand provided a place of refuge that could easily be defended; beneath it were built in the second century the baths, the amphitheatre,¹ of which a part survives, a circus and a theatre, all on a scale appropriate to a city that long remained unpretentious; later on, after the disasters of the third century, the fortified camp was made in which his enthusiastic subjects hailed as Augustus the young Cæsar Julian.²

The rich soil of Normandy had made it from the first one of the great agricultural districts of Gaul, but its capital *Rotomagus* (Rouen) gave no hint in those days of its future destiny: the presence of some linen factories did not compensate for the insignificance of its river traffic. Otherwise there were no cities in the district; only humble villages formed in the neighbourhood of the principal villas. It was a land of farmers who remained loyal to old usages and to the life of the countryside.

Armorica, more closely connected with the Atlantic than with the neighbouring districts, was still more wrapped up in its old traditions. The only city, *Namnetes* (Nantes), owed to its river and its relations with the great island of Britain a commercial activity which was not ignored by the Romans; the town was latinized and equipped in the style of its masters. Excavation has shown that the same civilization extended also to a large number of places whose ancient names are unknown to us, the townships of Anjou and the vast granary of the Carnutes.

The Roman Belgica³ was considerably larger in area than modern Belgium. To the south it included the western half of Switzerland,⁴ the lowland half, and all the upper valley of the Rhone except Valais, which was subject to the procurator of the *Alpes Pœninæ*. This latter region was at first regarded as a military zone for defence against the Alpine brigands; towns or colonies were only established there for the sake of their strategical position, which explains why Nyon, Augst and Avenches began to decline as soon as they were no longer required for that purpose. The annexation

¹ C. Jullian, *Le Paris des Romains*, Paris, 1924.

² CCI, IV, chap. VIII.

³ XCI.

⁴ CLXXXVI.

of the Agri Decumates and the pacification of the towns changed the condition of the Helvetians; Roman culture was more widely spread and endured for centuries, since there is still a Swiss Romance dialect in existence, whereas the isolated and less firmly established Celtic yielded before the invasions which gave birth to German Switzerland. But this romanization, due to mere proximity and not to any systematic endeavour, produced no great city: the country, divided by many partitions, was already beginning its cantonal life.

Similarly the mountainous character of our Franche Comté explains the insignificance of its towns: only one of them, *Vesontio* (Besançon), kept its importance as a stronghold, and also extended towards the plain, where some ruins of the Latin city have survived.

We know little of Langres, capital of the Lingones, or of Rheims (*Durocortorum*), the headquarters of the Remi and the Roman capital, thanks especially to the roads that met there. In those days there was no separation between districts which now belong to two different states. But the roads traversing France and Belgium crossed the former of these two territories in preference to the latter, because they found their best outlet to the sea at *Gesoriacum* (Boulogne), an old Celtic harbour turned into a military station, which also provided the shortest means of communication with Britain. From Rheims a great highway ran straight to *Bagacum* (Bavai), which commanded a second road, and forked a little beyond it towards the west, one of the branches passing through *Nemetacum* (Arras) and *Taruenna* (Théroutanne), where it rejoined the other, which had diverged by way of *Turnacum* (Tournai), *Viroviacum* (Verwieu) and *Castellum* (Cassel). These were important roads, though they served no city of the first rank; and the position was similar, but still more striking, in the basin of the Escaut.

It has been justly remarked¹ that the Belgium of those days was a country without towns, whose agricultural population lived in farms and villages. The influence of Rome was slowly introduced and never completely established there, and it was spread by indirect means. Among the most efficacious we may note first the constant, though quite voluntary, enlistment of such warlike tribesmen as the

¹ XCI, p. 9.

Menapii of Flanders, the Nervii of Hainaut, and the Tungri of Limbourg, and secondly the constant activity of the agents of the *annona*; from the earliest times Italian *negotiatores* found it an advantage to carry on their business within the orbit of the armies of the Rhine. The Menapii furnished crews for the war fleet of the Pas-de-Calais and for the barges on the river ways. Farmers and cattle-breeders, clothiers and workers in metal, even miners developed their industry by means of the new methods learnt from Rome. The prosperity of the inhabitants is shown by the ruins of villas scattered all over the country.¹ The richest of them, built of solid materials, affect an Italian style, subject only to certain modifications on the score of climate; thus they have deep cellars as a precaution against the damp, glass window-panes, hypocausts like those of the Italian baths, tiles and slates which could be provided on the spot. In their decoration, furniture, utensils and good fare, the Belgians clearly imitated their masters, importing luxuries from a distance when they could not make them for themselves. Græco-Roman art imposed its influence on them, but without prejudice to the realism of the race or its powers of observation. Finally, there is no doubt that education penetrated even into the country districts—a very unusual occurrence. The wave of barbarism swept over Belgium and caused the same disasters there as elsewhere: in order to save time, it rounded the forest of the Ardennes, which was larger and denser than it is today, and this no doubt is one of the facts that explain the persistence of the Latin character in Wallonia.

The invader had followed two main routes converging on Rheims: that of the Sambre and Meuse, after passing Tongres (*Aduatuca*), branched in three directions, to Neumagen (*Noviomagus*), Xanten (*Vetera*) and Cologne (*Colonia Agrippina*); that which, further south, came from the Rhine through Trèves and Arlon (*Orolaunum*) played a much more pacific and civilizing part than the other. It was the principal thoroughfare between Lyons and the Rhine frontier. Metz (*Divodorum* or the “sacred village”) marked the junction of the roads from Langres to Trèves and from Rheims to Strasbourg; but this latter, serving Alsace² and the southern

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42 *et seq.*

² J. Toutain, *Notes sur l'Alsace gallo-romaine* (*Pro Alesia*, 1920, p. 145-161; 1921, p. 52-67).

Palatinate, had its eastern terminus in a very barren region whose great importance was not realized until a later period; few garrisons were to be found there with a mere handful of troops in each.

Further north the conditions were just the opposite: the two Germanies¹ were crowded with troops concentrated in great permanent camps. Near them, to supply their many requirements, and linked together by well known and perfectly maintained roads,² a number of small villages, *conventus*, *vici*, were formed, which grew incessantly until they became towns like Neumagen, Cologne³ and Mainz (*Moguntiacum*),⁴ which was at once capital of the province and headquarters of the Rhine shipping.⁵ Very few, however, developed into real cities, and those few will never be well known: the ancient *Colonia* is buried under heaps of rubbish, and the fragments preserved in collections are all that has survived of *Moguntiacum*.

On this side of the great rampart that followed the course of the river, a military headquarters, less exposed than these towns but near enough to supervise them all, was found to be necessary, especially after the German inroad; and to this fact alone was due the prosperity of Trèves (*Augusta Trevirorum*),⁶ hitherto a very obscure colony, but afterwards the residence of the emperor of the West, and then of a prætorian prefect. On its charming site girt round with sunny slopes on which, in spite of its latitude, the vine finds an admirable soil, massive and sombre ruins like the enormous "Black Gate," at once gloomy and imposing, are a better memorial than anything else of a century full of trouble and danger; the life of luxury and pleasure indulged in by very high dignitaries and their suites was frequently interrupted, and under the threat of an ever present danger the population acquired a "frontier spirit" and a marked taste for brutal and bloody entertainments.

¹ F. Drexel, *Germania Romana*, 2 Aufl., II, Bamberg, 1924; H. Dragendorff, *Westdeutschland zur Römerzeit*, 2 Aufl., 1919.

² CXVIII.

³ A. Grenier, *Quatre villes romaines de Rhénanie: Trèves, Mayence, Bonn, Cologne*, Paris, 1925, p. 123 *et seq.*; R. Schultze, IX, CXXX (1925), p. 254-261.

⁴ Grenier, *ibid.*, p. 73 *et seq.*

⁵ Cf. H. Aubin, *Der Rheinhandel in römischer Zeit*, IX, CXXX (1925), p. 1-37.

⁶ Grenier, *ibid.*, p. 11 *et seq.*

VII

ROME'S ACHIEVEMENT

This may be summed up in a few words, and first of all let us dispose of an old theory that spoke of a mere veneer leaving the original groundwork untouched. No one would venture to maintain this any longer, and the only reservation still made is that the monuments chiefly reveal to us the life of the rich¹ and give us little information about the transformation of the masses. For both alike, however, some things of the past had really been destroyed—the influence of the druid priests, for example, so different from the provincial priests who replaced them and were in reality laymen preaching the imperial idea. After that it mattered little that the old forms of worship profited by Rome's tolerance; there needed only the coming of Christianity to stamp them out.

Was there any institutional development? Among the Gauls who were Roman citizens we cannot doubt that there was. As for the others—and there were no others after the third century—it seems clear that the patriarchal family of the clan was gradually replaced by the family of the Latin type, and that the advance from collective ownership to individual ownership was at any rate hastened by the coming of the Romans. The result was the emancipation of the individual: the local chiefs were no longer appointed by right of birth, but by election or by their masters. The Gauls cannot have opposed the disappearance of an oppressive and economically deadly system; their attitude would be determined by this enfranchisement of the individual without any other inducement. When the Empire fell into decay, the old personal subordination of man to man was re-established; but atavism had less to do with this than the influx of Germans.

In the matter of language, the still incomplete conclusion to which we have come is satisfactory as far as it goes.² It is true that, towards the time of the invasions, Gallic words

¹ CXLII, V, p. 9.

² LXV, p. 385 *et seq.*; F. Brunot, *Revue des cours et conférences*, 1923-24, II, p. 481-490.

were still in use, and the authors quote them occasionally. St. Irenæus, bishop of Lyons from 178, made use of a "barbarian dialect" in his preaching; but are there not still Breton sermons in Brittany and Corsican sermons in Corsica? St. Jerome compared the language of the Asiatic Galatians with that of the Treviri; but, in spite of all, we see that Latin is finally triumphant in the sixth century, a popular Latin destined to give birth to the Romance tongue, but rising on the ruins of the Celtic. The current use of old idioms did not prevent Latin from being understood; in our day almost all the speakers of dialect understand French. It would be vain to search for Celtic influence on the latinity of the popular inscriptions, though naturally they are sometimes incorrect, as they are in all the provinces of the Empire. Epigraphy was a valuable acquisition for Gaul. It is true that it has given us no specimen of the municipal acts, whence the hypothesis that they must have been announced by a crier instead of being posted up;¹ but the fact remains that the epitaphs are not only those of the upper classes, and that many humble artisans live again for us as we read them. Are we to believe that their heirs engraved on their tombstones lines that would have been unintelligible to them? And is it not a point of supreme significance that Latin became the universal language of commerce?

If we are willing to admit that the unity at last acquired was a benefit to Gaul, we shall honour the dominion of Rome for having helped to achieve it, for it was something more than a mere question of frontiers. And we shall hesitate to admit that the maintenance of peace among the Celts was counterbalanced by the rivalry of pretenders to the throne with its evil consequences even for the provinces,² seeing that such conflicts might have arisen among the Celts if they had remained independent. The prestige of the central power had a profound influence on their minds, and inspired in them a respect that was mingled with devotion.

And this influence persisted even when authority had ceased or almost ceased to make itself felt, from the fifth century onward. A close alliance was made between the Merovingians and the Roman church, which used the Latin language, so that the romanization begun by the Cæsars was

¹ CXLII, VI, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 545.

completed by their enemies. No doubt the culture transmitted to the Gauls was stagnant or even retrograde towards the end; there was no originality in it; nothing but servile imitation except for a few details. Hence some harsh criticisms have been made: "Rome recast Gaul in her own contemporary image, and checkèd her natural development."¹ But we do not know what the latter would have been; and this involves a more general question to which we must return elsewhere.²

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 553 *et seq.*

² See our Conclusion.

CHAPTER X

BRITAIN

I

HISTORICAL OUTLINE

LONG before the Roman conquest Britain had been invaded by men from across the Channel; the pure Celts were mingled with Gallo-Celts from northern Gaul, for the relations between peoples are largely determined by geographical conditions, and this country which was easily accessible from the Gallic coast and belonged to the same land mass attracted emigrants, singly or in groups, before it fell an easy prey to the Romans.¹ It was with peoples resembling the Gallic tribes and, like them, disunited that Cæsar came in contact when he made his first attempt, of which we have already noted the result.² We know that it led to nothing, and that Claudius was the first to repeat it successfully³ and create the new province.

This dated from the year 43, but its boundaries were undetermined; a foothold had been gained in the country, but it had to be pacified, and this involved a laborious advance, accompanied by fighting, towards the north and the west. The policy adopted, which had already proved successful elsewhere, was to receive the submission of the local sovereigns while leaving them a nominal authority, but unfortunately the masses did not always prove obedient. A special cause of anxiety to the Romans was the druid priesthood which had, as it were, an intrenched position in the isle of *Mona* (Anglesey); the governor Suetonius Paulinus came to disturb them in their retreat, but they escaped, no doubt to regions still free from the foreign yoke.

This attack, and still more the behaviour of the veterans, the exactions of Roman legates, and compulsory enlistment

¹ CXXIII.

² See above, p. 36.

³ *Id.*, p. 54.

caused a serious revolt, in which a woman, Boudicca, played a remarkable part; at her summons a number of tribes joined forces in a great coalition (59). During the absence of Paulinus, a legion was cut to pieces; three open towns, where many Romans lived, were occupied, and plunder and fire had their sequel in a massacre of prisoners in the forest, in accordance with ancestral custom. Yet the legate's tactical skill repressed the revolt in a single battle; another massacre avenged the first, and Boudicca poisoned herself. Henceforward there were only occasional attempts at resistance until the coming of Vespasian.

This emperor had a very happy inspiration; one of his chief partisans, Cn. Julius Agricola,¹ had already held a military command in Britain, and Vespasian placed him in charge of the province, where he took up his duties as legate in the year 77.² His son-in-law Tacitus records the administrative reforms which he immediately introduced, without neglecting to subdue by force of arms a turbulent people in Wales and to reimpose obedience on Mona, which seems to have regained its freedom in the late revolt. Then he carried his police measures further north and imposed peace on the war-loving Brigantes who occupied what is now the county of Yorkshire. It is not clear whether the campaigns which he next undertook were the result of orders from Rome or due to his own initiative. Even their scene remains a problem. It is certain that he reconnoitred the country as far as the Firths of Clyde (*Clota*) and Forth (*Bodotria*), and subsequently advanced even beyond this line. Tacitus has described in abundant detail the battles which he fought and the far-seeing strategy which he adopted: simultaneously with the manœuvres on land he despatched a naval squadron to cruise round Scotland, thus insuring for himself a means of retreat and learning the size of the island.

When he was recalled in 84, after a long term of government, he had covered the Roman arms with glory, but Domitian did not allow him to follow up his successes; no doubt he did not require the conquest of all northern Scotland,³ which never became a part of the province.

¹ Gaheis, **XLVII**, X, col. 125-143.

² R. Knox MacElderry, **XXII**, X (1920), p. 68-78.

³ **CXCIII**, p. 74; **CXV**, p. 174 *et seq.*

At the time of their first contact with the Romans the *civitates* of Britain differed from those of Gaul in being subject to petty kings; Cæsar states this very clearly; only a few southern districts, influenced perhaps by what was taking place on the other side of the Channel, were governed by oligarchies. The changes which must have been introduced or promoted by the conquest are imperfectly indicated in the following passage from the *Agricola*:¹ "Formerly the Britons were subject to kings; now they are divided, in accordance with their feuds or their interests, among a number of *principes*." This last term is obscure; it might refer either to an aristocratic faction or to the pseudo-kings who were supported by Rome and acted as her agents; in any case, if the territorial divisions continued to exist, as they did in Gaul, the governor seems to have secured the predominance in each one of a *régime* consistent with his own views.

Our sources are almost entirely silent about the period which followed Agricola's departure. It used to be thought that his expedition was a mere voyage of discovery and that the province did not even extend as far as the Solway Firth; such moderation would be justified by the necessity of employing on other frontiers the troops which a more ambitious policy would have required. But it is now possible to establish by means of archæological data² that the occupation of North Britain continued in practice until towards the end of Trajan's reign, when a withdrawal was brought about by some disaster which befell the ninth legion. Then the Brigantes were left outside the province, and Rome was content with imposing tribute on them; but they were not so easily subdued, and it seems to have been in their neighbourhood, at *Eburacum*, that some grave disturbances inspired Hadrian with the idea of visiting the island in order to establish lasting order in it. We are very ill informed as regards the details of his intervention, but there is no doubt that he was chiefly concerned with this region of the north, where he must have marked out his *vallum*, and that a valuable impetus was given to the mining industry in particular.

Antoninus Pius felt the urgent need of putting an end

¹ Chap. XII.

² G. Macdonald, **XXII**, IX (1919), p. 111-138.

to the disturbances caused by the Brigantes, and resolved to take away what remained of their independence, in order to isolate them from their ungovernable neighbours, the Caledonians, who were constantly inciting them to revolt. He reincorporated their territory in the province, and its boundary, now carried further north, was marked by a new *vallum*.

But this rampart was destined to be violated; and when the assailants had surmounted it, they cut to pieces a Roman troop and extended their ravages far and wide. Then Commodus despatched against them the governor Ulpius Marcellus, whose rapid successes seemed sufficient to entitle him (i.e. the emperor) to the surname *Britannicus* (184). Nevertheless it seems probable that at this date the strip of territory between the two ramparts was no longer occupied, at least in its entirety, by the government forces. Moreover, these latter already showed signs of mutiny and affirmed their right to create Cæsars, thus giving dangerous encouragement to ambitious legates and placing the loyal ones in a false position. One of the former was Albinus, proclaimed Augustus by his three legions in 195, who deserted his province to march against his rival and was beaten by him north of Lyons.

As soon as he was rid of his various competitors, Septimius Severus made haste to divide into two provinces a government which seemed to place excessively large forces at the disposal of one man. Thus there were two Britains, *Superior* and *Inferior*, whose common frontier has been sought in vain; but it has been usual to suppose that, speaking generally, the *Inferior* division comprised the northern territories, and the *Superior* division those less remote from Rome. We have already expressed our doubts on this point¹ and suggested that on the whole the division must have followed a line drawn approximately from north to south, leaving to one legate the defence of the *vallum* and the mountainous regions of the west, especially Wales,² where two legions were encamped on guard, one at each end of the country; to the other legate the more low-lying districts of the east, where

¹ V. Chapot, **XXVII, LXXI** (1911), p. 154-164.

² R. E. M. Wheeler, *Segontium and the Roman Occupation of Wales*, London, 1923; *id.*, *Prehistoric and Roman Wales*, Oxford, 1926.

the single legion of York was stationed with a few auxiliaries. It would be an exaggeration to say that their forces were equally matched, though the better provided of the two was to see the numbers at his disposal considerably reduced.

Thus precautions were taken against internal dangers, but there remained the dangers from outside, which constantly increased. In spite of their promises, the Caledonians were ready to take the part of a revolted tribe, from which the governor was forced to buy at a high price a peace that was undoubtedly precarious.¹ Conditions became so unsettled that Septimius Severus, in spite of his age and infirmity, thought it necessary to appear in person, and he established himself with his retinue at York.

There he was to die two years later, after a series of expeditions in which he had been constrained to suffer "unspeakable things," to cut down forests, to dig trenches, to fill up marshes in order to obtain firm foundations for bridge-heads, to resist, without the power of forcing a real pitched battle, light-footed barbarians who found it easy to carry on a guerilla warfare because of their marvellous knowledge of the country. They were incredibly sober and, being almost naked, had nothing to encumber them; they drew the Roman detachments far from their base; they practised the stratagem of leaving flocks astray without a shepherd, as if they had been abandoned, and then murdered the sutlers who ventured in small numbers to a distance from the camps. At last the troops began to melt away, and yet Severus, who followed his army in a litter, showed himself strangely obstinate and even, according to Dio, anxious to subjugate all Caledonia. As a matter of fact, nothing could be more obscure than the actual result of this laborious effort; our only exact datum is furnished by the recent discovery of a Roman camp in the neighbourhood of Aberdeen.²

Throughout the third century, until its concluding years, no emperor, if we may trust the evidence of epigraphy, assumed the title of *Britannicus* or conqueror of the Britons. It would be rash to conclude from this that the country was

¹ Dio Cass., LXXV, 5.

² G. M. Fraser, *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, XXXI (1915) p. 561-567.

finally pacified, for the Caledonians began a new rebellion at the very moment when Severus died. All that has survived, in the loss of every detailed account of this confused period, is the memory of the rival ambitions by which the Empire was torn asunder; the legions of Britain were involved in those disputes and rallied to the support of various usurpers proclaimed in the Gallic provinces.¹ It is not clear what support—or what opposition—the usurpers could find among the native population, but in a case like that of Carausius we may form a hypothesis on the subject. That man of humble origin was a Menapian—either from Ireland, as has been suggested, or, as is more probable, from the plains of Flanders—and therefore a Celt, much more likely than a native Roman to gain acceptance. Moreover, he had at his disposal a considerable fleet with a well trained crew, and this was no small recommendation at a time when efforts were being made on every coast of Britain and Gaul to get rid of the pirates who infested the North Sea. The adventurer was acknowledged by the whole of Britain, and he had moreover taken into his service a considerable number of those Franks or Saxons who were forerunners of the invaders. Constantius Chlorus had just despatched an expedition against him when Carausius was assassinated (293) by a junior officer, Allectus, who got himself proclaimed emperor in his turn and survived for three years, when he was killed in a battle near *Vectis* (the Isle of Wight). Britain had been severed from Rome for about ten years; the welcome given to the new *Britannicus Maximus* in the hour of victory showed that the Franks enrolled by the usurper had practised every license on the population.

Thus the division of Britain into two provinces had not secured the results which Severus expected. Diocletian concluded that the division should be carried still further, and it is probably from his reign that we must date the four provinces mentioned as early as about 297 in the Verona list: *Britannia I* and *II*, *Maxima Cæsariensis*, *Flavia Cæsariensis*. Attempts to fix their boundaries have been made in vain;² it has only been proved by an epigraphical text that *Durocornovium* (Cirencester)³ lay within *Britannia I*,

¹ See above, p. 69.

² CXCH, p. 217.

³ F. Haverfield, IV, LXIX (1920).



which must therefore have included the south-western portion of the island. The subsequent creation of a fifth province, *Valentia*,¹ has merely puzzled research.

During the first half of the fourth century the history of Britain is as obscure to us as it was in the third. We do not know why Constantine also took the title of *Britannicus*. His son Constans had to cross the Channel in order to compose some difficulties, of which we know nothing, on the Scottish frontier. But, from the reign of Julian, Ammianus gives us some details about Britain which resemble only too closely those reported from the other provinces of the Empire:² the malpractices of such and such a high official sent there by the State; the murderous and destructive invasions, constantly repeated, of the barbarians of the North, who returned to the attack under the new names of Picts and Scots, and of the Franks or Saxons, who came by sea and ravaged the districts nearer Gaul. One energetic leader, Theodosius, father of the future emperor of that name, knew how to cope with both dangers; but when a certain Maximus, an officer of high rank in the island, was invested with the purple as a result of his own manœuvring and started for Italy with his troops and the young Britons who followed him of their own accord, Britain was left defenceless and was attacked again on every side. We need not give the details of a history that was always repeating itself; one fact—the general insecurity—is proved by the ever increasing quantity of buried treasure, and now the Britons themselves were appealing for help to the Roman forces which had been withdrawn from their country to carry out some other operation deemed more urgent. The day came when Honorius clearly announced as permanent a state of affairs which had already existed for three years, since 407: the inhabitants, hard pressed by the Saxons, must no longer rely upon anyone but themselves.³

An attempt has been made⁴ to deny this resolution and maintain that only the rampart of the north was then abandoned, the complete evacuation being postponed until 442 under Valentinian III. This view derives but a frail support

¹ Amm. Marc., XXVIII, 3, 7.

² CXCI, p. 239 *et seq.*

³ Zosimus, VI, 10, 2.

⁴ J. B. Bury, XXII, X (1920), p. 181-154; Edward Foord, *The Last Age of Roman Britain*, London, 1925.

from the *Notitia Dignitatum*, seeing that in other countries, which were certainly detached from Rome, it refers to imperial garrisons as still present;¹ the stern reality was too shocking for the Court scribes. On the other hand it has been possible to show² by the study of coins that the frontier wall was abandoned about 383, and that after 410 every link was severed between Britain and its former masters, whose place was taken by the Saxons.

II

THE OCCUPATION³

By the time this rupture took place the relations between Rome and her subjects had become more friendly. In the third and fourth centuries, when an emperor was created in Britain, the chief part was played by the regular troops, and the population, remaining loyal, gave little support to the usurper; but it is quite clear that, in earlier days, any pretext for revolt seemed good enough to the natives. Three legions with auxiliary troops was a large force to guard a very short frontier line; moreover, at least half the troops were stationed a long way from the *limes*, so that they must have been required to meet another possible emergency.⁴

Two significant facts give us food for thought: these units, even after Hadrian, were entirely unsupported by local enlistment,⁵ and before Diocletian we find in this army of Britain no single corps of auxiliaries recruited from among the natives—a systematic exclusion which we see nowhere else, except in Egypt. Yet, apart from the Spaniards who were found everywhere, most of the recruits for the island garrisons were drawn as a matter of principle from among the Gauls of Belgica and the two Germanies. They found in Britain a kindred people since, apart from the bond of common Celtic origin, certain Belgian tribes had, in the time of their independence, crossed the Channel to take up their abode on the other side. The comparative romanization

¹ F. Lot, **XXXII**, XXV (1923), p. 56.

² R. G. Collingwood, **XXII**, XII (1922), p. 74-90.

³ Cf. L. Le Roux, *L'Armée romaine de Bretagne*, Paris, 1911.

⁴ See above, p. 343.

⁵ **CXCIII**, p. 187 and 371.

of Britain is largely due to the Gauls, especially the Belgians.¹

We know very little of the administrative machinery employed there. The legates—there was more than one after Septimius Severus—are known by name in some cases;² the original capital and the several capitals after the division of the province are not once mentioned, so that we can only depend on arguments from probability. As regards the administration of justice, the names of a few *legati juridici* do not enable us to guess the number of these agents at any particular period or the date of their creation. Evidence concerning the financial institutions of the island and the collection of the taxes is very meagre, while our sources are almost completely silent about the provincial assembly and the worship of the Cæsars, everything leading us to suppose that this was very half-hearted. It was not there that the emperors found their readiest worshippers.

On the whole all our data point to an organization that was essentially military. Of course the roads were not merely of strategical value; as elsewhere, they met the needs of commerce and were used by civilian travellers; but their construction exceeded the requirements of the population. The network was very closely drawn—much more so than the population itself³—if we may trust the general evidence of the very inferior *Itinerary of Antoninus*, which is suspect in points of detail. But our still imperfect knowledge of the roads of Britain has benefited by many researches made on the spot. The milestones, which are few and displaced and by no means clear, have given hardly any help; but since in this very damp country very durable highways were essential, the builders brought to their task all the elaborate care prescribed by their technical advisers. As a matter of fact, more than one of these ancient roads has served as the foundation for a modern highway; and the charters and royal acts of the Middle Ages also refer, under quite new names, to roads which could hardly be other than those of the Roman occupants. The principal lines of direction were

¹ Léon Halkin, *Le Diplôme militaire romain de Flémalle-Haute* (*Publications du Musée belge*, No. 44), Louvain, 1913.

² Cf. Donald Atkinson, *The Governors of Britain from Claudius to Diocletian*, XXII, XII (1922), p. 60-73.

³ LXXXIV, Introduction and map.

determined by the nature of the country, and we may arrive at a just idea of the ancient system merely by examining a map of the chief railways in use today. There were already a number of roads converging on London; the southern routes were of course the earliest in date, and new sections were added as the province extended further north;¹ they even forestalled the construction of the *limes*.

It is this latter which has most attracted the attention of archæologists. Not that there was any lack of fortresses in the rest of the province, but it was observed that they were for the most part of the type usually adopted by Roman military science. The Britons already possessed their own intrenched positions, mere embankments of earth raised on the hill-tops. The Romans preferred the plains and valleys,² without regard to the impregnability of their fortresses. They did not require them for a purely defensive policy, but sought above all to command the roads and, by a prompt sortie, to reach the threatened point as quickly as possible.

The indispensable systematic excavation of the great ramparts that formed the border of the province did not begin until the year 1890, so the theory which has since been gradually arrived at is not likely to experience the vicissitudes of its predecessors.

The work of Hadrian,³ which was the first to be constructed, between 122 and 127, comprised essentially a *vallum* to the south, a wall to the north, and a military road between them. Of this whole the *vallum* was the most ancient component; it consisted of three ramparts of earth, often mixed with stones, and a ditch with a flat bottom and bell-shaped sides, the average depth of the latter being about four and a half metres; the smallest of the three ramparts, which was very low, commanded the southern slope of the ditch, from which the others were about seven metres distant—they being two or three metres in height. The earth dug out of the ditch provided most of the material of which they were made. It is quite clear that the *vallum* was of this type, but the purpose for which it was designed has been more

¹ For the region of Edinburgh cf. Harry Inglis, *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, LII (1918).

² CXCIII, p. 140 *et seq.*

³ CCXVI, p. 118-137; R. G. Collingwood, XXII, X (1920), p. 37-66; CXXVII, p. 151 *et seq.*; cf. pl. ad p. 82.

disputed. There is now a general agreement to regard it not as an instrument of defence, but as a work of purely civilian character: it marked the end of the provincial territory, which was open to everyone, while the land between it and the wall beyond was a strictly military area. For defensive purposes the ditch and embankment would have been quite inadequate, and, further, the *vallum* ran in a straight line, even through marshy hollows, without any regard for strategic points or for changes in the contour of the land.

North of the *vallum* there ran, also from Hadrian's time, the continuous line of fortresses placed at an average interval of about 4 miles, though in fact they were very irregularly distributed. A certain number of them have been explored;¹ some were really equivalent to small towns, whose streets and various buildings have been traced, for these essential positions of defence could lodge a cohort of 500 or even 1,000 men. They were formed by enlarging some of the secondary forts or "mile-castles," so called by modern archæologists because they were placed at more regular intervals and because their total number seems to have been approximately 73, i.e. one for each mile covered by the rampart. These secondary forts were hastily constructed on a smaller scale, and were linked together by watch-towers at frequent intervals.

The discovery in 1895 of a turf wall (*murus cespiticius*), recognizable through the black streaks produced at each layer of sods by burning the grass on them, gave currency for some time to a theory that Hadrian had only raised this earthwork north of the *vallum*, and that the stone wall was the work of Septimius Severus. But there is nothing to prove that this turf wall was continued for the whole length of the frontier, and, above all, the excavations of 1911 have proved that the lower stratum of the stone wall dates from the first half of the second century. The building of the latter must therefore have followed close upon that of the forts, which were originally conceived as isolated and independent structures, each completely surrounded by a ditch. Finally, the most recent researches² have shown that the

¹ CCXVI, p. 127.

² F. Gerard Simpson, *Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmoreland Antiquarian Society*, XXII (1922); cf. fig. 6 to 10.

vallum was reconstructed here and there, where breaches had been made in the embankment and the ditch had been filled up in order to make a gangway for carts bringing material from the quarries south of the *vallum* for use in the building of the wall.

To sum up then, this whole creation was a great undertaking executed by the army. We do not know in what the work of Severus consisted, whether it was repair or adjustment or restoration. A solitary text of Spartian,¹ giving him credit for "a line fortified by a wall drawn across the island from coast to coast up to the brink of the ocean," is doubtless no more worthy of belief than many another statement in the *Historia Augusta*. The strip of territory between the wall and the *vallum* varied in breadth from 27 to 800 metres, with an average of about 60; and the variation was especially marked about the middle of its course because the wall, unlike the *vallum*, had not been carried in a straight line; on the contrary, it followed the contours of the land in order to command the dominant positions.² A military road traversed this area from sea to sea, generally keeping close to the wall.

The Caledonian *vallum*, which crossed Scotland at its narrowest point, between the estuaries of the Forth and the Clyde, was only half as long and much more simple. It comprised a series of forts and stations linked together by another military road skirting, at a distance of about 30 metres, an *agger* with a ditch beside it, beyond which again there rose an exterior embankment of little height. Capitolinus refers to it as a *muris cespiticius*, and this precise definition fits the principal rampart, between the road and the ditch. Antoninus Pius contented himself with this hastily constructed work, and his successors made no change in it. The forts were more numerous but much smaller than those of Hadrian's *limes*. The emperor must have regarded it merely as a supplementary measure of defence, a barrier to check the petty incursions of a few raiders, who might fall into those traps masked with brushwood, of which some traces are believed to have been found,³ as well as to delay and hamper more serious invaders who, even when they

¹ *Sev.*, 18, 2.

² CCXVI, p. 122, fig. 37; CCXX, p. 68, fig. 13.

³ CLV, p. 232.

had broken the first line, would still have to reckon with Hadrian's wall. The country between the two lines of defence was always unfertile and thinly populated; its products were so meagre that no serious loss could be incurred through ravages committed in it.

In the absence of a decisive text, agreement has not been reached as regards the length of time for which the northern barrier was occupied; the English archæologists generally follow Haverfield in assuming that it was abandoned about the year 180 at latest.¹

It was not only on the northern frontier that the Romans were troubled with anxiety; we have seen that, especially after the Antonines, a serious danger became apparent off the shores of the North Sea. Piracy, that scourge of antiquity, was at first checked without too much trouble (at any rate along the coast) by the *classis Britannica*, which, in spite of its name, had its principal base in Gaul, at *Gesoriacum* (Boulogne); texts and inscriptions enable us to date its creation as early as Claudius himself. The real task of this fleet was to guard the communications between the island and the continent, and it must have provided convoys for the other shipping. As a further defence against the pirates, some fortresses were built on the coast in order to prevent them at any rate from landing. The naval ports of call were either on the Pas-de-Calais or close to it—at *Dubraë* (Dover), *Portus Lemanaë* (Lympne), *Rutupiæ* (Sandwich), *Regulbium* (Reculver); light-houses or signal stations helped them to communicate with one another. To the north, towards Scotland, the *classis Britannica* had more harbours of its own, and even granaries, apparently, for revictualling in case of need.² According to the inscriptions, it owned some lands near Hadrian's wall beside the Irish Sea, so that it must have operated in those waters too.

For a long time it must have served its purpose adequately: there were fashionable villas close to the sea on the Channel coast, whose position was evidently considered free from danger. Yet garrisons had to be stationed very near the shore; the two legions of Wales were not encamped in

¹ CCXV, p. 62; CCXX, p. 56; R. G. Collingwood, XXII, XIII (1923), p. 69-81.

² CXCI, p. 205.

the interior, and the recently excavated¹ fortress of *Segontium* (Carnarvon), opposite the isle of *Mona*, was doubtless built as a defence against perils which might come from the sea; made originally of wood, it was rebuilt in stone and strongly garrisoned, especially in the time of the Severi.

Indeed, from that period onwards the position became more serious, and new measures had to be taken against attacks by sea from North Germany.² Carausius was specially appointed to check them, but he used the fleet to affirm the independence of Roman Britain and make himself emperor, and it was perceived for the first time that mastery of the sea could free the country from dependence on the continent; he had an intuition of British policy in the centuries to come.

But the Roman government adopted a new system. After the death of Carausius and the recovery of the province, Diocletian, or one of his colleagues or immediate successors, appointed a *comes litoris Saxonici per Britannias*³ and placed under his orders nine fortresses between the Wash and the neighbourhood of the Isle of Wight. In place of the *classis Britannica*, a *classis Sambrica* (from the name of the *Samara* or Somme) was charged with the defence of the two coasts of Britain and Gaul regarded as one. The nature of the "Saxon" coast (i.e. the coast threatened by the Saxons) was well calculated to attract robbers from the open sea: there they found flat shores where their ships could put in without danger, creeks in which they could hide them, and sand dunes among which they could easily hide themselves. To insure constant vigilance, the number of stations was multiplied and garrisons were increased; several of the ports built for this purpose have been explored in recent years. It has been shown that in the second half of the fourth century the same precautions were taken much further off, beyond the Wash, especially to the east and north of *Eburacum*. On the edge of the wild country (called Egton Moors) there were watch-towers which, at the first alarm, sent a message to the garrisons of the interior; near Saltburn,

¹ **XXII**, XI (1921), p. 224 *et seq.*

² F. Haverfield, **XXII**, II (1912), p. 201 *et seq.*

³ *Not. Dign.*, Occ. V, 132 Seeck; J. Mothersole, *The Saxon Shore*, London, 1924.

Scarborough and Filey, preferably at the mouths of small rivers, there were numbers of camps, and the approximate dates of their establishment or reconstruction have been revealed to us by the coins found among their ruins; some fragments of tiles prove that certain forts were restored even after the accession of Honorius. The abandonment of the island about this time was therefore quite unpremeditated; but men were needed to carry out a well conceived policy, and the Empire lacked them; Britain was emptied of its troops because a crisis elsewhere was deemed to be more serious.

III

LOCAL LIFE

We are almost completely ignorant of the municipal system adopted in this country.¹ Epigraphy at any rate testifies to the persistence of the *civitates*,² each bearing the name of a tribe or, very rarely, that of a town; from the time of Caracalla they must have ranked as *municipia* and had their decurions, but the earlier period remains obscure. The local authorities felt no temptation to record their decisions in stone, and most of the inscriptions are the work of Roman settlers or of the army.

The most ancient colony of veterans was established near the coast of the North Sea in the already important city of *Camulodunum* (Colchester), dedicated to the Celtic Mars; this intrusion exposed it to the fury of the natives in the time of Boudicca. *Glevum* (Gloucester) became a colony under Nero; it has been possible to reconstruct the plan of the town, with its two great roads, and to discover the remains of its walls, gates and other buildings.³ *Eburacum* probably attained the same rank in the second century; traces of the ancient wall may still be seen in the York of today.⁴ Perhaps we should add *Lindum* (Lincoln), a creation of the Flavians, and that completes the number. This parsimony in bestowing the colonial right can be explained by the

¹ CXCIH, p. 209. For the names of the cities see LXI.

² CLXXXIII, p. 222 *et seq.*

³ Huebner, IX, LX (1876), p. 142 *et seq.*; LXI (1877), p. 157 *et seq.*

⁴ G. Home and W. E. Collinge, *Roman York*, London, 1924.

very gradual annexation of Britain after the time of Cæsar and Augustus.

Very few of the old Romano-British cities have been adequately explored in our time. *Deva* (Chester), north of Wales, the headquarters of a legion on the estuary of the Dee, has only yielded small fragments of antiquity. The best known is *Calleva Atrebatum* (Silchester),¹ an important road junction south-west of London, which was a fortified town with a wall and moat, whose irregular polygon and rectilinear streets included about forty *insulæ*. Near the intersection of the two main avenues there was a spacious forum,² comparable to that of Trajan at Rome, one of its sides being occupied by a basilica and the other three bordered by colonnades under which the stalls were sheltered; a sort of hotel (*hospitium*), some temples recalling the style of certain Gallic buildings, and an amphitheatre outside the town were its principal characteristics. But we are also indebted to the ruins of this place for very detailed information concerning the houses of Roman Britain. Similar discoveries have been made at *Venta Silurum* (Caerwent), whose forum seems to have been modelled on that of *Calleva*.³

We are still uncertain about the origin of *Londinium*, the monster London, whose geographical dimensions alone are sufficient evidence of the vast development that has since taken place.⁴ It seems clear that there was a settlement there before the creation of the province, in view of the discovery of Roman remains that must date from the first years of our era, for commerce is not sent into unpopulated districts. No trace of an ancient road has been found near the town, though Tacitus⁵ says that it was famous from the reign of Nero for the wealth of its traders and the activity of its trade. Burnt down about this period, it rose again from its ashes and was this time provided with walls, low but strong. In spite of the alterations made in them during the Middle Ages, it is still possible to trace their outline almost exactly. Roughly speaking, they encircled what

¹ John Hope, **IV**, LXI, 2 (1909), p. 473-486; **CCXX**, p. 132.

² **CCXVI**, p. 217, 221.

³ **IV**, LXI, 2 (1909), p. 569; **CCXVI**, p. 221.

⁴ F. Haverfield, **XXII**, I (1911), p. 141 *et seq.*; W. Lethaby, *Londinium*, London, 1922; Gordon Home, *Roman London*, London, 1926.

⁵ *Ann.*, XIV, 33.

is today "the City," from the Tower to beyond St. Paul's; on the side of the Thames they kept some distance from the river.¹ Judging from the situation of the Gallic pottery, which was dug up at the time of the excavations² and can be dated, Londinium had reached the limits fixed by this rampart as early as Domitian's time, and they remained unchanged until the barbarian invasions. The coins that have been discovered show that this purely civilian centre, which perhaps lacked unity and had no ties with the continent, must have succumbed to the attacks of the Saxons in about the year 400. It had only one hour of glory, when it served as winter quarters for the general Theodosius (368-369) and gained the name of *Augusta* from his victory.³

But the exploration of the towns has contributed much less than that of the rural establishments⁴ to our knowledge of the mixed culture that had its beginnings in Britain under the Roman dominion. As has been justly remarked,⁵ it was not, properly speaking, an urban civilization; its most striking manifestations are to be found in the country, and even the cities from which we learn most seem more like groups of cottages. Although most of them were levelled with the ground, the private dwelling-places that we have been able to study have yielded up nearly all their secrets to us, and one fact strikes us on the first examination: the style of decoration is Latin, and so are the various improvements that contribute to the comfort of the home, but the ground plan remains Celtic. It is said that the preference of the Britons was divided between two forms of arrangement; a distinction was drawn between houses with a corridor and houses with a court,⁶ though it was not a fundamental one.⁷ If we look closely at the type with a court, we see that it has nothing in common with the Pompeian or purely Latin house: the court is surrounded not by an open portico, but by a corridor on which the rooms open; and in examples of some size another corridor surrounds the outside of the house, so that the rooms are entirely shut in by lobbies which isolate them from the neighbouring streets. Generally

¹ Plan in IV, LXIII (1911/12), pl. LXIV.

² Frank Lambert, IV, LXVI (1914/15), p. 225-274.

³ *Amm. Marc.*, XXVII, 8, 7-8; XXVIII, 3, 1.

⁴ CXCH, p. 334-341.

⁵ LXXXVI.

⁶ CXCH, p. 332 *et seq.*

⁷ LXXVII, I, p. 297.

speaking, the houses with a corridor were the commoner and the more modest, this being the initial type. If the occupier prospered, he added a wing with a new corridor at right angles to the first; then another, parallel to the original dwelling, and then even a third; so that at last there were four sets of rooms forming a square, each with its corridor, which thus encircled the empty space in the middle.¹ The addition of another corridor surrounding the outside of the house implied a further increase in the owner's prosperity. Often, however, the houses of this type did not get beyond a single set of rooms, whereas the wealthy villas came to have two courts separated by blocks of buildings.

Ward² also describes a "basilical" type of house for the poorer classes, without either court or corridor, several apartments being marked off in a single block by two parallel rows of columns.

The corridor flanked by a wall was better adapted than the open portico to the requirements of a cold and rainy climate. Another peculiarity due to the nature of the country is the extreme abundance of hypocausts—even in humble buildings, so that they cannot in all cases have been made for heating public baths.³ Glass window-panes were used as freely as in Gaul to prevent the warmth from escaping.

As regards the economic life of Roman Britain our sources are remarkably reticent.⁴ Thanks to the climate, which favoured pasture land, quantities of cattle were exported, and corn also was one of the great resources of the country. The Romans passed on the science of their agricultural experts to the natives, introduced new agricultural implements, and reclaimed land from the marshes by works in which British labour shared with the army. Exploitation of the mines, tin mines especially, had begun some time before the occupation, but one result of the latter was the speedy establishment of a quasi-monopoly in the interest of the State. It must be confessed, however, that the mines produced more in consequence, and that the produce was used in a greater variety of industries. Finally, a remark-

¹ See Ward's diagrams, **CCXVI**, p. 143, fig. 41; cf. p. 169, fig. 51, a restored corridor.

² *Ibid.*, p. 174 *et seq.*

³ **CCXX**, p. 149, fig. 36.

⁴ **LXXXIII**, p. 208-221; **CXC bis**, p. 212.

able impulse was given to the potter's art; as a general rule, the vessels show a resemblance to the *terra sigillata* of the continent.¹

IV

ROMANIZATION

This is a difficult problem in every province and not less thorny here than elsewhere.² Though opinion is not unanimous on the subject, in England at any rate it is generally supposed³ that after the retirement of the Romans Britain became Celtic again, as she had been four centuries earlier. Is this national *amour-propre*? If it were merely that, we should not feel ourselves instinctively in agreement with it. We readily compare the relations between Rome and Britain with those between England and India.⁴ The supporters of Celticism, who hardly derive any assistance from philology in the case at issue, are very sceptical about the depth and efficacy of the Roman influence. The reservations that have been made as regards the precise significance of certain traces of it appear to be just; we must not forget that Rome tried everywhere to work upon the richer and therefore cultivated classes. Anyone who merely collected the number of English phrases in use everywhere in Paris would suppose that our capital was in a fair way to become denationalized; but it can be seen that the people are resisting the tendency. In Roman Britain it would be much more difficult to detect the resistance because it was made by poor or uncivilized people—a fact which at once explains the absence of Celtic inscriptions.

Outside the area defined by Haverfield⁵ the problem with which we are concerned does not arise at all. The whole of the military zone in the north may be ignored; the native population was sparse, hostile and intractable, the soil poor and barren; Rome encamped there but assimilated nothing. In the west, besides Devon and Cornwall, the whole of Wales is similarly excluded. Even in the lowland plains the traces of Roman life are few and far between; the towns are rare

¹ CCXV, p. 153-176; CCXX, p. 156 *et seq.*

³ Except by Collingwood, LXXXVI.

⁵ CXXIII and CXXIV.

² CXXIV, p. 76.

⁴ CCXX, p. 226-235.

and, with few exceptions, small. It is certain that the Latin tongue had penetrated there, even before Cæsar; the drawings at Calleva are thought to be the work of Britons of the lower classes. But, even so, conditions in the East today have familiarized us with the idea of a small class, including even some of the poor, which has been made cosmopolitan and to some extent polyglot by the nature of its occupation. Agricola urged the sons of the *principes* to study Latin, so we need not be surprised to find a grammarian teaching in Britain about the year 80;¹ Juvenal's reference² to the British jurists educated by Gallo-Roman masters hardly implies any more than this. Some of the modern geographical names seem to be based upon those of antiquity; but there was a resemblance between Latin and British forms, and we are ignorant of the correct pronunciation of the latter. Which were the real originals?

We have described the form of the British houses; their internal decoration was inspired by Latin models, and the painted stucco-work and mosaics admitted no native subject. Nevertheless, in the accepted styles there was a preponderance of cable-moulding and engine-turning, for which later Celtic art has shown a partiality; and the pottery of Castor and Durobrivæ also reveals peculiar preferences: hunting scenes, animals with their heads reversed, many transcripts from the vegetable kingdom, few attempts to reproduce the human figure. Some *fibulæ* seem to anticipate the barbarian art of the Middle Ages. Local tradition was never abandoned. It is clear that there was an abundance of articles imported from Italy, but in the same way negroes and savages buy European wares today without any *arrière-pensée*. Also there is no doubt that the cities were, officially, Roman in form, with borrowed magistracies; we find in them forums, hot baths, basilicas, and also, though less often, theatres or amphitheatres; but they were inhabited by Romans, who created a society in their own image. The appearance of the rural communities is altogether unknown to us. In the *civitas* the tribe was loosely connected with its chief township; in Gaul it was the name of the former that survived and passed into modern French, but nothing of the kind has happened in Britain.

¹ H. Dessau, **XVI, XLVI** (1911), p. 156-160.

² **XV, 111.**

This process of romanization, so limited in extent, was only moderately successful in the first century, interrupted in the second, and resumed in the third and fourth; but soon afterwards, when Britain was left to itself, the Celtic fringe of Scotland and Ireland made its influence felt; immigrants from those countries laid waste the Roman centres, and massacred or expelled the people who had adopted Latin ways of life. After the country had regained its freedom, the most ancient writers, such as Gildas in the middle of the sixth century, retained only confused or absurd remembrances of what had happened less than a hundred years before their time.

CHAPTER XI

THE DANUBIAN REGIONS

UNDER this heading we include all the provinces watered by the *Danubius* of the Celts, the *Ister* of the Greeks.¹ Their common destiny was a result of the shipping industry on the river and, still more, of their close kinship with the tribes established beyond its left bank, their rapacious instincts, and their frequent attempts to force the frontier of northern Italy. The necessity of defending the peninsula and its capital on this side helps us to understand the beginning of the Roman conquest, its progressive extension and the changes of policy in regard to it. This solidarity of the Danubian territories has already been demonstrated by Mommsen;² we have only differed from him in excluding the Roman protectorate over the Greek colonies of South Russia, which had a different origin and was more closely connected with the provinces of Anatolia.

Being guardians of the frontier, the provinces studied in this chapter were occupied for the most part by military establishments, and the too meagre information that has come down to us concerning this vast area is chiefly relative to the history of the armies.

I

RÆTIA

We have seen above how, under Augustus, the campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius finally subdued the Germanic clans of the Ræti, who had assembled to ravage the valley of the Po.³ The Romans carried off, perhaps as slaves, a con-

¹ See the maps in **XLI**, III, Supp. II, *in fine*.

² **CLXII**, IX, chap. VI.

³ **CLXXXVIII**; Vigilio Inama, *La Provincia della Rezia ed i Reti* (*Rendiconti del R. Istituto lombardo*, ser. II, XXXII [1899], p. 797-815); Haug, **XLVII**, Ia, col. 42-46.

siderable number of the nation's young men, only leaving in the country the labour indispensable to its cultivation, and veterans came to take the place of the exiles. Heavy taxes were imposed on those who remained, except a few tribes which had submitted without a struggle; but at first no recruitment in the conquered territory added to these burdens; it was only at a later date that the country was required to furnish regular *auxilia*.

Geographical conditions divided the land into two very different sections: the plain of the Vindelici to the north-west and the mountain mass inhabited by the Ræti, the former being roughly identical with Southern Bavaria and the latter with the Tyrol. At first the only bond between the Ræti and the Vindelici was their subjection to a common governor called sometimes *præfectus*, sometimes *pro legato provinciae Rætiae et Vindelic. et vallis Pœninæ*,¹ and having only auxiliary troops at his disposal. It was not until Claudius that there was a province of "Rætia" pure and simple, and this did not include the most southerly districts, which had been annexed before the war of Augustus and assigned to the Italian towns of Trent, Como and Brescia. From that date the construction of roads and fortresses began. The *vallis Pœnina*, furthest removed from the German districts, formed a small confederation of four towns on which Claudius bestowed the Latin right; it was identical with what is now "Vallais" on the banks of the Rhone south of Lake Geneva.

The frontiers of Rætia can only be determined with certainty² on the eastern side adjoining Noricum, from which it is separated by the river Inn, from its confluence with the Danube at Passau as far as the neighbourhood of Kufstein. To the north, the Danube served at first as boundary, but later an advance was made beyond it, until the day when Hadrian caused the *limes Reticus* to be built. At first this province, like Noricum, was governed by *procuratores Augusti*,³ but after Trajan their place was taken by *legati pro prætore*.⁴

The capital was immediately established in the richest part of the province at *Augusta Vindelicorum*, now Augsburg. For a long time the mountainous region was neglected, and

¹ CLXXV, p. 165 *et seq.*; CXLVI, 23.

² CLXXVIII, p. 55 *et seq.*

³ CXXIX, p. 390.

⁴ For their names see CVIII, p. 54.

the only traces of Roman civilization there are to be found at *Curia Ratorum* (Coire) and *Brigantium* (Bregenz). Hitherto the inhabitants had lived in independent communities. The Latin authors supposed them to have some affinity with the Etruscans, but there was no bond between them except their language, of which something has survived in the dialects of Romansh, which for linguists is no more than romanized Rætian.

In the Tyrol hardly a trace of Roman civilization has been found, though it had for its missionaries the army, the officials of all sorts, and afterwards Christianity, which was perhaps more efficacious than either. But the valleys of this great mountain mass soon attracted barbarian invaders; as early as the reign of Marcus Aurelius the Chatti made their pressure felt there, and they were followed by the still more formidable Marcomanni. We can trace by the military diplomas the repeated reinforcements of the garrisons of Rætia¹ in face of these threats; then the commercial city of Augsburg had a rival in the fortress of *Castra Regina* (Ratisbon),² which was garrisoned by the legion *III Italica* whose legate became also governor of the province.

Henceforward all the life of the province began to be concentrated on the frontier. The peace of Commodus which, by recalling the troops to their old positions, reduced almost to nothing the achievement of Verus and Marcus Aurelius in this region, nevertheless required the abandonment by the Marcomanni of a strip of territory one mile wide on the left bank of the Danube, in which colonists were established. A new series of *castella* was built along this line. Septimius Severus gave a strong impetus to road building, either the making of new ones or the repair of those already in existence;³ the great highway of the Adige and the Brenner,⁴ the *iter Romanum* of the Middle Ages, was restored by his care; another road, through the Splügen pass, led from Como to Coire and thence towards the Rhine, while communications were established between Windisch (*Vin-*

¹ H. Arnold, *Beiträge zur Anthropologie Bayerns*, XV (1901), p. 43-100; B. Fabricius, *XXVII*, *XCVIII* (1907), p. 1-29.

² Oertner, *Das römische Regensburg*, Regensburg, 1909.

³ Inama, *op. cit.*, p. 804; *XLVII*, 1a, col. 55; *CVIII*, p. 18, map p. 72.

⁴ P. H. Scheffel, *Die Brennerstrasse zur Römerzeit*, Berlin, 1912.

donissa) and Bregenz, Innsbruck and Salzburg. Meantime the *limes* of palissades set up by Hadrian had become a wall of stone.¹

From the time of Alexander Severus some *militēs limitanei* and *ripenses* had taken up a position on the left bank of the Danube which was soon to be evacuated; the latest Latin inscription north of the river dates from the time of Gallienus.² The Alemanni compelled the local authorities to take refuge behind the river barrier, and strife continued on this frontier after Diocletian had restored, under the names of Rætia I and II, what was in fact the old division into Vindelicia and Rætia proper, both being subject to a *dux Rætiarum* and attached to the diocese of Italy. This unfertile region, thinly populated by a people who had few dealings with the capital, seeing that they long retained the alien right, produced too little food to maintain the peasant soldiers who kept guard in it. A detachment of the legion was set apart *transvectioni specierum*: it supervised the convoys coming from Italy. The inevitable recoil of the Romans towards the south began under Stilicho; and yet the *dux Rætiarum* of the time of Theodoric shows how obstinately their claims were still maintained. The Ræti marched with the Huns to the battle of Châlons, where the German elements triumphed, and the plain finally fell a prey to the Baiuvari, successors of the Marcomanni. Only the Romansh language attests the more durable influence of Rome in the upper valleys of the Inn and the Rhine; but most of the peaks and water-courses have kept the names which they derived from earlier idioms.

Thus the Roman civilization of Rætia³ was reduced to practically nothing in the absence of urban life; only three *municipia* were established there. The Celtic inhabitants, imbued with German influence, lived in woods in the depths of the country; the grants of land to the *limitanei* were readily accepted, but the *canabenses* never constituted real centres of population.

It was only slowly and piecemeal that the Romans abandoned this northern bulwark of their country:⁴ all along

¹ Cf. *Der römische Limes in Österreich*, Vienna, 1900 *et seq.*; LXXXIX, p. 31-49.

² XLI, III, 5933.

³ CVIII, p. 371-430.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

the roads to Italy the stages of their final retreat are marked by numerous earthworks, each one proving the abandonment of its predecessor after a desperate fight in which numbers perished. Only one important Roman building has survived—the prætorian gate of Ratisbon.¹ The ruins of the dwelling houses show that they were adapted to suit the harsh local climate; they were low buildings with few windows, no luxury or solidity, but a notable provision of heating apparatus. Roman usages had at last been introduced, as well as the dress of the Roman populace; but intercourse between the different parts of the province was hindered by the nature of the country.

II

NORICUM

Noricum, which came next to Rætia on the eastern side, corresponded to the modern Upper Austria, Carinthia and Styria. The submission in 16 B.C. of the independent kingdom which had sprung up there must have been secured without much difficulty, since it is passed over in silence in the Turbrian monument. It offered much less resistance than Rætia to Latin influences,² though this does not mean that it was treated differently by Rome; as a matter of fact, she used all these Danubian countries alike. Mommsen lays stress on the fact that the foundation of Aquileia³ in 181 gave the Roman traders every facility for pressing up the valleys of Friuli and that of the Save; but these facilities were more important to Pannonia than to Noricum, and they may have been restricted to the neighbourhood of the Marcomanni who, before becoming dangerous enemies (from the time of Marcus Aurelius), had shown themselves less hostile to Rome than the other Germans, and had even made a friendly agreement with her during the reign of Augustus and of their own king Maroboduus.⁴ It should also be noted that the population of Noricum was very mixed and

¹ CXLVII, p. 47, fig. 37.

² CLXII, IX, p. 25.

³ Cf. C. Herfurth, *De Aquileia Commercio*, Halis, 1889.

⁴ Almgren, *Mannus, Zeitschrift für Vorgeschichte*, V (1913), p. 265 *et seq.*

less inclined to unite in opposition to a foreign influence: the original Illyrian nucleus had finally coalesced with a horde of Celtic immigrants who, being themselves on good terms with the natives, offered no stubborn resistance to Italian infiltrations. A Roman market had already been established during the republican period under the name of *Nauportus* (Oberlaybach), and there was another at *Emona* (Ljubliana), where Augustus founded a colony before the complete annexation of Noricum. Recent excavations have revealed the plan, in the shape of a draught-board, of the city of the year 34, whose streets were built over vaulted canals.¹ Though fortified by way of precaution, *Emona* was principally devoted to the business of peace, for which the neighbouring rivers provided facilities. Yet other towns were founded beside the main highways of commerce: *Celeia*² (Cilli), *Aguntum* (Lienz), *Juvavum* (Salzburg), *Virunum* (near Klagenfurt), *Teurnia*³ (Peter im Holz), of which extensive ruins can still be seen. Mere insignificant villages occupy the sites of several of these towns today. There are also unmistakable traces of Roman dwellings on the hills; and none of this work was due to the army. These centres of population received from Claudius the organization of the Italian *municipia*. The military occupation⁴ was limited in the first two centuries to a few camps for *alæ* or cohorts; Marcus Aurelius had to station a legion at *Lauriacum*, near Enns, but it only supervised its immediate neighbours: the men of the interior were so far from thinking of revolt that large numbers of them voluntarily enlisted in the Roman legions and the Prætorian guard.

The governor of Noricum⁵ was at first perhaps entitled *præfectus civitatum in Norico*, then *procurator regni Norici* (or *provinciae Noricæ*), which is sufficient evidence of the ease with which the annexation had been made. Then Marcus Aurelius, proceeding as he had done in Rætia, gave all authority to the legate of the legion *II Pia Italica*.⁶ Dio-

¹ **XIX**, XIX-XX (1919), *Beiblatt*, col. 155-164; cf. V (1902), col. 7 *et seq.*

² Its exploration has been begun: *Ibid.*, XVI (1913), *Beiblatt*, col. 93 *et seq.*; XVII (1914), *Beiblatt*, col. 5 *et seq.*

³ R. Egger, *Teurnia*, Vienna-Leipzig, 1924.

⁴ **CLXXV**, p. 196 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 170; **CXXIX**, p. 383.

⁶ H. Van de Weerd, **XXVIII**, VII (1903), p. 101.

cletian split the province in two: along the banks of the Danube stretched a *Noricum Ripense*, which was bordered on the south by *Noricum Mediterraneum*. But the invasion of the barbarians, whose flood submerged so many flourishing towns, could only be postponed a little longer.

III

ILLYRIA-DALMATIA

It was natural that Roman eyes should be fixed at a very early period on the shores of Dalmatia: the Italians adopted the *mare nostrum* policy with all the more zeal because of the great Macedonian power on the other side, with which they were just as unwilling to share it as they had been with the Carthaginians in earlier days. Then a number of barbarian clans, their old opponents, began to resist the Roman dominion, but we have seen¹ how it was gradually established. The refractory peoples belonged to that Albanian race which has few and scattered representatives today, but was then very wide spread, as far as Hungary. It produced soldiers of great bravery, hardened by an open-air life on the mountains where the Illyrians shepherded their flocks; they were semi-nomads, little given to agriculture, because their country was better suited for rearing cattle, and almost entirely ignorant of urban life, which was concentrated on the shores of the Adriatic alone. This population was disturbed by the expansion of the Celts, who, instead of blending as they might have done with the earlier inhabitants, practically made a division of the country with them: the Celts were mostly massed together near the Danube, the original Illyrians in the region which is now Serbia.

After the defeat of Perseus at Pydna, it was easy to subdue Gentius, the petty king of *Scodra* (Scutari), and to win Greek Illyria, with Apollonia and Epidamnus, from its queen Teuta. This territory was divided into three districts with varying frontiers that were often shifted; but it took a century of intermittent and very unprofitable strife to establish peace in it.² Then, at the time of the civil wars,

¹ L. Homo, *Primitive Italy*, etc., p. 342; cf. CCXXII.

² Richter, XVIII, XIII (1898), p. 87 *et seq.*

when the rival leaders assumed extravagant powers, Illyria became a single governmental district united with Gaul under the proconsular authority of Julius Cæsar. Finally we have the separate province of *Illyricum* constituted in 45 B.C. and assigned to the Senate from the year 27—an act of excessive optimism, since armed intervention was long to be rendered necessary by chronic insurrections. After a number of small risings (in 11 and 10 B.C.), a more serious revolt began in the year 6 of our era, and Tiberius, the future emperor, was sent to suppress it.

It had its centre among the Dalmatians or Delmatians,¹ the most formidable enemies of Rome in these parts, and it was in remembrance of their bravery that the southern part of *Illyricum* was called Dalmatia.

The opportunity chosen for the revolt was that of the war against the Marcomanni, which was undertaken in order to secure Bohemia, an advanced bastion from which the whole of Germany might have been set at defiance, and its decisive cause was the harshness of the tax-collectors and of the recruiting officers, who had impressed the able-bodied men of Dalmatia to fill the gaps in the decimated legions. Rome hastily enrolled men whose country had only just been annexed and, as she was likewise raising auxiliaries in Pannonia, she found herself simultaneously attacked by soldiers whom she had intended to throw into the conflict on her own side: born soldiers, of a valiant stock, as we have just said, who combined with their native qualities the advantages of a Roman military education. And to the dangers which had arisen within the frontiers of the Empire others were added from outside: the neighbouring peoples hastened to make common cause with the Illyrians, who had begun by massacring the Roman soldiers and Italian traders established in their midst.

Tiberius was given more than 10,000 men, hurriedly collected from every quarter, who had to maintain their position in the chief fortresses and contend against the guerilla warfare that was carried on in every canton. His nephew Germanicus, who came to his support, was placed in charge of the operations in the south towards the Macedonian frontier. The last stand of the rebels was broken

¹ Patsch, XLVII, IV, col. 2448-2455.

not far from the coast in the citadel of Andetrium near Salona, which was abandoned by its commander and taken by storm. Henceforward the native soldiers, though still recruited, were not employed in the country itself, and the territory, which had proved too extensive, was subdivided: the southern part remained *Illyricum* proper, afterwards called Dalmatia; and although the frontier line between it and Pannonia is imperfectly known to us, it is certain that the valley of the Save was included in the latter province.

Further, the old trading stations of Apollonia¹ and Epidamnus, which had become *Dyrrachium* (Durazzo)² under the Romans, had been attached to Macedonia, so that this coastal area remained Greek; the Italian language did not penetrate there until the Middle Ages, when it was introduced by Venice. On the shore of Dalmatia proper, Roman traders had established themselves in a number of towns: *Iader* (Zara), *Salona* (Spalato), *Narona* (Widdo, near Metkovitch), *Epitaurum* (near Ragusa). Salona was the capital, and it was protected by the two camps of *Burnum*³ and *Delminium* on the banks of the two rivers which flanked it at a distance on either side. But a long peace reigned in these regions; when Diocletian, a native of Dalmatia, built near Salona the imposing palace⁴ which now shelters the township named after it (Spalato), his action marked not the beginning, but the crowning recognition of a prosperity that had been augmented by intercourse with Italy. The political severance of the two coasts and the impenetrable *hinterland* caused the decadence of the Dalmatian ports, but at any rate that mountain barrier preserved Roman Dalmatia for a long time from the effects of the barbarian invasions.

On the other hand it formed a serious obstacle to the romanization of the interior;⁵ few townships came into existence there, and they were very different from the Roman or Greek type. Three judicial *conventus* were created there (*Sardona*, *Salona*, *Narona*), groups of alien communities

¹ C. Praschniker, XIX, XXI-XXII (1922), *Beiblatt*, col. 17 *et seq.*

² Philippson, XLVII, V, col. 1882-87.

³ M. Abramitch, in *Strena Buliciana*, Zagrebix, 1924, p. 221-228.

⁴ E. Hébrard, and J. Zeiller, *Spalato, le Palais de Dioclétien*, Paris, 1912.

⁵ For that of the coast see CLXXII, p. 151-173.

that were merely organized as clans; each one, divided into *decuriæ*, retained some measure of independence and had its own treasury. Such a system needed a very long period of evolution to reach the standard of the classical city,¹ and the recent acquisitions of the kingdom of Yugoslavia owe very little to Roman colonization, though attempts have been made to lay stress on any traces of it that remain.² Nevertheless the imperial government did not neglect the means of penetration: the most frequented road skirted the coast, but others had been begun as early as Tiberius, and in the light of their milestones³ it is no longer possible to assert that they were afterwards abandoned; such negligence would have been remarkable on the part of the "Illyrian" emperors. But these roads, which were of military importance and served to shorten the passage to the Lower Danube, did not suffice to stimulate local life.

The only change made in the administrative map after Diocletian was the detachment of a small province called *Prævalitana* in the south; it was roughly equivalent to one of the *conventus*, and its capital must have been the presumed birth-place of Diocletian, *Doclea* (near Podgoritsa). This *Prævalitana* was included in the diocese of *Mœsia* and thus became a part of the Eastern Empire, whereas the other Dalmatian lands remained attached to Italy.

IV

PANNONIA


On the other hand Pannonia,⁴ the northern section of the old *Illyricum*, became about this time the kingdom of the Ostrogoths; though whether it retained the same frontiers is all the harder to determine since those of the province were only fixed at a late date. *Emona*, the most prosperous town of the south-western district, was placed sometimes

¹ LXXXVII, chap. VI.

² Cf. C. Patsch, *Bosnien und die Herzegowina in römischer Zeit* (*Zur Kunde der Balkanhalbinsel*, XV), Sarajevo, 1912, and the same writer's numerous contributions to the *Wissenschaftliche Mittheilungen aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina*.

³ Besnier, XLIII, art. *Via*, p. 806.

⁴ CLXII, IX, p. 260; C XXIII, p. 205 *et seq.*



MAP IX.—THE DANUBIAN REGIONS.

in Noricum, sometimes in Pannonia; *Celeia* too was transferred from one province to the other. Separated from Dalmatia, as we have seen, at the end of the reign of Augustus, Pannonia comprised, roughly speaking, what is now Croatia, between the Save and the Drave, together with the western districts of Hungary on this side of the Danube from a point not far west of Vienna. It was above all else a military area: for a short time a legate commanded three legions there; then, during the whole of the first century, the province was governed by a consular legate who is thought normally to have had two legions under his command. The progress of civilization in this country was closely connected with the movement of the Roman camps; it was only gradually that the various sections of the population exchanged a military for a civil organization.

The most ancient encampments commanded the line of the Save, chief among them being *Siscia* (Sissek). A first advance carried the defensive works a little further north, along the line of the Drave, and then *Siscia* was replaced by *Pœtovio* (Pettau),¹ whose position, quite close to Noricum, allowed of intervention in that province in case of need. The great plain north of the Drave seems to have been almost devoid of troops throughout the first half of the first century; a small force was stationed on the banks of the Danube, which was further garrisoned by a flotilla of ships. Vespasian seems to have advanced his military camps to the river itself, at *Vindobona* (Vienna)² and above all at *Carnuntum* (Petrozell), a little to the east, which was then detached from Noricum; its line of fortifications is still visible;³ a camp with its appendages has been found there, and even a large amphitheatre.

Roman civilization was earliest introduced and most noticeable on the borders of Noricum.⁴ At Carnuntum, the headquarters of a legion, the highway of the amber trade,

¹ Archaeological exploration has been begun there: M. Abramitch, **XIX**, XVII (1914), *Beiblatt*, col. 87 *et seq.*; Id., *Pœtovio, Führer*, Vienna, 1925.

² W. Kubitschek, in the *XLIII. Jahresbericht über das Staatsgymnasium VIII*, Vienna, 1893.

³ W. Kubitschek and S. Frankfurter, *Führer durch Carnuntum*, 3. Aufl., Vienna, 1894.

⁴ Ant. Hekler (*Strena Buliciana*, p. 107-118).

which ran from the Adriatic to the Baltic, debouched upon the river. On this same road *Scarbantia* (Oedenburg) and especially *Savaria* (Szombathély) still exhibit notable ruins; it also passed through *Pœtovio*. The rest of the province made slower progress. Its population—a mixture of Celtic, Illyrian, German and Thracian elements, as is proved by the dress of the women carved on the Pannonian reliefs¹—certainly felt no hostility towards Rome; but the quadrilateral area between the amber thoroughfare, the Danube and the Drave gave little scope for colonization; even today its towns of any importance could soon be counted. Yet military events gave some value to certain points on its circumference.

After Trajan's Dacian war (106-107) there were two Pannonias, *Superior* and *Inferior*, one having its legion at *Brigetio* (opposite Komorn), the other at *Aquincum* on the heights from which Buda now dominates Pest. Danger was no longer threatened by the Marcomanni alone; on the left bank of the Danube, after its curve towards the south, the formidable tribe of the Iazyges,² moving near the *Tisia* (Tisza or Theiss), caused some anxiety. Not far from the confluence of that river with the Danube a garrison was stationed at *Acumincum*, which covered at the same time the Roman colony of *Mursa* (Eszeg), near the confluence of the Drave, and the capital of Lower Pannonia, *Sirmium* (Mitrovitza), which itself occupied a remarkable position on the Drave, where several ways met, and was rendered prominent in the third century by its manufacture of arms and its imperial palace.

The reign of Marcus Aurelius was a crucial period for Pannonia. The many posts on the Danube, of which the Aurelian column gives us a picture in outline,³ failed to intimidate the barbarians. A hard campaign, however, kept them at a respectful distance; peace was restored, and the shipping on the rivers was encouraged. No desire was shown to depart from the old organization of the country in *vici*, *pagi* and *regiones*. Septimius Severus, who was proclaimed emperor at Carnuntum, made it a Roman colony and introduced new colonists at Siscia; but these towns were sub-

¹ Margaret Lange, **XIX**, XIX-XX (1919), *Beiblatt*, col. 207-260.

² Vulitch, **XLVII**, IX, col. 1189.

³ **CXLVII**, p. 49, fig. 39.

sequently laid waste, some by the Alemanni, others, like Pœtovio, by the Goths.¹

Diocletian detached from Lower Pannonia a province called *Valeria*, extending from north to south along the right bank of the Danube, and made a separate province (*Savia*) of the whole region between the Save and the Drave. The coins prove that a skeleton of military and administrative organization survived in the country as late as the reign of Theodosius I.²

V

MÆSIA

As complications extended further east, the annexation of Mœsia³ followed that of Pannonia. There is no doubt that strife in the region between the Balkans and the Danube—the former Serbia and Northern Bulgaria—dated from well before the Empire; the proconsuls of Macedonia had at first been charged with the task of repressing it, which accounts for the fact that C. Scribonius Curio had already in 75 B.C. advanced into Dardania as far as the river. But even the Dalmatian wars under Octavius (35-33) had made no change in the political situation. The coming of the Bastarnæ in 29 to seek new homes in the heart of Thrace was the occasion of the conquest;⁴ the system of small buffer states was replaced in the year 1 by that of the governors of Macedonia acting as *legati Aug. pro prætore in Mœsia*. Then there was a special military command in Mœsia,⁵ though this was still attached to Macedonia. When a true province was created is uncertain; it becomes more and more difficult to suppose that Augustus took this step,⁶ and doubtful whether even Tiberius did so; it is possible that no separate administration was assigned to Mœsia until the reign of Claudius.⁷ Under Domitian, probably in 86, the province was divided into Upper Mœsia (Serbia) and Lower Mœsia (Bulgaria), with

¹ Rud. Egger, XIX, XVIII (1915), *Beiblatt*, col. 253-266.

² Andreas Alföldi, *Der Untergang der Römerschaft in Pannonien*, I, Berlin-Leipzig, 1924.

³ CIV, p. 1-6; CCIV, p. IX *et seq.*

⁴ See above, p. 44.

⁵ XIX, I (1898), *Beiblatt*, col. 172 *et seq.*

⁶ CXI, II, 3, p. 786 *et seq.*

⁷ CCIV, *Introd.*

the *Cibrus* (Tzibriza), a tributary of the Danube, as line of demarcation between them. The former comprised the old Dardania and the riverside zone of the Triballi; the latter, that *ripa Thraciæ* which had originally been entrusted to the king of Thrace. The boundary by which it was separated from the province of Thrace is not clear and seems, in the course of time, to have receded towards the south. *Nicopolis ad Istrum* (near Tirnovo), founded about 115 in memory of the Dacian war, when Thrace had been finally freed from her official and hierarchical connexion with Mœsia, was at first a town of Thrace, but from the reign of Commodus, or at latest in 198, it was included in Mœsia. This movement of the frontier cannot have been more than a slight adjustment; it would be determined, not by the mountain chain of *Hæmus* (the Balkans), but rather by the distinction of tongues, Greek being spoken in Thrace and Latin in Mœsia.¹

Roman culture, propagated by the army, made its way along the Danube and did not spread very far from the banks of the river: there alone do we find any Mœsian towns worthy of mention. A Celtic town, judging by its name *Singidunum*, arose on the site of Belgrade, and became first a *municipium*, later a *colonia* and the headquarters of a legion; *Viminacium* (Kostolatch) had a similar history. When the troops in Mœsia had to be reinforced, new garrison towns arose, generally near the river confluences: *Ratiaria* (Archar),² *Æscus* (Gigen), *Novæ* (Sistova); the *canabæ* fulfilled their function, notably at *Durostorum* (Silistria).³ Was Mommsen right in supposing⁴ that the angle formed by the Danube below Silistria was at first excluded from the Empire? The series of excavations in the Dobrudja⁵ has raised doubts on the subject; at any rate another legionary camp was soon established at *Troesmis* (Iglitza), near Galatz, a little below the last bend of the river.

Imperial works in Mœsia date from the Antonines: it was in their time especially that the roads were made and the principal thoroughfare, skirting the right bank of the

¹ G. Seure, *Revue archéologique*, 1907, II, p. 257-276.

² **XIX**, I (1898), *Beiblatt*, col. 149.

³ V. Parvan, *Rivista di filologia*, 1924, p. 307-340.

⁴ **CLXII**, IX, p. 289.

⁵ Parvan, *Ausonia*, X (1921); H. Grégoire, *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, IV (1925), p. 317-331.

Danube, was brought to completion. This highway had been confronted by an extraordinary obstacle at the Iron Gates, over which Trajan had triumphed *montibus excisis, anconibus sublatis*;¹ from Viminacium and Ratiaria two branches converged upon *Naïssus* (Nisch),² and, still further on, two roads at right angles to it led towards Thrace.

The legions of Mœsia had a footing on the right bank, east of the *Alutus* (Oltu), and the governor of the Lower province extended his authority to *Tyras* (Akkermann), north of the mouths of the river, and even to the towns of the Euxine as far as the Crimea,³ where, from the first century, the garrison troops were *vexillationes* from Mœsia, afterwards from Cappadocia. Finally, a strip of territory on both banks of the lower Tisia was included in Mœsia.

But the third century was disastrous for these countries. In 235 the wave of Gothic invaders deprived the Empire of the possessions of Lower Mœsia beyond the Danube, and even south of the river all seemed lost, when Claudius II saved the situation by his great victory at Nisch (268).⁴ Aurelian, a Mœsian by birth, took the necessary measures and, by a series of counter attacks beyond the Dobrudja, guaranteed the security of the frontier. Constantine easily repelled the new attempts of these plunderers. Meanwhile, Diocletian had divided Upper Mœsia, called *Prima*, in two, the eastern part forming the province of Dardania, while the Dobrudja became Scythia Minor.

VI.

DACIA

When, after Trajan's successes,⁵ the province of Dacia was constituted, it would at once be thought that the provinces of Mœsia no longer formed a first line of defence along the whole extent of their frontier. As a matter of fact, the Romans did not immediately decide to occupy the whole of the left bank of the Danube; opposite Mœsia, from one

¹ **XLI**, III, 1699, 8267.

² For the roads of Serbia see **XIX**, III (1900), *Beiblatt*, col. 104-178; IV (1901), *Beiblatt*, col. 73-162.

³ Rostowzew, **XXIII**, II (1902), p. 80-95.

⁴ Homo, *De Claudio Gothico*, p. 49-59.

⁵ See above, p. 60.

end to the other, there was nothing but an alluvial plain which offered no dominant position of any kind, and it was hard to see where the boundary of the covering zone should be drawn. On the eastern side it was merged in the boundless steppe. Transylvania at any rate provided a sort of great natural redoubt or "shield" which it seemed wise to occupy, if only to prevent its inhabitants from periodically threatening the Empire's borders; but this vast recess was already occupied, no longer by its original holders, but by people of Thracian origin, the Dacians, who had invaded it and thereby freed themselves from the former overlordship of a brother people, the Getæ, now restricted to the lowlands of Wallachia and Moldavia.¹

In its present state, however, it could only serve as a stronghold for brigands; the task before Rome was to take possession of it methodically² and unite it with the other provinces. The researches of Tocilescu³ have thrown light on many details, showing for example that the works of fortification in Dacia were not all subsequent to Trajan. Before his time, in order to mark off the Dacian territory from the districts of Wallachia in which Rome had already staked out some claims, a great *vallum*, consisting of a ditch and an earthwork 3 metres high, ran from west to east, starting from the Danube south of Turnu-Severin, passing Craïova and Ploïesti, and ending at Tufesti, south of Braila (the modern names serve as landmarks), thus skirting the base of the mountain's last spurs. A second, shorter and further south, only covered in the main the arc of a circle which the Danube describes between its tributaries the Argesiu and the Oltu. This was known as the *limes Danubianus*.

We can hardly doubt its antiquity, for its western portion would have served no useful purpose from the day when the *limes Alutanus*, parallel to the *Aluta* (Oltu), linked the river barrier with the Carpathian range. This was a wall of earth, 2 metres in width and 3 in height, surmounted by a battle-mented rampart, which extended for 235 kilometres east of the Oltu, being supported at a short distance by a series of *castella* and watch towers. Its construction dates, not from Trajan, nor even from Hadrian, who merely distributed

¹ Brandis, **XLVII**, IV, col. 1948 *et seq.*; **CCX**, p. 12 *et seq.*

² **CCX**, p. 179 *et seq.*

³ **CCVII**.

small garrisons on the banks of the Oltu, but from Septimius Severus, who had to face a much graver situation than that of the previous century. Strategic roads, bordering the river and the *limes*, maintained communications between the various camps, which were occupied by auxiliaries.

It is hard to trace the lines of defence in the north-west and the north. Perhaps the mountain ridges were sufficient there; and yet a portion of a *vallum* has been discovered, running southward from *Porolissum*, and a series of ramparts furrowed the plain parallel to the Tisza, about a hundred kilometres east of its banks; here and there they were intersected by roads leading towards the Danube.¹ We know still less of the fosse that was carried eastward to end near the mouth of the Dniester on the Euxine coast.

In order to fill the gaps caused by the war and to spread the Latin spirit all the more quickly through the land, the Romans adopted the exceptional procedure of introducing a great number of colonists simultaneously,² who were crowded almost everywhere, but especially in the Greek districts of the Thracio-Illyrian peninsula. Miners were brought from Dalmatia and soldiers from the Celtic countries, and Trajan transplanted into the new province 12,000 Dacian families from the still independent regions at the foot of the Carpathians. Finally, a number of Italians were attracted there by the gold mines, and the diverse elements of the population were united by mixed marriages.

Trajan had created two Dacias, Upper and Lower, whose boundary we cannot determine. Then Marcus Aurelius, at the beginning of his reign, increased the number to three, whose relative position at any rate is known to us: in the north *Porolissensis*, from the name of its chief town *Porolissum* (near Mojgrad); next *Apulensis*, whose chief town *Apulum*, still marked by important mines at Karlsburg, was a *colonia*, a junction of roads, and the headquarters of a legion; in the south *Malvensis* (western Wallachia). The ancient royal city of the Dacians, *Sarmizegetusa*³ (Varhély), remained the common capital, but it had been reinvigorated since Trajan's time by the establishment of a colony. Connected

¹ Finally, *Archæol. Ertesítő*, 1903, p. 164 *et seq.*

² *CCXXI*, p. 59 *et seq.*

³ Vulitch, *XLVII*, IIa, col. 25-27.

by roads with Viminacium in Mœsia and with Apulum, as well as with *Drobeta* (Turnu-Severin), an old *municipium* of the Flavians, whence it communicated with the other bank of the Danube by means of the stone bridge which Trajan built there, Sarmizegetusa became a very prosperous city and a centre of religious life; several *mithræa* bear witness to its relations with other parts of the Empire. It raised a monument¹ to record its gratitude to Marcus Aurelius, who had banished the danger of the Marcomanni far from its gates. Some emperors accepted from it the title of *duovir*, causing their place to be taken by *præpositi*. The extent of the ruins and the frequent mention of slaves and freedmen suggest that it lived a busy economic life, as indeed did most of the towns of Dacia. Three procurators were responsible for the collection of the taxes.

Colonization² was confined almost entirely to the banks of the rivers: the Oltu, the Maros (*Marisus*), the Szamos and their tributaries. The native masses were finally dominated, though we should not go so far as to say that assimilation took place; the same epigraphical texts describe Apulum, the most populous city, as at once a *municipium* and a *colonia*. The Latin language was spread by the army and by the rise of corporations, for it was the idiom adopted by the burial societies, the mutual aid societies, and the syndicates of watermen (*utricularii*), who transported the wealth of the country—salt, iron and marble. The Dacian kings had begun to exploit the gold, and the Roman State continued to do so under the system of farming. The roads were principally used for military purposes; they linked together not only the *auxilia*, but the numerous *vexillationes* drawn from the legion *XIII Gemina*, for detachments were posted almost everywhere on guard. The period immediately following the conquest was much the most peaceful, although Hadrian had to repel an attack by the Sarmatians and the Roxolani. We can hardly credit the assertion of later writers that this emperor had thoughts of abandoning Dacia; we are rather inclined to attribute to him the digging of the fosse between the Carpathians and the Dniester.

Under Marcus Aurelius the situation became critical. M. Claudius Fronto, leading the combined armies of Mœsia

¹ XLI, III, 7969.

² CCXXI, p. 73 *et seq.*

and Dacia,¹ was defeated and killed by the Quadi and the Marcomanni; the emperor himself intervened and drove the enemy back. Septimius Severus strengthened the fortresses and increased the number of camps; to him the ancient Drobeta² owes its present name, Turnu-Severin or tower of Severus. On the site of *Romula*, the modern Caracal also recalls, though rather vaguely, the activity of Caracalla. Thenceforward the insecurity of Dacia became chronic;³ Maximin, Decius, Gallienus, Aurelian successively acquired the title of *Dacicus*; and this was because, outside the conquered territory, some Dacians remained free, though their liberty was incomplete, since in some of the centres of population in their country a census was held⁴ with a view to raising taxes. Their efforts to free themselves from this partial subjection gave rise to the operations conducted against them. This also accounts for the fact that some Latin inscriptions have been found outside the province, together with legionary bricks that bear witness to the permanent establishment rather than the transit of Roman contingents.

The two Philips lost a part of Dacia, which Decius had to reconquer. They acquired the surname of *Carpicus* for having repulsed the Carpi—an enemy of secondary importance in comparison with the Goths. The small successes won at the latter's expense by Gordian, Decius and Gallienus, and the great victory of Claudius II by no means abated their menace, and as these barbarians aimed rather at the regions south of the Danube than at Dacia, which they skirted, the occupation of that province uselessly absorbed troops when the Empire was short of them. Hence Aurelian frankly adopted the policy of evacuation, though perhaps after a reconquest subsequent to the abandonment which some authors ascribe to Gallienus.⁵ Aurelian desired to make a retreat in good order: he withdrew from Dacia "the army and the provincials."⁶ Roumanian scholars suppose⁷ that only the rich men went with the army, their property

¹ Premenstein, **XXIII**, XII (1912), p. 145.

² Patsch, **XLVII**, V, col. 1710.

³ **CCX**, p. 192 *et seq.* ⁴ **XLI**, III, 827.

⁵ N. Vulitch, **XXVIII**, XXVII (1923), p. 253 *et seq.*

⁶ Vopisc., *Aur.*, 39; **CCXXV**, p. 313-321.

⁷ **CCXXI**, p. 100 *et seq.*; **CCX**, p. 195.

being compromised by the departure of the garrisons, whereas the poor men—obscure colonists and veterans—being detached henceforward from any Roman organization, found it more difficult to leave the country and incurred less risk by remaining. As they were without culture, no inscription has been found subsequent to these events.

By a sort of verbal hypocrisy or out of respect for Trajan, Aurelian kept the name of Dacia as if it implied, not a territory henceforward abandoned, but a fugitive population, which he transported across the Danube and settled between the two Mœsias, themselves sufficiently depopulated; its new dwelling place constituted a *Dacia Ripensis* and a *Dacia Mediterranea*.¹ It has been maintained that the renunciation of Roman "Transylvania" was not even official, that the barbarians occupied the recently evacuated camps as allies, that both banks of the Danube continued to be imperial territory, and that the inhabitants of northern Dacia formed an autonomous "Romania."² However that may be, the length of the occupation has very little interest for modern Roumanians; more essential is the persistence of a Roman element which handed on without interruption to the following generations the precious trust committed to it in the second century of our era;³ it was the work of Trajan that obtained, a few years since, its final consummation.

At first sight we should have expected to find a more abundant and more detailed supply of information concerning these vast Danubian countries. The conditions of local life, in particular, are almost entirely unknown to us.⁴ The period of occupation was too short in countries that had been too recently opened up and were too constantly laid waste. It must have been a hard task to maintain the unity of each province, and we cannot hope to ascertain the part played by the provincial assemblies,⁵ since hardly a trace of

¹ B. Filow, **XXIII**, XII (1912), p. 234-239.

² N. Jorga, **XV**, 1924, p. 66.

³ For the theories on this subject see **CXXXIV**, p. 316, note 3; Jorga, *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, III (1924), p. 35-50.

⁴ See only **XCX bis**, p. 216-232.

⁵ Kornemann, **XLVII**, IV, col. 807 *et seq.*

one remains. The *concilium Daciarum trium* met at Sarmizegetusa; but there is no reference to any in Noricum and Rætia, while, as regards Dalmatia and the two Pannonias we have vague memories of imperial altars and priests who made sacrifices on them, doubtless in presence of the delegates from the towns. It must be admitted, however, that archæological explorations have only just begun, and it is from them that some light may at last reach us.

CHAPTER XII

THE LATIN PROVINCES OF AFRICA

I

EXTENT OF THE ROMAN DOMINION;¹ LOCAL WARS

It was just at the date which serves as starting point for this book (146 B.C.) that the Republic for the first time set foot in this land with intent to remain there. After the destruction of Carthage it was necessary to stay in Africa in order to prevent the vanquished competitor from rising again under a new name with a population derived from the neighbouring towns; but the government of the day judged it sufficient to occupy a narrow strip of territory equivalent to about one third of our Tunis, i.e. the north-eastern part of it, which is still the most populous and the best situated from a political point of view. Occupation of this territory meant the exclusion of other peoples and the preservation of Italy. Like the French under Louis-Philippe, the Romans did not at once conceive the idea of extending their conquest any further; the fosse of Scipio was symbolical of this wise moderation, marking off the Roman territory on the west and on the south between *Thabraca* (Tabarca) and *Thenæ* (Henchir-Tina)² opposite the islands of Karkena. This district was called quite simply *Africa*: a "somewhat pretentious" name and "full of menace," according to Boissière;³ though, on the other hand, it might imply that this was the only piece of land which Rome proposed to annex in Africa. The capital was *Utica* (Bu Schater), rewarded by this title—as well as by an increase in its territory—for having made its submission to Rome in advance. All of the former domain of Carthage that was not included in this zone and had been subdued by the recent exploits of Massinissa was left to that king, who had been an ally of the Republic

¹ CLVII, map and chap. III. ² LXXIV, p. x. ³ LXVII, p. 182.

in the late events and now became one of those "instruments of servitude"¹ through whom Rome was wise enough to defend her new acquisitions at the least expense.

The province of *Africa* was very little increased as a result of the war with Jugurtha (106); it merely seems to have exercised a sort of disguised protectorate over the coastal towns bordering on the Syrtes, which was exchanged for annexation (46) when Cæsar had triumphed over the Pompeians. But in another direction the dictator took a much more decisive step: he carried the northern frontier from Thabraca to the *Ampsaga* (Wad-el-Kebir), and the original province, now called *Africa Vetus*, was bordered from the north-west to the south-east by a very wide strip of territory called officially *Africa Nova*, but more often *Numidia* in current speech, being in fact the richest part of the ancient Numidian kingdom. Still further west than the Ampsaga a new littoral zone, extending as far as the Wad Sahel and formerly granted to Bocchus, was annexed to *Africa Nova* in the year 41. But, generally speaking, all the country west of the Ampsaga formed the kingdom of Mauretania, nominally independent, but really administered by Roman prefects after the death of Bocchus in 33. In the year 25 Augustus confirmed this fiction of an autonomous State by assigning it to Juba II, one of the most romanized of the natives. Juba's son, Ptolemy, was strangled at Rome by the order of Caligula: according to Dio Cassius² it was the wealth of this unfortunate prince that the imperial monster coveted—not merely his private possessions, we may suppose, but his states as well; nevertheless, if Mauretania then became a province, it was not organized as a province until the reign of Claudius (42).

By this time the whole of North Africa was Roman territory, subject to limitations that we shall note in due course. At any rate the Empire had extended its dominion along the coast to a point opposite the southernmost promontory of Spain, and had even occupied an important area on the shores of the Atlantic. No external enemy remained in sight; some advances might be made into the interior, but no other changes affected Roman Africa until the Vandal conquest in 430. Its recovery a century later by Belisarius

¹ Tac., *Agric.*, 14.

² LIX, 25.

and the Byzantine administration after Justinian, although inspired by the great examples of former times, do not fall within our period.

The last step taken before Claudius, which had important consequences, was more cruel than daring: all this process of piecemeal annexation seems remarkably cautious when we compare it with the gradual, though much less gradual, formation of French North Africa.¹ The Romans took twice as long, although they had no Moslem fanaticism to conquer and no other power to bar their progress, whereas France will sooner triumph over the local opposition in Morocco than over the jealousy of other European States. On the other hand Rome had been occupied by other ambitions and by long civil wars on three continents at once.



MAP X.—THE PROVINCES OF AFRICA.

Thus there was no diplomatic problem to embarrass her operations in Africa, but in order to establish her power there she had to undertake a whole series of campaigns. First of all, in the reign of Augustus, the country was in a permanent state of war, to which the writers of a much later period make but scanty allusions. Among the insurgent tribes they mention especially the Gætulians, a name which generally denotes the inhabitants of the high plateaus and of the Saharan regions, who were no doubt akin to the Musulamians of Byzacium and the Garamantes who lived near the Syrtian sands. They seem to have been moved by nothing more than the instinct of plunder, which

¹ R. Cagnat, *A travers le monde romain*, Paris, 1912, p. 259 et seq.

² LXXIV, p. 3-99.

impelled them each year to make sudden incursions, followed by a rapid retreat at the first repulse. With the help of Juba, some Roman generals at last gained a victory which would have been decisive but for the chance appearance (17) of an energetic chieftain, Tacfarinas, whose prestige among all the natives was very great.¹

This Numidian, a deserter from the *auxilia*, knew how to recruit, organize and animate with his own zeal those nomad bands, and, further, how to attract to his standard the Moorish tribes on the borders of the province. But his head was turned by the delight of leading an army, and he was rash enough to accept an offer of battle in the open country, where he was defeated by the proconsul, Furius Camillus. Nevertheless the vanquished leader made his escape, returned to the desert, reorganized his forces and, adopting new tactics, made assaults on isolated stations. Sometimes he was successful, but on other occasions he failed, for the siege of fortified positions was beyond his power. This he perceived, and, changing his tactics once more, he followed the example of Jugurtha, increased the number of his forays, struck unexpected blows at many positions simultaneously, and withdrew at once if things began to go ill. But the booty that he won proved at last an encumbrance, and the Romans too accustomed their troops to a war of surprises: a flying column did such good service that the barbarian had to retire once more to the sands of the desert, where he felt himself to be beyond pursuit. In the year 21 he suddenly gave signs of life again; his envoys demanded concessions of territory from Tiberius on pain of "endless war"—in fact their claims were precisely those which the Empire was destined to concede so readily to the frontier peoples three centuries afterwards. But the times were not yet accomplished, and Tiberius organized a strenuous resistance. The army was divided into several corps, and small forts were built in every position of importance, which broke the assault of the Numidians and compelled them to retreat after suffering heavy losses. Their repeated checks made the emperor too confident, and he reduced the number of the troops at the moment when, owing to the weakness of Juba's son, the Moors revolted and brought strong reinforcements

¹ L. Cantarelli, VI, III (1901), p. 3 *et seq.*

to Tacfarinas. All Africa was in danger, from the Syrtes to beyond the pillars of Hercules. Fortunately the Numidian allowed himself to be surprised by the skilful Dolabella; his army was cut to pieces and he himself was punished with death, after having been a source of grave danger to the Roman occupation for seven consecutive years (17-24).

One consequence of these sudden changes of fortune was the occupation of the southern territories which had been left outside the province: a series of landmarks discovered in South Tunis proves that a great survey of those districts was undertaken as a preliminary to the collection of tribute.¹ A revolt of the Moors, who used the murder of Ptolemy as a pretext, taught the soldiers all the hardships of a campaign in a parched and torrid land, but its issue was favourable for Rome. Some other occasional revolts were made in the succeeding reigns, but by the time of Domitian the Gætulians had been repelled, or included (under supervision) among the possessions of the Empire, which was to be indebted to them for colonists, not to speak of auxiliary forces. The Garamantes and Nasamones had been chastened in Tripolis, and it was chiefly in the west that the successors of Hadrian would have to intervene henceforward.

The Moors remained unsubdued, and the forces opposed to them were inadequate; Antoninus Pius had to send reinforcements, especially of cavalry. The result was the occupation of the *Mons Aurasius*,² at whose foot only the legion of *Lambæsis* had been encamped hitherto. Then in our meagre sources we find references to new wars under Marcus Aurelius and Commodus against these same Moors, who had even ventured to invade Bætica.³ As time went on, the insurrections became more serious: under Maximin the peasants were provoked by the exactions of a procurator, and this revolt broke out at the beginning of the short reign of Gordian I.⁴ Thereafter the incursions of armed bands became periodic; many tribes were involved in them, and they were not mere raids for plunder. They were repressed as a matter of course, but the repression always had to begin afresh.

¹ J. Toutain, **XXVI**, XII (1907), p. 341 *et seq.*

² Ém. Masqueray, *De Aurasio Monte*, Lut., 1886.

³ **CLXII**, XI, p. 277.

⁴ For the insurrection of 253, cf. J. Carcopino, *Revue africaine*, 1919, p. 369-383.

On the threshold of the fourth century matters were complicated by the emergence of a new source of trouble. The country was disturbed by religious quarrels, and these were all the more violent because the emperors no longer observed in such matters the becoming neutrality of earlier Cæsars. Personal quarrels also occurred, like that between a petty Mauretanian king called Firmus and a high Roman official: the loyalty of the Africans to the former prolonged the conflict, but a cleverly instigated defection brought it to an end. Soon afterwards a military commander revolted and swore allegiance to the Eastern Empire, in order to escape the supervision of any nearer authority—a sad prospect for Rome who derived her sustenance from the African corn supply. Nevertheless the tie had to be severed thirty years later, when a court intrigue gave occasion for the Vandals to make their triumphant entry upon the scene.

All these episodes, which were often tediously protracted, make a dull and obscure story; they show that during the four centuries of occupation some of the natives were so indomitable that real peace was never completely established everywhere. Let us now see what were the boundaries of this Roman Africa taken as a whole. To the east it was terminated by the great desert of sand which, beyond Tripolis, reaches almost to the shore of the Greater Syrtis; the southern frontier gradually moved further into the interior with the progress of colonization.

The time is approaching when, thanks to the inscriptions and the small forts of the *limes*, which will all have been explored, we shall be able to trace the precise line of each successive frontier. In the region which corresponds to the modern Libya, the government of the first emperors was content with a few serviceable harbours surrounded by a narrow belt of suburban territory. Starting from Cades, there were at first no settlers north of the great Shott-el-Fedjidj; then the frontier extended northward through Gafsa and Tebessa, practically following that of our Tunis, and turned to the west, leaving the mountain masses to the south. When it reached the middle course of the Sheliff, it ran beside it at a short distance from the sea, to which it gradually drew nearer, until, after having crossed the Muluya, it ended at an old Phœnician trading station whose site is now occupied

by Melilla. The Rif was not regarded in practice as a part of any province, but some towns were distributed along the most favourable part of the Atlantic coast, from Tangier to Sallee, and even in the interior a few bold settlements had been made beside the watercourses.¹ Outside the Roman dominion were left not only Saharan Morocco and central Atlas, the region of the high plateaus, but even positions which are today occupied by towns of the first rank, Casablanca, Mogadore, Agadir and Marakesh. In short, except for the bulk of Tunis and a considerable portion of our department of Constantine, the whole area of occupation formed a sort of shaft tapering towards the Ocean, and this has not varied in the course of the ages. Marked progress was made towards the south from almost every point along the frontier; it was continued throughout the first third of the third century, and even Doucen, the southernmost point of Numidia, 40 kilometres south-west of Biskra, was occupied and fortified by Gordian III.² It has been shown that the posts were somewhat thinly distributed along the south side of the cliff which dominates the plains of the interior. In the great angle described above, a wide *détour* was made in the middle only of our department of Algiers, in order to round a district of Shotts and the valley of the Wad-Touil, after which the frontier proceeded towards Melilla almost in a straight line from east to west, generally following the northern slope of the high plateaus. As regards Morocco, our knowledge is still very slight; but a beginning has been made south of Rabat in the exploration of the *limes* of Tingitana.³

There were also a few advance posts of observation in front of the *limes* on the south side, especially in the mountainous region of the Aulad-Naïl; but they were nowhere so deeply buried in the heart of the desert as in Tripolis,⁴ where permanent garrisons were encamped at Bonjem, Gharia and Ghadames.⁵

¹ LVIII; CLXXXVIII; CXXXVI, I.

² J. Carcopino, XXXII, XXV (1923), p. 33-48; Id., *Revue archéologique*, 1924, II, p. 316-325, and XXXVII, VI (1925), p. 30-57 and 118-149.

³ Rouland-Mareschal, XV, 1924, p. 155.

⁴ R. Cagnat, *La Frontière militaire de la Tripolitaine à l'époque romaine* [XXV, XXXIX (1912), p. 77-109]; LXXIV, p. 524-568.

⁵ XLI, VIII, 10990.

Here was an enterprise that could not be achieved in a hurry. In this Libyan sector and in Tunis it could be brought to completion, but in Algeria more time was undoubtedly needed to secure the plateaux of the interior. Moreover there was a shortage of troops: the *fossatum* that was finally dug and the increased number of small forts prolonged the occupation until the fifth century; but during the last two centuries it had been necessary to keep within the shelter of these defensive works.

II

THE PROVINCES OF AFRICA

This long chain of territories was no more subject to a single administration than it is today, but the Roman divisions were by no means identical with those of our time. Moreover, neither the former nor the latter had any clear connexion with geographical conditions; everything was determined by historical circumstances.

The Carthaginian civilization had already done its work in the region which is now Tunis; it had actually colonized a considerable part of it; commerce and agriculture prospered there even before the coming of the Romans; and, although there were still some hostile barbarians left at a distance from the sea, they were among the first to be reduced to subjection. Similar conditions were found in the neighbouring districts of what is now Algeria, so that the whole of *Africa Proconsularis* had been pacified and there was no risk in assigning it to a civil governor. The number of the inhabitants was very large, and most of them were intent upon their work, without indulging in any dreams of independence.

The boundaries of this province began, on the western side, a little beyond *Hippo Regius* (Bona), including within it *Calama* (Gelma), Tipasa, and probably also Tebessa, at least from the end of the first century. On the south the frontier was marked by the lines of stations of which we shall have to speak later. Tripolis was attached to the Proconsular province because, in the vast stretch of sands, too few positions could be occupied to justify a separate administration.

The governor lived at Carthage, which indeed possessed a sort of moral supremacy over all the territories dealt with in this chapter.

Next, towards the west, came *Numidia*, whose western frontier was coincident with the Wad-el-Kebir for the whole length of its lower valley, after which it turned westward—so that *Cuicul* (Djemila) was in Numidia and *Sitifs* (Setif) in Mauretania—skirted the Shott-el-Hodna, reached as far as the Zahrez-Shergui, and finally turned southward in the direction of El Aghuat. This was less a province than a military command, under the legate of the third legion, who merely received in addition the title of proprætor and was appointed by the emperor himself, often for a period of several years. In practice *Africa* was separated from *Numidia* under Caligula; till then there had been a curious violation of the principle which, since Augustus, had forbidden the subordination of a military commander to a proconsul. Yet, even after the year 41, Numidia continued to be regarded fictitiously as a dependency of the Proconsular province; the distinction between them did not become official until the end of the second century, although for 150 years the proprætor had been directly responsible to the emperor as administrator and judge. The residence of the governor of Numidia—and also its capital—was the headquarters of the legion, fixed first at Ammædara,¹ then, from the reign of Vespasian, at Tebessa,² much further east, and finally, after Trajan, at *Lambæsis* (Lambesa);³ its *vevillationes* were stationed at various points on the *limes*, even in Tripolis. Thus Numidia was a province unique in its kind, whose governor had military powers outside his administrative district and civil powers, although a legate, in the completely pacified northern section, where however the town of *Cirta* (Constantine), the ancient capital of the Numidian kings, as well as its far humbler neighbours, enjoyed a large measure of autonomy, which softened this administrative paradox. All this brings home to us the extreme flexibility of the Roman *régime*.

¹ De Pachtère, **XV**, 1916, p. 273-284.

² **LXXV**, p. 127-155.

³ *Ibid.* (pictures of the camp), p. 44 and 48; cf. p. 50; Cagnat, *Les deux camps de la légion III Augusta à Lambèse*, **XXV**, XXXVIII, I (1908), p. 219-277.

Further west came a lengthy province corresponding on the whole to the northern section of our departments of Algiers and Oran, since it extended as far as the mouth of the *Malva* (Muluya), i.e. the part of Mauretania called *Cæsariensis* after the name of its capital *Cæsarea* (Shershel). Here the products of the soil were inferior to those of the two preceding territories and were moreover less quickly and zealously exploited. An imperial procurator seemed quite an adequate representative of Roman sovereignty there, and had this further advantage, namely that he could be left in office for a long time. The same system was finally extended to *Mauretania Tingitana*, a district entirely included within modern Morocco and having its capital at *Tingis* (Tangier).¹

We may be quite sure that in this subdivision and variety of combinations there was no political plan or hidden purpose of dividing in order to govern more easily and prevent the growth of a national spirit, which Islam alone was destined to call into being at a later period. With each new annexation of territory Rome created new machinery of government, in accordance with her administrative needs at the moment and the hopes which she founded on the exploitation of the country.

The reform of Diocletian, born of suspicion and jealousy, had of course its usual effect of subdivision and separation in Africa. The new Proconsular province, or *Zeugitana*, included only one third of its predecessor (of which it retained the capital, Carthage); from it were detached *Tripolitana* and *Byzacium* (South Tunis), with *Hadrumetum* for capital. Until Constantine, there was a *Numidia Militiana*, with its centre at Lambesa; but, from the reign of that emperor, the former Numidia recovered its unity, and the capital, Cirta, took the name of Constantine, which it has retained ever since. Mauretania *Cæsariensis* was split in two, and the western part formed a distinct province, *Sitifensis*, so called from the name of its capital *Sitifis* (Setif). On the other hand, Tingitana, which had originally been conquered in order to protect the Spains, was officially attached to that group of provinces—the only innovation inspired by a logical idea.

¹ L. Chatelain, *Bulletin de l'École des Hautes-Études marocaines*, I (1920), p. 153-163.

III

LOCAL LIFE

North Africa was no more for Rome than it is for France what the economists call a colony for immigrants; moreover, at the time when it began to be thoroughly exploited, Italy was suffering, like France today, from an acute depression in the birth-rate. As a matter of fact, however, most of the colonists of Tunis have come from Italy, just as the Spaniards have immigrated further west. To take the place of this



MAP XI.—PROCONSULAR AFRICA AND NUMIDIA.

twofold supply of immigrants there were in antiquity Roman citizens of recent creation, natives of some other province, who had been promoted to the *civitas* as a reward for their military services. In this sense only can we agree with Boissier¹ that there must have been many Romans in Africa. He himself, while admitting the impossibility of estimating their number, recognizes that the Roman names in inscriptions do not all refer to Romans by birth; some epigraphical texts even expressly attribute a native descent to men who bear the *tria nomina*. Mixed marriages certainly contributed to

¹ LXVI, p. 315 et seq.

the abundance of imperial citizens, and this partial assimilation was favoured by the fact that no profound national hatred and no marked religious antipathy existed between the Africans and the masters of their country.

The cities of Africa were so numerous that it would be tedious to give a list of them. In Tunis alone, there were no fewer than thirty-five colonies or municipalities¹ in the valley of the Majerda and its tributaries, and fourteen in the valley of the Wad Miliana, though it is true that many of them acquired neither status until the time of the Severi. There are few countries where more of the ancient names have been preserved, and they were left almost unchanged by the Arabian language: *Thuburbo Minus* survives in Teburba, *Thubursicum Bure* in Tebursuk, *Thugga* in Dugga,² *Thibar* in Thibar, *Simitthu* in Schemtu, *Uthina* in Udna, and this is omitting places of comparative insignificance. The towns were clustered along the shore; only *Thabraca* (Tabarca) was isolated; but starting from *Hippo Diarrhytus* (Bizerta), which had the initial advantage of its magnificent roadstead, the names are crowded on the map: we would recall especially *Hadrumentum* (Susa), *Tacapæ* (Gabes), and, in Tripolis, *Æa* (Tripoli)³ and *Leptis Magna* (Lebda). In the interior all southern Tunis and even the Kroumiria district, near the northern coast, contained a very much smaller number of cities. In the south the long mountain chain of Zeugitana, running from south-west to north-east, with its peaks 4,000 to 5,000 feet high, once the territory of the *Musulamii*,⁴ was colonized immediately after the Antonines; Neptune, god of the waters, even fresh waters, was worshipped there for the springs which he had caused to rise, and by the sources of the streams which cleft the mountain mass were formed the towns of *Mactaris* (Maktar), *Ammædara* (Haidra), *Aquæ Regiæ*, *Cillium* (Kasrin), *Sufes* (Henchir Sbiba), *Sufetula* (Sbitla)—towns widely separated from one another, but some of them surrounded by a sort of suburban district of no small extent. Beyond them, towards the Shotts, there was an expanse of steppe, only cultivated by the natives and

¹ CCVIII, Appendix; CLVII, p. 91 *et seq.*

² R. Cagnat, XX, 1914, p. 473-484.

³ G. Costa, VI, XIV (1912), p. 1-40; CXXXVI, II.

⁴ J. Toutain, XXVII, LVII (1898), p. 271-294; Dr. L. Carton, *Les Musulamii*, Tunis [1925].

chiefly overrun by nomads. As regards the region of the Syrtes, which adjoined this on the eastern side, ruins of agricultural settlements are abundant in it, but they are all of native origin; the names of these places recorded in the Itineraries have nothing Roman about them.

Northern Numidia possessed a town of considerable size in *Cirta* (Constantine),¹ which had been from an early period a resort of Italian traders. During the civil wars it was assigned to the adventurer Sittius and his family, and from Cæsar's time it had taken rank as a Roman colony. Augustus associated it with *Rusicade* (Philippeville), *Chullu* (Kollo) and *Mileu* (Mila) in a "Confederation of the IV Colonies," in which *Cirta* held the first place and exercised authority over various *castella* or embryo communes, not to speak of numerous *pagi*. The confederation was dissolved at the end of the third century at latest, and certain *pagi* were promoted to the rank of *municipia*. Throughout this country the Roman forms of administration were constantly spreading, and *municipia* or *coloniæ* gradually replaced the native "republics." There were 12 towns at the end of the first century, 26 under the last of the Antonines, 37 at the end of the third century, and 45 at the coming of the Vandals—fewer than in Tunis, but many more than in Mauretania.² The *Saltus Aurasius* was much less satisfactorily broken up: despite the proximity of Lambesa and *Thamugadi* (Timghad), it was always one of the chief centres of resistance of the local spirit, and most of the legionaries who retired there were merely Africans with a superficial veneer of Roman civilization.³

The region of the Shotts, to the south of the Sitifian district, was given up to agriculture of the native kind. To the north of it the civilizing influence of the Romans was more felt, principally in the colony of *Sitifis* (Setif), and it was left without a rival after Hadrian had created a vast imperial domain there at the expense of a Numidian tribe; but the proximity of the rebel nomads of the Biban range and of the Kabylia made its security doubtful, and in the third century the number of *castella* and watch towers had to be increased. The Berber nomenclature, which is promi-

¹ CLXIII, V, p. 470-492.

² CLVII, p. 110.

³ Graillot and Gsell, XXIV, XIII (1893), p. 472.

ment in the records of epigraphy, shows that Roman civilization in this district was very limited. The whole country of the Kabylia is strewn with ruins, the remnants of old military stations which, near the mouths of the dangerous passes, provided quarters for the troops who policed the country.

In Mauretania Cæsariensis, always in danger of raids by the independent tribes, against whom villages and farms had to be defended by works of fortification, Roman settlements were only made along two lines—one by the coast, including Cæsarea,¹ Tipasa² and *Rusguniæ* (a little east of Algiers), the other following the lower valley of the Sheliff, where only insignificant centres were to be found, completely surrounded by small forts which guarded the lines of approach to them. To the south the whole Warsenis area was excluded from the sphere of Roman activity, which did not extend beyond a few military precautions; only in the western part of it some vast domains were formed in the fourth century, protected by the stations of the *limes* and by the scattered redoubts, many of which show traces of having been destroyed by fire.

All the department of Oran was similar in character; its Roman settlements were unimportant and very scattered, except for the garrisons and their fortified quarters. Here inscriptions become rare, and we are dependent on the *Historia Augusta* which records many skirmishes with the recalcitrant natives; some of these Moorish tribes are specified by Ammianus Marcellinus, but they were all alike.³ Their chiefs had to admit the presence of a delegate of the Roman government called the *præfectus gentis*, corresponding to the “chef de bureau arabe” appointed by France in the nineteenth century; his duty was to exercise a general supervision and, if possible, raise recruits for the *auxilia*. The *gentiles* or subject Moors recognized only their *princeps*, but he was supervised by the *præfectus*. As the imperial power declined, the bond of vassalage grew steadily weaker; there was no more talk of subjects, but of allied peoples, and these considered themselves to be hired servants of the Empire, which experienced considerable difficulty in paying them regularly.

¹ St. Gsell, *Promenades archéologiques aux environs d'Alger*, Paris, 1926, I.

² *Ibid.*, II.

³ CLVII, p. 157 *et seq.*

There remains Morocco or Tingitana, and we shall be better informed about this region when the excavations that were later beginning have attained the requisite scope. Besides the *oppida* on the coast, there were a few *municipia* in the interior, notably Volubilis, which from the extent and imposing appearance of its ruins seems to have been a remarkable exception. Apparently in Tingitana the Roman supremacy, except perhaps on the coast, became a mere pretence after the invasions which took place in Diocletian's reign.

We are very ill informed as regards the mode of government of those *gentes*¹ to which we have just referred, but we catch glimpses of a very rudimentary organization, especially among the nomad shepherds. As regards the *civitates*, certain distinctions have to be made. Pliny reckoned 516 in the provinces of Africa, but many of these must have been of the native type, for in his day the work of assimilation had made very little progress. If epigraphy enabled us to draw up complete statistics, we should prove that under the Lower Empire a much larger proportion of towns was really organized on Roman lines; progress in this direction became marked from the time of the Severi.

In this matter, however, we must remember that Rome was not obliged to start *ab initio*.² Carthage had already favoured the municipal system and included some 300 towns among her possessions; we hear of a great number taken and occupied during the expeditions of Agathocles, Regulus, Scipio and Cæsar. The Greeks also had played their part, but, being too scattered, they had not been able to establish any truly Hellenic centre; yet the natives were used to them, and Greek culture seemed at first much less strange than Latin culture.

It is freely repeated³ that the municipal institutions were closely analogous from one end of the Empire to the other, but it would be a mistake to exaggerate this idea, especially where Africa is concerned. Rome lacked the levelling temperament; she proceeded with great caution and flexibility, taking account of established facts and customs. Some towns retained under the Republic a Phœnician or-

¹ CLXII, XI, p. 292 *et seq.*

³ For example, LXVI, p. 194.

² CLXXXIII, p. 249 *et seq.*

ganization, which was not replaced by the *jus Italicum* until Cæsar's time;¹ while there was one city, Carthage, whose ruin and extinction were regarded as a sacred duty, her very name having become a symbol of hatred. And yet her site was such an advantageous one that, just twenty-three years after her demolition, the solemn vows forbidding her resurrection were forgotten, a Latin colony was sent there under the leadership of C. Gracchus and the protection of Juno Cælestis, and the ancient Phœnician Tanit was re-established under a new name. But the *colonia Junonia*, more Punic than Roman, acquired no distinction and was governed by suffetes as in the days of independence. Perhaps it was to end this state of affairs that Cæsar resolved to send a second batch of colonists there, chiefly veterans, in the year 44 B.C.² At first enlarged rather than transformed, it became the centre of an extensive territory containing 83 very small communities, whose administration passed under its control; it appointed their duumvirs, but they chose their own ædiles. These communities were called sometimes *castella*, sometimes *pagi*, and Cæsar surrounded them with a regular girdle of colonies. Many were still subject to Carthage at the beginning of the third century; for instance, in spite of its remoteness, Thugga on the bank of the Ampsaga, where a curious dual system was long maintained: by the side of a *pagus Thuggensis*, created by Claudius, there was a *civitas Thugga*, created by Hadrian; under Marcus Aurelius *utraque pars civitatis* acted in concert, but each had a separate assembly and distinct magistracies. Finally Septimius Severus combined them as a single Roman city.

Pagus did not mean the same thing everywhere. The territory of Cirta, which also was considerable in extent, comprised a good number of *pagi*, more than one of which seems to have retained an organization dating from the Numidian period. Each one had its *magistri*, its perpetual flamen, and its body of senators. Besides, there were such things as *civitates stipendiariæ in pago*. The various types were legion, and it will suffice for us to have given a few examples; we should have discovered much more about

¹ CLXII, XI, p. 285, 288.

² LIV, p. 45; Kornemann, *Die Cäsarische Kolonie Carthago*, XXX, LX (1901), p. 402-426; LXXV, p. 13-33.

them if epigraphy had not, as a general rule, omitted all mention of the native communities, precisely those which must have shown the most diversity.

In one particular they conformed to the rule established everywhere else, namely in the supremacy of the rich. Africans of wealthy or moderately wealthy families served as municipal officials in hereditary succession, and those who had been particularly noticed by the higher authorities were even promoted to the service of the State, either in their native province or in another. In any case they remained attached to their family home, protected its interests, and bestowed their generosity upon it. Such men truly worked for the romanization of Africa, since it was in their interest to secure it.

It was for them and for the few Romans of Italian descent in these lands that cults were imported, especially that of the Capitoline Triad, for, strangely enough, no other part of the Empire except Italy raised so many temples dedicated to Jupiter, Juno and Minerva in conjunction.¹ But this worship had a purely official character: the natives were not offended by it; they even showed themselves profoundly indifferent to the names of deities,² and they may sometimes have given their masters a mistaken impression of their feelings when they approached a Latin idol. But those which they preferred, even when they bore a Latin name, were essentially Punic in character, and showed traces of Egyptian influence.³ Moreover, their rites had taken a remarkably firm hold upon them; the extreme conservatism of the Berbers in this respect is shown especially in their burial customs. Before, during and after the Roman occupation, these peoples remained loyal to the practices of the Stone Age and continued to use its implements—cut flints and flat axes of polished stone. They still constructed megalithic tombs, suggestive of the menhir, in the form of a cylindrical oven covered by a broad flag-stone, and ethnologists have noted these survivals as late as the nineteenth century.

¹ LXXV, p. 76-87.

² Cf. the *Dii Mauri*, e.g. those of the springs; LXXIV, p. 353 *et seq.*; p. 771 for the apparent assimilation.

³ LXXVII, I, p. 437-442.

Thus the worship of the Cæsars must have been more half-hearted in Africa than in other provinces. Yet the upper classes at any rate made a show of revering the sacred character of the imperial dignity, since it was from their ranks that the towns chose their delegates to attend the provincial assemblies.¹ These provided an opportunity for them to express their desires or their grievances, and thus the natives were given an indirect share in the administration. In the military sphere they played a more important part.

IV

THE ARMY²

We have seen³ that there was only one legion in Africa, *III Augusta*, which proved sufficient with an average strength of 5,500 men reinforced by a very large number of auxiliaries. From the second century at least it was composed mostly of Africans, some of them the sons of citizens, but most of them becoming citizens on enlistment. Its soldiers were very widely distributed among the various garrisons of Numidia, principally in the south; a cohort of 500 men was stationed at Carthage as the proconsul's escort, its *personnel* being changed every year by rotation, as we know from the speech which Hadrian made to the troops of Africa on his tour of inspection—a speech of which several very important fragments have come down to us.⁴ The legion very rarely served in distant lands, so that it was marked far more than others by local characteristics. It was distinguished among all the rest by the number and variety of the works which it performed, works of a purely civil character as well as those which are now assigned to the corps of engineers; the towns, especially Lambesa, were indebted to it for their architects and for the construction of their public buildings.

As regards the *auxilia*, about 6,000 men were raised in Numidia and about 15,000 in Mauretania. There were few *alæ* of cavalry and few infantry cohorts, preference being given to *cohortes equitatae*, mixed corps, which were especially

¹ Pallu de Lessert, *Bulletin des antiquités africaines*, II (1884), p. 5-67, 321-344.

² LXXIV, p. 104.

³ Above, p. 393.

⁴ LXXIV, p. 146 *et seq.*

valuable against opponents who had to be sometimes pursued at full speed and sometimes held in check, if they decided to attack. At first these auxiliaries were Asiatics, Britons, Corsicans, Dalmatians, Spaniards, Gauls, Pannonians, Parthians, Sardinians and Thracians, but from the middle of the second century, though keeping the same names, the corps were composed almost exclusively of Africans; new auxiliaries were termed quite frankly Moors, Numidians or Musulamii. Later on, some Syrians were included among them.¹

Sometimes the natives furnished irregular troops very similar to the French Algerian contingents. On occasion they were even employed outside Africa, as in the case of those Moorish horsemen whose exploits in Dacia are recorded on Trajan's column.

Omitting these last contingents and also the urban cohort at Carthage (not to be confused with the detachment of the third legion that was also stationed there), we arrive at an approximate total of 27,000 men: a modest establishment, far smaller than that of France today; but Rome had not to reckon with Islam and did not occupy so large an area as the French protectorate. Moreover, she clearly relied on certain methods of persuasion: the Berbers who had been romanized—by service in the army—set a striking example, in virtue of their privileges, to those of their kinsmen who were still recalcitrant. Finally, the work of fortification seems to have contributed as it no longer does in our day to the attainment of peace and security, seeing that there was a number of fortified farms, although we have no ground for supposing that their occupants had the right to bear arms.² The fortresses of the state were distributed especially along the *limes*, whose system of defence is still imperfectly understood for the period before Diocletian,³ while our sources for the history of the Lower Empire give us no information about it, apart from dull lists of names and the mention of a *fossatum* under Honorius.⁴

French Africa derives profit from the merchant service, but piracy has disappeared, whereas it was rampant during

¹ XXXVII, VI (1925), p. 118-149.

² *Ibid.*, p. 270 *et seq.*; 687 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 680 *et seq.*

⁴ *Cod. Theod.*, VII, 15, 1.

the whole of the Roman period and even after it; the peoples of the Rif in particular, who are now so formidable on land, spread terror in those days off their coast as well. A division of the fleets of Syria and Egypt was detached to deal with them, having its base at Cæsarea, where the traces of a large ancient harbour have been brought to light.¹

V

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS²

In every detail of the Roman policy in Africa we can perceive a deliberate effort to avoid shocking or offending the native, to win his favour by granting privileges to those who best deserved them. This plan was compatible with an economic development of the country by methods which, while adding to the wealth of the Empire, increased the prosperity of the population. The maintenance of order, the introduction of better implements, the development of roads and navigation were sources of enrichment for all alike, except the unruly element whose only aim was rebellion.

We must recognize the fact, however, that here again Rome was not required to lay her own foundations; the Carthaginians had not belied their Phœnician blood. Though less skilful artists, perhaps, than their Asiatic ancestors, they had inherited their genius for commerce and acted, so to speak, as middlemen between the various countries bordering on the western Mediterranean. Everywhere they had applied themselves zealously to the cultivation of the soil, and agricultural experts of their race, like the long famous Mago, had brought certain kinds of husbandry to perfection. Thus Carthage and its territory had come to be self-sufficing without the aid of imports from abroad; cereals, vines, olives, fruits and vegetables provided the natives with the necessary means of subsistence. This prosperity impressed the kings of Numidia, who drew inspiration from the methods employed in Carthaginian territory and converted many of the nomads into agricultural labourers, without detriment, however, to

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 275-284.

² **CLXII**, XI, p. 295 *et seq.*; **L**, p. 23 *et seq.*; **LXXXIII**, p. 132-148; **CXC bis**, p. 274-293.

the breeding industry which supplied such admirable mounts for cavalry.

But the Romans did more than continue the work of others. In the first place trade followed new lines: there were no more sea-carriers monopolizing the great highways of commerce; it was with Italy henceforward that Africa had her most constant dealings, and they were profitable dealings, for Italy imported far more from her new subjects than she dreamed of exporting to them. Her requirements immediately determined the course of economic development in Africa.¹ As bread eaters who were poorly supplied with corn, the Italians imported it from various provinces, and North Africa was for them before all else a land of harvests. Barley sufficed for the humble folk of the country—the same, no doubt, as was given to the horses; but wheat was very plentiful, especially in that southern region of the Proconsular province, from which marvellous pasture is derived today. Many of the *frumentationes* at Rome, distributions made to the rabble of the capital to secure the emperors' popularity, consisted of African wheat. Often too the tawny beasts of Atlas provided an attraction at the games of the Coliseum.

Under the Antonines other products began to be grown, which still in our own day make the fortune of the Maghreb: at this moment olive gardens are plentiful in South Tunis and on the border of Tripoli, but they were already well established then in these districts, as well as on the sea coast of Mauretania Cæsariensis. If Tingitana was restricted to the cultivation of cereals, the vineyards elsewhere acquired an importance which has not diminished. As for the mines, chiefly of iron, they gave rise to an industry of secondary importance which was limited by the small extent of the seams.

The brilliant results of agriculture in Africa were a benefit due to Rome, not only because of the inestimable value of the Italian demand for corn, but because of the extensive hydraulic works achieved by Roman engineers.² It seems to be well established now that the climate of North Africa was practically the same then as it is today,³ subject only

¹ R. Cagnat, *L'Année d'Afrique*, XXV, XL (1916), p. 247-277.

² Cf. P. Gauckler, *Enquête sur les installations hydrauliques romaines en Tunisie*, Tunis, 1897-1912; CXVI, I, p. 260 *et seq.*

³ St. Gsell, *Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*, Paris, I (1913), chap. III.

to the possible consequences of that deforestation which, here as in Asia, followed the Arab invasion. In any case agriculture suffered no more than it does in the twentieth century from insufficient moisture. There is no lack of water in North Africa; but it needs to be distributed; for if the land in some places is too dry, in others it is reduced to a quagmire. Even the Carthaginians had undertaken this necessary work, but their dominion covered especially those regions in which the water supply was best distributed. The Romans, pushing further south and becoming masters also of Numidia and Mauretania, showed a praiseworthy zeal in irrigating those countries; they encouraged the springs to rise, built dams in the valleys to regulate the flow of the rivers, dug canals and ditches in the plains, sunk wells and cisterns in the scattered villas, and conducted a supply of water to the cities by means of their aqueducts. Here again, as the inscriptions show, the army supplied invaluable labour. As regards the utilization of the water, the rights and duties of river-side residents, it is probable that the engineers profited by the long experience of these matters which had been acquired by the specialists in the Nile valley. A detailed list of regulations, discovered in the region of Batna,¹ is comparable to the orders made for the same purpose at Rome and Lyons. All this admirable work has been allowed to perish in Africa through the traditional Moslem indolence.

These provinces, like the other countries of the Empire, were made use of in a variety of ways. The humble peasants who cultivated their own property under the Carthaginian *régime* were not expropriated by their Latin masters, though they had to pay a land-tax, from which Carthage was not likely to have exempted them. Further, the government acquired through the conquest certain domain lands, which were afterwards increased by confiscation; and on these it established a new kind of small-holder by assigning allotments to veterans. These settlements brought under cultivation some neglected districts in the south of Proconsular Africa and still more in Numidia, as well as in the several Mauretanias. But the plague of *latifundia*² was not slow to spread

¹ **XLI**, VIII, 4440.

² **CLXII**, XI, p. 291; **LXVI**, p. 152 *et seq.*; **CLXXXIII**, p. 319 *et seq.*; Schulten, *Die römischen Grundherrschaften*, Weimar, 1896, p. 28 *et seq.*; Kornemann, **XLVII**, Suppl. IV, col. 249 *et seq.* For pictures of great fortified villas in the mosaics see **CXC bis**, pl. LVIII, i; **LIX**, ii.

through the country. If we may believe Pliny, six men already owned half of Africa in the time of Nero. There were not enough colonists to cultivate all the *ager publicus*; a considerable part of it was soon acquired by the *nobilitas* at a small or even fictitious rent. Most of these large domains passed gradually into the possession of the emperors, but they often kept the names of their first owners, although the emperor had received them either as a testamentary bequest, or in consequence of a more or less lawful condemnation. The *saltus*, as they were called, were excluded from the municipal organization and handed over to companies of farmers,¹ who were responsible to the owner. The latter resided in Italy and did not even visit his domains. Each company was practically independent of slave labour; as a rule it sublet small allotments to colonists, who had nothing but the name in common with the veterans of Cæsar and Augustus, but were true serfs of the soil, inheriting their plots of ground and paying proportional rents for them. There was an official scale of charges, and the governor saw that it was adhered to. This engrossing task of supervision would alone suffice to account for the title of *procurator* which was given to the governors of the Mauretaniae. Abuses were inevitable, either on the part of the *conductores* or of the procurator himself, and therefore we see the colonists forming associations for mutual aid and protection; the petition of the labourers on the *saltus Burunitanus*² is particularly instructive, for it shows us the remarkable fact that, in a district where the great majority of inhabitants were natives, some Roman citizens were included among the petitioners.

These poor colonists lived in cottages resembling the huts of today, grouped in hamlets which together constituted the farm with all its dependencies. Such assemblages merely degenerated into *latifundia*, the exploitation of poverty, so that agricultural life was very far from leading in all cases to the creation of villages.³

¹ J. Carcopino, **XXIV**, **XXVI** (1906), p. 365-461, and **XXXII**, **XXIV** (1922), p. 13-36; cf. Tenney Frank, *American Journal of Philology*, **XLVII** (1926), p. 55-73, 153-170.

² **XLI**, **VIII**, 10570; **CLXIII**, **III**, p. 153-176.

³ **L**, p. 34 *et seq.*

VI

ROMAN MONUMENTS¹

If he lived on his land (which he rarely did) or frequently visited it (which happened more often), the first task of the well-to-do owner was to erect a great villa,² composed of fashionable buildings arranged about a large courtyard; if necessary, he gave his steward a lodging in it. The same type of dwelling was occupied by the principal farmer of an estate, or the agent placed in charge of an imperial domain. Villas of this kind are depicted in very beautiful mosaics,³ found in the country itself, which portray the life of the "country gentleman," whose house sometimes adjoined the farm buildings properly so called and sometimes stood at a distance from them. It had special apartments, bath-rooms, a park and an orchard, pigeon-lofts and aviaries, and sometimes studs where horses were bred for the circus. The "lady of the manor" also appears in these pictures reclining in the shade.

As regards the small independent farmers, they were rarely content to live, as in Europe today, in isolated dwellings. Their homes were in towns which, judging from the extent of their ruins, must have held a considerable population and occupied a position of medium importance comparable to that of the big French sub-prefectures. There the farmers felt more secure and, since from the third century the number of Roman citizens was so largely increased, their improved status obliged them to follow the Roman fashion or, in other words, to live an urban life.

This accounts for the extraordinary number of cities of the Latin type whose remains, little disturbed by Moslem indolence, still exist in Algeria and Tunis, and are becoming better known to us every day as a result of excavations. Those on the coast are less open to investigation than the others; the water has encroached upon the land or altered the nature of the soil or brought down alluvial deposits, and the harbours still in use have required new buildings which involved the destruction of the old ones. We can form a much clearer picture of the inland towns, such as Dugga,

¹ CXVI. ² XLIII, art. *Villa*. ³ LXXVII, II, p. 149-152.

Announa, Timgahad, Lambesa, Djemila,¹ Gighti,² Althiburus.³ There we find a striking contrast between the private houses, which were poor and mean (with occasional exceptions, for the local aristocracy demanded a somewhat higher standard of comfort), and the public buildings, which were the pride not only of the community, but of each individual citizen: forums,⁴ baths,⁵ basilicas, temples, various places of entertainment, theatres⁶ and amphitheatres, even works of mere ostentation like the monumental gateways and triumphal arches,⁷ extravagances which closely relate the towns of Africa to those of Italy.

VII

ROMANIZATION

These monuments suggest to the superficial observer that Africa was completely romanized. There is no doubt that a style of architecture of the most authentic imperial type was widely distributed there; even the tombs, or at any rate the most luxurious among them, are executed in this uniform style imported from Italy. But it is precisely this rigorous conformity to the models of the capital which best reveals the artificial character of an urban civilization due to a narrow class—the only class which Rome troubled to bring within her orbit and attach to her interests. Very little thought was given to the masses, so long as they understood the material advantages to be gained by loyal submission.

It is obvious that the Latin language was widely spread in Africa, but it is important that neither the significance nor the consequences of this fact should be exaggerated; its establishment there was comparatively late and must have been largely due to Christianity. When the sister of Septimius Severus, a native of Leptis in Tripolitana, came to visit him in Rome, she disgraced him by her ignorance of Latin. Those who had learnt it did not speak it very purely:

¹ LXXV, p. 111-120.

² L. A. Constans, *Gightis* (Notes et documents publiés par la Direction des Antiquités et des Arts), Paris, 1916.

³ A. Merlin, *Forum et maisons d'Althiburos* (*Ibid.*), Paris, 1913.

⁴ LXXV, p. 61-75.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 94-98.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88-94.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53-59.

Apuleius, a native of Madaura, feared when he reached the capital that his speech would reveal his origin. This detail is more significant than the extremely incorrect wording of the epitaphs of humble folk, which were not composed by professional men of letters like Apuleius, but by artisans whose trade brought them into connexion with all kinds of people and compelled them to be more or less polyglot; similar cases may still be found today. Nevertheless Latin was compulsory in the law courts, the municipal assemblies and the army, through which so many natives passed. That was enough to bring about the establishment of schools where the universal language was taught and often carried far beyond the rudiments. Some of these, especially at Carthage, Cirta and Madaura, must have been very like the Italian schools; literary history was taught in them by the reading of famous authors, not to speak of that rhetoric which extended its evil influence throughout the Empire. The towns took a pride in their scholars, set up statues of them and carved a record of their successes on the stone. And yet the literature¹ of this country would have been negligible without the aid of Christianity, which promoted Africa to the first rank:² the most stubborn and vigorous of the apologists and polemical writers were born there. Unfortunately it is impossible to determine whether they were of native or Latin descent, but it seems hard to resist the conclusion that more than one of them was an assimilated Berber.

Even in the last days of the occupation, the Roman language had by no means eliminated earlier dialects: Carthaginian was still spoken, and what was called "Libyan" remained the current speech of the nomads.³ On the other hand, the stationary part of the population readily acquired the language of the people who dominated them politically; they adopted Carthaginian and Latin in succession, just as they were to adopt Arabic later on. This race possessed "a medley of contrary qualities which no other people has combined to the same extent: it seemed to surrender, yet did not

¹ CLXII, XI, p. 301 *et seq.*

² H. Leclercq, *L'Afrique chrétienne*, Paris, 1914; P. Monceaux, *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne*, Paris, 1901-1923 (7 vols.).

³ CLXII, XI, p. 280 *et seq.*

completely yield; it adapted itself to foreign ways of life, yet at bottom retained its own; in a word, it showed little resistance but much persistence."¹ It readily accepted from Rome certain practices conducive to greater comfort, as well as the tendency to form associations, which was illustrated by the religious or professional colleges and, on a still larger scale, by the city; the positive, realistic instinct of the race prompted it to follow such examples.

But in order that these should produce their full effect, it was essential that the *pax romana* should seem to be firmly established.² From the third century, however, a wave of anarchy and insecurity swept over the whole Empire, whereas to African eyes all prestige seemed to rest upon a display of irresistible strength. A serious consequence followed, which can hardly be matched in any other province; the romanized Berbers felt their loyalty wavering and began to dream of independence; they clearly perceived that the army was steadily becoming less Roman and more barbarian. The native chiefs who rebelled against the central authority had no ambition, like the other rebels of whom we have spoken, to become emperors at Rome; their aim was to carve out an independent kingdom for themselves; they had lost belief in the permanence of the Empire and strove to break it up.

This separation was also promoted by religious quarrels.³ From the beginning of the fourth century the romanized population of Africa was cleft in two by the Donatist schism, and hatred between the orthodox and their opponents became more and more intense. Poverty also began to disunite the rural population: bands of insurgent colonists, stirred up by the Donatists, wandered through the country, gaining the name of *circumcelliones* because they prowled about the farms (*circum cellas*), laid ambushes, robbed, destroyed and even massacred, making the life of the quiet folk so intolerable that they finally renounced it and left the fields deserted. If there had been at that moment any barbarian State sufficiently powerful to take advantage of the circumstances, the severance of Africa from the Empire would not have been delayed until the year 430.

¹ LXVI, p. 359; cf. CLXII, XI, p. 250 *et seq.*

² LXXIV, p. 772 *et seq.*

³ Leclercq, *op. cit.*, I, chap. IV; J. Mesnage, *Le Christianisme en Afrique, Origines*, Paris, 1915.

The Vandals, who established themselves there at that date, did not show any special leaning towards the Roman civilization which their kings even affected to adopt: they were interested in nothing but plunder. But, for that reason, they fixed their choice on the wealthiest regions where cities were most abundant, and disdained the interior,¹ whose inhabitants, left to themselves, gradually relapsed into savagery. So too the rule of Justinian, which is called Byzantine, though it followed the Roman model, exercised little influence over the high plateaus and the districts bordering on the Sahara; its many strong fortresses did not save it from succumbing, after less than two centuries, to the attacks of the Saracens.

Thus the receptivity of the Berbers, their apparent willingness to acquire a veneer of European culture, should not be misinterpreted. The capital introduced many ephemeral things into Africa, but not those elements of population by which alone its influence and spirit could have been permanently established there. The ruins which cover the country are the perfect symbol of an artificial work that had no future.

¹ E. Albertini, **XV**, 1925, p. 261 *et seq.*

CONCLUSION

SUCH, according to the evidence of archæology and history, was this vast and composite¹ Empire which has so profoundly impressed the imagination of mankind. Even the barbarian invaders were fascinated by it, and for centuries its mere title was regarded as that of a State divinely appointed and endowed with perennial life. By a strange fiction which took no account of probabilities, it was in central Europe, whence the authority of the Cæsars was most violently assaulted, that the *Kaiser*, who inherited their name, maintained until 1806 the obsolete phantom of the Roman Empire.

It is easy to explain why the conventional attitude of admiration persisted so long in spite of the advance of knowledge and the labour of criticism; but how much has been achieved in this sphere by the work of historical reconstruction, and what may reasonably be expected from it in the future, is a harder question. It cannot be denied that many of the details in our picture of the *Orbis Romanus* are gradually becoming clearer; and yet it is doubtful whether any section of it will ever be revealed to us in its true nature. Our sources, whether books, inscriptions or works of art, bring to light especially those characteristics which the various provinces shared in common; it is much more difficult to grasp the dissimilarities which existed in the lower strata of the population but remained unexpressed and therefore can only be surmised. To sum up, there has nowhere been any lack of archæological research, and a general inventory of its discoveries in each province, which must of necessity be a provisional one, has either been published already or is in process of formation. Chance finds or the data supplied by excavation have revealed or corrected numbers of minor points, and this kind of reconstruction has a boundless prospect before it; but it does not seem likely that any great

¹ On the medley of peoples in the Empire cf. Tenney Frank, *American Historical Review*, XXI (1916), p. 689-716, CVI, pp. 565 *et seq.*

revelations will now be made, or that new solutions will be found for the fundamental problems which must be examined in conclusion.

Is it reasonable to be so much impressed by the union of all these different countries under a single head? Old authors are never tired of expatiating on the miraculous power of organization displayed in it. We shall not deny that the little city on the Palatine showed remarkable prowess in extending its sway over the surrounding country, in gaining the dominion of all Italy, and in breaking the power of Carthage; also the subjection of Macedonia was an enterprise that involved grave difficulties; but everything accomplished after that first period, from the date at which the present book begins, seems small in comparison.

A strong centralized State with firmly established and revered institutions, whose soldiers are citizens or have been promised citizenship in the future, and are trained in accordance with an approved science of war, sets out to attack some new country. What does she find to oppose her? In the East she finds citizens content with an appearance of freedom and long since become indifferent to the name of their ruler; in the West, tribes and clans at enmity with their neighbours, or sometimes a raging mob which presents no danger to any but small forces. Success might be delayed more or less, according to the number of troops employed, but it was generally inevitable.

An attractive thesis¹ blames the Romans for having yielded to the attraction of the Greek Orient instead of immediately devoting all their energies to the barbarian world, in which they would have found scope for the fulfilment of their true mission. Shall we venture to find fault with them because they deliberately chose the easier task first? The continent of Asia offered temptations which can easily be explained: decaying kingdoms invited invasion, and Rome even displayed a certain politic hesitation before she annexed them. Sometimes kings made the Roman people their heirs—whether spontaneously or in return for bribes

¹ L. Homo, *Primitive Italy*, etc., p. 416 *et seq.*

matters little; the populations submitted to a change of masters without much opposition. Italy, says the accuser, allowed herself to be dazzled by the treasure of the Orient. But wealth is an instrument of dominion; distant expeditions were costly, and Rome would have found it difficult to embark on them if these "sinews of war" had not been guaranteed in advance. Would the soldiers so devoted to a Marius, a Pompey or a Cæsar have followed blindly and even in defiance of the law the general who led them to new conquests, without those largesses that were rendered possible by the plunder of the rich and industrious Orient? If the first attack had been made on Gaul, for instance, what spoil would there have been to distribute among soldiers who set out with the hope of finding plunder? Would the wretched huts of turf and brushwood have sufficed, in which the half-naked peasants lived their simple life; or even the chariots and weapons of the nobility, which differed little from those of the Romans?

Not only was the West poorer, but Rome learnt from her first contact with them that its inhabitants would offer a fierce and stubborn resistance. The idea of fatherland, attached to a small strip of territory, did not suggest to their minds any doubtful franchise symbolized by state-institutions, but the independence of the land and of its occupants. The slow and difficult conquest of Iberia shows clearly enough why Rome had set foot in a land as distant as Palestine before she had even protected the northern frontiers of Italy by establishing a military district beyond the Alps. It was not until the imperial epoch that she ventured to supply this deficiency, and then she experienced some shocks there. By that time, however, she had attained her full strength and was bound to have the last word; but even so she found it necessary, willy nilly, to set a limit to her ambitions.

Those ambitions were often acquired unwittingly by the ruling powers, and of this fact we have other examples. In very recent history we can find striking cases of "responsibilities" becoming constantly heavier and leading to "controls" that were deemed indispensable. Similarly, when Rome annexed a new country, she considered it fair to the inhabitants and wise in her own interest to protect them by occupying a covering zone. Thus Gaul was covered by

Britain and was to have been covered, together with the regions of the Upper Danube, by Germany. Mauretania covered Spain and Numidia; Dacia was indispensable to the defence of Moesia; and the lack of a strong frontier line for northern Syria involved the slaughter of so many men on so many occasions in the hope of securing Mesopotamia—which would have required defence in its turn against the Iranian bastion. That Persian kingdom, whether subject to the Sassanid dynasty or to the Parthian, made an insufferable claim to equality with the Roman State and was often the aggressor; but when it looked in the direction of Armenia, it could fairly plead the same necessity of securing a firm bulwark of defence.

Thus every advance suggested or even demanded a new one. The ocean at any rate provided a sort of *terminus ad quem*—unless another shore was visible beyond it, for the Channel was treated like a mere river. As for the desert—another sea in virtue of its sands—the daring advances made southward from the African provinces show that it was not relied on absolutely. This insatiable desire for security was increased even by the weakness of the opposition. The further the Empire extended, the smaller and more contemptible did the enemy of the moment appear, and the Cæsars rarely had to vanquish a coalition; simultaneous attacks were hardly ever the result of an agreement between their enemies. In short, everything tended irresistibly towards universal dominion. Had it not been for the disaster of Varus and the constant disappointment on the banks of the Tigris, Rome would have penetrated, in two directions, ever more deeply into the void.

Why then did she find two lines of resistance insurmountable? Some explanation has already been given in the preceding chapters, but a recapitulation of the causes which led to the fall of the Empire will enable us to understand it better.

These were pointed out long ago, and the most recent studies¹ have only been able to accumulate proofs and illustrations;

¹ CIII; CCI; LXIV, p. 236-299; CXXXIV, p. 330-392; XVII, LXXXIV (1900), p. 1 *et seq.*; CXC *bis*, p. 478-487.

there was hardly a new document to add to the terrible list of indictments. The Empire gradually killed itself; decay was more rapid at the heart¹ than on the frontiers; and the result could not have been brought about in any other way, since it was the greatest power in the world, and could only die of its own inherent weaknesses.

From the very beginning Rome's purpose was to acquire wealth: at every period it was taken for granted that a small section of the population should hold the rest in subjection and make profit out of their labour and property. First the primitive *Urbs* looked down on its suburbs, then the enlarged city treated the peninsula as its inferior, and finally the latter had to occupy a position of privilege among the other countries of the Empire. Each conquest, regarded as a speculation, had to be achieved at the least possible cost, and therefore Rome carried the principle of economy to ridiculous lengths;² the great ease with which she subdued a degenerate Orient encouraged her to continue the use of similar methods, which in some cases were inadequate. All the military resources of the State were not concentrated on a single object, but various operations were carried on simultaneously, more than one of which might have been postponed. We shall avoid any comparison with the vast numbers engaged in the late European War, but the employment of small detachments was still the rule under the Empire, in spite of its immense resources. The largest numbers were assembled when two rival claimants disputed the supreme authority; great armies were employed in civil strife, but for wars abroad much smaller forces were deemed sufficient. Typical of these expeditions, ambitiously planned but half-heartedly carried out, was the invasion of Germany under Augustus. The same fault was committed each time an army was sent against Persia, whether for defence or attack. Thus the plans miscarried, though if they had succeeded they would only have given rise to further complications.

The underlying reasons why Rome was gradually stripped of her conquests were of a different order; we shall summarize

¹ Cf. L. Homo, *Les Institutions politiques romaines*, etc.

² Indeed it is on the small number of troops employed that Pais, **CLXXII**, p. 55-98, founds his theory of the defensive character of Roman imperialism.

in a few words what must be more fully dealt with elsewhere.¹

The right of peoples to dispose of themselves is a modern idea which never occurred to the mind of antiquity. It is not surprising therefore to note, at least among the more developed nations, a certain readiness to make submission, though this had for corollary an unstable allegiance, more resigned than enthusiastic, and a tendency to rely upon the sovereign power, which had to be present everywhere. The Empire was founded on the supremacy of the Latin race, which formed only a minute fraction of the total population. The right of Roman citizenship might be distributed with increasing liberality, but, outside some circles of the aristocracy, no provincials were completely assimilated; they respected the Empire and had no thought of wholesale defection,² but they never went so far as to feel a true devotion to it. No great general rebellion occurred in any province; but individual attempts at secession, the daring ventures of some ambitious leader, often experienced a wide measure of toleration, so long as they seemed likely to succeed. Moreover, each pretender posed as a champion of the Roman cause. The Cæsars were gods, but not by heredity; anyone who rose to power would become divine in his turn, and there was no mark by which he could be recognized in advance. The transmission of the title of Augustus was governed by no regular constitutional law; it was acquired by victory over rivals, and the Senate did no more than ratify the decision of arms. This ominous fact became apparent in the first century of the Principate, which was so far merely a continuance of the military dictatorship.

The population of Italy, as we have said, had another object than its own glorification in the dominion of the world; its object was to secure comfort, and this desire for an easy life with all the refinements of luxury had the same results then as it has today. Wealth decreases when it is shared: hence there was an instinctive or deliberate reduction in the birth-rate. At the end of the republican period Italy was suffering from an ever more marked decrease of population, and this continued to the end, in spite of all the measures taken to check

¹ In forthcoming volumes of this series.

² F. Haverfield, **XXII**, V (1915), p. 252 *et seq.*

it; the centre of the Empire, its brain and essential motive power, grew weaker. But the same evil gradually invaded all the provinces.¹ Then they too experienced what at first had chiefly wasted Italy: civil war not only kills men but devastates the land; and its effects were combined with those of a detestable economic system which must not be left unmentioned.

The city organization, from which Rome developed into a vast State, had given her the best equipment for imposing her supremacy (and besides it had been adopted in the Greek Orient from time immemorial). But it was not out of generosity or mere acquiescence that she promoted or tolerated local autonomy. It was not only the subjects who benefited by it; the central power found in it an administrative machinery ready mounted to carry out its wishes and subject the peoples to the burdens which it imposed upon them. Besides, the method lacked originality, since it was borrowed from the Hellenistic monarchies. Rome perceived its advantages, but not its fatal consequences, though they were already clearly visible. Thus the wealthy classes monopolized the magistracies and were responsible for recovery of the tax—a thankless task which grew constantly heavier, since the State became permanently insolvent on the day when all conquest ceased, and all plunder with it; the last great spoil was taken by Trajan in Dacia. We have already seen that, under the Lower Empire, municipal duties were shunned, the *curiæ* were left empty, and the State adopted the wretched expedient of assigning to each man his class and his department in it. Nothing was gained by this; the yield from taxation was insufficient, for the small proprietors had been impoverished by civil wars, invasions, brigandage and arbitrary taxation. We see some of them deliberately limiting their production (just as in Turkey some peasants cut down their olive trees rather than pay an excessively inflated tithe), others take refuge among the barbarians² or become clients of the senators, great land-owners who were *de facto* independent and refused to pay taxes.

The towns fared no better than the depopulated countryside; many of them fell into decay and more than one dis-

¹ CCI, I, chap. V.

² *Ibid.*, II, p. 295.

appeared altogether. The artisan class, which had been the cause of their prosperity, was ruined by the continual warfare and insecurity that hindered trade, by the debased coinage, by the decrease of private wealth and by its improper concentration in the hands of a few plutocrats. Other business was interrupted at the end of the third century by the building of ramparts round each city, though all this was only an imperfect form of protection. The walls generally engirdled not the whole of the city's territory, but a sort of redoubt of comparatively small extent; they checked the enemy, exasperated him, made him more savage in his attack on the open country, and thus increased the hostility, which had long been acute, between townsmen and countrymen, the latter being supported by the army which now derived all its recruits from them.¹

To sum up, there was grave discord between the social classes, and a sort of universal lassitude in the face of administrative anarchy; while finally the State was struck in its vital parts by the gradual transformation of what had been its chief support, namely the army, whose whole strength now lay in its barbarian element.

Whether we should regret this ruin of a system and an Empire depends on the answer to the following question: Had the subjection of so many countries to Rome been a blessing to them or not?

The reply is most often in the affirmative; but there are some harsh critics in whose words hatred of all imperialism finds expression.² That of the Romans seems to us to have been fatally insatiable: there was something mechanical about their foreign policy, and the government almost always allowed itself to be carried away by the circumstances of the moment.

¹ M. Rostovtzeff, **XXVIII**, **XXVII** (1923), p. 233-242; **CXC bis**, Preface.

² Among the first was the German philosopher Herder (*Rev. Arch.*, 1924, II, p. 249). Littré said: "Cæsar founded nothing but a decadence terminated by a catastrophe." Today, especially C. Jullian, **CXLII**, VI, *ad fin.*; Albert Grenier, *Les Gaulois*, Paris, 1923, Conclusion. Cf. also R. Von Poehlmann, *Aus Altertum und Gegenwart*, 2 Aufl., München, 1911, II, p. 262.

*Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento :
Hæ tibi erunt artes.*

AEN. IV, 851-2.

That axiom was older than Virgil. We need not examine the methods of conquest; Montesquieu¹ has passed judgment on them without prejudice or favour. It only remains for us to consider whether the subject nations received any compensation for their loss of liberty.

It is reasonable to allege² certain benefits derived by the subjects from measures taken for another purpose, i.e. with a view to conquering the world and making profit out of it. Roman roads, whether military or civil, created facilities previously unknown for travel and trade. Economic implements, which, it is true, had already reached a high level of efficiency in the oriental countries, were still further developed, and peoples who had hardly been touched by Hellenism were indebted to the Romans under this head for precious instructions which they themselves were content to transmit to others without further improvement. Certain public works on a very large scale, such as aqueducts, brought wealth to districts which had hitherto been wasted. The wide use of Roman money and of the Latin language in remotest markets was an aid to commerce, even though the first was of poor alloy and the second was abused from the beginning by doubtful stock-jobbers. Education reached at any rate the wealthy classes in many a country where ignorance had been universal;³ comfort and a show of luxury entered the new cities. Further it will be said that many provincials—almost all, in the long run—acquired Roman citizenship, but we must remember that they only had this privilege because they were subject to the Roman Empire.

But the supreme blessing, according to the Romans themselves—and the moderns habitually accept their statement—was the *Pax Romana*, widespread and beneficent, which covered all the countries subject to the same law. It is true that a reservation immediately has to be made: was this majestic peace the gift of the Republic? According to the

¹ *Grandeur et décadence des Romains*, chap. VI.

² CXXXIV, p. 296 et seq.; also *The Legacy of Rome*, edited by Cyril Bailey, Oxford, 1923.

³ CLXXII, p. 175-205.

received opinion it was a product of the Empire, caused or expedited to a large extent by the wretched condition of the provinces.

After all, what exactly was this peace? It can be conceived as existing between different States, between different groups, or within these.

Certainly, for the East in particular, the Hellenistic period was a time of bitter strife, since the great monarchies could not agree together; but did Rome spare her provincials the consequences of her wars with the peoples who felt themselves in danger? Did Italy bear the brunt of the war with Mithridates? Doubtless that "philhellene" king would have wished it to be so, and those whom he massacred were Italians; but he compromised the Greeks and provoked reprisals against them, and every campaign was fought in the East. Even under the Principate the central power was not always in time to prevent the inroads of nations beyond the frontier; more than once they swept over Asia Minor and North Syria. In the West the conditions were different: there were no States, in the proper sense of the word; yet barbarian confederacies were formed, chiefly at a later period, and the policy which they adopted towards Rome often strengthened the union of the provinces by the injury which it inflicted on them.

By the word "group" we mean, in the East, the city, in the West, the tribe or petty State. Here we should expect to find more remarkable and more useful results of Rome's activity. It is well known that in Gaul, and to a less extent perhaps in Spain, the tribes agreed ill together and were constantly fighting—an occupation which nevertheless gave them pleasure. After the annexation these practices came to an end; the new ideal of a life of peace grew up behind the shelter of the Rhine frontier, which was energetically defended. As for the Greek cities, we must not exaggerate the importance of their quarrels under the kings to whose overlordship they submitted; besides, they already had recourse to arbitration, which Rome favoured. But what helped to establish peaceful relations between the cities, and even that concord, *Homonoia*, to which their coins lay claim,¹ was the destruction of all public life in them; thenceforward

¹ Zwicker, XLVII, VIII, col. 2265 *et seq*

their only rivalry sprang from a stupid desire for external display, or for the pompous titles which Rome herself conferred as a reward for tokens of adulation.

Finally, the factious strife within each small group came to an end. In Gaul, in the time of Cæsar, the upper classes were constantly opposed by a popular party; and for centuries this had also been the curse of the Greek cities. But here again peace was a product of decadence: Rome abolished discord by imposing as a matter of principle the supremacy of the aristocratic party or, to speak more accurately, of the rich. Everywhere, in short, this degrading peace was merely a consequence of enslavement.¹

The masses had allowed themselves to be so far subjected because their main desire was to escape from the burdens which war imposed on the individual. From the end of the Republic the army was a mercenary one; recruits enlisted voluntarily to find a profession in it, and the State did not require the blood of those who refused. This general immunity would help to spread the impression that each man was left to pursue his own trade and assured of protection without contributing to it himself. Then, from another point of view, peace to the coward meant exemption from fighting, even for his country. The professional army may have been more or less adequate until the last of the Antonines, but no longer. How can we speak of a *pax Romana* after Commodus? Everywhere troops are coming and going, without intermission, to engage in civil or foreign wars. After the final collapse there could only be one peace—the peace that falls on ruined cities and devastated fields.

Sometimes a final complaint of a less material kind is added to those which we have discussed. It is the custom to extol Rome's work as a civilizing power, to maintain that she raised whole peoples from a condition closely akin to the state of nature, gave a settled habitation to nomads, developed urban life, and, within the new centres of population, encouraged social habits, education, a taste for luxuries and

¹ Cf. Clifford H. Moore, *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, XLVIII (1917), p. 27-36.

even for art. What is called romanization is an undeniable fact, so long as it is not exaggerated. The Latin speech replaced the old idioms, and the numerous Romance languages attest its victory. Buildings which we find in the heart of Africa prove the existence far from Italy of real Latin homes.

But wherever this culture struck root it was dearly paid for. By imposing her own ideas and usages, and the style of decoration in which her own life was lived, Rome finally destroyed the people's souls and nipped in the bud original civilizations which would have developed. The world never needed a uniform mould, a cosmopolitan human type, produced at the cost of intelligence, which could only yield commonplace results—as is proved conclusively by the example of Rome.

This criticism, made in connexion with Gaul,¹ to which it is peculiarly applicable, needs further consideration. We should ourselves be stern critics of the Roman culture if it had been imposed on the conquered peoples by other means than persuasion or free contact;² but as a matter of fact it took root quite freely wherever it appeared and, for all its plagiarisms and spiritual mediocrity, it was far superior to that of the primitive societies which received it. Hence it is that the Orient almost entirely escaped its influence.³ In provinces like the Mauretania and certain Danubian regions we ask ourselves whether there would have been any culture at all without it. In Spain, Gaul and Britain the case is different: some industries prospered there in obedience to the national instinct which, in spite of the conquerors' supremacy, never ceased to show itself in certain specifically native characteristics, like rare sparks shining among the ashes. It will be alleged that this Latin style in the provinces was only adopted by the native Romans who settled there, and by the rich provincials who were clients of the capital;⁴ but this objection carries little weight, for, if the artist is very often a man of humble birth, he has need of the rich to give him orders; his originality is compromised in advance when his wealthy patrons expect of him nothing but imitation.

¹ See above, p. 340.

² Harrer, *Classical Journal*, XIV (1918-1919), p. 550 *et seq.*

³ CXX.

⁴ M. Gelzer, *Das Römertum als Kulturmacht* (XVII, CXXVI [1922], p. 189-206.)

Must we then regret whatever of ancient Rome has become a part of our national life: administrative forms and methods, legal theories, private habits, and so on? That would be black ingratitude; but the Latin heritage, to a large extent wasted until the Renaissance, might have come to us from Italy alone, without having hindered progress in some directions for centuries.

Anyone who would take a side in this controversy is embarrassed by the difficulty of contrasting what has been with what might have been. Let us examine a concrete case. Rome extinguished the Celticism of Gaul, but did not touch that of Ireland. What has Ireland gained by this liberty? Her awakening was slow and did not begin until Christianity came to her. Under that influence—a Latin one—she developed a school of caligraphists and ornament makers who are said to have shown merit in a very inferior branch of art; in any case she had more reason to take pride in them than in her childish epic literature, an exclusively native product.

Finally, if northern barbarism could overwhelm the time-honoured culture of Rome, shall we not suppose that it could as easily have destroyed the native civilizations, which would have been less vigorous, since they were only beginning?

We see how many unknown quantities the problem contains.

The Roman Empire is an unforgettable example of purpose, energy, skill and perseverance, but also of insatiable ambition, which haggled over the means of its own achievement and soon ceased to rely upon the full discharge of civic duties. It passed through three phases of about the same length: in the first it made the kingdoms its prey and robbed their inhabitants; in the second it governed them reasonably and developed their economic resources with the subjects' help; in the third it gradually fell to pieces, though the end was delayed by the general disorder and by various expedients.

Admiration for the second phase too often makes us forget the other two; that at any rate creates the impression—imperfect but striking—of a work of value to humanity.

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
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
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MAP XII. THE ROMAN EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE P



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